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CHAPTER 1 
THE SMALL CLAIMS COURTS AS A RESEARCH SUBJECT AND ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
n his seminal article ‘The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice’ the famous American legal scholar, Roscoe Pound, writes that every legal system 
has been the subject of complaint.1 He notes that the popular lamentation is that there is one 
law for the rich and another for the poor.2 This is a poignant observation in the South African 
context because poverty levels are high on account of unemployment, lack of education and the 
dire state that the vast majority of rural people find themselves in.3 As the Nobel-winning 
economist, Joseph Stiglitz, has discovered, South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in 
the world.4 
The rule of law is in jeopardy if the majority of the people cannot afford to litigate matters in 
the courts.5 The persistent service delivery disputes, mass action in the townships, land grabs, 
and the state of lawlessness in the country are causes for concern.6 Much of this is attributable 
to the fact that ordinary people feel powerless. The law and the legal system seem to have failed 
them. They cannot afford legal representation. They are unable to understand court processes 
and procedures. For them, civil justice is a distant luxury.  
																																																								
1 Pound ‘The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice’ (1906) 40 American Law 
Review 729 at 731.  
2 Ibid. 
3 The youth unemployment rate for persons ages 15 to 24 is 52,4%, and the national unemployment rate is 26,7%. 
The Eastern Cape has an unemployment rate of 46%; Mpumalanga’s unemployment rate stands at 42,5% and the 
North West at 41,8%. These three provinces also have large rural communities. See Mkentane ‘Over 52% of SA’s 
youth jobless’ Business Report (16 May 2018).  
4 Stiglitz The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future 29. 
5 Cameron JA observed in Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government v 
Ngxuza 2001 (4) SA 1184 (SCA) para [1]: ‘The law is a scarce resource in South Africa ... justice is even harder 
to come by.’ 
6 Peter ‘Soweto’s Middle Class Rises Up’ City Press (14 May 2018). 
I 
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This thesis looks at the role of small claims courts in the South African legal landscape. It 
argues for the retention and reform of small claims courts. The study is pertinent given the 
State’s constitutional duty to advance access to justice for all.7 It is also relevant because the 
current legislation8 governing the small claims courts is dated and there is ample evidence to 
suggest that the courts are not functioning optimally.9  Because the small claims courts have 
huge potential to alleviate some of the challenges that poor and middle-income people face in 
terms of accessing justice, a critical study is not only timely, but essential given greater public 
demands for transformation in the public and private sectors.  
This introductory chapter covers two aspects. Part I discusses the research question of the thesis 
as well as the methodology for addressing the research question. Part II considers the relevance 
of small claims courts in the access to justice debate. 
PART I 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY  
1.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis identifies the challenges that South African small claims courts face. Some of the 
difficulties are inherent in the legislation governing the courts and to this extent, the legislation 
will be critically analysed so that concrete suggestions for reform be can made.10 Research 
reveals11 that even if the legislation is amended, this will not alleviate the practical problems 
that small claims courts and litigants face, because many of the difficulties arise from the way 
in which the courts are managed. To ‘re-engineer’ the courts, one must address logistical 
aspects affecting the courts. Consequently, a portion of this thesis looks at issues of 
																																																								
7 Constitution, s 34. 
8 See SCCA and the SCCRs. See list of abbreviations.  
9 See chapters 3. 
10 See chapters 4 to 10. 
11 See chapter 4.  
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management and considers issues affecting the appointment and retention of presiding officers, 
and the support given to them.12 
The aim and objective of this thesis are thus to engage with various aspects concerning small 
claims courts critically and to argue for reform. 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
This thesis, by and large, relies on a review of small claims courts literature. Extensive research 
was conducted to identify the day-to-day problems that the small claims courts face. 
Information was inter alia sourced from the Department of Justice, newspaper articles, letters 
written by members of the legal profession to professional publications, and reports. By 
identifying the logistical issues facing the courts, concrete suggestions for reform are made.   
For the legislative critique, this thesis relies on the common law, legislation, and academic 
opinion to advance reasons why the small claims court legislation is in need of reform. When 
making concrete suggestions for reform, comparative law is used. Because of divergent 
practices in different jurisdictions in the area of civil procedure, it was difficult to reconcile the 
positions in all jurisdictions. Consequently, this thesis relies mainly on the Kenyan Small 
Claims Court Act13 and the positions in Canada and the United Kingdom. The Kenyan Small 
Claims Courts Act proved to be a particularly valuable resource as it is a modern legislative 
enactment, is forward-thinking, and reflects the legal needs of people living in a developing 
economy on the African continent. 
To make out a case for a particular position, statistical data is used. Some of this data was 
sourced from the Department of Justice. Other data was sourced from official information 
channels such as Statistics South Africa.  
																																																								
12 See chapter 5. 
13 2 of 2016 (hereinafter to referred to as the ‘Kenyan Small Claims Court Act’).  
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PART II 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE  
1.4  THE ROLE OF SMALL CLAIMS COURTS: SOME DOMINANT THEMES 
(a)  Small claims courts as vehicles for law reform initiatives  
In the last century, civil litigation in the Anglo-American tradition was divided into two broad 
categories: ‘small claims’ and ‘regular cases’. In different eras the notion of a ‘small claim’ has 
meant different things. For example, they have sometimes been characterised as ‘petty debts’. 
Implicit in this terminology is the notion that small claims matters are low-status claims 
involving ‘petty’, inconsequential, everyday disputes by litigants who do not often litigate. At 
other times, the term ‘small claims’ is used to describe cases that involve small monetary values 
relative to the other courts.14 Terminology notwithstanding, there is no doubt that ‘small claims’ 
and ‘small claims courts’ have recently been used as the ‘vanguard of procedural reform’ and 
‘as the crucible in which law reform experiments [are] tested and refined for later use in all the 
courts’.15  
In South Africa, civil justice reform has, by and large, fallen behind. While there is an 
acknowledgement that there is an access to justice problem16 and that the civil justice system is 
in need of revision, little has been accomplished thus far.17 Since the advent of democracy in 
1994, the legislature has done very little to interrogate the substantive issues affecting civil 
justice, for example, the rules of jurisdiction, the rules relating to locus standi, principles of 
evidence, and the processes and procedures of the courts as encapsulated in the empowering 
																																																								
14 Steele ‘The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts’ (1981) 6 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 
293 at 296. 
15 Ibid 296. 
16 Vahed ‘Access to Justice: Conference Hosted by the Chief Justice 8 to 10 July 2011’ (August 2011) Advocate 
2-4; Ngcobo ‘Delivery of Justice: An Agenda for Change’ (2003) SAJHR 688ff.  
17 Former Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo described the challenges facing the civil justice system as ‘colossal and 
immediate’: Ngcobo (n16) 689. See also Paleker ‘Civil Procedure in South Africa: the Past, the Present and the 
Future’ (2011) ZZPInt 343 at 361.  
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legislation.18 The SCA stands as a modern monument to missed opportunity because even 
though the legislature had the chance to rethink the underlying premises of the adversarial legal 
system, the Act, by and large, follows its 1959 19  predecessor. It is startling to note that 
alternative dispute resolution20  is not contemplated in the Act, when in fact ADR is a global 
phenomenon as borne out by the innovations introduced by the Woolf reforms in England and 
Wales.21  
Given law reform experiences in other jurisdictions, small claims courts in South Africa – no 
matter how they are currently perceived – are a useful starting block to address the civil justice 
crisis. If the legislation of the small claims courts is revised and innovative processes and 
procedures are introduced, there is no doubt that the legislative amendments will impact on the 
other courts. It is submitted that commencing civil justice reform in the lowest court of the court 
structure is the correct approach to take. Because civil disputes are funnelled to the superior 
courts, legal reform in the lower courts is more urgent. As courts of first access, lower courts 
have to contend with a panoply of issues (often informed by social and economic circumstances 
on the ground) that superior courts do not. For example, lower courts have to deal with 
unrepresented, ill-informed litigants on a daily basis. Because lower courts operate at the 
coalface, there is a higher expectation that they should be more responsive to the needs of 
people.  
																																																								
18 It must be noted that since 2010 the Rules Board for Courts of Law has been actively amending rules of court 
to expedite justice and to reduce costs. See Theophilopoulos ‘Constitutional Transformation and Fundamental 
Reform of Civil Procedure’ (2016) TSAR 68. However, the Board’s powers are limited by s 6 of the Rules Board 
for Courts of Law Act 107 of 1985. Furthermore, the Board is constrained by the provisions of the MCA and the 
SCA.  Unless there is progressive reform of the empowering legislation, the Board is hamstrung by the existing 
enactments.  For more on the powers of the Board, see §3.4. 
19 Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
20 Hereinafter referred to as ‘ADR’.  
21 Genn ‘What is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR and Access to Justice’ (2012) 24 Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities 397 at 401. 
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(b)  Macro-social role of small claims courts  
A particularly unfortunate aspect of the intellectual engagement with small claims courts is the 
perception that the courts are forums for adjudicating micro-social disputes, i.e. disputes that 
lack social importance and therefore have limited relevance.22 
The macro-social importance of small claims courts in terms of providing reliable justice to the 
whole of society and its impact on the rule of law23 and social cohesion is often overlooked or 
undermined. It is unfortunate because as the gap between the rich and poor keeps growing, and 
as social and economic inequality becomes more pronounced, conflicts are more likely to arise. 
Unless civil justice can provide reliable, expedited and less expensive modes of resolving 
everyday disputes between the powerless and the powerful, those living on the fringes are more 
likely to turn away from the rule of law and to resort to violent conflict to resolve their everyday 
disputes.24 In South Africa, there is ample evidence that people are taking the law into their 
own hands on a daily basis.25 
In the paradigm of the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’, small claims courts can make a valuable 
contribution, provided of course that the legislature and the legal profession recognise the 
macro-social status of small claims courts. The expansion of small claims courts by the 
government since 2003 reflects an appreciation of the importance of these courts.26 However, 
the lack of engagement with the legislation, the inadequate allocation of resources, and the poor 
management of the courts27   show that the important mind shift to recognise the macro-
																																																								
22 Steele (n14) 299-300. 
23 Ibid 300. 
24 Genn (n21) 397. See the caution expressed by Ackerman J in S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para [168] 
about what happens when the State fails to fulfil its constitutional obligations to ensure that people can vindicate 
their rights by lawful means. See also Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC) paras [11]; 
[12], [18]; [22]. 
25 Anonymous ‘Service Delivery Disputes in South Africa Hit a Record High’ EWN (10 July 2018). 
26 See §3.8. 
27 See chapters 4, 5. 
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transformational influence of the courts on the achievement of social hegemony has not been 
attained.  
(c) Small claims courts as vessels for libertarian values 
Since the time of the French Revolution, there was an obsession with placing the law in the 
hands of everyday people. Evidence of this can be found in the legal codification process in 
Europe and in other parts of the world.28 With industrialisation and the birth of the affluent 
middle classes, there was a feeling that every person had an innate competence to handle his or 
her own affairs, including legal affairs. However, the complexity of both procedural and 
substantive law thwarted this belief. ‘Law appeared to many people as a set of arbitrary 
constraints imposed by the outdated and rigid doctrines and structures imposed by colonial 
masters who used the law as an instrument of exerting dominance.’29 Lawyers were often seen 
as symbols of obfuscation and repression because they traded on the complexity of the law.30  
The birth of small claims courts was a grand symbol of the power of the people to exert direct 
control over their legal system. Hence they have often been referred to as the ‘People’s Court’.31 
The unique processes and procedures of the courts coupled with the idea that lawyers were not 
necessary to successfully litigate in the courts satisfied the yearning for autonomy and provided 
the opportunity for people to stare justice in the face without the need for an intermediary. 
In South Africa, for a very long time, the law was seen by the masses as the repressive arm of 
the State.32 The courts were viewed as illegitimate and discriminatory. Lawyers were regarded 
																																																								
28 See J Sorabji English Civil Justice After the Woolf and Jackson Reforms: A Critical Analysis 79ff. 
29 Steele (n14) 302. 
30 Ibid.  
31 McGill ‘Challenges in Small Claims Court Design: Does One Size Fit All?’ in Trebilcock, Duggan, Sossin (eds) 
Middle Income Access to Justice 352 at 353.  
32 See the interview with Penuell Maduna (1990) 2 Lawyers for Human Rights 21. See also Forsyth ‘Interpreting 
a Bill of Rights: The Future Task of a Reformed Judiciary?’ (1991) 7 SAJHR 1; Dlamini ‘The Influence of Race 
on the Administration of Justice in South Africa’ (1988) 4 SAJHR 37; Dlamini ‘Apartheid and the Black Judge’ 
(1989) 5 SAJHR 246. 
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as the instruments of the law. The majority of them were white and male, and thus objectively 
did not represent the vast majority of people who were black and female. 
One of the refreshing aspects of South African small claims courts is that they do not need 
lawyers to represent people. While some jurisdictions33 allow legal representation in the small 
claims courts, the Hoexter Commission34 favoured the modus operandi of the jurisdictions that 
do not.35 The Commission felt that the absence of lawyers would reduce costs and encourage a 
relaxed atmosphere in the courts.36 From a libertarian perspective, the small claims courts allow 
people to take charge of their own affairs. By removing lawyers from the equation, the 
traditional racial divide that pervaded South African courts has been significantly reduced. This 
is in keeping with the Hoexter Commission’s recommendation that the small claims courts 
should be colour blind.37 Of course, presiding officers were unrepresentative because of the 
demographic profile of the legal profession.38 But, in the grander scheme of the South African 
court structure, the small claims court was a refreshing outlier.  
There is no doubt that the libertarian values associated with the small claims courts should 
continue today. Even though South Africa is a democracy predicated on non-discrimination,39 
equality before the law,40 and open access to the courts,41 many South Africans experience a 
feeling of ambivalence towards the law. The law is still complex, rigid and mysterious.42 It is 
also extremely expensive to activate.43 In this context, small claims courts have a role to play. 
Aside from barring lawyers from appearing in the courts, the SCCA and the SCCRs simplify 
																																																								
33 See McGill (n31) 358-359; and see generally Whelan Small Claims Courts – A Comparative Study.   
34 For discussion of the Hoexter Commission, see chapter 2.  
35 Report §13.9, 13.10. 
36 Report §13.11. 
37 Report §13.45. 
38 See chapter 6. 
39 Constitution, s 9. 
40 Constitution, s 9(1). 
41 Constitution, s 34. See discussion in §1.5. 
42 The South African legal system is an uncodified, mixed legal system, which has as its foundation Roman-Dutch 
law.  
43 See the opening statement by Navsa JA in Oshry v Feldman 2010 (6) SA 19 (SCA) para [1].  
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the processes and procedures of the courts.44 In so doing, they demystify the experience of 
confronting a complex adversarial litigation process, which is prevalent in all the other civil 
courts.  
(d) Costs and inefficacy 
The quest to reduce costs and improve efficiency within the courts runs like a thread through 
small claims courts literature.45 Since the 19th century people complained about the exorbitant 
cost of litigation. The price of litigation was regarded as the most pervasive barrier to the 
vindication of rights. In a liberal democracy predicated on the rule of law, the small claims 
court provides the essential vehicle to vindicate rights, where a cost-benefit analysis of litigation 
makes it unfeasible to sue for a small claim in another court. 
Aside from focussing on reducing costs, the literature on small claims courts reveals an ardent 
desire to improve efficiency.46 On one level small claims courts allow for efficient litigation by 
court users because they simplify court processes and procedures. However, on another level, 
the presence of small claims courts improves the overall efficiency of the civil justice system. 
As noted by Grevstad in 1891: 
‘[L]itigation is necessary and a blessing. It keeps the fountain of justice fresh and flowing. For this reason 
every incipient legal controversy should be carried into court. While the force of this argument may be 
admitted, it offers no comfort to crowded courts, overworked judges, or parties waiting for adjudication 
of highly important controversies. The plain, common-sense view of the matter is that the courts are 
loaded down with inconsequential litigation which should be kept out of court, as its only and inevitable 
effect is to keep in abeyance important questions pressing for consideration, and to furnish cheap lawyers 
with employment. To relieve the courts from this drudgery, without depriving the people of their rights 
to obtain legal redress for legal wrongs, be they ever so insignificant, is the object of the court of 
conciliation in Norway and Denmark. It has served its purpose so well that it has become the most popular 
tribunal in each country.’47 
																																																								
44 For Bentham’s view on the interaction between substantive law and procedural law and for the simplification 
of procedural law for maximising utility, see Sorabji (n28) 80. 
45 Yngvesson, Hennessy ‘Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims Literature’ (1974-
1975) Law and Society Review 219 at 225-226. 
46 Ruhnka, Weller with Martin Small Claims Courts: A National Examination (1978) 2-3. 
47 Grevstad ‘Courts of Conciliation in America’ (1891) 68 Atlantic Monthly 401.  See also Yngvesson, Hennessy 
(n45) 221-222.  
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The need for efficiency in South African courts cannot be understated. Many courts in different 
parts of the country are overcrowded with civil cases. There are never enough presiding officers 
to quell the constant delays in finalising matters. In addition, court resources are often stretched 
to capacity. Court administration cannot cope with the ever-growing backlog of cases, and court 
officials seem to be unable to provide the quality of service that is expected of them.48 
(e)  Small claims courts as an alternative to judicare  
In 1970, Professor Mauro Cappelletti, the eminent procedural academic, embarked on his 
famous Access to Justice Project. In 1978-1979 he published a multi-volume series titled Access 
to Justice in which he identified ‘three waves’49 for improving access to justice. The first wave 
involved the reform of institutions responsible for delivering legal services to the poor. As a 
result of his recommendations, judicare systems became a common feature in many parts of the 
world to cater for the needs of those who could not afford legal services.50  
The South African Legal Aid Board predates the work of Professor Cappelletti. It was 
established in 1969 and started to operate in 1971. The objective of the Board is to provide 
judicare for people who cannot afford legal representation. During the early years, most of its 
budget was spent on civil matters.51 However, the recent trend has been to prioritise criminal 
																																																								
48 According to National Assembly Parliamentary Question 4464 of 20 October 2015 which was answered by the 
Minister of Justice on 28 October 2015: ‘[The Department of Justice views] a backlog case in the Lower Courts 
as a case that exceeds the cycle time of 6 months from the date of first appearance in the District Court or 9 months 
in the Regional Court; or 12 months in the High Court. At the end of September 2015, the lower court backlog 
figure stood at 33 532 (21%), against a… (outstanding) court roll of 159 729. If compared to the figures at the end 
of June 2015, when the lower court backlog figure stood at 38 854 (23,7%), against a then current court roll of 
163 986’. The Minister went on to state: ‘The rising backlogs in the regional courts in particular, are, however 
being closely monitored.’  
The Minister advanced the following reasons for the backlog: ‘The problem in many areas where case backlogs 
are encountered, is that there are an insufficient number of courts and permanent staff, including magistrates, to 
attend to the normal court rolls...’  
49 The first wave involved the reform of institutions delivering legal services to the poor. The second wave sought 
to extend representation to diverse interests such as consumers and environmentalists. The third wave involved a 
shift in focus to less formal alternatives to courts and court procedures. See Cappelletti Access to Justice and the 
Welfare State 4. 
50 Cappelletti (n49) 4. 
51  Sarkin ‘Promoting Access to Justice in South Africa: Should the Legal Profession have a Voluntary or 
Mandatory Role in Providing Legal Services to the Poor?’ (2002) SAJHR 630 at 632. 
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cases.52 Since its inception, the demand on the Board has far exceeded its available resources. 
The Board has always been in a state of fiscal peril.53 It has also not helped that in the last 
decade the budget allocation to the Board has not kept up with inflation and the general demand 
for services.54 
On 1 March 2015 under the Legal Aid South Africa Act,55 the Legal Aid Board was restyled as 
Legal Aid South Africa, ‘which is governed by a Board’.56  According to regulation 27 of the 
Regulations57 passed in terms of the Act, the following means test58 is applied before a person 
qualifies for Legal Aid: 
‘(3) An applicant who applies for legal aid for a civil case and who does not have a spouse or is not a 
member of a household and has a net monthly income, after deduction of income tax, of R5 500 a 
month, or less, may qualify for legal aid for that civil matter. 
(4)  An applicant who applies for legal aid for a civil case and who has a spouse or the applicant is a 
member of a household and whose household has a monthly income, after deduction of income tax, 
of R6 000 a month or less, may qualify for legal aid for that civil matter. 
(5)  A legal aid applicant or an applicant who is a member of a household who does not own immovable 
property and has net movable assets of less than R100 000 in value may qualify for legal aid for a 
civil or criminal matter. 
(6)  A legal aid applicant or an applicant who is a member of a household who owns immovable property 
and has net immovable assets and movable assets in value of up to R500 000, may qualify for legal 
aid for a civil or criminal matter: Provided that the legal aid applicant or the member of a household 
must physically reside in the immovable property or in at least one of the immovable properties, 
where there is more than one, unless Legal Aid South Africa decides to the contrary.’ 
The threshold requirements mean that only the poorest of the poor will qualify for Legal Aid. 
Middle-income litigants will most certainly not qualify. What constitutes the middle class in 
																																																								
52 McQuoid-Mason ‘The Delivery of Legal Aid Services in South Africa’ (2000) 24 Fordham International Law 
Journal 110 at 114. 
53 Sarkin (n51) 632. 
54 See ‘Legal Aid SA Remains Optimistic About the Future’: http://www.legal-aid.co.za/?p=3554 (last accessed 
on 2 May 2018); McQuoid-Mason (n52) 114. 
55 39 of 2014. 
56 Ibid. Section 2 provides: 
‘(1)  There is hereby established a national public entity as provided for in the Public  Finance 
Management Act, to be known as Legal Aid South Africa, which is governed by a Board 
appointed under section 6. 
(2)  The Board, of which the powers, functions and duties are set out in section 4, is  represented 
by the chief executive officer and any director or directors as may be  designated by the 
Board.’ 
57 Legal Aid South Africa Act, 2014 (Act 39 of 2014): Regulations, published under GN R 745 in GG 41005 of 
26 July 2017.  
58 The means test is qualified by regulation 28 which provides that a social grant is not taken into account. 
However, maintenance and child support are.  Regulation 30 permits the means test to be relaxed if a person is 
subjectively judged to be indigent and ‘deserves sympathetic consideration on the grounds of exceptional or other 
circumstances…’. 
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South Africa is difficult to determine as there are different sectoral stipulations. A middle-
income family is said to earn a salary that ranges from R6 000 to R14 000 per month.59  From 
the perspective of Legal Aid, a person who exceeds the means test is termed ‘relatively affluent 
middle class.’60 It is not difficult to argue, given the current cost of living relative to the cost of 
litigation, that even those who fall into the so-called ‘middle-income’ range will not be able to 
afford legal representation. 
The Fees Must Fall Campaign in recent South African history highlighted the plight of the so-
called ‘missing middle’. Tertiary students across South Africa embarked on mass action to force 
the government to deal with the economic difficulties experienced by students from households, 
which according to skewed economic indicators, were deemed to be middle class and thus not 
entitled to student beneficiation programmes. After two years of student protests, President 
Ramaphosa announced at the 2018 State of the Nation Address that free higher education and 
training would be available to first-year students from households with a gross combined annual 
income of up to R350 000.61 It is axiomatic that the government adapted its calculation of what 
constitutes ‘middle class’ by taking into account the actual cost of education.  
The Fees Must Fall Campaign revealed a problem that exists not only in the area of education 
but also in many other areas affecting civil society.  The Legal Aid means test is purposefully 
set low to make the Legal Aid budget stretch. However, the means test criteria for Legal Aid 
exclude a significant proportion of the population that can otherwise not afford legal 
representation. 62  In this regard, South Africa is not unique. Pleasence and Balmer after 
surveying 23 jurisdictions note: 
																																																								
59 Khumalo ‘Feeling Confident about the Economy shouldn’t be a Green Light to Spend’ Personal Finance (5 
May 2018) indicates that high-income earners have a salary of R14000 or more and middle-income earners are 
those with an income of R3 000 to R14 000.  
60 See Visagie ‘Who are the Middle Class in South Africa? Does it Matter for Policy?’, published Research Paper 
of the Human Sciences Research Council (April 2013); Anonymous ‘How Much Money You Need to be Middle 
Class in South Africa’ Business Tech (3 February 2016). 
61 See https://www.thesouthafrican.com/sona2018-read-the-full-text-of-cyril-ramaphosas-address-here/ (last 
accessed on 1 May 2018). 
62 See Geffen ‘South Africa, a Country of Chequebook Justice’ Daily Maverick (5 September 2013). 
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‘All of the …surveys have been intended to inform access to justice policy, generally with a focus on the 
needs of those who are most disadvantaged or on the lowest incomes. However, there is a growing interest 
in the predicament of those people on middle incomes who face justiciable problems that might best be 
resolved with the involvement of lawyers, especially given the increasing pressure on many legal aid 
budgets that is seeing legal aid eligibility rates fall and scope narrow.’ 63 
The government should apply the same standard to legal services as it did to education. To 
determine when people are entitled to legal services it should compare people’s salaries to the 
actual cost of litigation.  The difficulty, however, is that the State has limited resources, and it 
is unlikely that the provision of legal services will achieve the same level of recognition as 
education. Whereas education is acknowledged as a human necessity, unfortunately legal 
services are still viewed as a luxury.  
If large-scale Legal Aid is not economically viable, the State should identify other means of 
catering for the needs of the missing middle. It is submitted that the small claims courts provide 
an excellent opportunity to enhance access to justice.64 The government needs to expand the 
monetary and substantive jurisdiction of the small claims courts so that more people are directed 
to those courts.  
The presence of small claims courts already directly assists the Legal Aid system to function 
and to provide much-needed services.  To this extent regulation65 11(3) provides:  
‘Subject to the provisions of regulation 23(8), legal aid may not be granted for any action that can be 
brought in a small claims court in terms of the Small Claims Courts Act, 1984 (Act No. 61 of 1984): 
Provided that Legal Aid South Africa may grant legal aid for a claim that does not exceed the monetary 
jurisdiction of the small claims court by more than 50 percent.’ 
That the small claims courts operate in concert with Legal Aid is plain to see. However, the 
solution would be so much more effective if the jurisdictional and locus standi rules of the 
courts are further developed.  By expanding the accessibility of the small claims courts, Legal 
Aid South Africa can divert its limited resources to cases where the claims are significant and 
																																																								
63 Pleasence, Balmer ‘Caught in the Middle: Justiciable Problems and the Use of Lawyers’ in Trebilcock, Duggan, 
Sossin (n31) 29. 
64 See Thusi v Minister of Home Affairs 2011 (2) SA 561 (KZP) para [104] on the importance of finding creative 
ways of making legal services available to those who cannot afford them.  
65 See Regulations (n57) above. 
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complicated.66 Like the position in other jurisdictions, South African small claims courts must 
do more to complement the state-sponsored Legal Aid judicare system.67 
 
1.5 THE MEANING OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND ITS IMPACT ON PROCEDURAL 
REFORM 
A constant mantra in small claims courts literature is that the courts promote ‘access to 
justice’.68 The phrase ‘access to justice’ thus requires analysis. 
‘Access to justice’ has multiple meanings and depends on the context in which it is used. It is 
sometimes used to justify court decision-making69 without explaining what the phrase means. 
In many instances, the term is symbolically employed as an expression of political correctness. 
It is thus unsurprising that the term is said to suffer from ‘a bad case of semantic overload.’70  
What is perhaps most disconcerting about the phrase ‘access to justice’ is that both the words 
‘access’ and ‘justice’ are vague. In the realm of civil justice, the word ‘justice’ is sometimes 
linked to the outcome that a case yields, but in other instances ‘justice’ is associated with the 
substance of the law and its fairness.71 But, it can also be a combination of the two.72 Depending 
on the context in which ‘justice’ is invoked, the law might be just if it achieves an equitable 
outcome,73 while in other instances as long as the substance of the law (its principles) is 
																																																								
66 Small claims courts are precluded from hearing complicated claims. See SCCA, s 23(1). 
67 Sarkin (n51) 631. 
68 McGill (n31) 352. 
69 See for example Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-operative Ltd 2004 (9) BCLR 930 (SCA). 
In this case, the court overturned the common-law prohibition against champertous agreements. Such agreements 
allowed a third party to fund litigation in return for a share of the proceeds of the claim if the litigation was 
successful. Under the common law such agreements were considered to be against public policy because they 
encourage wagering and speculative litigation which amounts to an abuse of the court process. In casu a third 
party entered into a champertous agreement with the respondent. In overturning the common law, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that the law had to be informed by s 34 of the Constitution: see [43], [44]. 
70 Grossma, Sarat ‘Access to Justice and the Limits of Law’ in Gambitta, May, Foster (eds) Governing Through 
Courts 81. 
71 McGill (n31) 354. 
72 Sorabji (n28) 67-74. 
73 Ibid 83. 
	 15	
defensible, even if the outcome is harsh, the law is still just.74 Many expect that both the 
substance of the law and the outcome on an application of the law must be defensible and 
equitable (fair). This seems to be the case in the procedural context. It is for this reason that in 
the realm of civil procedure a court is often given the discretion to relax a procedural rule if the 
court feels that the substance of the procedure will lead to an inequitable (unfair) result.75 As 
the ‘handmaid’ of justice,76 a procedural rule will not be allowed to willy-nilly frustrate the 
plaintiff’s claim or the defendant’s defence. As the South African courts have said, procedure 
is made for the courts and not vice versa.77  
‘Access’ traditionally refers to a courthouse or tribunal door.78 Thus factors that impede a 
person’s ability to have a matter decided by a court are seen to be inimical to ‘justice’ because 
they prevent a person from exercising the substance of the law (the rights entrenched therein) 
and from acquiring an equitable outcome in a judicial setting.79 When commentators talk about 
‘access to justice’, they are thus referring to barriers that must be removed for a litigant to gain 
access to an independent and impartial court for the vindication and restoration of rights though 
court-imposed remedies. At the most basic level, the State has to provide court infrastructure. 
After that, it has to staff the courts with competent and independent personnel (administration 
staff and judges). And finally, it has to establish mechanisms for the creation of procedural rules 
																																																								
74 See generally Sorabji (n28). 
75 Sorabji (n28) 67-68; Bone ‘Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for Federal Rules’ 87 (2010) Denver University 
Law Review 287; (South Australia) Supreme Court Rules 1987, r 2.01; (South Australia) Supreme Court Civil 
Rules 2006, r 3; (Ontario) Rules of Civil Procedure (R.R.O 1990, Reg. 194) r 1.04 (1.1); Woolf Access to Justice: 
Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales 216-217; Abenga ‘Civil 
Practice and Procedure in Kenyan Courts: Does the Overriding Objective Principle Necessarily Improve Access 
to Justice for Litigants?’ (2012), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2240955 (last accessed on 25 May 
2018).  
76 In Re Coles [1907] 1 K.B 1 at 4 Collins M.R said: 
‘Although I agree that a court cannot conduct its business without a code of procedure, I think that the 
relation of the rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of a handmaid rather than 
mistress, and the court ought not to be so far bound and tied by rules, which are after all only intended as 
general rules of procedure, as to be compelled to do what will cause injustice in a particular case.’ 
77 Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 (5) SA 89 (CC) para [32].  
78 Grossman, Sarat (n70) 80; Hurter ‘Access to Justice: To Dream the Impossible Dream?’ (2011) 44 CILSA 408 
at 414. 
79 Smith Justice: Redressing the Balance (1997) 9. See also Bass, Bogart, Zemans (eds) ‘Introduction’ in Access 
to Justice for a New Century: The Way Forward (2005) 3. 
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to ensure a fair process of litigation.80 Procedural rules are considered unfair if they unduly 
favour one litigant over another.81   
Since time immemorial commentators have argued that traditional adversarial litigation models 
erode access to justice.82 Adversarial litigation makes a game of litigation.83 Consequently, it 
favours the rich because they can afford to hire the most experienced lawyers who use their 
acumen and skill to strategically over-complicate cases by relying on the technicalities of 
procedural and substantive law.84 Poorer litigants are often forced to abandon their cases due to 
mounting legal costs, thus negating access to justice.  To overcome such abuses, modern 
procedural reformists argue that procedural rules must be simplified and that the courts should 
step in to identify instances of abuse and to take action. To this extent, judicial case management 
systems have been implemented in many legal systems,85 even in adversarial ones where the 
courts have traditionally taken a hands-off approach to the way in which cases are conducted.86  
Some modern reformists go so far as to argue that justice is better served if the courts employ 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as court-connected mediation or pre-action 
protocols to encourage the parties to resolve a matter quickly and to forgo the conventional 
trial.87 The modern conceptualisation of ‘access’ in ‘access to justice’ therefore does not refer 
to the courthouse or a tribunal door as the only mode of accessing justice, but takes into account 
other forms of court-connected dispute resolution mechanisms. In the modern sense, ‘access to 
																																																								
80 Boulle ‘Promoting Rights Through Court Based ADR?’ (2012) SAJHR 1 at 10-11 states: 
‘“access to justice” has never entailed merely entering the courthouse doors and demanding a judicial 
hearing. It has always been couched in terms of various formalities, preparatory activities and procedures 
required by legislation, rules of court and other regulatory measures.’ 
81 Twee Jonge Gezellen (Pty) Ltd v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa t/a The Land Bank 
2011 (3) SA 1 (CC) para [43]. 
82 Sorabji (n28) 13.  
83 Pound (n1) 738. 
84 See Genn (n21) 412. 
85 Genn (n21) 401. 
86 Pound (n1) 738. 
87 Some are critical. For example, Galanter ‘Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability’ (2010) 
Fordham Urban Law Journal 115 suggests that ADR no longer enjoys the assumption of facilitating access to 
justice.  
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justice’ thus presumes the removal of barriers that would prevent parties from vindicating their 
rights quickly, efficiently and cheaply.88 Procedural law is expected to provide the mechanisms 
to assist the parties to resolve their disputes without necessarily turning to formal litigation.89 
In light of the above, contemporary notions of access to justice require one to approach 
procedural reform in a nuanced manner: (i) procedural rules must be simple and easy to 
navigate; (ii) procedural rules should be logical, reasonable,90 and not be overly formalistic or 
technical – where technicality is inescapable, the court should have an interventionist role to 
identify instances of abuse, to relax rules, and to hold the parties to account by imposing costs 
orders;91 and (iii) procedural rules must be crafted in such a way as to facilitate the quick, 
efficient and cost-effective resolution of disputes.  
In conformity with modern access to justice imperatives, the SCCA and the SCCRs must be 
evaluated. One has to look out for legislative provisions and common-law rules that are overly 
technical, formalistic, or unreasonable. While there may be a tendency to emphasise procedural 
law, it is necessary to be vigilant of substantive law rules as well.92 If the application of 
																																																								
88 Hurter (n78) 409. 
89 Ibid 411. 
90 See President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). 
91 Eke v Parsons 2016 (3) SA 37 (CC) para [39]. 
92 In Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd 2016 (5) SA 240 (GJ), the applicants sought to bring a class action on 
behalf of current and past underground mineworkers who contracted silicosis or tuberculosis, and on behalf of the 
dependants of mineworkers who died of silicosis or tuberculosis, contracted while employed in the gold mines. 
The mineworkers asked the court to declare that any claim for general damages that a mineworker brings, or may 
wish to bring, against any of the mining companies is transmissible to his estate, should he die before the litigation 
reaches the stage of litis contestatio. It was a substantive rule of the common law (Roman-Dutch law influenced 
by Roman law) that a claim for non-patrimonial loss was not transmissible to a deceased’s estate unless the 
litigation had reached litis contestatio (i.e. close of pleadings). In this case, the miners argued that the common 
law violated their rights to equality, human dignity, life, freedom and security of the person, right to bodily 
integrity and access to courts. A full bench of the Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg agreed that there was a 
violation. The court held that ss 8(3) and 39(2) of the Constitution explicitly enjoin the court to develop the 
common law to the extent that it is necessary to make it consistent with the values enshrined in the Constitution, 
especially those explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights. See paras [215], [217]. The court ruled that the common 
law had to be developed as follows: ‘A plaintiff who had commenced suing for general damages, but who has 
died, whether arising from harm caused by a wrongful act or omission of a person or otherwise, and whose claim 
has yet to reach the stage of litis contestatio, and who would but for his/her death be entitled to maintain the action 
and recover the general damages in respect thereof, will be entitled to continue with such action, notwithstanding 
his/her death…’ This case is a prime example of a situation where the application of a substantive rule would have 
negatively affected the outcome of a case if a mineworker died before litis contestatio. The court was thus correct 
from an access to justice perspective to strike down the common-law rule.  It is interesting to note that the court 
did not expressly apply the s 36 limitations analysis upon finding that the common-law rule violated the Bill of 
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substantive law prevents the plaintiff from presenting the merits of the case, or hinders the 
defendant’s mounting of a defence, access to justice is compromised.93 For the SCCA and the 
SCCRs, it is submitted that access to justice requires a wide approach to include alternatives to 
formal court litigation. ADR must be explored as it promotes the settlement of disputes and 
reduces the time and expense of executing on court judgments.94 
1.6 ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(a) The relevant constitutional provision 
Section 34 of the Constitution provides: 
‘Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a 
fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or 
forum.’  
(b) Courts and tribunals are an essential service 
The peremptory framing of s 34 makes access to the courts and other tribunals and forums an 
essential service that must be promoted and supported by the State. The State thus has an 
obligation to provide funding and other logistical assistance to the courts. The State must use 
its fiscal and human resources to remove barriers that would otherwise prevent people from 
accessing the courts.  
The State has done admirable work in promoting small claims courts. Between 2003 and 2018 
the State has dramatically increased the number of small claims courts across the country.95 
There is a small claims court in virtually every magisterial district. However, where the State 
has fallen short is in the implementation and management of the courts. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss 
the challenges confronting the courts in the area of court management. Poor management 
																																																								
Rights. It is submitted that the court should have done so. Be that as it may, it seems that even if the court had 
applied the limitations analysis the finding would not have been different. The court established that the common-
law rule was devised with different considerations in mind and that it was illogical to apply the rule in the 
prevailing system of civil litigation. See paras [188]-[190]. 
93 See also chapter 6, parts III and IV. 
94 See chapter 10 for further discussion. 
95 See §3.8. 
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affects access to the courts and undermines the steps that have been taken thus far to mainstream 
small claims courts.  
(c) Section 34 is broadly interpreted 
In a number of cases the courts have relied on s 34 to strike down, relax or uphold an aspect of 
procedural or substantive law. The courts thus interpret s 34 broadly and do not limit the 
interpretation of the section to the mere imposition on the State of the obligation to provide 
courts, tribunals and forums.  Section 34 has been used to test both the substance of the law96 
and the outcomes97 of court processes and procedures. Where on an application of the Bill of 
Rights the law is unreasonable,98 discriminatory,99 overly formalistic,100 or has led to unjust 
outcomes by yielding ineffective remedies, 101  the courts have employed s 34 to provide 
effective substantive law changes or procedural remedies. It is safe to state that s 34 
jurisprudence is consonant with the international ‘access to justice’ theory. However, where the 
courts have been less vocal is on the relationship between ADR and access to justice. 
Fortunately, however, legislation has been less equivocal. Rule 70 of Chapter 2 of the MCRs 
explicitly connects ADR with access to justice. The rule reads:  
‘The objectives of this Chapter are to give effect to –  
(1)  section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which guarantees everyone  the 
right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of the law decided in a fair public 
hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum; and 
(2)  the resolution of the Access to Justice Conference held in July 2011, under the leadership of the Chief 
Justice, towards achieving delivery of accessible and quality justice for all, that steps be taken to 
																																																								
96 In Beinash v Ernst & Young 1999 (2) SA 116 (CC) [17], the court upheld s 2(1)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings 
Act 3 of 1956. The court held that restricting vexatious litigants was essential for protecting the right of access to 
court for good faith litigants with meritorious litigation.   
97 See President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd supra where the court held that 
the mechanisms to enforce eviction orders were not effective. The court found that it was unreasonable of the State 
to stand by and to do nothing while the respondent was attempting to evict thousands of unlawful occupiers who 
had nowhere to go ([48]). The conduct of the State rendered the eviction order ineffective. The court stated that 
the inaction of the State breached the respondent’s right to an effective remedy as implied by the right of access 
to court and as required by the doctrine of the rule of law ([51]). 
98 See Moise v Greater Germiston Transitional Local Council: Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
Intervening 2001 (4) SA 491 (CC). In this case, the court found a 90-day notice period for the institution of legal 
proceedings to be unreasonable and inconsistent with s 34 of the Constitution.  
99 See BID Industrial Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Strang 2008 (3) SA 355 (SCA) at [43]. 
100 See Airconditioning Design & Development (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works, Gauteng Province 2005 (4) 
SA 103 (T) para [19]. 
101 See n92. 
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introduce alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, preferably court-annexed mediation or the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration kind of alternative dispute resolution, into the 
court system.’102 
(d) Independence and impartiality  
On a reading of s 34, it is easy to appreciate that the State bears a positive obligation to provide 
impartial and independent venues for people to access justice. To fulfil this expectation, the 
State has to firstly appoint people (for example, judges and other court officials) who will 
dispense justice without fear, favour or prejudice. Secondly, the State has to put mechanisms in 
place to ensure that court processes and procedures will be free from State interference which 
would undermine the independence of the courts and their ability to provide a fair trial.  
Currently, the Minister of Justice is solely responsible for making the processes and procedures 
of the small claims courts in conformity with the SCCA.103 However, in the future the Rules 
Board for Courts of Law will develop the SCCRs in accordance with the SCCA, as amended.104 
This is a significant step in terms of ensuring compliance with s 34 of the Constitution because 
the Board is widely regarded for its integrity in maintaining impartiality and promoting the 
independence of the courts.105  
The SCCA is subject to constitutional challenges. The Act predates the constitutional era and 
one can thus anticipate that the Act may be challenged from time to time.106 One such challenge 
may relate to the appointment of presiding officers in the small claims courts. In terms of the 
SCCA, the Minister of Justice has the power to hire and fire presiding officers at will in the 
small claims courts.107 This conflicts with the State’s obligation to provide independent and 
impartial courts. The broad ministerial power also conflicts with s 165(2) of the Constitution, 
																																																								
102 Chapter 2 of the MCRs contains the voluntary court-annexed Mediation Rules. The rules are discussed in more 
detail in chapter 10. 
103 SCCA, s 25. 
104 See Judicial Matters Amendment Act 8 of 2017, s 15. See also chapter 4 for further discussion. 
105 See §5.5. 
106 See also	Crish v Commissioner Small Claims Court Butterworth [2007] ZAECHC 114. In this case the applicant 
unsuccessfully challenged s 45 of the SCCA. The case is discussed in §9.11.  
107 SCCA, s 9(3) read with s 9(5). See further chapter 5. 
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which provides: ‘The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, 
which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.’108 Furthermore, s 
165(3) provides that ‘[n]o person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the 
courts.’  The issues relating to the appointment of judicial officers are addressed in more detail 
in chapter 5.  
(e)  Fair trial  
In De Beer NO v North-Central Local Council and South-Central Local Council109 the court 
stated: 
‘This s 34 fair hearing right affirms the rule of law, which is a founding value of our Constitution. The 
right to a fair hearing before a court lies at the heart of the rule of law. A fair hearing before a court as a 
prerequisite to an order being made against anyone is fundamental to a just and credible legal order. 
Courts in our country are obliged to ensure that the proceedings before them are always fair. Since 
procedures that would render the hearing unfair are inconsistent with the Constitution courts must 
interpret legislation and Rules of Court, where it is reasonably possible to do so, in a way that would 
render the proceedings fair. It is a crucial aspect of the rule of law that court orders should not be made 
without affording the other side a reasonable opportunity to state their case. That reasonable opportunity 
can usually only be given by ensuring that reasonable steps are taken to bring the hearing to the attention 
of the person affected. Rules of Courts make provision for this. They are not, however, an exclusive 
standard of reasonableness. There is no reason why legislation should not provide for other reasonable 
ways of giving notice to an affected party. If it does, it meets the notice requirements of s 34.’ 
An important aspect of fairness in civil proceedings is the principle of audi alteram partem. 
The parties to litigation must have notice of proceedings and must be able to make 
representations before the court. To this extent, the SCCA and the SCCRs make provision for 
a notice and a summons,110 which must be served on the defendant. Consequently, the SCCRs 
provide for service rules to ensure that designated officers of the court correctly serve court 
processes on the defendant.111 Furthermore, the SCCA tasks the presiding officer to proceed 
inquisitorially at the trial and not to grant judgment unless the defendant has had the opportunity 
to address the court. 112  Where the defendant fails to appear after receiving notice of 
																																																								
108 See also Constitution, s 165(2). It has been argued that because s 165(2) is not part of the Bill of Rights, the 
requirement to provide independent and impartial courts is not subject to the general limitations clause as set out 
in s 36. Consequently, a lack of impartiality and independence will be fatal in every case. See Currie, de Waal The 
Bill of Rights Handbook 733. 
109 2002 (1) SA 429 (CC) para [11].  
110 See §8.2, §8.7. 
111 See §8.13. 
112 See §8.17. 
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proceedings, the court may grant judgment if it is satisfied that the plaintiff, at an oral hearing, 
has proven its case.113  
All of these procedural rules are designed to safeguard the right to a fair hearing. However, as 
noted in chapter 8 there is a need for these procedural rules to be critically evaluated. They must 
be tested for their efficiency. New procedures may have to be introduced to take into account 
modern forms of communication. As new trends for doing business emerge, it may be necessary 
to rethink the nature and content of court processes, which might have to be managed 
differently. To meet the lifestyle of the millennial court-user, the physical inquisitorial trial 
process might have to undergo a fundamental transformation. The right to a fair trial does not 
exclude the prospect of parties conducting a trial from different locations by using virtual 
technology platforms.  
A particularly interesting aspect is whether legal representation is a prerequisite for a fair trial. 
It is trite that legal representation is not permitted in the small claims courts.114 Section 34 of 
the Constitution does not explicitly confer a right to legal representation. It is conceivable that 
in certain types of proceedings – geared towards reducing costs – the right to legal 
representation may be limited. Given the nature of small claims courts, and their aims and 
objectives, chapter 7 takes the position that the prohibition of legal representation in the small 
claims courts is consonant with s 34 of the Constitution.  
(f)  Section 34 is not more important than the other rights in the Bill of Rights 
While s 34 is essential for the maintenance of the rule of law, it is not more important than the 
other rights in the Bill of Rights such as the right to education,115 housing,116 healthcare or 
social security.117 The Constitutional Court in Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-
Natal) established that when it comes to providing services, the State cannot be expected to 
																																																								
113 See §9.14. 
114 SCCA, s 7(2). 
115 Constitution, s 29. 
116 Constitution, s 26. 
117 Constitution, s 27. 
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provide beyond its available means.118 Furthermore, it is for the executive and the legislature 
to determine how they wish to allocate resources.119 The court went on to hold: 
‘The State has to manage its limited resources in order to address all these claims. There will be times 
when this requires it to adopt a holistic approach to the larger needs of society rather than to focus on the 
specific needs of particular individuals within society.’120 
This observation is important because it dispels the view that civil justice and civil justice 
reform require the State to provide top-notch facilities to promote access to justice.121 For that 
reason, when it comes to advocating for reform measures in the small claims courts, this thesis 
takes a pragmatic and measured approach. To a large extent, the measures that are 
recommended can be accommodated within available resources. In so far as innovation is 
introduced, such as the use of technology in the courts and in court processes, the costs are not 
exorbitant.122 For the most part, the cost of technological innovations will be borne by the 
litigants, for example, the cost of e-filing or serving documents by electronic means. Such 
measures are suggested as alternatives to current processes and procedures that have proven to 
be cumbersome, sometimes ineffective, and expensive.123  
(g)  Public hearing  
 
 
Section 34 guarantees the right to a fair and ‘public hearing.’ This is in keeping with the general 
rule that court proceedings must be open to the public. Following the recommendations of the 
Hoexter Commission, the small claims courts are also open to the public.124 However, this 
aspect of s 34 may be limited if there is a good reason for doing so. Hence, in cases involving 
children, for example, the courts have for a long time adopted the position that the proceedings 
must be held in camera (i.e. in private).  
																																																								
118 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) [1998] 1 All SA 268 (CC) para [11]. 
119 Ibid [29]. 
120 Ibid [31]. 
121 See also Legal Aid South Africa v Magidiwana 2015 (6) SA 494 (CC) where the court recognised that Legal 
Aid South Africa had finite resources and that it was impossible to help everyone who needed legal assistance. 
122 See chapters 4, 8. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Report §13.25. See also the discussion at §4.4. 
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In the small claims courts, one can hardly conceive of situations where a trial will be closed to 
the public. However, if ADR in the form of mediation is introduced in the small claims courts, 
this will present an interesting challenge to the requirement for a public hearing. A hallmark 
feature of mediation is the principle of confidentiality.  In chapter 10 it will be argued that given 
the nature of mediation it is justifiable for the right to a public hearing to be limited in the case 
of mediation in the small claims courts.125 
1.7  SOME ACCESS TO JUSTICE CHALLENGES FOR SOUTH AFRICAN SMALL 
CLAIMS COURTS 
Since the purpose of small claims courts is to provide a forum for the speedy, cost-effective and 
efficient resolution of disputes, the legislation governing small claims courts in many 
jurisdictions pays careful attention to not only the procedural but also the substantive law 
aspects affecting the courts.  
(a) Jurisdictional woes 
For access to justice, careful attention must be paid to the substantive rules of jurisdiction as 
well as the regulated monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts. It is vital for the small 
claims courts to address the social and economic challenges that people face.126 As noted 
earlier, South Africa is confronted by poverty and unemployment. There is a significant 
proportion of the population that will never be able to litigate matters in the magistrates’ courts. 
In some sense, therefore, the small claims courts have to cater for this skewed reality. If the 
monetary jurisdiction of the courts is set too low, it means that litigants will have fewer options 
to vindicate their rights. There is already evidence to suggest that it is not economically viable 
to institute a claim in a magistrate’s court where the value of the claim is less than R80 000.127  
																																																								
125 See also §4.4. 
126 Sarkin (n51) 636-637. 
127 See chapter 6 n 91, 93, 94, 96. 
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Furthermore, as will be discussed in chapter 6, the substantive rules of jurisdiction are far too 
cumbersome. Some of the rules are formalistic, nonsensical and redundant. Because the rules 
of jurisdiction act as gatekeepers to the courts, they affect access to justice. 
(b)  The ‘one-shotter’ requires greater access to justice than the ‘repeat-player’ 
In his famous article, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change’, Galanter128 identifies two classes of litigants: the ‘one-shotters’ and the ‘repeat-
players’. 129  Classically the repeat-players are business entities and the State who litigate 
frequently in the courts. The one-shotter is the person in the street who litigates rarely. Galanter 
identifies certain advantages that repeat-players enjoy which the one-shotters do not. Repeat-
players acquire knowledge of court procedures because they litigate often. This experience 
gives them the edge because they can employ court procedure to maximise their chances of 
winning in court. They also have deeper pockets. This allows them to employ the best lawyers 
who can financially deplete or browbeat the one-shotter into an unfavourable settlement.  
Galanter also mentions that repeat-players can form relationships with the court. Because they 
litigate frequently, their lawyers come to know court officials on a personal level. This allows 
them to influence the direction of a case in subtle ways.130 From an access to justice perspective, 
the repeat-player has more advantages than the one-shotter. 
The South African small claims courts have several features that ameliorate the abuse that 
Galanter mentions. Firstly, legal representation is not permitted in the courts.131 This results in 
a drastic reduction of legal costs. Allied to this is the fact that only natural persons may sue in 
the small claims courts. Juristic persons can be sued, but they cannot sue.132 However, as 
																																																								
128 M Galanter ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974-1975) 95 
Law and Society Review 95. 
129 Ibid 97. 
130 Ibid 98ff. 
131 SCCA, s 7(2). 
132 SCCA, s 7(1). 
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discussed in chapter 7 juristic persons are often represented in court by in-house counsel.133  It 
does affect the level of expertise that they have when defending matters when compared to 
natural person plaintiffs. Fortunately, however, the small claims court commissioner proceeds 
inquisitorially.134 This assists the parties by levelling the playing field as the judicial officer 
effectively runs the proceedings.   
Even though the general trend is to exclude juristic persons from suing in the small claims 
courts, it will be argued (in chapter 7)135 that there are good reasons in the South African context 
to allow juristic persons to sue. Small businesses should not be saddled with the cost of suing 
for small claims in the magistrates’ courts. Furthermore, an impoverished natural person 
defendant should not suffer the financial burden of having to defend a matter in a magistrate’s 
court when he or she is sued by a juristic person for a small claim. It may be better from an 
access to justice perspective to widen the rules of locus standi. The inquisitorial procedure, it 
will be argued, provides an adequate safeguard against any abuse that could arise from 
permitting juristic persons to sue in the small claims courts. 
As far as the State is concerned, presently, it may not sue and be sued in the small claims courts. 
However, as will be argued in chapter 7, there may be good reasons for affording natural person 
plaintiffs a limited right to sue the State in the small claims courts. It would be in the interests 
of good governance and the rule of law for it to be permissible for local government to be sued 
in the small claims courts. It is submitted that if it were permissible for local government to be 
sued in the small claims courts, there would be a low risk of one-shotters being unduly 
prejudiced because the courts would use their inquisitorial function to prevent local government 
from gaining an unfair advantage. Furthermore, to permit actions against local government 
might result in better service delivery, which is a particular challenge in South Africa.  
																																																								
133 See §7.5. 
134 SCCA, s 26(3). See also §7.5. 
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Another advantage that the one-shotter has in the South African small claims courts is that the 
processes and procedures of the courts are relaxed. As discussed in chapter 8, the parties may 
not cross-examine each other and the traditional rules of evidence in so far as they relate to 
admissibility are not applicable in the small claims courts. This affords the one-shotter 
protection against the potentially over-litigious repeat-player who might use the rules of 
procedure and evidence to over complicate a case or to limit truth-finding. It is not suggested 
that there is no room for further improvement. On the contrary, as will be highlighted in chapters 
8 and 9, there is considerable scope for the development of the processes and procedures of the 
small claims courts to take into account technological advances and other practical realities. 
Furthermore, the courts should operate during business hours so that more people can access 
the courts at times that suit their lifestyle and work requirements. There is also a need for better 
court administration because current experiences reveal that poor court administration affects 
people’s perceptions of access to justice. To this extent, recommendations will be made in 
chapters 4 and 5 for the overall improvement of court administration and for the employment 
of full-time presiding officers to service the courts during business hours. 
A major stumbling block for access to justice and the one-shotter in the South African small 
claims courts is that there is no mechanism to insist that a plaintiff institutes proceedings in a 
small claims court where the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the court. As the law 
currently stands, the plaintiff, as the principal litigant, holds the card to decide whether to sue 
the defendant in a small claims court or in a magistrate’s court.136 A rich litigant, therefore, has 
the unfettered right to force a poor litigant to defend a matter in a magistrate’s court, when the 
dispute could be conveniently resolved in a small claims court. It is submitted that South Africa 
must adopt a position that is similar to the one in England and Wales and that a small claims 
court track should be introduced in the magistrates’ courts. A district magistrate, after 
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identifying an appropriate case, should be free to refer the matter to the small claims court if 
the claim falls within the jurisdiction of the court.137 In the overall process of civil justice 
reform, one must question and revisit the archaic idea of having a multiplicity of courts with 
concurrent jurisdiction.138  
(c) ADR is needed  
A further issue that must be addressed is the lack of ADR in the small claims courts. As much 
as ADR may be viewed with some scepticism, national and international experience suggests 
that ADR is part of the legal landscape with more and more countries adopting some or other 
form of court-annexed mediation. In South Africa, the court-annexed mediation rules in the 
magistrates’ courts,139 which came into operation on 1 December 2014, are a significant step to 
mainstreaming ADR as part of the court procedure. It is only a matter of time before ADR in 
the form of mediation will be introduced in the High Courts.140 Chapter 10 discusses the trend 
towards ADR and the benefits of ADR, and makes recommendations for the introduction of 
mediation in the small claims courts.  
1.8 CONCLUSION 
In as much as ‘access to justice’ is a seemingly nebulous concept, local and foreign 
jurisprudence has added sufficient gravitas to the term. Under the influence of s 34 of the 
Constitution, there is sufficient consensus in South Africa about what access to justice means 
and what its prerequisites are. This is particularly useful for the purposes of this thesis, which 
locates small claims courts within access to justice theory and argues for reform on that basis. 
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Access to justice thus informs many of the discussions that will follow, not least the issue of 




THE HOEXTER COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
riting in 1981 in The Solicitor’s Journal, Mr Robert Egerton, a London solicitor, 
made the following concluding remarks: 
‘Our old adversary system of trial is too expensive for some types of cases and intolerably so 
for small claims. The factor most obviously contributing to the expense is the employment of 
lawyers by each of the parties, and this has become almost essential where elaborate rules have 
been developed to deal with the complexities of some contentious matters and the intricacies of 
litigation practice.’1 
This quotation represents the staple argument for the creation of small claims courts in many 
parts of the world. It is also significant in that it was the opening salvo of the Fourth Interim 
Report of the Hoexter Commission of Inquiry into the Structure and Functioning of the Courts. 
The Hoexter Commission under the chairmanship of Judge GG Hoexter, was tasked in 1979 by 
the South African government to inquire into the structure, functioning and rationalisation of 
South African courts, with a special emphasis on Local and Provincial Divisions of the Supreme 
Court (now High Court).2  The main term of reference of the Commission was: 
‘To inquire into the structure and functioning of the courts…and to make recommendations on 
the efficacy of that structure and functioning and on the desirability of changes which may lead 
to the more efficient and expeditious administration of justice and a reduction in the cost of 
litigation…’3 
Over a period of four years, the Commission rendered four interim reports and a Fifth and Final 
Report in 1983.  Although the Commission was tasked to focus on the superior courts, in its 
                                                             
1 R Egerton (August 1985) The Solicitor’s Journal 575 as quoted in Report § 2.1. 
2 Chapter 8 of the Constitution changed the names of the courts. The Supreme Court was renamed to the ‘High 
Court’ and the Appellate Division to the ‘Supreme Court of Appeal’. See Paleker ‘Civil Procedure in South Africa: 
the Past, the Present and the Future’ ZZP Int (2011) 343 at 360 for a discussion of the practical impact of the name 
changes. See also de Vos ‘Developments in South African Civil Procedural Law over the Last Fifty Years’ (2000) 
11 Stellenbosch Law Review 343 at 347.   




original terms of reference it was also required to give attention ‘[t]o the desirability of 
providing special machinery for the settlement of minor civil disputes in an informal manner.’4 
How this term of reference came about within the context of an investigation into superior 
courts is not certain.  
Consequently, the Hoexter Commission embarked on a special inquiry into small claims 
mechanisms and produced its Fourth Interim Report (‘Report’) in May 1982. In the Report it 
recommended the establishment of small claims courts in South Africa.  
While there is no doubt that the Commission’s recommendation was the single most important 
factor leading to the creation of a uniform system of small claims courts, it must be noted that 
the Commission was not the only government-sanctioned body to make such a 
recommendation. The Galgut Commission of Inquiry into Civil Proceedings in the Supreme 
Court of South Africa had already recommended in the late 1970s5  the creation of a uniform 
system of small claims courts. However, the Galgut Commission’s recommendation was never 
taken further. 
This chapter will consider the work of the Hoexter Commission with a view to better 
understanding its recommendations for the establishment of small claims courts in South 
Africa. 
                                                             
4 Report § 1.1. Italics inserted for emphasis.  
5 The Galgut Commission was appointed in 1976. For more information see E Kahn ‘The Extra-judicial Activities 
of Judges’ (1980) 13 De Jure 188. 
It is worth mentioning that there were cries from within the legal profession from as early as 1969 for the creation 
or the reintroduction of small claims courts mechanisms within the existing civil justice system.  For example, P 
W du Plessis ‘Hof vir Klein Sakies’ (Febuary 1975) De Rebus Procuratoriis 68 writes: 
‘‘n Leemte in die struktuur van die Suid-Afrikaanse hofsisteem is klaarblyklik die afwesigheid van ‘n hof 
vir klein sakie. Op verskeie geleenthede is doe noodsaaklikheid vie die skepping van sodanige hoof reeds 
aangestip [1969 De Rebus 483, 1971 De Rebus 255].’ 
Translation: A lacuna in the structure of the South African court is system is evidently the absence of a court for 
small claims. On various occasions the necessity of establishing such a court has been emphasised.  
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2.2  THE HOEXTER COMMISSION’S WORK IN CONTEXT 
There was a realisation in the late 1970s that the South African civil justice system was not 
providing adequate access to justice. The justice system was considered unwieldy, time-
consuming, and inefficient.6 Aside from administrative and logistical problems, the justice 
system also faced a legitimacy crisis. The populace regarded the South African justice system 
as the handmaiden of the Apartheid regime.7  
When the Report was presented in 1982 to the then State President, Mr PW Botha, South Africa 
was going through a tumultuous period of political unrest, governmental repression, economic 
instability, and global ostracisation.8 The vast majority of South Africans could not access the 
institutional courts, which were divided along racial lines. There was a fundamental distrust of 
the law and all its institutions. The legal profession, too, reflected the broader societal patterns 
of racial and gender discrimination.9  
It is interesting to note that in its Fifth and Final Report, the Hoexter Commission called for 
the appointment of black magistrates. Prior to 1977 there were no black magistrates in South 
Africa, and by 1982 only two out of 754 district and regional magistrates were non-white. The 
two were of Indian descent.10 Non-whites were expected to obtain legal training and practical 
experience in ‘self-governing’ and ‘independent homelands’. 11  The Hoexter Commission 
recommended that magistrates should be independent of the civil service and that ‘active steps 
                                                             
6 Fifth and Final Report 128 et seq; see also de Vos (n2) 348. 
7 Sachs Justice in South Africa. 
8 For a comprehensive discussion of South Africa in the 1980s see Giliomee, Schlemmer From Apartheid to 
National Building. 
9 For an excellent analysis of the racial history of the South African legal profession and its systemic consequences 
see Pruitt ‘No black names on the letterhead? Efficient Discrimination and the South African Legal profession’ 
(2002) 23 Michigan Journal of International Law 545. 
10 Albertyn ‘Judicial Diversity’ in Hoexter, Olivier (eds) The Judiciary in South Africa 245 at 252. 
11 Minister of Justice ‘Justice Vote’ in Hansard Debates of the House of Assembly 6 June 1977 col 9363; see also 
Albertyn (n10) 252. 
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be taken to recruit judicial officers from all racial groups in the private sector.’12 Although the 
Commission was cautious about politicising its work, it must have recognised the legitimacy 
problems facing the justice system and must have tried, in a conservative way, to balance the 
interests of the State with the interests of the individual citizen seeking formal justice.  
When dissecting the Report, one must keep the broader South African context in mind and not  
focus narrowly on the recommendations in isolation. The recommendations reflect inherent 
limitations within the justice system and the institutions supporting it at that time. In fulfilling 
its mandate, the Hoexter Commission was given the unenviable task of performing its functions 
in an ideological vacuum, and was expected to discount the political, social and economic 
realties facing the country. In an ironic twist, the Report in itself is a reflection of precisely the 
socio-political and economic realties prevalent at the time. Consequently, when studying the 
Report, one should not be swept up by the seemingly benign academic study that informs the 
Report; the Report is a reflection of a dramatic scene that was unfolding in South Africa, and 
therefore calls for a healthy dose of scepticism and critical engagement.  
Aside from the social, political and economic limitations, the imagination of the Commission 
was constrained by the modus vivendi of the time. When the Hoexter Commission sat, South 
Africa and the rest of the world were in the age of the typewriter. The personal computer and 
the internet were very much the stuff of science fiction. The cellular phone had not been 
invented. Consequently, when evaluating the Report, one must be conscious of the fact that the 
Commission’s recommendations were restrained by available technology and prevailing human 
ingenuity.  
In the study of legal institutions context counts. It is sometimes easy to forget that the present 
is a reflection of the idiosyncrasies of the past. While the Commission’s Report stands as an 
                                                             
12 Fifth and Final Report §6.14. 
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important monument to the underlying thought processes informing the current system of small 
claims courts in South Africa, an appreciation of context, and especially, the South African 
experience with its troubled history, is important.  It makes one less hesitant to retain the plinth 
and to replace the monument that sits upon it so as to achieve a solution that better represents 
the aspirations of a modern society with transformed values and legitimate demands.  
 2.3  THE METHODOLOGY OF THE COMMISSION 
In its enquiry into small claims procedures, the Commission approached the research question 
quite widely by drawing on a number of sources: 
(a) submissions from select members of the legal profession, and other public interest 
groups and individuals;13 and 
(b) comparative research.  
A glaring lacuna in the Commission’s research methodology was that of wide public 
consultation. For example, there were no public hearings on the matter, and there was no 
participation by non-governmental organisations.14 Today, of course, one can hardly think of 
the government passing legislation with limited public participation.15 If one thinks of the small 
claims court as the most basic court of first access for the person in the street, then it seems 
rather strange that the ordinary citizen did not have a say in the shape and form that small claims 
courts would take. 
                                                             
13 Report § 1.2 states:  
‘Pursuant to its terms of reference the Commission solicited and received many submissions mostly from 
judges, advocates, attorneys, magistrates, teachers of law.’ 
14  The Black Sash is an example of a non-governmental organization that operated during the time and had 
enormous grassroots experience working with underprivileged communities. See 
http://www.blacksash.org.za/index.php/our-legacy/our-history (last accessed on 1 March 2015). 
15 King ‘Principles of Good Law’ Good Law Project Report II (2016) 14-17.  
 
 35 
What is also axiomatic from the Report is the lack of qualitative or empirical research of any 
kind. The Commission drew conclusions from the opinions of certain key and influential 
members of the legal profession (predominantly male) and attached quite a lot of probative 
value to their experiences.16 This is problematic, because these individuals – many of whom 
would later go on to have distinguished careers in the legal profession culminating in 
appointments as justices of the Appellate Division, the Supreme Court of Appeal17 and later, 
the Constitutional Court – would themselves today agree that they did not represent a cross-
section of South African society.  
The consultation process reveals a number of shortcomings: a distinct lack of black voices; a 
dearth of female voices; and the absence of public interest representations by non-governmental 
and civic organisations. The latter would have been engaging with communities at a grassroots 
level, and would have had a good assessment of issues confronting people in everyday disputes, 
especially in the various townships in South Africa.18 Yet, the Report does not reflect their 
participation. 
Because small claims procedures were already recognised in several world jurisdictions,19 the 
Commission sent a deputation consisting of the chair of the Commission and the Commission’s 
chief researcher (referred to in the Report as ‘the deputation’) to England and to three cities in 
the United States.20 England was an obvious choice:  South African civil procedure is based on 
English civil procedure.21 The United States was also a good jurisdiction to explore, because 
                                                             
16 Report §5.2-5.25. 
17 See n2.  
18 See Hund, Kotu-Rommopo ‘Justice in a South African Township: The Sociology of Makgotla’ (1983) 16 
CILSA 179. 
19 Report §1.3.  
20 Report §1.3, 1.4. 
21 Paleker (n2) 343ff; see Erasmus ‘The Interaction of Substantive Law and Procedure’ in Zimmerman, Vissser 
(eds) Southern Cross 149ff. 
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the United States had, and continues to have, a strong and long history of recognising small 
claims courts in its various states.22 
In England the deputation attended arbitration proceedings in connection with small claims in 
the County Court of Bolton, near Manchester.23 In the United States, the deputation visited the 
Small Claims Division of the Civil Court of New York; the Special Pro-Se Branch of the Small 
Claims Court of the First Municipal District of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Chicago; and 
the Small Claims Court of the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District, 
California.24 In England and the United States, the deputation also met with legal practitioners, 
law school lecturers, and other persons from research institutes and the business sector.25 These 
interactions are summarised in various parts of the Report.  
2.4  THE COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Hoexter Commission found that, despite arguments to the contrary, a ‘strong 
preponderance of opinion’ favoured the creation of small claims courts.26 The Commission 
stated that it was: 
‘the clear view of the Commission that in South Africa there is a crying need for a small claims 
court; and indeed, that in regard to this particular aspect of the administration of justice the 
South judicial system has lagged behind other countries too far and too long.’27 
 
While the Commission acknowledged that there was no universal model that could simply be 
adopted,28  it noted that a significant proportion of the developed world had small claims 
                                                             
22 The first small claims court in North America was established in 1913 in Cleveland, Ohio. See Steele ‘The 
Historical Context of Small Claims Courts’ (1981) 6 Law & Social Inquiry 293ff, and see Patry, Stinson, Smith 
Evaluation of the Nova Scotia Small Claims Court Final – Report to the Nova Scotia Law Reform Commission 
Saint Mary’s University 8.  This was followed by the court in Massachusetts in 1920. Today virtually every State 
in the United States has a small claims court: see Ison ‘Small Claims’ (1972) 35 Modern Law Review 37. 
23 Report §1.3. 
24 Report §1.3. 
25 Report §1.4; 1.5. 
26 Report §12.1. 
27 Report §12.2. 
28 Report §13.1.  
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procedures,29 and consequently, South Africa needed to follow suit.  The procedures of the 
small claims courts, said the Commission, would be novel in terms of entrenching several non-
conventional and non-traditional legal concepts of civil trial procedure.30  
Significantly, the Commission recommended that the small claims courts had to be rolled out 
in a phased program.31 It was felt that small claims courts had to be piloted on a limited scale 
to see their impact on the civil justice system. The Commission felt that it was necessary to ‘test 
the waters’, as it were, before jumping in with full-scale nationwide changes. 32  The 
Commission envisaged that there would be a small claims court in all the densely populated 
metropolitan areas. It recommended, however, the creation of ‘ad hoc circuits’ in small 
centres. 33  The Commission identified ‘small centres’ as rural districts that ‘are large and 
sparsely populated.’  The Commission stated:  
‘Some system of ad hoc circuits will have to be devised to bring a small claims court from the 
city to the country from time to time.’34 
The specific recommendations of the Commission were as follows: 
(a) The small claims courts would be separate and independent tribunals functioning at lower 
court level. They would be established by separate statute and not by means of amendments 
to the MCA. The procedure of the courts would be regulated by their own set of rules. The 
courts would be under the administrative responsibility of the Minister of Justice.35 
                                                             
29 See chapters 6 to 11 of the Report. 
30 Report §12.3. 
31 Report §14.6. 
32 Report §14.7 states: ‘The Commission accordingly recommends that … a start be made by way of pilot projects 
operating in three large metropolitan areas, each such area respectively having – 
(a) a predominantly White 
(b) a predominantly Black 
(c) a predominantly Coloured or Asiatic  
[population group].’  
On the merits of pilot schemes in the realm of civil procedure, see Johnson ‘Promising Institutions: A synthesis 
Essay in Cappelletti, Weisner Vol I Book II Access to Justice 901.  
33 Report §14.5. 
34 Report §14.5. 
35 Report §14.3(m). 
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(b) The processes and procedures of the courts would be characterised by simplicity, speed 
and inexpensiveness.36 The Commission thought that a simple and inexpensive process 
was necessary to reflect the small value of the claims.37 The Commission also envisioned 
litigants to be poor, uneducated and unsophisticated people and hence, it was important for 
the processes and procedures not to present an obstacle to people engaging the courts.38  
At this juncture it has to be noted that the welfare of litigants was not the only consideration 
that motivated the Commission to recommend a simplified, speedy and inexpensive 
process; cost to the State was a critical consideration. To this extent, it was stated: 
‘The Commission takes the view that the small claims court should be a forum which is 
inexpensive not only in terms of the cost to the litigants appearing before it, but also in terms of 
the financial burden which the State will have to shoulder in establishing and administering it.’39 
(c) Paperwork would be kept to an ‘absolute minimum’.  The only pleadings required would 
be ‘a simple notice’. Aside from a simple court docket, there would be no written memorial 
of proceedings. 40 
(d) The plaintiff’s notice of claim would be served personally on the defendant. The defendant 
would be required to appear in person at the court on the date set for the trial and present 
his or her defence, if any. The defendant would also be permitted to file a counterclaim 
against the plaintiff.  In the notice, the defendant had to be informed that if he or she failed 
to appear at court, default judgment would be taken, and that this would result in the 
initiation of proceedings to execute the judgment.41 
                                                             
36 Report §14.3(a). 
37 Report §14.3. 
38 Report §13.1.  
39 Report §13.31. 
40 The Commission accepted that the ‘only pleading required of a plaintiff should be a “notice” pleading in very 
simple form; that no formal plea by the defendant should be required; and that the defendant should not be required 
to make any appearance at the small claims court before the day of the actual trial.’ See Report §13.20. 
41 Report §14.3(d). 
 
 39 
(e) Legal representation would not be permitted in the courts.42 The Commission thought that 
this was in line with international trends and marked a critical step in terms of making the 
courts more affordable for litigants. 
(f) The small claims courts would not be courts of record.43 The primary motivation behind 
this recommendation was to reduce the financial burden on the State in administering small 
claims courts.44  If the small claims courts had been courts of record, the courts would 
presumably have required expensive recording equipment, and perhaps the services of 
stenographers. The Commission clearly did not want to impose such costs on the State.  
(g) The small claims courts would be open to all litigants irrespective of race or colour.45 This 
recommendation was significant, considering that segregation in the lower courts was rife. 
In the 1980s the civil divisions of the magistrates’ courts were not open to black people. 
People classified as coloured, Indian and Asian could litigate civil matters in the 
magistrates’ courts, alongside white people. However, black people had to litigate their 
matters in front of ‘Commissioners Courts’ established in terms of the Black 
Administration Act46. 
                                                             
42  Report §14.3(k). 
43 Report §14.3(b). 
44 At §13.31 of the Report the following is stated: 
‘The Commission takes the view that the small claims court should be a forum which is inexpensive not 
only in terms of the cost to the litigants appearing before it, but also in terms of the financial burden which 
the State will have to shoulder in establishing and administering it. Accordingly the Commission accepts 
as a matter of principle that the small claims court should not be a court of record.’ (Italics supplied). 
45 Report §14.3(e). At §13.45 the following is stated: 
‘The Commission accepts as a fundamental principle that the small claims courts should be open to 
litigants irrespective of race and colour. Although the small claims court will form of the system of lower 
courts, it will be separate from and exist independently of the magistrates’ courts. It follows that in respect 
of persons the jurisdiction of the small claims court will not be ousted by section 17(4) of the Black 
Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927); and that the small claims court will have jurisdiction also in 
cases in which both parties are Blacks.’  




(h) The small claims courts would not make any award of costs as between party and party.47 
The costs claimable by the plaintiff would be limited to a modest filing fee48 in respect of 
his or her notice of claim, plus a sum sufficient to cover the cost of service on the defendant. 
The recommendation that a costs order should not be permitted was consonant with the 
Commission’s recommendation that legal representation should not be permitted. 
(i) Only a natural person would be permitted to sue in the small claims court. Furthermore, 
actions based on cession claims would not be permitted. The question of jurisdiction would 
be determined by having regard to where the defendant lived, worked, or carried on 
business.49  
(j) The monetary jurisdiction of the court would be for claims of R750 or less.50 
(k) If a dispute fell within the jurisdiction of the small claims court, the plaintiff would be 
permitted to elect to proceed either in the small claims court or in any other ‘conventional 
court.’  The plaintiff would reserve the right to make the election and once he or she elected 
to sue in the small claims court, the defendant was obliged to submit to its jurisdiction.51 
                                                             
47 South Africa generally subscribes to a winner-takes-all system of cost recovery. The successful party to litigation 
is entitled to recover fees determined in terms of the tariff tables attached to rules of court. The Uniform Rules of 
Court of the High Courts and the Magistrates’ Courts Rules each have their own table of tariffs for litigation in the 
respective courts. At the time of judgment, the court has wide discretion to make a costs order. The courts, 
generally award costs party-party, although the courts can award attorney-client or even attorney-own-client costs. 
Party-party costs are the reasonable and necessary costs incurred by the successful party, whereas attorney-client 
costs, also determined in terms of the tariff tables, constitute a slightly higher award and is made where a party 
can show his or her entitlement to such costs (for example, that he or she is entitled to such costs in terms of a 
prior contractual arrangement), or where the court feels that it should award such costs as a punitive measure 
(because the unsuccessful party abused the courts process, for example).  Attorney-own client costs entitles the 
successful party to recover the full amount of costs that he or she would be liable for in terms of the fee agreement 
with his or her attorney. Such costs are awarded in exceptional cases  (for example, a particularly egregious abuse 
of the court’s process). See generally Cilliers Law of Costs; Francis-Subbiah Taxation of Legal Costs in South 
Africa. 
48 The filing fee was paid by appending a revenue stamp to the notice commencing action. It must noted that with 
effect from 31 March 2009 the Stamp Duty Act 77 of 1968 was repealed. This effectively brought an end to the 
payment of any court filing fees. Today one can file a suit in any court free of charge. See GN 360 GG 32059 of 
27 March 2007. 
49 Report §14.3(g). 
50 Report §14.3(h). 
51 Report §14.3(i). 
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(l) If the court found that the claim involved complex issues of law or fact, it could refuse to 
entertain the action. The plaintiff would then have recourse to the ordinary courts.52 
(m) As a surrogate for legal representation, the Commission recommended that the service of 
a legal assistant should be made available free of charge at the seat of each court to provide 
assistance and legal advice to litigants. It was envisaged that the legal assistants would be 
fulltime salaried legal graduates or suitably qualified paralegals. The plaintiff’s notice of 
claim would expressly inform the defendant that pre-trial assistance was available. It was 
recommended that the defendant had to be orally informed of this fact at the time when the 
notice was served on the defendant. A simple brochure had to be available at the court, 
describing the purpose and procedures of the court, and emphasising the low cost of using 
it.53 
(n) The presiding judicial officer in the small claims court, ‘the adjudicator’, would not be a 
member of the civil service. He54 or she would preside at hearings on an ‘ad hoc’ basis and 
not in a permanent capacity. The ‘adjudicator’ would be an unpaid volunteer making his 
or her services available on a regular basis.  The adjudicator would be drawn from the 
ranks of qualified lawyers who had to have considerable experience in legal practice as 
advocates or attorneys.55 
(o) The procedure of the courts was to be inquisitorial in nature and not adversarial. The 
adjudicator would assume a multiplicity of roles:  mediator, counsel for the plaintiff, 
counsel for the defendant, arbitrator and adjudicator. As adjudicator, he or she had to 
engage in an investigative role of both fact-finder and decision-maker.56 Although the 
                                                             
52 Report §14.3(j). 
53 Report §14.3(l). 
54 The report refers to the male pronoun ‘he’. It can be argued that the Commission had not intended to exclude 
females from serving in the courts. However, it must be noted that at the time when the Report was written, there 
were very few female judicial officers in South Africa. 
55 Report §14.3(n). 
56 Report §14.3(o). 
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adjudicator could act as a mediator, and in that capacity encourage settlement, the 
Commission noted: ‘the primary function of the small claims court will be the resolution 
of disputed claims through a process of adjudication’.57 
(p) The proceedings had to be conducted in a ‘relaxed atmosphere.’58  The adjudicator, at the 
time of hearing a matter, would be free to adopt any method of procedure, which he or she 
considered to be convenient and fair to both parties. Consequently, the rules of evidence 
had to be relaxed.59 
(q) Undefended claims would also be entertained by the small claims courts. However, default 
judgment would only be granted after the plaintiff proved his or her entitlement on the 
merits and quantum of the claim.60 
(r) Upon the granting of judgment, the adjudicator would have the power to immediately hold 
a financial inquiry and require the debtor to give evidence as to his or her financial position 
under oath. Where necessary, the Commission recommended, the clerk of the small claims 
court could issue a provisional writ in order to secure the attachment of the debtor’s 
movable assets in case he or she should default in making payment.61 
(s) All hearings would happen in open court, unless both parties requested the adjudicator to 
conduct proceedings in private.62  
(t) The small claims courts would function, ‘so as far as possible, to meet the convenience of 
the litigants.’ Although claims would be filed with the clerk of the court and legal 
assistance and advice by the court staff would be available at court during ordinary office 
                                                             
57 Report §14.3(p). 
58 Report §14.3(o). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Report §14.3(q). 
61 Report §14.3(r). 
62 Report §14.3(s). 
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hours, ‘actual hearings will be conducted in the evening and outside of ordinary office 
hours.’ 63 
(u) There would be no appeal from the decisions of the small claims courts. An aggrieved 
party was to be given a limited right of review to the ‘Supreme Court’ (now the High 
Court).64 
With these recommendations in place, the stage was now set for the government to take up the 
cudgels and to embark on a process that would lead to the realisation of small claims courts in 
South Africa. As will be seen in the next chapter it did not take the government long to act on 
the recommendations of the Commission. 
                                                             
63 Report §14.3(t). 




SMALL CLAIMS COURTS DURING THE PERIOD 1983 TO THE PRESENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
ven before the government could act on the recommendations of the Hoexter 
Commission (‘the Commission’), the provincial law societies and the Association of 
Law Societies welcomed the proposal to establish small claims courts. The legal fraternity 
organised symposia to publicise small claims courts and lauded them for providing ‘accessible, 
speedy, inexpensive, simple to use, and fair’ justice.1 More than that, the legal fraternity viewed 
small claims courts as a kind of conscience cleansing opportunity. To this extent, it was noted: 
‘[t]he recommendations raise exciting prospects for a fairer deal for the litigant with a small claim, and 
present the practising lawyer with an excellent opportunity to perform a community service2 which will 
enhance the status of the profession and will dispel much existing bias.’3 
This chapter will look at the period 1983 to the present. History is perhaps the best judge of the 
successes and failures of the past and a powerful mirror to ensure that the foibles of yesteryear 
are not repeated in the future. 
 
3.2 THE ANNOUNCEMENT  
On 19 October 1983, the legal profession displayed its enthusiasm to embrace small claims 
courts at a conference on ‘Adapting the Law for Inflation’ which was organised by the Institute 
of Foreign and Comparative Law at the University of South Africa. At the conference, the then 
Minister of Justice, Mr HJ Coetsee announced in his opening address that Cabinet had in 
principle accepted the Commission’s recommendation for the establishment of small claims 
courts. The audience of approximately one hundred strong, consisting of judicial officers, 
                                                             
1 ‘Editorial’ (September 1982) De Rebus 399 
2 The Hoexter Commission recommended that the small claims courts would be presided over by adjudicators who 
would be drawn from the ranks of the attorneys and advocates profession on a voluntary basis. See Report § 




members of the profession and law academics, welcomed the announcement, and so did the 
country’s newspapers.4 If pictorial manifestations are anything to go by, the January 1984 
edition of De Rebus caricatured small claims courts in the following way: 
 
However one wishes to interpret the cartoon, it is clear that the small claims courts were 
perceived as diminutive courts, not quite measuring up to the other institutional courts. In some 
sense, the pictorial was a portent of things to come. 
3.3 SMALL CLAIMS COURTS ACT 61 OF 1984 
Within a year of the announcement of Cabinet’s endorsement of small claims courts, Parliament 
passed the SCCA,5 which came into operation on 30 August 1985. Speakers in the House of 
Assembly, on the second reading, lauded the Small Claims Courts Bill as an ‘important and 
historic advancement in the administration of justice in South Africa.’6 In line with the Hoexter 
Commission’s recommendation, pilot courts were established in Johannesburg, Pretoria, 
Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Cape Town, Springs, Port Elizabeth, and Rustenberg. The 
government envisaged that over the next few months and years, it would extend small claims 
courts incrementally.7 
                                                             
4 Sanders ‘News and Views’ (January 1984) De Rebus 13.  
5 61 of 1984. 
6 Scott-Macnab ‘The Legal Profession’s Declining Image: Is there a Better Way?’ (January 1987) De Rebus 27. 
7 Coertse ‘Howe vir Klein Eise’ (August 1985) De Rebus 396.  
 
 46 
Anatomically, the SCCA consists of a definitions section and ten chapters. The Act contains 
the empowering provisions for the establishment of the courts.8 Additionally and significantly, 
it deals with the qualification requirements of presiding officers and the appointment of 
presiding officers,9 the rules of jurisdiction,10 procedure and evidence,11 judgment and costs,12 
and the execution and enforcement of court orders.13 As far as procedure is concerned, the Act 
sets out the rules of procedure in broad-brush strokes. In contrast to the procedure in all of the 
other courts, 14  the Act declares that the presiding officer ‘shall proceed inquisitorially to 
ascertain the relevant facts, and to that end, the presiding officer may question any party or 
witness at any stage of proceedings.’15 This is in stark contrast to the adversarial nature of 
litigation in all the other courts in the land.16 
It is significant that the monetary jurisdictional limit of the small claims courts was set at R1 
000.17 The significance is underscored by the fact that on 2 May 1984 the monetary jurisdiction 
of the magistrates’ courts changed from R1 500 to R3 000 in respect of all illiquid claims and 
to R10 000 in respect of liquid claims and liquid documents.18 In numerical terms, the small 
claims courts’ monetary jurisdiction was 1/3 (33.3%) of the monetary jurisdiction of the 
magistrates’ courts. Even though the small claims courts’ monetary jurisdiction is fifteen times 
higher today (R15 000)19 than it was in 1984, the present monetary jurisdiction of the small 
claims courts is paltry (1/13.33 or 7.5%) relative to the jurisdiction of the district magistrates’ 
                                                             
8 SCCA, ss 2-7. 
9 SCCA, ss 8-11. See chapter 5.  
10 SCCA, ss 12-24. See chapter 6. 
11 SCCA, ss 26-33. See chapter 8. 
12 SCCA, ss 34-37. See chapter 9. 
13 SCCA, ss 38-44. See chapter 9. 
14 Where the procedure is adversarial.  
15 SCCA, s 26(3). See chapter 8. 
16 Paleker ‘Fact and Truth-Finding in the South African Civil Procedure’ in Uzalec and van Rhee (eds) Truth and 
Efficiency in Civil Litigation – Fundamental Aspects of Fact-finding and Evidence-taking in a Comparative 
Context 190-91. 
17 Coertse (n7) 397. 
18 Magistrates’ Courts Amendment Act 56 of 1984. 
19 In terms of GN R185 in GG 37450 of 18 March 2014, with effect from 1 April 2014 the monetary jurisdiction 
of the small claims court is R15 000. 
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courts, which currently stands at R200 000.20 The monetary jurisdiction of the small claims 
courts between 1985 and 2016 did not keep up (in real terms) with the rampant cost of litigation 
and wider demands for access to justice. Monetary jurisdiction will be discussed in more detail 
in chapter 6. 
 
A further feature of the Act is that it excludes legal professionals from being able to represent 
litigants in the courts.21 In its deliberations, the Commission paid extensive attention to the issue 
of legal representation. While some foreign jurisdictions allowed for legal representation in 
small claims courts, the Commission noted that there were a significant number that did not.22 
In the mind of the Commission, the arguments against legal representation were in keeping with 
the ethos of small claims courts, namely to foster speedy and cost-effective access to justice. 
The inclusion of legal professionals ran the risk of matters becoming protracted and expensive. 
The inquisitorial nature of proceedings was further reason for prohibiting representation by 
legal professionals.23 
3.4 SMALL CLAIMS COURTS RULES 
The SCCRs were published on 30 August 1985.24 The SCCRs accompany the SCCA. Whereas 
the Act sets out the rules of procedure in broad-brush strokes, the SCCRs contain the nitty-
gritty aspects of procedure. They also contain a set of precedent forms25 and a table of tariffs 
and costs.26 
                                                             
20 In terms of GN 217 in GG 37477 of 27 March 2014, with effect from 1 June 2014, the monetary jurisdiction of 
the district magistrates courts is up to R200 000 and the regional magistrates’ courts is from R200 000 to R400 
000. 
21 SCCA, s 7(2). 
22 Report § 9.6.2, 9.15.2, 9.15.3, 10.2.7, 10.3.10, 10.4.9; 10.5.8; 11.8. 
23 Report §13.9. For further discussion see chapter 8.  
24 Rules Regulating Matters in respect of Small Claims Courts GN R1893 in GG 9909 of 30 August 1985 as 
amended by GN R851 in GG 13178 of 19 April 1991. 
25 SCCRs, Annexure 1.  
26 SCCR, Annexure 2. 
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According to the SCCA,27 the Minister of Justice is responsible for making rules regulating the 
following aspects of the small claims courts: 
‘(a)  The practice and procedure, including the procedure when proceedings are reviewed; 
(b)  fees and costs; 
(c)  the duties and powers of officers of the court; 
(d)  the establishment, duties and powers of one or more [advisory] boards28 to advise the 
Minister on the functioning of courts; 
(e)  any other matter which he may consider necessary or expedient to prescribe for carrying 
out the provisions of this Act or the attainment of its objects.’ 
The SCCRs are thus delegated legislation and, as such, cannot exceed the provisions of 
the SCCA in scope and in breadth. If they did so, the rules would be ultra vires and 
invalid.29  
Whilst there was nothing inherently wrong with conferring power on the Minister to 
make rules for the small claims courts, it is noteworthy that the SCCRs have only been 
amended once since their inception. The last amendment to the SCCRs was in 1991 – 
some 27 years ago. This is in sharp contrast to the rules in the other courts, which have 
been consistently and routinely amended by the Rules Board for Courts of Law in terms 
of its mandate set down by the Rules Board for Courts of Law Act.30  
                                                             
27 Section 25(1). Section 25 will be amended by s 15 of Judicial Matters Amendment Act 8 of 2017. The Act has 
not yet come into operation. In the future the Rules Board for Courts of Law will make rules for the small claims 
courts. 
28 The role and purpose of advisory board will be discussed later.  
29 Ex parte Christodolides 1953 (2) SA 192 (T); Gross v Commercial Union Assurance Co Ltd  1974 (1) SA 630 
(A) at 634D; United Reflective Converters (Pty) Ltd v Levine 1988 (4) SA 460 (W); Minister of Safety and Security 
v Kekana 1996 (2) All SA 324 (W); Harmony Caterers (Pty) Ltd v Ford 2002 (5) SA 536 (W). 
30 107 of 1985. In terms of s 6(1) of the Act: 
‘The Board may, with a view to the efficient, expeditious and uniform administration of justice in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court of South Africa and the Lower Courts, from time to time on a 
regular basis review existing rules of court and, subject to the approval of the Minister, make, amend or 
repeal rules for the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court of South Africa and the Lower Courts 
regulating– 
(a) the practice and procedure in connection with litigation, including the time within which and the 
manner in which appeal shall be noted; 
(b) the form, contents and use of process; 
(c) the practice and procedure in connection with the service of process or other documents, including 
the issue of interrogatories; 
(d) the practice and procedure in connection with the execution of process, including writs and warrants; 
(e) the practice and procedure in connection with the reference of any matter to a referee under section 
38 of the Superior Courts Act, 2013, and the remuneration payable to any such referee; 
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3.5 CREEPING PROBLEMS 
The enthusiasm, optimism, and fanfare soon subsided as cracks started appearing in the fabric 
of small claims courts, causing one commentator to lament that the small claims courts had 
been received with ‘enthusiasm and a naive joy’.31 A ‘fatal flaw’32 in the procedural mechanism 
of small claims courts was that successful plaintiffs were required to go through the ordinary 
magistrates’ courts’ judgment and execution procedures in order to enforce orders of the small 
claims courts.33 The enforcement of small claims orders via the machinery of the ordinary 
magistrates’ courts meant that while the plaintiff incurred almost no expense and enjoyed 
relatively speedy justice in the small claims court, he or she had to expend both money and time 
to have the judgment enforced. Scott-Macnab stated the problem as follows: 
‘The question of compliance and enforcement has plagued small claims procedures wherever they have 
been instituted. It is really only the threat of the plaintiff proceeding further with the complicated and 
                                                             
(f) the compulsory examination by one or more registered medical practitioners of any party to 
proceedings in which damages or compensation in respect of alleged bodily injury is claimed and 
whose state of health is relevant for the determination of such damages or compensation, as well as 
the manner, time, place and responsibility for the cost of the examination, and the making available 
to the opposing party of any documentary report on the examination; 
(g) the procedure at or in connection with any enquiry as to the mental state of any person, and the 
findings or orders which may be made or issued at any such enquiry; 
(h) the appointment and admission of commissioners to take evidence and examine witnesses; 
(i) the manner in which documents executed outside the Republic may be authenticated to permit of 
their being produced or used in any court or produced or lodged in any public office in the Republic; 
(j) the appointment and admission of sworn translators; 
(k) the duties of sheriffs and other officers of court; 
(l) fees and costs, including the fees payable in respect of the service or execution of process (except 
subpoenas or warrants issued at the request of the State in criminal matters) or in respect of the 
summoning of persons to answer interrogatories; 
(m) the manner of determining the amount of security in any case where it is required that security shall 
be given, and the form and manner in which such security may be given; 
(n) the hours during which the offices of registrars and clerks of the court shall be open for official 
purposes; 
(o) the manner or recording or noting evidence and proceedings; 
(p) the custody and disposal of records or minutes of evidence and proceedings in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and the High Court of South Africa; 
(q) the appointment of assessors in proceedings in lower courts; 
(r) the tariff of fees chargeable by advocates, attorneys and notaries; 
(s) the taxation of bills of costs and the recovery of costs; 
(t) generally any matter which may be necessary or useful to be prescribed for the proper despatch and 
conduct of the functions of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court of South Africa and the 
Lower Courts in civil as well as in criminal proceedings.’ 
31 Scott-Macnab ‘The Legal Profession’s Declining Image: Is there a Better Way’ De Rebus (January 1987) 27. 
32 Scott-Macnab (n31) 27. 
33 For the provisions of s 41 of the SCCA. See chapter 9. 
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traditional enforcement and execution procedures that may, and I repeat may, secure compliance with the 
judgment. It has been found that plaintiffs can do little else besides taking civil action or transferring to a 
magistrates’ court where the defendant fails to comply with an order of the commissioner of the small 
claims court. The plaintiff must also pay in advance for the [sheriff] of the court to serve summons and 
execute against the defendant.  It, therefore, can be a disquieting spectacle to see rows of disconsolate 
successful small claims plaintiffs wrestling with the problem of whether to proceed with the enforcement 
of their claims by transferring to the magistrates’ courts. Even then, of course, if the defendant has 
nothing, they will get nothing.’34 
The legislature was also criticised for failing to contemplate alternative methods of dispute 
resolution, such as mediation, as opposed to judicially imposed court orders and traditional 
enforcement techniques.35 
A further issue that was identified was the lack of proper backup for court administration.36 The 
small claims courts were dependent on the infrastructure and the personnel of the magistrates’ 
courts to fulfill their function.37 Magistrates’ courts staff, it was felt, did not consider the 
administration of the small claims courts a priority. Their primary responsibility was to service 
the ordinary magistrates’ courts, and their performance was evaluated on that basis. This meant 
that their hearts were not in the small claims courts. Commentators called for the small claims 
courts to be given their own personnel and a proper budget, and argued that they should not 
operate in the shadow of the magistrates’ courts. After all, the small claims court was 
established as a separate and distinct court.38 
To exacerbate matters, there was a perceived lack of enthusiasm on the part of many attorneys 
to serve as judicial officers (commissioners) in the small claims courts.39 The reasons advanced 
for the lack of eagerness are not clear. Statistical information40 from the time, however, paints 
                                                             
34 Scott-Macnab (n31) 27. For further discussion on the problems relating to the enforcement of small claims 
judgments, see chapter 9.  
35 Scott-Macnab ‘Mediation Prior to Small Claims Litigation: A Human Approach’ (November 1987) 619.  
36 Kuny ‘Legal Redress for All – The Small Claims Court’ (December 2001) Advocate 22 at 23. 
37 Scott-Macnab (n31) 27 quotes Mr Geyser, president of the Natal Law Society who said that the legal fraternity 
had detected that the small claims courts did not have the administrative back-up to cope with debt collecting.  
38 Kuny (n36) 23. For further discussion on court administration see chapter 4.  
39 Botha ‘Small Claims Courts’ (February 1994) De Rebus 87.  See also Kuny (n36) 23.  
40 As at September 1992 there were approximately 358 serving commissioners for 23 and towns in the Cape 
Province. In the Orange Free State, 92 commissioners sat in 13 centres. The Transvaal had 318 commissioners. 
Cumulatively they heard approximately 750 cases a month: see Editorial (n3) 583.  
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a slightly difference picture – a significant number of attorneys were serving the courts with 
distinction. However, some commissioners complained that the jurisdiction of the court was 
too high, 41  resulting in an ever-increasing number of cases and the overburdening of 
commissioners.  This they said caused reluctance amongst many attorneys to serve as 
commissioners. In a letter to the Editor in De Rebus the position was stated as follows: 
‘It was explained in the letter that the particular town was experiencing a reluctance on the part of 
attorneys to serve as commissioners, with the result that that few that were still willing to serve were still 
overburdened with work. The letter warned that, if this trend were to continue, a real danger existed that 
no commissioners would be available, with the result that this very important service could not be 
rendered to members of the public. 
The letter further explained that the whole purpose of these courts was to render a service to a part of the 
population that could not afford legal services and for that reason the attorneys’ profession has been keen 
to assist. 
With the increase in the jurisdiction of the court, matters are now heard which are not really “small” 
claims. It was noted that in more and more cases people who could in fact afford legal services were 
subjecting their claims to the small claims court in order to establish a principle. Claimants also reduce 
their claims to be able to bring them before the small claims court. 
The suggestion was then made that commissioners be remunerated for their services.’42 
At the time when this letter was written, the jurisdiction of the small claims courts had been 
increased to R2 000. The jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts was R20 000 in respect of 
illiquid claims and R50 000 in respect of liquid documents, liquidated claims and claims based 
on credit agreements. Bearing these thresholds in mind, it is strange that the writer viewed 
claims in the small claims courts as ‘not really “small” claims’.  The letter fails to outline a 
                                                             
41 However, there were also contrary opinions. For example, Kuny (n36) 22 argued that the monetary jurisdiction 
of the small claims court was too little and argued that it should be increased from R3000 to R10 000. 
42  De Rebus (February 1994) 87. See also Badenhorst ‘Pressure mounts on existing small claims court 
commissioners’ (April 1998) De Rebus 23 wherein the writer states the following: 
‘I have ascertained from the clerk of one of these courts that the number of available commissioners has 
dwindled considerably, and that new appointments have not kept pace with an increase in cases. I am 
afraid that this serious shortage of commissioners may not be a local problem only. If drastic action is not 
forthcoming, resignations of commissioners may snowball which will jeopardise the existence of these 
courts. 
There may be various reasons for this situation. 
Government has not reacted to pleas of commissioners to be remunerated for their services or 
alternatively to be given some tax relief. Furthermore, the shorter intervals between hearings and the 
longer hours at hearings are taking their toll. This may have led to the spate of resignations by 
commissioners, who in many cases have done their share of service to the community by serving in this 
capacity for a long time.’ (Italics supplied).  
For a discussion of the relationship between small claims courts and legal fees see §6.7. 
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principled, structured argument as to why attorneys refused to serve in small claims courts. One 
must therefore question, in light of other statistical evidence available at the time, whether in 
fact attorneys were generally reluctant to serve as commissioners in the small claims courts for 
the reason advanced, or at all.  
A more pressing concern was the lack of adequate training for commissioners. In terms of the 
SCCA,43 the procedure of the small claims court was inquisitorial, and not adversarial. As noted 
before, this marked a significant departure from the conventional South African civil procedure, 
which is grounded in the adversarial tradition. Fear was expressed that if training was not 
offered, the adversarial model would inadvertently creep into the small claims courts.44 It was 
also argued that practitioners required training in areas of professionalism and judicial ethics.45 
A particularly perplexing question that arose concerned the extent to which small claims courts 
could adjudicate matters involving African customary law. Section 14(3) of the SCCA 
provided: 
‘Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law contained, a court may hear an action between 
Blacks as contemplated in section 10 of the Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927), and the 
court may at such hearing apply such Black law and custom as may be proved.’  
Professor Kerr identified two important questions as regards section 14(3): 
• ‘Does s 14(3)... mean that small claims courts are to function as Commissioners’ courts in respect of civil 
claims between black South Africans except in so far as special provision is made in the Small Claims Courts 
Act on such matters as jurisdiction (ss 14-16), the absence of representation (s 72), procedure and evidence 
(ss 26-8), the absence of a record (s 3(1)) and the absence of a right to appeal (s 45)?’46 
• ‘If one accepts that a small claims court may apply customary law what sources of that law are available to 
it? Section 14 refers to “such Black law and customs as may be proved”. A legislature which has prohibited 
representation and has required parties to appear in person (s 7(2) of the Small Claims Courts Act 1984) 
clearly relies on the presiding officer to know the law and to apply it. The legislature surely cannot have 
intended that the vast majority of litigants in cases involving customary law (all except those who are lawyers 
and who appear in person in their own matters) were to be placed in a position where they would lose their 
cases if they did not “prove” statutory rules, such as those in the statutes on succession ... , on land tenure... , 
and in the areas where they apply, the respective Codes of Zulu Law. Similarly, one cannot believe that the 
                                                             
43 Section 26(3). 
44 Van Loggerenberg ‘Die Hof van Klein Eise: Adversatief of Inkwisitories’ (July 1987) De Rebus 343.  
45  Nochumsohn ‘Johannesburg Small Claims Court “in disarray”’ (November 2005) De Rebus 7; Khumalo 
‘Unprofessional for small claims court commissioners to miss sittings’ (October 2000) De Rebus 11. 
46 Kerr ‘Customary Law in the Small Claims Courts’ (1984) 101 SALJ 726 at 727.  
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legislature intended legally untrained and unrepresented litigants to “prove” the decisions of the Appellate 
Division or the Appeal Court for Commissioners Courts and its predecessors.’47 
Fortunately, the aforementioned legal conundrums were resolved by s 23 of the General Law 
Amendment Act48 of 1992, which deleted s 14(3) of the SCCA. Today, there are no longer 
special commissioners’ courts for black people. As such, the small claims courts are in a similar 
position to any of the lower courts and may adjudicate small claims matters by application of 
African customary law, in so far as the matter falls within the general jurisdiction of the small 
claims courts. Like in any other small claims matter, it is the commissioner who bears the 
responsibility of establishing the applicable African customary legal principles that will apply 
to the factual scenario presented by the parties. 49   
3.6 2003 SMALL CLAIMS COURTS CONFERENCE  
In 2003, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, with the support of the 
then Deputy Minister of Justice,50 held a series of engagements with the legal profession and 
academia aimed at extending access to justice. Support for the small claims courts was 
identified as a project that could have a profound impact on access to justice.51 
In November 2003, the Department of Justice organised a small claims courts conference in 
Camps Bay, Cape Town. The Department invited selected members and organisations 
representing the legal profession, the judiciary, non-governmental institutions, academia and 
members of civil society. Delegates were divided into small working groups, which considered 
practical steps to improve the functioning of the small claims courts. The workshop proved to 
be useful in that it revealed teething problems. It is interesting to note that 2003 also saw the 
                                                             
47 Ibid 728. 
48 139 of 1992. 
49 For a discussion of the general jurisdiction of the small claims courts, see chapter 6.  
50 The Hon Ms C Gillwald.  
51 Gangen ‘Small Claims Courts Hear 20 000 Matters Despite Problems’ (June 2008) De Rebus 13. 
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dramatic increase in the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts from R3 00052 to R7 
000.53  
The primary product of the workshop was the adoption of a document titled ‘The Guideline and 
National Action Plan for the Small Claims Courts in South Africa’54 (hereinafter referred to as 
the ‘NAP’).  
3.7 NATIONAL ACTION PLAN (NAP) 
The NAP adopted at the 2003 conference identified ‘7 key result areas’ for improving the 
operations of small claims courts. To summarise, the NAP proposed that: 
• The legislation governing small claims courts had to be reconsidered. It was felt that there 
were aspects of the legislation that were in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution. 
The view was also expressed that the rules of procedure were too technical and should be 
simplified to enable the courts to achieve their objective of providing cheap and quick civil 
justice. Furthermore, the current legislation was lacking for failing to provide an appropriate 
administrative structure for the establishment, management and development of small 
claims courts throughout the country.55 
• Commissioners and court officials had to be properly trained. It was argued that 
commissioners should undergo training similar to the Department of Justice approved 
training that is received by magistrates. As far as court officials were concerned, delegates 
pointed out that many of them lacked professional training and this was evident from the 
chaotic nature in which the courts functioned.56 
                                                             
52 GN R1402 in GG 16661 of 15 September 1995 which came into operation on 1 October 1995. 
53 GN R313 in GG 26113 of 12 March 2004. 
54 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Guidelines and National Action Plan for the Small 
Claims Courts in South Africa. 
55 Ibid 35ff. 
56 Ibid 41ff. 
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• A training and information manual for commissioners and court officials had to be drafted.57 
• A public education and communication strategy had to be developed and adopted. Delegates 
thought it was mere lip service to talk about access to justice if people were unaware of how 
to access justice.58  
• A student internship program had to be developed. Law students wanting to volunteer or to 
perform community service should be permitted to work at the small claims courts. They 
could assist with the administration of the courts and, where possible, they could even staff 
information desks and help desks. Students could also play a role in public education by 
speaking to communities.59 It was common cause that the SCCA60 and SCCRs61 made 
provision for ‘legal assistants’ to assist litigants appearing in the small claims courts. None 
of the courts in the country had any assistants appointed. 
• Small claims courts had to be decentralised at a rural level. Delegates were concerned that 
the most marginalised groups were being denied justice simply because it was logistically 
impossible for them to access the courts. Ground experience revealed that people in rural 
areas often had to travel long distances to reach a court. This severely impacted on their 
ability to use the court. Delegates felt that if the constitutional guarantee of access to 
justice62 was to be realised, it was vital for the courts to go out to meet the people.63 
• A national steering committee had to be appointed to co-ordinate, manage and facilitate the 
                                                             
57 Ibid 13ff. 
58 Ibid 50ff. 
59 Ibid 44ff. 
60 Section 11(1). 
61 SCCR 5 sets out the duties of the ‘legal assistant’ as follows: 
‘(1)  The legal assistant shall render to any person who has so requested him advice in regard to any 
action which falls within the jurisdiction of the court. 
(2)  If he is so requested, the legal assistant shall render assistance with the drafting of the process of 
court. 
(3)  Any act to be performed by the legal assistant in terms of these Rules may be performed by the 
clerk of the court.’ 
62 Constitution, s 34. 
63 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Guidelines and National Action Plan for the Small 
Claims Courts in South Africa.  
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re-engineering of the courts. It was clear that the statutory-mandated advisory committees, 
which were supposed to regulate small claims courts across the country in the various 
provinces and magisterial districts, were ‘inefficient, dysfunctional, [and] inactive.’64 
3.8 NATIONAL STEERING COMMITTEE: SIGNIFICANT MILESTONES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS 
Following the recommendation of the delegates at the 2003 conference, and in line with the 
NAP, in 2005 the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development65 appointed a National 
Steering Committee for Small Claims Courts (‘the Steering Committee’). Its responsibility was 
to co-ordinate the revitalisation of small claims courts in South Africa. The Steering Committee 
was chaired by the Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development66 and consisted 
of: 
• A senior representative of the Department of Justice who was also the Chief Director of 
the small claims courts project; 
• two representatives of the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation; 
• a representative of the Pretoria Society of Advocates; 
• a representative of the Law Society of South Africa who also served as a cluster chair 
of a small claims courts committee; 
• a representative of the Eastern Cape Law Society who was also a practising attorney 
and a commissioner of the small claims courts; and  
• academic representatives for the various university law schools. 
 
The initial period of appointment of the Steering Committee was for five years. However, the 
                                                             
64 NAP (n54) 35ff; see also Department of Justice and Constitutional Development ‘Re-engineering Small Claims 
Courts’ Unpublished Report (June 2010) 5. 
65 The Hon B Mabandla. 
66 The Hon Adv J de Lange. 
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Steering Committee’s term was extended for three more consecutive periods. Its work 
eventually came to an end in 2014. Small claims courts currently fall under the Vulnerable 
Groups and Women Portfolio of the Department of Justice, which in turn falls within the Court 
Services branch of the Department of Justice.67 
Despite an initial slow start (principally because of fiscal control measures in respect of monies 
allocated to the Steering Committee) the Steering Committee accomplished several things 
during its period of operation. These include, inter alia: 
• The processing of funding from the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation to 
kick-start and maintain the small claims courts project. In 2007, the government of the 
Swiss Confederation represented by the Swiss Development Corporation (‘SDC’) reached 
an agreement with the South African government in terms of which the SDC undertook to 
provide a grant contribution of R4.5 million to assist with the implementation of the NAP. 
The grant was for a three-year period commencing in March 2007 and terminating in 
February 2010. The Department of Justice, in turn, agreed to provide a grant contribution 
of R3.1 million for operational costs during the three-year period.68 The Swiss were keen 
to partner with the South African government to improve access to justice for the poor. The 
small claims courts were identified as an ideal opportunity to realise this goal, and the Swiss 
involvement proved to be instrumental in fast-tracking the NAP.69 In August 2010, the 
funding agreement between the SDC and the government was extended until the end of 
2015.70 As will be seen below, the partnership proved to be a game-changer for revitalising 
the small claims courts. 
• The approval of a ten-year budget plan to organise, co-ordinate and manage the NAP. 
                                                             
67 Department of Justice Unpublished Report (n64) 6. 
68 Department of Justice Unpublished Report (n64) 5. 
69 Gangen (n51) 13. 
70 Manyathi-Jele ‘Additional R3 million boost for SCCs’ (July 2015) De Rebus 11.  
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• The appointment of a project manager and the setting up of a staffed project office. The 
purpose of the project office was to compile reports, convene meetings and workshops, give 
effect to the key results areas identified in the NAP, and deal with the day-to-day operational 
issues arising from the small claims courts. 
• Through the project office, the Steering Committee called for a national audit of all small 
claims courts in South Africa. The purpose of this audit was to elicit the following 
information: 
(i) The precise number of small claims courts in South Africa; 
(ii) the number of active advisory boards; 
(iii) the number of active commissioners; 
(iv) commissioner profiles with regard to gender and race; 
(v) the number of clerks, interpreters and security personnel available in each court; 
(vi) statistical information relating to the processing of court cases in terms of types of 
cases and case backlogs. 
(vii) information on court infrastructure; and  
(viii) general problems experienced at the courts.71 
Data was collected by sending questionnaires to advisory boards, magistrates and 
commissioners. The data was received by the project office and independently verified. The 
information gathered is a valuable source because it draws on data from every part of the 
country. As such, the data does not suffer the usual shortcoming of empirical research, namely, 
limited sampling and the consequent possibility of skewed research trends. The project office 
continued to collect and update data on a regular basis and this has proved to be enormously 
useful in terms of identifying trends in the courts over several years. Some of the data will be 
                                                             
71 Department of Justice Unpublished Report (n64) 7. 
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discussed in this thesis.72 
A notable shortcoming is that the Steering Committee did not gather customer-satisfaction 
information. It could have easily used its directive powers to gather such information. 
Customer-satisfaction information would have been useful in terms of determining people’s 
attitudes towards the courts in the various regions of South Africa.  
The Steering Committee identified a number of districts in South Africa where small claims 
courts were needed.  From very early on the Department of Justice indicated that it wanted 
every magisterial district in South Africa to have its own small claims court73 in accordance 
with the call: ‘One constituency, one small claims court.’74  By 19 May 2017 there were 405 
small claims courts in the country75 compared to the 151 courts that existed in 2003.76  This 
translates to a significant increase in small claims courts, especially in rural and peri-urban 
areas. 
                                                             
72 I am grateful to Mesdames F Thema, C Naude and T Ramnarain at the Department of Justice who assisted me 
with the information at their disposal. Relevant data is used in this thesis. 
73 Keynote Address by the Deputy Minister Of Department Of Justice And Constitutional Development: Mr A Nel 
(Mp) South African Women Lawyers Association (Sawla) National Agm: Gala Dinner : Protea Hotel, 
Bloemfontein; 21 March 2011. In this address the Deputy Minister said: 
‘As part of continuing efforts to improve the civil justice system, various new small claims courts were 
established during the 2009/10 financial year to bring the total number of these courts to 224. The target 
is to establish a small claims court for each of the 384 magisterial districts by 2014, subject to the 
rationalisation of the areas of jurisdiction of lower courts as explained above.’ 
For a copy of the speech see http://www.sawla.org.za/media_room/MEDIA_Dep_Min.pdf (last accessed on 20 
November 2016).  
74 See also Manyathi ‘Small Claims Commissioners undergo training’ (July 2010) De Rebus 12. 
75 See §4.2. 
76 Department of Justice Unpublished Report (n64) 11. 
The following table gives an indication of the slow pace of expansion of small claims courts in the 1990s. 
Source: Central Statistical Service Statistics of Civil Cases for Debt (January 1997).  
TABLE 1 – SMALL CLAIMS COURTS, LITIGANTS REFFERED, SUMMONSES ISSUED AND 
HEARINGS  
Item  1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 
Number   
Courts 120 113 111 109 106 103 92 
Litigants referred  21 230 20 154 20 101  19 502  18 906 16 857  16 474 
Summonses issued  27 463 24 905 25 112 24 929 24 942 19 520 16 551  




In 2008, the Department of Justice awarded a tender to a consultant firm to draft manuals for 
commissioners and court officials.  The manuals were produced and published in May 2010.77 
The purpose of these manuals was to provide commissioners and clerks with readily accessible 
information so that they could better fulfil their duties. While the Department of Justice must 
be complimented for the initiative, which undoubtedly assisted court officials to understand the 
processes and procedures of the small claims courts, it must be noted that the manuals are, by 
and large, commentaries on the SCCA and SCCRs and contain limited practical advice. The 
manuals do not, for example, give commissioners practical advice about how to gather and 
weigh evidence or how to engage with parties in a manner that reflects gender or cultural 
sensitivity. Similarly, the manual for clerks also lacks practical information.78 There is thus 
considerable room for the future improvement of these manuals.  
The Steering Committee constantly engaged in negotiations with Justice College79 to build 
capacity so that it could train commissioners and court officials.  During the period 2007 to 
2010, 114 commissioners were trained.80 Since then, the amount of training has petered out. 
                                                             
77 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Small Claims Courts: Guidelines for Commissioners 4. 
78 Department of Justice Unpublished Report (n64) 8 the following is observed: 
‘The manual for Clerks is essentially identical to the Commissioner manual.  However, given the fact that 
clerks are not legally qualified their manual would benefit from a plain language edit. Perhaps more 
importantly, a base document used by clerks on a daily basis, the Code Small Claims (sic), was identified 
by the NAP as being a critical source document to be used when drafting the manual. This does not appear 
to have occurred. Thought needs to be given to whether this gap could be addressed in future versions of 
the clerk manual.’ 
79 Justice College describes itself as follows: 
‘Justice College is a State Academy that is located within the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development. Our central focus is on offering a high quality, relevant expanded programme offering that 
is institutionalize to contribute to the DoJ&CD [Department of Justice and Constitutional Development) 
vision and strategic objectives. Our programmes are designed to offer functional skills that enhance 
participant’s knowledge, skill and behavioral [sic] competencies.’   For more information, see 
http://www.justice.gov.za/juscol/index.html#about-us (last accessed November 2016). 
80 Department of Justice Unpublished Report (n64) 9. See also Address by Mr Andries Nel, Deputy Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development at the training of Commissioners of Small Claims Courts in East 
London (http://www.gov.za/address-mr-andries-nel-deputy-minister-justice-and-constitutional-development-
training-commissioners - last accessed November 2016); Address by Mr Andries Nel, Deputy Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development at the opening of the Small Claims Court in Alexandra and the launch of the 
guidelines for Small Claims Court Commissioners and Clerks, held in Alexandra, Johannesburg 
(http://www.gov.za/address-mr-andries-nel-deputy-minister-justice-and-constitutional-development-opening-
small-claims - last accessed November 2016).  See also Manyathi (n74). 
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Today there are a considerable number of commissioners who have not received training at 
all.81  As regards court officials and clerks, Justice College seems to be doing a better job by 
offering a comprehensive five-day capacity building programme.82 
Where the Steering Committee has particularly fallen short is in the area of co-ordinating a 
student internship program. Soon after the 2003 Small Claims Courts Conference, the 
Universities of Cape Town, Western Cape and Stellenbosch all expressed interest to comply 
with the NAP and to make their law students available to serve as volunteers at the small claims 
                                                             
81 Choma in his article ‘The Small Claims Court and Accessible Quality Justice for All’ (2015) 42 (12) Journal of 
Social Science 59 at 62 asserts: 
‘The department provides education and training to both commissioners and Small Claims Courts clerks. 
Clerks were being trained on a continuous basis by the justice college.’ 
It would be appear from the above statement that more training is being offered to clerks than to commissioners.  
82 The purpose of the programme is to ensure that learners will know how to apply the provisions of the SCCA, in 
processing small claims court cases. The topics covered during the programme: 
• Jurisdiction, parties and practical exercise. 
• Introduction to Contract Law and Delict. 
• Letter of demand (plus case study). 
• Summons (plus case study plus how to use the register, time periods and procedure). 
• Review (plus case study, plus how to use the register, time periods and procedure). 




At the end of the programme a participate is expected to: 
• Apply the provisions of the Small Claims Court Act in processing Small Claims Court cases. 
• Have insight into the processing of Small Claims Court cases. 
• Assist, advise and facilitate the matters placed by members of the public and complete paperwork 
Participants are expected to engage in practical sessions and are evaluated at different times during the 5-day 
programme.  For more information, see http://www.justice.gov.za/juscol/f-lqj-01.html#lcp05 (accessed November 
2016).  
It is interesting to note that while the Justice College website has information about the training of commissioners, 
it has no information on the training of commissioners.  
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courts.83 The initiative never materialised.84 It must be noted, however, that during the period 
between August 2013 and October 2013, the University of Limpopo, in consultation with the 
Department of Justice, initiated a student-run mediation service in the small claims court of 
Mankweng. It would appear that the mediation service was relatively successful as more than 
50% of cases were resolved through mediation.85 
Another area that has not been particularly successful is public education. Some progress was 
made with the publication of pamphlets and brochures in all the official languages on the 
internet and in official buildings (such as courts and municipal offices).86 But, more work needs 
to be done, especially with regard to finding creative and novel means to communicate with 
                                                             
83 Letter by Prof HM Corder, Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town dated 22 April 2008 to the 
Office of Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development. In this letter the Dean confirmed that a 
meeting was held on 3 April 2008 in which Dean and the then Deputy Minister of Cheryl Gillwald discussed a 
student intern program at the small claims courts. The Dean, inter alia, stated: 
‘We are very pleased by your willingness to accommodate our students and hope that our students’ 
involvement in the activities of the courts will have a positive effect on the publics’ access to justice.’ 
See also Budget speech by Ms Brigitte Mabandla, MP, Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development, 
National Assembly, Parliament, 20 May 2005 in which the Minister said: 
‘We are also proud to announce that we have completed a National Plan of Action to transform and re-
engineer Small Claims Courts throughout South Africa. This is meant to ensure greater access to civil 
justice. We have formed a dynamic partnership with the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-
operation; the South African Law Society and tertiary institutions in order to pursue our blueprint for 
Small Claims Courts’: http://www.polity.org.za/article/b-mabandla-justice-dept-budget-vote-20052006-
20052005-2005-05-20 (last accessed on 20 November 2016). 
Subsequent meeting were also arranged by the University of Cape Town law faculty, the University of Western 
Cape, represented by Mr F Moosa, and the University of Stellenbosch, represented by Prof D Butler, in 
consultation with the Cape Law Society, represented by Mrs N Gangen.  
84 Department of Justice Unpublished Report (n64) 19-20. 
85 http://photos.state.gov/libraries/southafrica/56706/pdf-docs/AlumniConnexIssue8-March2014.pdf. (last 
accessed on 14 November 2016). 
86 Annexure 1 hereto contains some of the information material produced by the Department of Justice. See also 
http://www.justice.gov.za/scc/scc.htm (last accessed 14 November 2016); 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yvWjvZm1RfI&feature=youtu.be (last accessed 14 November 2016); 
http://www.justice.gov.za/scc/2007_SCC_poster_StepbyStepGuide_a3.pdf (last accessed on 14 November 
2016); http://www.justice.gov.za/scc/2010_scc-posterA1.pdf (last accessed on 14 November 2016);  
http://www.justice.gov.za/scc/docs/2010_sccpamphlet_final-web.pdf (last accessed on 14 November 2016). For 
multilingual information sheets in all eleven official languages see 
http://www.justice.gov.za/scc/docs/2008%20Small%20Claims%20Brochures_03%20zulu.pdf (last accessed on 
14 November 2014). A confusing aspect of the brochures on the Department of Justice’s website is that all the 
information brochures appear on the same page. This can easily confuse the public, because the jurisdictional 
amounts on the various brochures represent the amount at the time when the brochure was published. Unless one 
looks at the latest brochure, one could be confused about the jurisdictional limit of the court. It is submitted that 
the older brochures should be archived, and that only the latest and most relevant information should appear on 
the front page.  
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people who are functionally illiterate. While illiteracy levels are disputed in South Africa,87 
there is no doubt that a significant proportion of the population has difficulty with reading and 
writing.88 For these individuals, alternative methods of communication are necessary. This 
would include the use of television,89 radio,90 and internet multimedia platforms91 to convey 
information about small claims courts. 
For the duration that the Steering Committee functioned, it received numerous complaints92 
about the functioning of the courts. The most notable complaints were: 
• The small claims courts did not have dedicated staff. This stalled the preparation and 
completion of the necessary paperwork in the courts.93 
                                                             
87 Pretorius ‘South Africa’s Real Level of Literacy’ (29 August 2013) The Citizen - http://citizen.co.za/news/news-
national/31407/literatez/ (last accessed January 2017).  
88  Aitchison, Harley ‘South African Illiteracy Statistics and the Case of the Magically Growing Number of 
Literacy and ABET learners’ (2006) 39 Journal of Education 89. 
89 More than eight‐tenths of South African households owned television sets (80.2%) and electric stoves (82.6%), 
while less than one‐third (32.4%) owned washing machines: Statistics South Africa General Household Survey, 
2013 (18 June 2014) 55.  
90 It is estimated that 87% of the population listens to the radio: Mqadi ‘Five Things that You Need to Know about 
Radio in South Africa’ (1 July 2015) Wits Vuvuzela (http://witsvuvuzela.com/2015/07/01/five-things-that-you-
need-to-know-about-radio-in-south-africa/ - last accessed on 14 January 1017). See also Meyers ‘Radio and 
Development in Africa –A Concept Paper’ International Development and Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada 
(August 2008).  
91  It is estimated that there were 28 580 290 internet users in South Africa in 2016 – see 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/af/za.htm (last accessed 12 January 2017). According to Cisco, video will 
account for seventy three percent of South African mobile data traffic by 2020, compared to fifty two percent at 
the end of 2015 –see http://memeburn.com/2016/05/south-africa-set-mobile-data-explosion/ (last accessed 14 
January 2017). According the General Household Survey: 
‘The survey (GHS) found that there was high access to telecommunications for households nationally, as 
only 5% of households did not have access to either landlines or cellular phones in 2013. By comparison, 
81.9% of households had access to at least one cellular phone, while 12.9% of households had access to 
both a landline and a cellular phone. Only 0.2% of households had only a landline. However access to 
these means of communication differed by province as a smaller percentage of households in Northern 
Cape (13%) and Eastern Cape (10.6%) had access to cellular and landline services together. Households 
in historically rural provinces such as Mpumalanga (90.6%) and Limpopo (92.6%) were very reliant on 
the more accessible cellular telephones than landlines. By contrast, a combination of both cellular phones 
and landlines in households were most prevalent in the more affluent provinces, namely Western Cape 
(29%) and Gauteng (16.7%).  
More than a third of South African households (40.9%) had at least one member who used the Internet 
either at home, workplace, place of study, or Internet cafés. More than half of households in Western 
Cape (54.4%) and Gauteng (54%) had access to the Internet while only just over a fifth of households in 
Limpopo (21.9%) had access to the Internet.’: Statistics South Africa (n89) 13. See also pages 51-52 of 
the Survey.  
92 Department of Justice Unpublished Report (n64) 19-20. 
93 See also Jacobsberg ‘The Low-Down on Small Claims Courts’ (2009 August) De Rebus 5; Kaplan ‘More Senior 
Small Claims Court Clerks Needed’ (December 2009) De Rebus 5; Rasikhalela ‘Small Claims Courts Woes 
Continue!’ (August 2010) De Rebus 5. 
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• It took very long for commissioners to be appointed. After being nominated by their 
respective law societies, bureaucratic processes within the Department of Justice delayed 
commissioners from being appointed for many months.  By the time that commissioners 
were appointed, many felt disinclined to act.94  
• The after-hours court time was an inconvenience to many commissioners and litigants, 
especially working mothers and older people. The lack of safe transport to many of the 
courts often resulted in litigants not pitching up on their appointed court days.95 
• There was a distinct lack of security at many of the courts during the evenings. 
Commissioners were placed in the unenviable position of maintaining order at the courts.96 
• Interpretation services at the courts were negligible or non-existent.97 
In response to these complaints, the Department of Justice held discussions with various 
regional heads of the magistrates’ courts to improve operations at the small claims courts.98 It 
would seem that the interventions had some positive results and that many, but not all, of the 
problems experienced at the courts have abated.99 It would also seem that the Department of 
                                                             
94 Department of Justice Unpublished Report (n64) 19-20. 
95 Department of Justice Unpublished Report (n64) 19-20. 
96 See also Datnow ‘A sad tale of harmful business practices in the small claims court’ (September 1998) De Rebus 
26; Mndebele ‘Small Claims Courts “not 100% operational”’ (July 2008) De Rebus 7. 
97 See also Editor ‘Poor Administration Must Not Tarnish the Good that Small Claims Courts Do’   (September 
2009) De Rebus 4; Settle ‘Blame Department for Small Claims Problems’ (September 2009) De Rebus 5-6. 
98  Department of Justice Unpublished Report (n64) 11. 
99 Mr Greese, the chairperson of the small claims committee of the Law Society of South Africa and a long-serving 
commissioner of the Small Claims Court in Gauteng made the following observations in the Law Society of South 
African Annual Report 2010/11: 
‘As far as the running of the courts is concerned, problems are still being experienced with the lack of 
interpreters and the inexperience of some clerks of the Small Claims Courts, who continue to refer matters 
to the courts, although some of these matters cannot be entertained in those courts.  
Members of the SAPS also refer matters, which in fact are of a criminal nature and should have been 
investigated by the SAPS first, to the courts.  
At present, commissioners are required to have a minimum of five years’ practical experience and, if 
possible, consideration should be given to increasing the number of years of experience prior to a 
practitioner being allowed to become a commissioner of the Small Claims Court, due to the fact that, in 
many instances, the courts function without the assistance of court orderlies and/or the police and the 
seniority of the commissioner is of vital importance to maintain order in the court during sessions, as 
litigants often become unruly.  
The Small Claims Courts: Guidelines for Commissioners, Version 1, 2010 (as well as a guideline for 
clerks) have been released, published and circulated by the Justice Department. An electronic copy of 
these and other useful material is available on the Department’s website at www.justice.gov.za.  
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Justice stepped up its processes to approve the appointment of commissioners. By August 2013 
there were 1561 commissioners nationwide, and the numbers have grown steadily since then. 
The Department of Justice conceded, however, that there was a ‘shortage of commissioners in 
the rural areas.’ 100  To address this issue and in consultation with the  Magistrates’ 
Commission,101 the Department implemented a ‘new innovation’ whereby magistrates could 
also become commissioners of the small claims courts.102  
Perhaps, the worst failure of the entire initiative to revamp the small claims courts was in the 
area of law reform. Although suggestions for reform have been tabled before the Steering 
Committee on several occasions103 and the Steering Committee has reaffirmed the need for the 
Department of Justice to urgently look at various aspects of the legislation governing small 
claims courts, to date there have only been four legislative amendments affecting small claims 
                                                             
LEAD is currently working on a judicial skills e-learning course, which will include introductory training 
for commissioners of the Small Claims Courts.  
On the whole, the Small Claims Courts appear to be functioning in a satisfactory manner, largely due to 
the contribution made by members of the profession.’ 
In the 2011/2012 Annual Report, Mr Greese, on behalf of the committee, notes: 
‘In the Witwatersrand area, in particular, there are a number of Small Claims Courts which formerly 
functioned under a single court, but have now been proclaimed as independent courts for each of the 
particular magisterial districts. They now have all the administrative facilities of the Magistrate’s Office 
for that district, so litigants are no longer required to travel to a central point far from their homes to have 
summonses and other process issued.’ 
It would thus appear that the incremental roll out of small claims court had the effect of improving the 
administration at the courts. However, as will be noted later, there are still problems with regard to court processes 
and procedures. 
100 Manyathi-Jele ‘Magistrates Can Now Act as Commissioners’ (August 2013) De Rebus 11. 
101 The Magistrate's Commission is a statutory body established in terms of the Magistrate's Act 90 of 1993.  
The objects of the Commission are amongst others, as follows: 
• To promote continuous training of magistrates appointed in the Magistrates’ Courts (District and Regional 
Courts). 
• To advise the Minister regarding the appointment of magistrates. 
• To advise or to make recommendations to, or report to the Minister, for information of Parliament regarding 
any matter which is of interest for the independence in the dispensing of justice and the efficiency of the 
administration of justice in the Magistrates’ Courts. 
• To carry out investigations and make recommendations to the Minister regarding the suspension and 
removal from office of magistrates. 
For more information see also: http://www.justice.gov.za/contact/cnt_mcomm.html#sthash.IU7Q53Cm.dpuf 
(last accessed 9 January 2017). 
102 Manyathi-Jele (n100) 11.  
103 Department of Justice Unpublished Report (n64) 10. See also Law Society of South Africa Annual Report 
2008/2009 51; Law Society of South Africa Annual Report 2010/2011 43; Law Society of South Africa Annual 
Report 2012/2013 53.  
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courts.  Three of these have extended the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts104 
and the other amendment extended the territorial authority of small claims commissioners to 
perform their functions.105 There have been no amendments to the procedure of the small claims 
courts.  
3.9  CONCLUSION 
At their inception small claims courts held a lot of promise. However, they quickly began to 
flounder. During the 1990s, they experienced teething problems and were on the verge of dying 
a slow death. To the credit of the government, they were resuscitated at the turn of the new 
millennium. Consequently, they survived and were expanded. Today there is a small claims 
court in nearly every magisterial district in South Africa. Even though small claims courts 
continue to require a lot of attention in terms of improving their administration and legislative 
framework, they play a fundamental role in ensuring that people from all walks of life can 
access speedy and cost-effective justice in claims where it does not make economic sense to 
litigate in the other courts.  
In the next chapter, the administration of small claims courts will be discussed. 
                                                             
104 On 1 April 2014 the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims court was increased from R12 000 to its current 
level of R15 000 by virtue of GN 185 in GG 37450 of 18 Mar 2014.  Previously, the small claims courts’ 
jurisdiction was increased from R7 000 to R12 000 in terms of GN R 985 in GG 33696 of 27 October 2010 which 
came into operation on 1 November 2010, and from R3 000 to R7 000 in terms of GN R313 in GG 26113 of 12 
March 2004 which came into operation on 1 April 2004.  
105 The Judicial Matters Amendment Act 42 of 2013, which came into operation on 22 January 2014, amended s 
9(1) of the SCCA by adding paragraph (c). Section 9(1)(c) provides as follows:  
‘A commissioner appointed in terms of paragraph (a) in respect of a specific court shall be deemed to be 
appointed for any court established under section 2 in that province.’  





THE ADMINISTRATION OF SMALL CLAIMS COURTS AND 
INCIDENTAL MATTERS   
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
o dedicate a chapter to court administration seems rather mundane. However, 
experience has shown that law on paper is one thing, and law in practice is quite 
another. The history of the small claims courts1 reveals that since inception they have 
not realised their true potential. Some of the setbacks turn on the legislation and the 
monetary jurisdiction of the courts, but as noted in chapter 3, the muted influence of 
the courts is largely due to poor court administration and ham-handed logistical 
arrangements.  
This chapter considers various aspects relating to the management of small claims 
courts. Strengths and weaknesses are identified and where relevant, proposals for 
reform are made. 
4.2 THE POWERS OF THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE 
Several provisions of the SCCA and the SCCRs empower the Minister of Justice to 
make decisions affecting the administration of the courts. It is important to look at these 
provisions and to critically evaluate whether they are successful in terms of promoting 
access to the courts. 
																																																								




(a) Establishment of courts and regulation of the courts 
Section 2 of the SCCA empowers the Minister of Justice by notice in the Government 
Gazette to:2 
• Establish ‘any area consisting of one or more districts or part of a district’ for the 
adjudication of small claims; 
• determine the seat of a court; 
• determine one or more places in the area concerned for the holding of sessions of a 
court; 
• alter the area for which a court has been established by ‘including therein or 
excising therefrom any district or districts or part thereof’; 
• abolish a court that has already been established; and  
• amend or withdraw any notice establishing a court, district or area. 
The Minister may authorise a magistrate to establish a court in a district that has been 
proclaimed. The magistrate can also determine the place in that district for the sitting 
of a court.3 There is no record that  the Minister has ever delegated his or her authority 
to a magistrate to establish a small claims court.  
Since 2003,4 the Department of Justice (and by implication the Minister of Justice) has 
proclaimed many small claims courts. In an address on 19 May 2017, the Deputy 
Minister for Justice said: 
‘There are, at the end of the 2016/17 financial year, 405 Small Claims Courts covering all 
magisterial districts and sub-districts nationally with another 19 additional places gazetted as 
places of sitting of these courts.  The establishment of Small Claims Courts, with at least one in 
each magisterial district and sub-districts in South Africa, is a major step forward in terms of 
enhancing access to justice.  We are now focusing on ensuring full coverage in the Branch 
Courts.’5 
																																																								
2 SCCA, s 2(1)(a)-(e).  
3 SCCA, s 2(2). 
4 See chapter 3.  
5 Address by the Deputy Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development, the Hon JH Jeffery, MP, 




The rapid expansion of the small claims courts since 2003 is a feather in the cap of the 
Department of Justice, which clearly sees the importance of the courts in the promotion 
of access to justice. 
(b) Advisory Boards 
In the past, section 25(1)(d) of the SCCA empowered the Minister of Justice to appoint 
advisory boards to ‘advise the Minister on the functioning of courts’.  SCCR 2 fleshes 
out the composition and the functions of the advisory boards: 
‘(1) (a)  The Minister may establish a board as contemplated in section 25(1)(d) of the Act for 
a district or area and may appoint as many members to such board as he deems fit. 
(aA) A member of such a board shall hold office during the Minister’s pleasure. 
(b) The Minister shall appoint the chairman and vice chairman of the said board. 
(c) If the chairman and vice-chairman are not available, a chairman shall be appointed by 
the members present.  
(2) The Minister may at any time dissolve the board. 
(3) The board may advise the Minister in regard to –  
(a)  the appointment of suitable persons as commissioners, in the case of an attorney, after 
consultation with the president of the law society of which the attorney is a member 
and, in the case of an advocate, after consultation with the chairman of the bar council 
for the division of the Supreme Court of South Africa where the advocate practises. 
(b) the recruitment and utilisation of persons as commissioners, clerks, assistant clerks, 
interpreters, legal assistants and such other persons as may be necessary; 
(c) suitable court and office accommodation; 
(d) the times for the holding of court; and 
(e) any other matter which may be necessary for the proper functioning of the court.’ 
 
By 2003 many boards were vacated and hardly met. This fact was raised at the 2003 
Small Claims Courts Conference.6 In the national audit7 following the establishment of 
the Small Claims Courts Steering Committee,8 the Department of Justice discovered 
that more than 90% of the boards were not operational.9 The Department reactivated 
																																																								
and Conference Centre, Kempton Park, Johannesburg, 19 May 2017, published at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/m_speeches/2017/20170519-Joasa_dm.html (last accessed on 10 October 
2017). 
6 See §3.6.  
7 See §3.8. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Department of Justice Narrative Report on the Small Claims Court Audit 4. 
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many boards and by 2010 the overwhelming majority of boards of the then-proclaimed 
small claims courts were operational again. The Small Claims Courts project office10 
did a great job in keeping the boards informed of developments and maintaining regular 
communication with the boards. But by 2015, the efficiency of the boards started to 
wane again. With the dissolution of the project office in 201411 and the end of the 
Steering Committee’s term of office,12 it is unclear whether the boards continue to 
operate and if so, at what level.   
The advisory board system is not ideal. There are no monitoring systems in place in the 
legislation to ensure that boards meet regularly. They seem to operate in a silo and as 
islands of decision-making.  It is unclear how they feed into the national small claims 
courts narrative.   
(c) The advisory boards must be scrapped 
The advisory board system of regulating the small claims courts is unworkable. The 
SCCA should make provision for a national Small Claims Courts Board comprising 
members drawn from the ranks of the legal profession and Department of Justice 
officials who must serve for a fixed term. The Board must be tasked to liaise directly 
with the office of the Minister of Justice on issues pertaining to small claims courts. 
The proposed Board should also have some implementation functions.  
At a grassroots level, advisory committees – also appointed for a fixed term  – should 
monitor and regulate the day-to-day running of individual small claims courts. These 
advisory committees should represent clusters of small claims courts. For example, ten 
																																																								





small claims courts should represent one cluster and each small claims court should 
have one representative (preferably a commissioner) who represents that court on an 
advisory committee for a particular area. If there are 405 small claims courts, there will 
be at most 41 clusters in the country.  It is important for small claims presiding officers 
to be well-represented on the advisory committees. The powers of the advisory 
committees must be articulated in legislation.  The advisory committees must report to 
the Small Claims Courts Board on issues affecting the courts.   They must also collect 
data about small claims courts on a regular basis and feed such information to the 
Board, which will then, in consultation with the Department of Justice, make strategic 
decisions affecting the courts. 
The legislation must stipulate how the Small Claims Courts Board and the advisory 
committees should be appointed and when they should meet. In this regard, lessons can 
be drawn from the Sheriffs Act.13   The Sheriffs Act contains clear provisions for 
constituting and conducting meetings of the South African Board for Sheriffs. If the 
Board fails to meet regularly as stipulated in the Act, the Minister is permitted to 
appoint a new Board.14 Like the Sheriffs Act, the SCCA should stipulate how the 
governing bodies of the small claims courts are expected to operate and it should 
stipulate accountability measures to ensure compliance. 
Currently, the legislation is silent on how commissioners should be disciplined for 
misconduct. The SCCA creates the impression that the Minister is solely responsible 
for disciplining commissioners because the Minister can hire and fire commissioners at 
will.15 This is untenable as there may be issues relating to judicial independence to 
																																																								
13 90 of 1986 (hereafter referred to as the ‘Sheriffs Act’). 
14 Sheriffs Act, s 14 read with s 14A.  
15 SCCA, s 9(3) read with s 9(5).  
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contend with.16 Again, provisions similar to the Sheriffs Act should be considered. In 
terms of the Sheriffs Act, the South African Board for Sheriffs must establish a 
disciplinary committee, the task of which is to discipline sheriffs who are guilty of 
misconduct.17 A similar mechanism can be introduced in the SCCA and the power to 
discipline presiding officers can be given to the proposed Small Claims Courts Board 
via its committee structure. Of course, if the presiding officer is a magistrate,18 the 
Magistrates’ Commission would be the appropriate body to discipline the judicial 
officer concerned.19 
Table 1: Diagrammatic representation of proposed governance structures for the 




16 See chapter 5.  
17 Sheriffs Act, ss 44(1), 18(1), 18(2), 49.  
18See chapter 5. 
19 Section 2 of the Magistrates Act 90 of 1993 establishes the Magistrates Commission.  The objects of 
the Commission are set out in s 4 of the Act. Section 4(a) lists one of the function as:  
‘to ensure that the appointment, promotion, transfer or discharge of, or disciplinary steps 
against, judicial officers in the lower courts take place without favour or prejudice, and that the 
applicable laws and administrative directions in connection with such action are applied 
uniformly and correctly...’ 
Section 6A provides that the Minister of Justice must by Regulations set out a complaints procedure. By 
GN R361 in GG 15524 of 11 March 1994 as amended, the Minister promulgated a complaints procedure. 
Once a magistrate is found guilty of misconduct and the Commission recommends to the Minister that 
the magistrates must be removed from office, the decision must be ratified by resolution of Parliament 








(d) Erosion of the Minister’s powers by legislative error 
Section 25 of the SCCA is due to be amended by s 15 of the Judicial Matters 
Amendment Act.20 The section provides: 
‘15. Section 25 of the Small Claims Courts Act, 1984, is hereby amended— 
         (a)  by the substitution for the heading of the following heading: 
           ‘‘Power of [Minister] Rules Board for Courts of Law to make rules’’; 
         (b)  by the substitution in subsection (1) for the words preceding paragraph (a) of 
   the following words: 
‘‘The Rules Board for Courts of Law established by section 2 of the Rules Board for 
Courts of Law Act, 1985 (Act No. 107 of 1985), may, subject to the approval of the 
Minister [may] make, amend or repeal rules regulating the following matters in 
respect of small claims courts:’’; 
        (c) by the insertion of the word ‘‘or’’ at the end of paragraph (d); and 
        (d)  by the substitution for paragraph (e) of the following paragraph: 
‘‘(e) any other matter which [he may consider] is necessary or 
expedient to prescribe for carrying out the provisions of this Act or 
the attainment of its objects.’’.’ 
 
The purpose of the amendment is to confer power on the Rules Board for Courts of 
Law21 to make litigation rules for the small claims courts. However, in amending s 25 
of the SCCA, the legislature is creating a new problem in that it is conferring power on 
the Rules Board, albeit in consultation with the Minister, to appoint advisory boards. 
This amendment marks a radical departure from the work of the Rules Board,22 and can 
only be regarded as a legislative misstep.  
The Rules Board is not responsible for the administration of the courts. Nor is it 
responsible for the implementation of litigation rules. The Rules Board’s powers and 
functions are limited to developing rules of procedure.23 Consequently, there is little 
doubt that s 25 of the SCCA must be amended in the future to rectify what is clearly a 
legislative error of conferring implementation powers on the Rules Board. 
																																																								
20 8 of 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Judicial Matters Amendment Act’). The Act has not yet 
come into operation and is awaiting promulgation by the President. Words in square brackets signify a 
deletion from the existing provision and words underlined signify an insertion into an existing 
provision.  
21 Hereafter referred to as ‘the Rules Board’.  
22 See Rules Board for Courts of Law Act 107 of 1985, s 6. 
23 Ibid.  
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(e)  Litigation rules for the small claims courts will finally be in the hands of the 
Rules Board  
Pending the enactment of s 15 of the Judicial Matters Amendment Act, the Minister of 
Justice is charged in terms of s 25 of the SCCA with making rules regulating: 
‘(a)  The practice and procedure, including the procedure when proceedings are reviewed; 
 (b)  fees and costs; 
 (c) the duties and powers of officers of the court; 
 (d)   the establishment, duties and powers of one or more boards to advise the Minister on 
                          the functioning of courts; 
 (e)  any other matter which he may consider necessary or expedient to prescribe for 
carrying out the provisions of this Act or the attainment of its objects.’ 
 
Section 25 goes on to provide: 
‘(2)  Different rules may be made under subsection (1) with regard to different classes of 
cases. 
 (3)  No rule relating to State revenue or State expenditure shall be made under subsection 
(1), except with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance. 
 (4)  No new rule and no amendment or repeal of a rule shall come into operation unless it 
has been published in the Gazette at least 30 days before the day upon which it is 
expressed to come into operation.’ 
 
The Judicial Matters Amendment Act leaves subsections (2) to (4) of s 25 unaffected. 
However, in a significant development, it confers powers on the Rules Board to make 
litigation rules for small claims courts. This legislative change is welcomed. There is 
no doubt that the Rules Board will start very shortly to interrogate the small claims 
courts’ legislation to improve the processes and procedures of the courts.24 
The Rules Board should have been tasked a long time ago with making litigation rules 
for the small claims courts. This would have prevented the situation of the rules falling 
behind in many respects when compared to the other courts in the land. It is startling to 
note that the last time the SCCRs were amended was in 1991.25 Many of the rules are 
																																																								
24 On 29 September 2017, the Rules Board resolved to establish a Small Claims Courts Committee to 
look into the legislation of the small claims courts. I am thankful to the secretariat of the Board for his 
information. 
25 See §3.4. 
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impractical, some are ultra vires, and others require improvement to meet the needs of 
modern users of the courts.26  
It is almost certain that the Rules Board will have to work with the Department of 
Justice to amend the SCCA because the Act is problematic on many levels and without 
amending the Act, proper amendments to the SCCRs cannot be introduced.27 
 4.3 SMALL CLAIMS COURTS ARE NOT COURTS OF RECORD 
(a) Why the small claims courts are not courts of record 
In accordance with the Hoexter Commission’s recommendations, the small claims 
courts are not courts of record.28 Unlike in the magistrates’ courts, court proceedings 
are not transcribed from stenographers’ notes or from audio recordings.29  
The Hoexter Commission felt that because there would be no right of appeal from a 
decision of a small claims court, it would be a waste of time and money to record court 
proceedings.30 Furthermore, the Commission thought it was necessary to reduce the 
‘financial burden which the State will have to shoulder in establishing and 
administering [the small claims courts].’31 Consequently, in terms of the SCCA, on the 
conclusion of a case, the presiding officer is simply required to record and sign the 
verdict, judgment or order of the court.32 
																																																								
26 See chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9.  
27 On 10 October 2017, the Rules Board sent a letter to the legal profession and other interested parties 
to suggest amendments to the SCCA and other legislation so that the SCCRs can be effectively 
amended.  A copy of the letter is in Appendix 5.  
28 Report §14.3(b). The Hoexter Commission’s Report is discussed extensively in chapter 2.  
29 MCA, s 4(1).  
30 Report §13.35. 
31 Report §13.31. 
32 SCCA, s 3(2). 
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(b)  Difficult to prove misconduct on the bench in review proceedings if there is no 
record 
While there is no right of appeal in the small claims courts,33 s 46 of the SCCA permits 
a litigant to take a decision on review. The grounds upon which proceedings of a court 
may be taken on review before a provincial or local division of the High Court34 are – 
‘(a)  absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court; 
(b)  interest in the cause, bias, malice, or the commission of an offence referred to in Part 
1 to 4, or section 17, 20 or 21 (in so far as it relates to the aforementioned offences) of 
Chapter 2 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004, on the 
part of the commissioner; and 
 (c)  gross irregularity with regard to the proceedings.’ 
Bias, malice, corruption, and the absence of jurisdiction may be established with 
adequate evidence and argument. Jurisdiction is common cause and can be determined 
on the papers before the court.35 Malice, bias, and corruption can be proven by objective 
evidence that is external to a particular case before the court. However, a gross 
irregularity in the form of misconduct on the bench by the presiding officer can be quite 
difficult to prove if there is no record of the proceedings. How would a litigant show 
that the presiding officer was rude, intimidating, disinterested or otherwise 
discriminatory in a case in the absence of a record of the proceedings?  The High Court 
would have to rely on the applicant’s version of events. Of course, his or her version is 
capable of refutation by the small claims court presiding officer. The High Court may 
have some difficulty in determining whose version is correct. 
Furthermore, there	is	always	potential	for	presiding	officers	to	fall	short	of	what	
can	be	legitimately	expected.	If they knew that proceedings were recorded, the level 
of professionalism displayed by commissioners would improve.  
																																																								
33 SCCA, s 45. 
34 The Act still refers to ‘the Supreme Court of South Africa.’ In conformity with s 169 of the 
Constitution this should read ‘High Court’.  
35 For a discussion of jurisdiction, see chapter 6.  
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(c) Taped proceedings and a time limit for review to reduce costs 
To ameliorate an escalation of costs associated with recording proceedings, one could 
tape proceedings but not transcribe them unless the matter is taken on review, and only 
if the taped record is unusable (i.e. the audio quality is bad). Furthermore, there should 
be a time limit for taking matters on review.  
In conformity with the general approach to review proceedings, the legislature has not 
placed a time bar on review proceedings in the small claims courts. Review proceedings 
must be initiated within a reasonable time.36 What is reasonable is determined by the 
facts of a case. Perhaps for small claims, the legislature should follow the stance 
adopted by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.37 Review proceedings under 
that Act have to be brought within 180 days of the decision that gives rise to the 
review.38 There is no reason why a similar time bar should not apply in the small claims 
courts so that matters can be finalised without delay. A time bar will also preclude the 
small claims courts from having to keep records for a long time. A time bar might 
prejudice poor litigants. However, they should be allowed to apply for Legal Aid39 to 
take matters on review. Legal Aid can use a taped record to determine whether the case 
is meritorious for further intervention. 
(d) Records must be free of charge 
When a matter goes on review to the High Court from a magistrate’s court, the person 
applying for review is generally required to request a transcribed record from the 
																																																								
36 See Van Loggerenberg Erasmus Superior Court Practice Vol 2 at D1-701 (Service 4, 2017) and see 
the authorities there cited. 
37 3 of 2000.  
38 Ibid, s 7(1)(b). 
39 Legal Aid is discussed in chapter 1. 
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registrar or clerk of the court. The court will not release the transcript without first 
obtaining payment. A litigant pays approximately R30 per page for the transcript. The 
fees for producing the record can be astronomical.  A litigant also has to wait many 
months for the transcript as the transcription services are overburdened.40 To perpetuate 
the litigant’s misery, there are often mistakes on the transcriptions.  
If small claims courts proceedings were recorded to improve professionalism and to 
make reviews easier, one would have to make court records available free of charge. If 
courts installed better technology, this would improve the audio quality of taped court 
proceedings. With improved audio recordings, there would be no need for 
transcriptions. Small claims courts proceedings are short. There is no reason why a 
review judge cannot listen to an audio recording of proceedings. In fact, this might be 
better as written records cannot adequately convey the tone and manner of 
proceedings.41  Needless to say, video recordings would be even better. Installing better 
audio (and video) equipment in the courts will be expensive. But after this initial capital 
outlay, the cost of providing audio recordings would be negligible when compared to 
the cost of providing transcribed court records.  
 4.4 THE COURTS ARE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC 
(a)  Proceedings must be conducted with open doors 
Until 1813 and in conformity with Roman-Dutch law, judgments and orders of court 
were pronounced in open court. However, evidence and arguments in cases were heard 
																																																								
40 How to Obtain Transcripts from the Court Publication of the University of Witwatersrand Justice 
Project ‘Know Your Rights’ Series 6-7.  
41 Lederer ‘The Effect of Courtroom Technologies on and in Appellate Proceedings and Courtrooms’ 
(2000) 2 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 251 at 253ff; Lederer ‘Courtroom Technology: For 
Trial Lawyers, The Future Is Now’ (2004) 19 Criminal Justice 18-21. 
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in private. In that year, the British Governor of the Cape issued a proclamation requiring 
all judicial proceedings to be carried on with open doors as a matter of ‘essential utility, 
as well as the dignity of the administration of justice’. The public nature of court 
proceedings was reaffirmed by article 32 of the Cape Charter of Justice of 1932. The 
principle of openness was however not followed in some of the provinces, where the 
Roman-Dutch position continued to apply.42 However, the matter was eventually settled 
with the coming into force of the Supreme Court Act.43 Section 15 of the Supreme Court 
Act provided: 
‘Save as is provided in any law, all proceedings in any court of a division shall, except as any 
such court may in special cases otherwise direct, be carried on in open court.’ 
The provisions of the Supreme Court Act have been overtaken by the SCA, which came 
into operation on 23 August 2013. Section 9(1) of the SCA simply states that the 
superior courts ‘must be open to the public every business day’. The provision seems 
to be more administrative than substantive. There is thus no equivalent provision to s 
15 of the Supreme Court Act in the SCA.  
In the magistrates’ courts, s 5 of the MCA provides: 
‘(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), the proceedings in a court shall take place in 
open court. 
(2) A court may in the interest of the administration of justice or of good order or of public 
morals or at the request of the parties to the proceedings for reasons considered sufficient by 
the court, order that the proceedings shall be held behind closed doors or that specified persons 
shall not be present thereat. 
(3) If any person present at the proceedings of a court disturbs the order of the court, the court 
may order that such person be removed and detained in custody until the court adjourns, or the 
court may, if in its opinion order cannot be otherwise maintained, order that the court room be 
cleared and that the public shall not be present at the proceedings.’ 
In relation to the MCA, Jones & Buckle states: 
‘Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, entrenches the right to 
have disputes resolved 'in a fair public hearing before a court'. It has been held that open 
courtrooms are likely to limit high-handed behaviour by judicial officers and to prevent railroad 
justice and, further, that open justice is an important part of the right entrenched in s 34 and that 
																																																								
42 For a history of the open civil court in South Africa see Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of 
Insurance 1966 (2) SA 219 (W). See also Botha v Minister van Wet en Orde 1990 (3) SA 937 (W).  
43 59 of 1959 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Supreme Court Act’).  
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it serves as a great bulwark against abuse.’44 
Like the Supreme Court Act and the MCA, the SCCA also provides for open courts. 
Section 4 provides: 
 
‘(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), the proceedings in a court shall take place in 
open court. 
(2) A court may in the interest of the administration of justice or of good order or of public 
morals or at the request of the parties to the proceedings for reasons considered sufficient by 
the court, order that the proceedings shall be held behind closed doors or that specified persons 
shall not be present thereat. 
(3) If any person present at the proceedings of a court disturbs the order of the court, the court 
may order that such person be removed and detained in custody until the court adjourns, or the 
court may, if in its opinion order cannot be otherwise maintained, order that the court room be 
cleared and that the public shall not be present at the proceedings.’45 
Evidently, s 4 of the SCCA is identical to s 5 of the MCA.  
(b) ADR and the open-court principle  
Chapter 10 argues for court-connected alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) in the 
small claims courts. In particular, mediation is favoured. It is argued that mediation 
should be court-connected and that a presiding officer should have the discretion to 
refer a matter to mediation. This begs the question whether mediation subverts the 
principle that litigation should be conducted in open court.  
At first blush, court-connected ADR poses a challenge to the open-court principle.  A 
cardinal rule of mediation is that all disclosures made at mediation are confidential. It 
is also common cause that mediation is held in private. The media and the public are 
not permitted to attend unless the parties agree otherwise. The only public record of the 
mediation is the settlement agreement between the parties if it is made an order of the 
court. Not even the agreement to mediate is for public consumption.46  The purpose of 
holding mediation in private is that it promotes settlement because parties can speak to 
																																																								
44 Van Loggerenberg Jones and Buckle The Civil Practice of the Magistrates’ Courts in South Africa 
Vol 1 at Act17 (Service 10, 2017). See also South African Broadcasting Corp Ltd v National Director 
of Public Prosecutions 2007 (1) SA 523 CC at 538C-D. 
45 See also Report §13.24 and §13.25.  
46 See chapter 10. 
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each other frankly and in a non-invasive environment.  
When confronted with the question about whether small claims courts should operate 
in public or in private, the Hoexter Commission was clear. It stated: 
‘It must be conceded that there are substantial arguments favouring hearings in private. In 
general, private hearings seem to be more conducive to settlement than trials held in public. The 
heightened possibility of settlement at private hearings apart, it is of some significance that in 
the fifteen courts examined in the course of the national survey both plaintiffs and defendants 
listed “trials held in informal surroundings and in private” as the third priority among six 
proposed features of small claims reform.47  
Having carefully considered the arguments for and against, the Commission is firmly of the 
view that in South Africa all small claims hearings should take place in public unless both 
parties request the court to sit in camera.  In a multi-racial country such as ours, so the 
Commission considers, it is vitally necessary that … “judges must be judged.” The more so if 
legal representation at trial is barred. Unless the parties themselves desire otherwise, therefore, 
the Commission is of the opinion that the proceedings at the small claims trial should be exposed 
to public scrutiny.’48 
As discussed above, the principle that court proceedings should be held in public is as 
a result of the English-law influence on the South African law of procedure. It must 
also be remembered that at the time when the MCA and the Supreme Court Act were 
promulgated, South Africa formed part of the British Empire. The British system of 
justice was standardised across the Union of South Africa. 49  The trial was the 
fundamental civil justice dispute resolution mechanism at the time. The purpose of the 
open-door principle was to prevent the State from abusing its power by prosecuting 
cases clandestinely and to prevent an abuse of judicial power.50 
While the open-door principle has constitutional implications in terms of promoting 
open and transparent justice,51 the principle cannot trump efforts to dispense justice 
																																																								
47 See also Ruhnka, Weller with Martin Small Claims Courts – A National Examination (1978) 185. 
48 Report §13.24 and §13.25. Italics supplied.  
49 Paleker ‘Civil Procedure in South Africa: the Past, the Present and the Future’ ZZP Int (2011) 343ff. 
50 Spigelman AC ‘The Principle of Open Justice: A Comparative Perspective’ (2006) 29 UNSW Law 
Journal 147 at 150.  
51 Richmond Newspapers v Virginia 448 US 555 (1980); Publicker Industries Inc v Cohen 733 F 2d 
1059 (3rd Cir, 1984); Westmoreland v Columbia Broadcast System, Inc 752 F 2d 16 (2nd Cir, 1984); 
Newman v Graddick 696 F 2d 796 (11th Cir, 1983). 
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through alternative means, especially if those means are beneficial to the parties in 
arriving at outcomes that are more effective than the traditional trial-centred litigation 
model. As shown in chapter 10, the legislature and the courts are already endorsing 
ADR. Legislation and precedent recognise and give effect to the confidentiality of 
court-connected and court-directed mediation.52 To facilitate mediation, the courts are 
prepared to limit s 34 of the Constitution because there are sound reasons for doing so. 
The courts appreciate that the aims and objectives of mediation are consonant with the 
values of an open and democratic society predicated on a range of liberties, which 
include the freedom to resolve disputes through processes that are private and 
confidential. It must also be borne in mind that parties are in any event at liberty to 
enter into settlement agreements and to stipulate that the terms of the settlement must 
remain confidential.  
The Hoexter Commission’s small claims model did not incorporate the prospect of 
mediation.  The Commission’s recommendations centred on trial.  The open-court 
policy proposed by the Commission must thus be considered within this historical 
context.  Furthermore, it appears that the Commission was concerned about race 
relations. This stands to reason. The small claims courts were the first deracialised 
courts in the country.53 If court proceedings were held behind closed doors, the fear 
must have been that this would have given rise to allegations of bias and prejudice. But 
24 years into democracy, the considerations of 1984 cannot limit the prospects for 
change in 2018. 
 
																																																								
52 See §10.5.  
53 Report §13.45. 
	
	 83	
(c) Online courts and the open-door principle 
Procedural law must harness modern technological advancements so that justice can be 
realised in an increasingly mobile and tech-savvy world.54 It is just a matter of time 
before online courts, such as the ones in Michigan in the United States and Victoria, 
British Columbia in Canada,55 make their appearance.56 These virtual courts may not be 
open to the public and yet from an access to justice perspective, they will serve the 
public interest.  
In light of ADR developments and continuous technological advancements, it is 
questionable whether ss 4(1) and 4(2) of the SCCA are useful. These provisions 
promote an anachronistic system of justice. The provisions should be replaced with one 
that is similar to s 9(1) of the SCA, which emphasises service delivery rather than 
prescribing the way in which proceedings must be conducted. If there is fear that non-
public hearings will promote corruption in the courts, then the legislature needs to find 
another way to address this issue, for example, by auditing cases in the lower courts at 
random. One should not allow fears of corruption to stultify legal developments 
because if that is the case, South Africa will lag behind the rest of the world for a very 
long time.  
																																																								
54 See Kengyel, Nemessányi (eds) Electronic Technology and Civil Procedure: New Paths to Justice 
from Around the World: 15 (Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice). For 
developments in England and Wales see Genn ‘Online Courts and the Future of Justice’ Birkenhead 
Lecture, Gray’s Inn (16 October 2017) - 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/sites/laws/files/birkenhead_lecture_2017_professor_dame_hazel_genn_fin
al_version.pdf (last accessed on 24 March 2018); see also Sela ‘Streamlining Justice: How Online 
Courts Can Resolve The Challenges of Pro Se Litigation’ (2016) 26 Cornell Journal of Law and Public 
Policy 331. 
55 Canada introduced an online tribunal for small claims (up to 25000 Canadian Dollars) in May 2012: 
Civil Resolution Tribunal Act, S.B.C. 2012, c 25 (Can.).  
56 Ponte ‘Michigan Cyber Court: A Bold Experiment in the Development of the First Public Virtual 
Courthouse’ (2002) 4 North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology 51-91. 
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(d)  Perusal of court documents by the public and for academic purposes  
In conformity with the principles of open and transparent justice and democratic 
governance, 57  s 6 of the SCCA allows the public to peruse documents under the 
supervision of the clerk of the court upon payment of the prescribed fee. According to 
the provision, documents must be preserved at the seat of the magistrate’s court of the 
district where the small claims court is located for a period that the Director General of 
Justice may stipulate. Upon expiration of the period, documents may be removed to a 
place of custody or may be destroyed.  
Section 6 is problematic. Firstly, the reference to a ‘prescribed fee’ is redundant. In the 
past, the clerk of the court had to be paid in revenue stamps. With the abolishment of 
revenue stamps, there is no mechanism for clerks to receive money for the inspection 
of documents.58 Because of corruption at the courts, the clerks are not permitted to 
operate a cash register.59 
Secondly, it can be near impossible to peruse small claims court documents at the 
courts. The filing system at many courts is in a state of disarray. Records are in 
shambles. They are frequently removed to places of safety and it is almost impossible 
to requisition documents that have been removed from a court building.60 There is an 
																																																								
57 Martin ‘Online Access to Court Records – From Documents to Data, Particulars to Patterns’ (2008) 
53 Villanova Law Review 855 at 857. See also Peltz, Leonard, Andrews ‘The Arkansas Proposal on 
Access to Court Records: Upgrading the Common Law with Electronic Freedom of Information 
Norms’ (2006) 58 Arkansas Law Review 555.  
58 In the past court fees were paid by affixing revenue stamps to the appropriate court document/form. 
By GN 360 in GG 32059 of 27 March 2009 revenue stamps were demonetised and no longer issued.  
59 I am thankful to magistrates in Johannesburg for this information. 
60 See Mafu ‘The Management of Court Records in Magistrate Court: A Case of Middledrift 
Magistrate Court, Eastern Cape’ (Unpublished M.Lis Thesis, University of Forte Hare, 2014); see also 
the following online newspaper articles highlighting problems around the country: 
https://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/missing-court-records-bedevil-cases-on-appeal-1513336 (last 
accessed 1 June 2017); https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-08-22-high-court-judges-
deliver-stinging-rebuke-of-cape-magistrates-courts/ (last accessed on 30 August 2017; 
https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-08-22-useless-judges-give-their-damning-verdict-
on-magistrates-courts/ (last accessed on 1 September 2017); http://lrc.org.za/lrcarchive/lrc-in-the-
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urgent need for the Department of Justice to start storing court records in electronic 
format which can be accessed online61 or at record centres at the courts.62 This should 
not be difficult or expensive to do given that technology allows one to scan lengthy 
documents within seconds. There may be some human resource implications to 
accomplish the task, but these are not insurmountable because legal interns and even 
law students can be employed to scan documents and to create record repositories.  It 
is unacceptable for court documents to go missing and for their retrieval from archives 
to be impossible.   
Thirdly, s 6 does not mention that records may be perused for research purposes. 
Section 7 of the MCA provides: 
‘(1)  Subject to the provisions of section 7A and the rules the records of the court … shall be 
accessible to the public under supervision of the clerk of the court at convenient times and upon 
payment of the fees prescribed from time to time by the Minister in consultation with the 
Minister of Finance, and for this purpose and for all other purposes the records of any 
magistrate’s court which has at any time existed within the Republic, shall be deemed to be the 
records of the court of the district in which the place where such court was held is situated, and 
such records shall be preserved at the seat of magistracy of that district for such periods as the 
Director-General: Justice may from time to time determine: Provided that the said Director-
General may order that the records of a court for any regional division shall be so preserved at 
such a place or places within that division as he may from time to time determine: Provided 
further that payment of such fees shall not be required from any person who satisfies the 
magistrate of the district where the records of the court are preserved, or any judicial officer 
designated by the said magistrate from among the members of his staff, that he desires access 
to the records of the court in connection with research for academic purposes.’63 
The proviso in s 7(1) makes it much easier to conduct academic research in respect of 
magistrates’ courts’ proceedings. The fee for the perusal of files is waived and there is 
a mechanism that allows for academic research. By not mentioning academic research 
																																																								
news/3370-lost-court-records-delay-judgment-in-activist-court-case (last accessed on 30 August 2017); 
https://www.pressportal.co.za/story/5935/looking-for-copies-of-yourdivorce-records-papers-or-
documents.html (last accessed on 1 September 2017).  
61 Winn ‘Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability in an Age of Electronic 
Information’ (2004) 79 Washington Law Review 307 at 310ff.  
62 It would seem that keeping digital records at the courts is the more preferable stance to take because 
keeping records online can violate the privacy rights of litigants, can have a chilling effect on access to 
justice, and can encourage people to hack into court systems to distort files: see, Eltis ‘The Judicial 
System in the Digital Age: Revisiting the Relationship between Privacy and Accessibility in the Cyber 
Context’ (2011) 56 McGill Law Journal 289.  
63 Italics supplied.  
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in s 6 of the SCCA, the legislature has created the impression that perusal of court 
documents for such purposes can only be undertaken if there is official authorisation 
from the Department of Justice. This interpretation is unfortunate. 
To ease the difficulty of conducting academic research in small claims matters, s 6 of 
the SCCA must be amended to include a proviso that is similar to s 7(1) of the MCA. 
There is a need for ongoing legal research at the courts, especially if the legislation is 
amended and if new and innovative processes and procedures are introduced. It is also 
imperative for researchers to monitor court proceedings so that service delivery at the 
courts can be improved.  
4.5 COURT PERSONNEL 
(a)  Officers of the court and their indemnity from liability  
Section 11 of the SCCA is headed ‘officers of the court’. In terms of this section, the 
magistrate of a district may appoint clerks and assistant clerks of the small claims court, 
interpreters and legal assistants ‘for the performance of prescribed functions’. 
Furthermore, a ‘messenger of the court’ appointed under the MCA for the magistrate’s 
court of a district ‘shall act as the messenger of the court for a court in that part of the 
said district falling within the area of jurisdiction of that court.’  Section 11(3) provides 
that: 
‘The State, a clerk of the court, an assistant clerk of the court or a legal assistant shall not be 
liable for any damage or loss resulting from assistance given in good faith by that clerk of the 
court, assistant clerk of the court or legal assistant to any party or prospective party to an action 
before a court or to the enforcement of a judgment or order in terms of section 41 in the form 
of legal advice or the compilation or preparation of a summons, statement or other document.’ 
At the 2003 Small Claims Courts Conference,64 there was much discussion about court 
																																																								
64 See §3.6.  
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officials. The view was widely held that many small claims courts did not have 
dedicated clerks, interpreters and legal assistants. The subsequent national audit 
confirmed this.65 
In its Report, the Hoexter Commission clearly contemplated that the small claims 
courts, as separate courts, were to be staffed by their own personnel, even though the 
courts would hold sessions at the local magistrates’ courts.66 The Commission thought 
that it was essential to staff the courts with legal assistants because legal representation 
would not be permitted.67  
In the national audit, the Department of Justice established that there were very few 
small claims courts clerks.68 Due to human resource constraints, magistrates found it 
difficult to redeploy magistrates’ courts’ clerks to the small claims courts. Furthermore, 
magistrates do not have the power to hire additional clerks. This function is reserved 
for the Department of Justice. The clerks of the magistrates’ courts often act as small 
claims clerks because the administrative function performed by the respective clerks is 
very similar.69  The national audit also established that there were none (or hardly any) 
dedicated legal assistants in any of the courts.70 At present, the lack of legal assistants 
continues to be an issue. The clerks of court fulfil the function of legal assistants.  This 
is not ideal as the clerks are overburdened. A fundamental Hoexter Commission 
recommendation has thus failed.  
																																																								
65 See §3.8. According to the national audit (n9), 80% of the small claims courts operated without 
interpreters (page 6); and only 35% of the courts had dedicated clerks (page 7). There is no mention 
made of legal assistants. One can assume there were either none or their numbers were so negligible as 
not to warrant mentioning.   
66  Report §14.3(l) and 14.3(t).  
67 See also discussion in §7.6.  
68 See n65. 
69 Compare SCCR 3 with MCR 3. Though the magistrates’ courts rule is more expansive, the functions 
of the clerks of the magistrates’ courts essentially include what clerks are required to do in the small 
claims courts. 
70 See n65. 
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(b)  Steps taken to address the issues are not enough 
Some steps were taken to rectify the situation, but to date, the issue of court personnel 
remains a substantial problem in many courts.  For a short while, the Department of 
Justice contemplated using LL.B 71  students to serve as legal assistants. However, 
nothing came of this.72 The reasons for not taking the initiative further are unclear.  It 
is quite possible that one of the stumbling blocks might have been that law students are 
not covered by the indemnity contained in s 11(3) of the SCCA. Court interpreters, too, 
are few and far between in the small claims courts. There is a general lack of interpreters 
in the civil courts and the work ethic among interpreters is rather poor. To compound 
matters further, court personnel have been perceived as lazy, incompetent, poorly 
trained, rude and complacent.73 It also does not help that the overwhelming majority of 
small claims courts operate after regular court hours when many court officials have 
gone home, leaving commissioners to deal with litigants who often become unruly.74 
The implementation of s 11 of the SCCA is thus a dismal failure. 
																																																								
71In South Africa, the LL.B. (Latin: Legum Baccalaureus) is offered both at 
the undergraduate and postgraduate levels. From 1996, it became the only legal qualification for legal 
practice. 
72 See §3.8.   
73  De Lange ‘Court Interpreters Get ‘Spaza Training’ The Citizen (23 March 2014); Louw ‘Court 
Interpreters Lost in Translation Times Live (8 June 2015):  https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-
africa/2015-06-08-court-interpreters-lost-in-translation/ (last accessed on 14 August 2014). See also 
Steytler ‘Implementing Language Rights in Court: The Role of the Court Interpreter’ (1993) 9 South 
African Journal of Human Rights 205ff; Moeketsi ‘Some Observations on Answers to Courtroom 
Questions’  (1999) 19 South African Journal on African Languages 237-244; Moeketsi ‘The Do’s and 
Don’t in Court Interpreting: A Functional Approach to a Professional Code’(2000) 31 Language Matters 
222-242; Hlope ‘Receiving Justice in Your Own Language – the Need for Effective Court Interpreting 
in Our Multilingual Society’  (April 2004) Advocate 42-47. See also ‘Letters to the Editor’ De Rebus 
(December 2010); Editor ‘Law Society of South Africa Speaks Out on Conditions in Johannesburg and 
on Errant Magistrates’ De Rebus (January-February 2011) 17; Welgemoed ‘Echoing Enough it Enough’ 
De Rebus (August 2011) 4.  See also Paleker (n60) for the letters from attorneys complaining about court 
personnel reproduced at footnote 160. 
74  Law Society of South Africa Annual Report 2010-2011 43. 
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(c) Recommendations to address staffing problems 
There are a number of measures that can be taken to reduce staffing issues in the small 
claims courts. Firstly, s 11 must be amended to give a greater role to court managers. 
Court managers, rather than magistrates, are responsible for daily administration in the 
courts.75 Secondly, the power of court managers must be reflected in s 11 and their 
duties in the staffing process of the courts must be articulated. Thirdly, the performance 
of court managers and staff must be audited biannually and people who perform poorly 
must be disciplined and booted from employment. Fourthly, Justice College must offer 
regular and better training for court officials. The training must include instruction 
about ethics, customer relations and service delivery. Fifthly, more multilingual 
commissioners must be appointed so that interpretation services are limited to 
exceptional cases. Interpreters must include sign language experts to cater for the needs 
of the deaf. The term ‘legal assistant’ must be defined in the Act. Currently, the term is 
not defined. A future definition must include the prospect of legal assistance being 
rendered by law students, paralegals, and other suitably qualified persons. There may 
be people who are willing to render assistance in the courts as part of their community 
service contribution. If they are adequately trained, there is no reason to exclude them 
from offering their time. Needless to say, they, too, should be indemnified from 
liability.  
(d)  The role of clerk and legal assistant must be kept separate  
According to SCCR 5:  
‘(1) The legal assistant shall render to any person who has so requested him advice in regard 
to any action which falls within the jurisdiction of the court. 
																																																								
75 The functions of a court manager can be gleaned from the following advertisement placed by the 
Department of Justice: https://joblistsouthafrica.com/court-manager-department-justice.html (last 
accessed 14 August 2017).  
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 (2) If he is so requested, the legal assistant shall render assistance with the drafting of the 
process of court. 
 (3) Any act to be performed by the legal assistant in terms of these rules may be performed 
by the clerk of the court.’ 
SCCR 5(3) is problematic because it serves to license the practice of not appointing 
legal assistants and instead asking clerks to shoulder an additional responsibility.  
If the SCCA permits legal assistants to be drawn from the ranks of law students and 
other suitably trained people, SCCR 3(6) must also be amended. Currently, the rule 
reads: 
‘Any act or notice to be performed or signed by the clerk of the court in terms of these rules 
may be performed or signed by a legal assistant or a commissioner except that no 
commissioner shall write out a statement or process for any party.’76 
The phrase ‘a legal assistant or’ should be deleted because it would be inappropriate 
for a law student or a layperson to have equal administrative authority to that of the 
clerk or the commissioner. In fact, it may be argued that SCCR 3(6) is ultra vires as it 
stands because the SCCA does not contemplate giving a legal assistant (who may not 
be a clerk) equal administrative authority to that of a duly appointed clerk.  
(e)   The definition of ‘State’ must be defined in the indemnity provision for greater 
clarity 
‘State’ is not defined in the SCCA. There is no doubt that for the purposes of s 11(3), 
‘State’ includes national, provincial and local government.77 As will be argued later, the 
word ‘State’ should be defined with greater clarity in the SCCA.78 For the purposes of 
s 11(3), the word ‘State’ should be replaced with the phrase ‘national, provincial and 
local government’ to explicate that all the branches of government are immune from 
liability. 
																																																								
76 Italics supplied. 
77 It will be shown that historically local government was sued in the small claims courts and that the 
courts hold that the word ‘State’ may have different meanings within different statutory contexts: see 
chapter 7.  
78 See chapter 7.  
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(f)  There are no ‘messengers’   
The reference to ‘messenger of the court’ in s 11(2) must be replaced with the phrase 
‘sheriff of the court’. Furthermore, sheriffs are not appointed in terms of the MCA; they 
are appointed in terms of the Sheriffs Act.79 The legislative change must be reflected in 
the subsection. 
4.6 LANGUAGE POLICY  
Section 5(1) of the SCCA is unconstitutional. It provides that ‘either of the official 
languages’ may be used in the small claims courts.  The reference to either language is 
a throwback to the time when South Africa had two official languages: English and 
Afrikaans. Today, the Constitution recognises 11 official languages.80 
The issue of a language policy for the courts is a thorny one. Even though South Africa 
has 11 official languages, from a practical resource perspective it is difficult to ensure 
that each and every language is equally represented in the courts. For example, it would 
be very costly for every sign in a court building to reflect the 11 official languages and 
for every court document to be translated into all the languages.  The exercise would 
be expensive and wasteful as South African languages are both demographically and 
geographically divided amongst the various provinces. From an economic and 
logistical perspective, it would make better sense for at least two dominant languages 
in every province to be represented. In the Western Cape, for instance, English, 
Afrikaans and isiXhosa should be represented, whereas in Kwa-Zulu Natal, Zulu and 
English should be the dominant languages. There is a need for one predominant 
language in all the courts to ensure a base level of language efficiency. It appears that 
																																																								
79 Sheriffs Act, ss 2, 5, 6.  
80 Constitution, s 6. 
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English predominates as the most spoken and understood among all the languages in 
South Africa.81 
It is interesting to note that in September 2017 the Chief Justice took the position that 
English should be the language of record in the superior courts.  Polity.org.za reported 
on the matter as follows:  
‘English will be the only language of record in South African courts, Chief Justice Mogoeng 
Mogoeng said on Friday. 
“Nobody is saying South Africans are not permitted to speak in their mother tongue in a court 
of law,” Mogoeng told reporters at the office of the chief justice in Midrand. 
“We are just saying, to facilitate efficiency and a smooth running of the court system, we would 
do well according to our experience... We [should] have everything that is said in a particular 
case captured in one language that is understood by all the judges - and that language is 
English,”he said. 
The decision was made during a two-day meeting held by the heads of courts, under the 
chairmanship of Mogoeng. 
Mogoeng said that poor people who had little resources and wanted to take their matters to the 
appeal court would have to exhaust their resources paying for their records to be translated. 
Not all appeal judges understood all 11 official languages, he added. 
“We are alive to the reality that language is a very emotive issue. When you don’t allow people 
to communicate in their mother tongue, they feel disempowered,” Mogoeng said. 
He said they had not arrived at the decision lightly, but had felt that what went into the records 
should be in English. 
“We are here to ensure that there is access to justice for all South Africans… If you are going 
to insist on changes that require additional resources, we will be more than happy to embrace 
that.”’ 
 
Clearly, there is some backlash to the Chief Justice’s language policy proposal. It must 
be noted that the Chief Justice is not suggesting that people would be forced to speak 
English in the courts. People would speak their own language and where necessary have 
the benefit of interpretation services if court proceedings are conducted in a language 
other than their home language. This is echoed in s 5(2) of the SCCA, which provides: 
‘(2) If evidence is given in a language with which one of the parties is in the opinion of the court 
not sufficiently conversant, a competent interpreter may be called by the court to interpret that 
evidence into a language with which that party appears to be sufficiently conversant, 
irrespective of whether the language in which the evidence is given is one of the official 
languages.’  
																																																								
81 The most common language spoken as a first language by South Africans is Zulu (23%), followed by 
Xhosa (16%), and Afrikaans (14%). English is the fourth most common first language in the country 
(9.6%), but is understood in most urban areas and is the dominant language in government and the media: 
see ‘Tongues under Threat’ Economist (22 January 2011) 58. 
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The Chief Justice is proposing that all court documents, records and judgments be 
written and recorded in English for the sake of administrative efficiency. Whether the 
language policy in the superior courts will apply in the lower courts remains to be seen. 
Because the small claims courts are courts of first access to the public and legal 
representation is not permitted, there is a need for small claims documentation to be 
available in English as the dominant language of record and in at least one other 
provincial language. There is a special need to prioritise indigenous African languages.   
Even though a party may obtain the services of an interpreter, experience has shown 
that interpretation services in the small claims courts are often difficult to come by. To 
counter this problem, small claims courts presiding officers should be multilingual. The 
use of indigenous languages in the small claims courts is very important. If presiding 
officers reflect the demographic profile of the South African population, it will go a 
long way to reducing the dependency of small claims courts on interpretation services. 
Furthermore, because the court proceeds inquisitorially, 82  it makes sense for the 
presiding officer to interact with the litigants on a personal level, as opposed to an 
interpreter acting as an intermediary.  
For pleadings – such as the summons or the statement of defence83 – parties should be 
free to write in their own languages and in simple terms. If legal assistants are appointed 
at the courts, they could assist litigants to translate pleadings that are written in a 
language other than English, for the benefit of the recipient of a pleading and for official 
record keeping. 
																																																								
82 SCCA, s 26(3).  
83 See chapter 8.  
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4.7   THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 
An issue that looms large over small claims courts is whether the courts should be 
separate courts or whether they should be incorporated into the magistrates’ courts with 
a special small claims track. 
The Hoexter Commission was unequivocal that small claims courts should be separate 
courts but that they should share the infrastructure of the magistrates’ courts. It appears 
from the Hoexter Commission Report that it was motivated principally by experiences 
in foreign jurisdictions. 84  Creating a separate system of small claims courts also 
accorded with the Apartheid structure of the courts. All the courts in the land operated 
on a racial basis. Black litigants were forced to litigate their matters in so-called ‘Bantu 
Courts’.85 As deracialised courts, the small claims courts functioned in sharp contrast 
to the other courts. If the small claims courts were amalgamated into the magistrates’ 
courts this would have created an anomalous position in the magistrates’ courts. The 
way of maintaining the racial divide was to keep the small claims courts separate and 
to treat them as the exception rather than as the norm. 
From their inception, the small claims courts experienced logistical difficulties.  The 
courts operated after hours.86 They did not have their own staff and operated in the 
shadow of the magistrates’ courts. At the 2003 Small Claims Courts Conference people 
complained that single parents and older people found it difficult and unsafe to attend 
the courts in the evenings. Commissioners conceded that they often did not have the 
protection of security in the courts and when litigants became unruly, the commissioner 
																																																								
84 Report §13.5. 
85 Yates ‘Bantu Civil Courts in South Africa’ De Rebus Procuratoriis (October 1973) 421-423. For a 
discussion of the ‘Bantu Courts’, see chapter 5.  
86 This was on the recommendation of the Hoexter Commission: Report §13.23. 
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was expected to maintain order in the court. There were no legal assistants and people 
found it difficult to navigate court processes and procedures.87 Many of the issues 
identified at the Conference were addressed but issues such as security and the lack of 
legal assistants remain an issue, even today. 
It is interesting to note that the Department of Justice started a programme of recruiting 
sitting magistrates and retired magistrates to preside in the small claims courts. This is 
partly to make up for the shortage of presiding officers at various courts.88 However, 
this also gives the courts more flexibility to operate during normal business hours. In 
Gauteng and Limpopo, for example, there are many small claims courts that now 
operate during the daytime, because magistrates realise that people have difficulty 
accessing the courts at night.89 But the overwhelming majority of courts still operate 
according to the Hoexter Commission model, namely after hours and on weekends. 
There is a need to rethink the small claims courts as separate courts. In England and 
Wales, as a result of the Woolf Reforms, the County Courts have a small claims track. 
A magistrate has discretion to refer any matter to the small claims track if the claim 
meets the monetary limit of the track.90 In South Africa, the magistrates’ courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction with the small claims courts. The plaintiff, as dominus litis, 
chooses which court he or she wants to go to. If the plaintiff can afford to bring a claim 
in a magistrate’s court, he or she can do so. The defendant has no say. This situation 
seems rather unfair because it allows plaintiffs with more finances to force defendants 
with less economic means to defend matters in the magistrates’ courts, where legal 
																																																								
87 This was confirmed in the national audit (n9) at 5. 
88 See Address by the Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (n5). 
89 I am thankful to Ms J Wessels, the Regional Court President of Polokwane and to Ms E De Klerk, 
the Senior Magistrate, Palmridge, for this information.  
90 Sime A Practical Approach to Civil Procedure 354-359. 
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representation is permitted and is often needed to navigate the more complex processes 
and procedures of the courts.91 
To overcome many of the logistical and substantive access to justice issues in the small 
claims courts, it seems better to incorporate the small claims courts into the magistrates’ 
courts system and to have a small claims track within the magistrates’ courts. The small 
claims courts will still have their own processes and procedures. Litigants can choose 
to either institute a claim in the small claims courts or in the magistrates’ courts. 
However, when they choose the latter option, they should be alive to the prospect that 
a magistrate could refer the matter to the small claims track if the value of the claim 
and its nature falls within the jurisdiction of the small claims court, and the matter is 
not too complex for the small claims court presiding officer to handle. 
All small claims courts should operate during normal business hours and only if a court 
has sufficient security and personnel should it offer after-hours services. Again the 
amalgamation of small claims courts into the magistrates’ courts system will make it 
easier for all small claims courts to operate alongside the magistrates’ courts. 
4.8 TECHNOLOGY 
The power of technology must be harnessed. A litigant should be able to file and 
exchange documents online through a central portal dedicated to each individual case.  
Currently, the small claims courts operate manually. Litigants must issue and file 
documents in court. They must take time away from work, social responsibilities and 
family to do this. They often have to travel long distances to do so. For poor people, 
the cost of ordinary travel can be a challenge. Access to the internet is growing at a 
																																																								
91 See chapter 6 for more on this issue.  
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rapid pace. 92  Even where a person cannot access the internet, it is likely that an 
acquaintance would have access. 
Online assistance to litigants should be available. Again, law students and other 
properly trained people can be used to provide such services free of charge. The 
exercise simply requires some forward thinking and planning.  
The use of technology as part of the processes and procedures of the court is considered 
in more detail in chapter 8. 
4.9 CONCLUSION  
The Department of Justice must be commended for expanding small claims courts so 
rapidly since 2003. The prevalence of small claims courts shows that the Department 
is committed to their presence in the civil justice system. However, as noted in chapter 
3 and in this chapter, the issue of court administration remains a serious concern. Unless 
the management issues are confronted and dealt with in a decisive, co-ordinated and 
business-like manner, court procedures will not have their desired effect.  
This chapter has offered some solutions for how to deal with issues of management. 
The solutions are for the most part not expensive to implement. In some instances, they 
require amendments to the SCCA and SCCRs to address governance issues. A new co-
ordination structure in the form of a national Small Claims Courts Board and advisory 
committees based on a cluster approach is not expensive to implement. People serving 
on those committees would do so on a pro bono basis having regard to their 
involvement in the courts or in professional structures within the attorneys’ or 
advocates’ professions.  Installing  better technology at the courts will require an initial 
																																																								
92 See chapter 3.  
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capital injection. But if quality equipment is sourced, it can serve the courts for many 
years and in the process can save the courts a lot of time, effort, and administration 
costs. The training of court officials is not a luxury. It is a necessity. No organisation 






he Native1 Administration Act2 created the so-called ‘Bantu/Black courts’, also known 
as the ‘commissioners’ courts’ because the courts were presided over by 
commissioners. These courts heard disputes involving black people only. Asian, coloured and 
white South Africans were required to resolve their disputes in courts other than the Black 
courts.3  
The establishment of the commissioners’ courts was an Apartheid instrument to formalise and 
encourage the use of African customary law to resolve disputes between black people. In so 
far as African customary law was deficient, the Black courts could refer to Roman-Dutch 
actions to resolve disputes involving eviction, purchase and sale, lease, succession and estate 
matters. 4  The establishment of the courts thus entrenched racial discrimination in the 
administration of civil justice, with the objective of forcing black people to resolve their 
disputes in a separate forum and through a separate system of law. The Native Administration 
Act was later renamed the Black Administration Act5 and extended criminal jurisdiction to 
the commissioners’ courts. 
By the 1970s, the Black courts fell into ‘sharp decline’ because they obtained a bad reputation 
for offering an inferior system of justice based on racial grounds.6 This prompted the Hoexter 
Commission in 1983 to propose the abolition of the commissioners’ courts, subject to the 
caveat that the special Black divorce courts should be retained because they enjoyed popular 
                                                             
1 In some literature the Act is also styled the ‘Bantu Administration Act’: see Yates ‘Bantu Civil Courts in South 
Africa’ (October 1973) De Rebus Procuratoriis 421. 
2 38 of 1927 (hereafter referred to as the ‘Native Administration Act’). 
3 Bennett Customary Law in South Africa 139. 
4 Yates (n1) 422.  
5 Section 9.  




support.7 By 1986, the commissioners’ courts were closed down and their jurisdiction was 
transferred to the magistrates’ courts and the small claims courts.  
The reason for raising the issue of the commissioners’ courts is that the Hoexter Commission 
Report8 contains an interesting point of departure when compared to the SCCA. The Hoexter 
Commission recommended the establishment of small claims courts presided over by 
‘adjudicators’.9 The term adjudicator was consonant with the foreign jurisprudence that the 
Commission had referred to. In many countries, the presiding officer of a small claims court 
is either titled ‘adjudicator’ or ‘arbitrator.’ The Commission felt that the former term was 
better for the South African small claims courts. Parliament, however, did not take the 
Commission’s recommendation and opted for the pejorative label ‘commissioner’.  
The use of ‘commissioner’, it is submitted, was not coincidental and must be appreciated in 
the context of the Hoexter Commission’s recommendation that the commissioners’ courts 
should be terminated and that the small claims courts should operate on a deracialised basis.10 
When one ponders the Apartheid edifice, one must wonder how the small claims courts fit 
into that racist ideology. Perhaps, given the decline of the commissioners’ courts, the purpose 
of the small claims courts was not to provide speedy and accessible justice for all; it was a 
cleverly engineered mechanism for the institution of legal proceedings between, against and 
by black people in a forum where the normal racial divide was relaxed, without affecting the 
fundamental structure of the magistrates’ courts and the Supreme Court.11 Some may say that 
                                                             
7 Hoexter Commission ‘Enquiry into the Structure and Functioning of the Courts’ Fifth Report Part V  § 7.3.1-2; 
Part I § 3.4.3.8. For a discussion of the black family courts see Burman, Dingle, Glasser ‘The New Family Court 
in Action: An Initial Assessment’ (2000) 117 SALJ 111. 
8 Discussed in chapter 3. 
9 Report §13.4. 
10 Report §13.45. 
11 See Report §13.45. See §2.4 and in particular the discussion of the repealed s 14(3) of the SCCA. The 
existence of s 14(3) in the original version of the Act provides further credence to the argument that the 
government was trying to replace the old commissioners’ courts with the small claims courts to a certain extent. 
See also Kerr ‘Customary Law in the Small Claims Courts’ (1984) 101 SALJ 726 at 727 where the writer raises 
the distinct possibility that the government was, in fact, trying to replace the commissioners’ courts with the 
small claims courts.   
In the past, the High Court of South Africa was called the Supreme Court of South Africa. Chapter 8 of the 
Constitution changed the names of the superior courts.  
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this argument politicises the small claims courts. However, every law and policy that 
emanated from the Apartheid regime requires suspicious engagement because the ruling 
National Party sought to use the law to maintain the Apartheid system. It is also interesting to 
note that the procedures of the small claims courts bear an uncanny similarity to the 
procedures of the commissioners’ courts.12  
Even if the Hoexter Commission had noble intentions, the government must have realised that 
black people were familiar with the commissioners’ courts and the procedures thereof. 
Perhaps the small claims courts were an extension of that system of racialised justice, albeit 
cleverly disguised to create a semblance of normality. Given the racial history of South 
Africa, one must wonder whether the loaded appellation of ‘commissioner’ should be used at 
all. Perhaps the label ‘commissioner’ should be replaced in the future with the Hoexter 
Commission’s label: adjudicator.13 Be that as it may, the commissioner of the small claims 
court remains one of the most important actors in the story of these courts. Consequently, this 
chapter considers various aspects relating to the commissioner.  
5.2 QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF COMMISSIONERS 
(a) The Hoexter Commission’s recommendations 
 The Hoexter Commission proposed that the commissioners of the small claims courts should 
be drawn from the pool of ‘practising attorneys of at least seven years’ standing; practising 
advocates of at least seven years’ standing; [and] academic teachers of law of at least seven 
                                                             
12 Native Administration Act, s 11(1).  Bennett (n3) 139, n 32, notes:  
‘Under s 11(1), commissioners had discretion to apply either customary or common law... and the 
procedures in their courts were much more relaxed than those in the magistrates’ courts or the Supreme 
Court. For example, commissioners could intervene to protect the interests of litigants. 
Thus…commissioners were obliged to assist unrepresented litigants to ensure that they did not suffer 
any undue prejudice.’  
According to Yates (n1) 421:  
 ‘These are not courts in the Western sense, in that no record of evidence is kept and strict rules of 
evidence are not applied. All evidence is led viva voce. Hearsay evidence may be adduced… The rule 
regarding the right to begin is not rigidly followed and, most important, is that there are no formal 
pleadings required…Legal practitioners are not allowed to appear in these courts.’   




years’ standing with actual experience of practice either as attorneys or advocates’.14 The 
views of the Commission were incorporated into s 9(2) of the SCCA. The original version15 
of the SCCA read as follows: 
‘No person shall be appointed as a commissioner unless he is qualified –  
(a) to be admitted to practise as an advocate under the Admission of Advocates Act, 1964 (Act 
No. 67 of 1964); or  
(b)  to be admitted to practise as an attorney under the Attorneys Act, 1979 (Act No. 53 of 1979); 
or  
(c)  to be appointed as a magistrate under the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1944 (Act No. 32 of 1944),  
and for an uninterrupted period of at least seven years practised as an advocate or attorney or occupied 
the post of magistrate, or for that period was involved in the tuition of law and also practised as an 
advocate or attorney for such period as, in the opinion of the Minister, makes him suitable for 
appointment as a commissioner, or possesses such other experience as, in the opinion of the Minister, 
renders him suitable for appointment as a commissioner.’ 
(b) Amendment to the Small Claims Courts Act  
Barely four years after the enactment of the SCCA, s 9(2) was amended.16  The seven-year 
practical experience period was reduced to five years. The reason for the amendment is not 
difficult to fathom. After the initial enthusiastic reception of the small claims courts waned, 
commissioners were difficult to come by and this prompted the amendment to the Act.17 By 
reducing the duration of active practice, the Department of Justice could attract younger and 
less busy practitioners to service the courts. The problem, however, was that the 
commissioners were not adequately trained.18 
At the 2003 Small Claims Courts Conference,19 delegates expressed the opinion that the 
eligibility requirements of commissioners must be changed and that the seven-year practical 
experience requirement had to be reinstated. The Law Society of South Africa’s Small Claims 
Courts Committee also took this view. 20 The premise behind the submission is that many 
                                                             
14 Report §13.4. 
15 See GN 900 in GG 9202 of 2 May 1984.  
16 The amendment was brought about by Small Claims Court Amendment Act 63 of 1989, which came into 
effect on 1 September 1989.  
17 See §3.5 for the reasons why some practitioners refused to serve.  
18 Ibid. 
19 See §3.6. 
20 The Law Society of South African Annual Report 2010-2011 at 43 states: 
‘At present, commissioners are required to have a minimum of five years’ practical experience and, if 
possible, consideration should be given to increasing the number of years of experience prior to a 
practitioner being allowed to become a commissioner of the Small Claims Court, due to the fact that, in 
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commissioners lack the relevant experience and knowledge to service the courts and they 
consequently render incorrect decisions. This situation is particularly dire as a decision of a 
small claims court commissioner cannot be appealed.21  By increasing the qualifications 
requirement, the argument is that the quality of decision-making would improve.  
Given the number of small claims courts in the country today, and the shortage of volunteer 
commissioners – especially in rural areas where there are not many practising attorneys and 
advocates – to increase the practical experience requirement to seven years would 
undoubtedly exacerbate the problems that small claims courts face in terms of recruiting and 
retaining commissioners.22 The answer to dealing with the inexperience of commissioners lies 
not in extending the duration of practical experience required, but in proper training.23 Aside 
from five years of uninterrupted practical experience, every commissioner admitted to the 
attorneys’ or advocates’ professions would have served articles of clerkship24 or pupillage,25 
and would have sat the Sidebar or Bar examinations. Five years of post-admission practical 
experience with the proper training seems more than adequate to serve the small claims 
courts, provided of course that commissioners receive specialised judicial training.26 It should 
be borne in mind that the Minister may, in any event, turn down an application for 
appointment if the Minister feels that the applicant is unsuitable.27 Furthermore, the SCCA 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
many instances, the courts function without the assistance of court orderlies and/or the police and the 
seniority of the commissioner is of vital importance to maintain order in the court during sessions, as 
litigants often become unruly.’ 
21 SCCA, s 45. 
22 Manyathi-Jele ‘Magistrates Can Now Act as Commissioners’  De Rebus 11. 
23 For problems relating to the training of commissioners see §3.8. 
24 The standard duration of articles of clerkship is two years unless the candidate attorney undergoes vocational 
training at the School for Legal Practice and completes all the practical training modules and evaluations at the 
School, in which case the period of in-firm articles of clerkship is reduced to one year.  See s 2 read with s 2A of 
the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. 
25 The duration of pupillage is one year. See https://capebar.co.za/pupillage/ (last accessed 15 January 2018). 
Interestingly, the Admission of Advocates Act 74 of 1964 does not mention the requirement for pupillage. 
However, to be a member of the organised Bar one has to serve pupillage. It is possible for a practitioner not to 
serve pupilage in which case the practitioner will form part of what is called the ‘Independent Bar’. Members of 
the Independent Bar cannot hold chambers with advocates who have undergone all the training prescribed by the 
General Council of the Bar. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of advocates serve pupillage and sit the 
Bar examinations.  
26 It is interesting to note that the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act requires that in order to serve as adjudicators 
legal practitioners have ‘at least three years of experience in the legal field.’  
27 SCCA, s 9(2). 
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provides that a commissioner can refuse to hear a matter deemed to be too complicated. He or 
she can refer the parties to the magistrates’ courts. 28  
(c) Characteristics and qualifications 
The SCCA does not stipulate particular characteristics that the commissioner should possess. 
It provides that commissioners must have undergone general legal training that would render 
them eligible for admission to either the attorneys’ or advocates’ professions. It does not 
stipulate that the commissioner should, for example, be a qualified mediator or that he or she 
must have undergone conflict management training. 29 
The qualifications criteria for commissioners may require amendment in the future. With the 
introduction of mediation in the small claims courts,30 it may be necessary to stipulate that 
commissioners must have undergone mediation training. This will assist commissioners to 
identify cases that are ripe for mediation and will also enable commissioners to serve as 
mediators in matters over which they are not presiding. The stumbling block, however, may 
be that by adding more qualification requirements one may be narrowing the pool of eligible 
commissioners.  
Adding further qualifications requirements would not have posed a problem if commissioners 
were remunerated for their services, as that would incentivise further professional 
development. The difficulty in the South African context is that commissioners are not 
remunerated,31 and hence adding further qualifications requirements may have the unintended 
consequence of turning eager people away because the bar for appointment is set too high. It 
is submitted that the preference for additional qualifications should be contained in the 
appointments policy, and not written into the legislation. In other words, when appointing 
                                                             
28 SCCA, s 23. 
29 See Clark The Tasmanian Small Claims Courts: An Empirical Study PhD Thesis, University of Tasmania 
(1993) at 120-122; Clark ‘Small Claims Courts and Tribunals in Australia: Development and Emerging Issues’ 
(1991) 10 University of Tasmania Law Review 201 at 227-228. 
30 See chapter 10.  
31 See discussion at §5.3.  
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people, those with additional skills should be preferred as a matter of policy, but additional 
qualifications should not be a prerequisite. 
5.3 PART-TIME VERSUS FULL-TIME COMMISSIONERS 
The cost of establishing small claims courts was a consideration in the mind of the Hoexter 
Commission.32  Even when it came to the appointment of commissioners, the issue of costs 
loomed largely. Hence, the Commission emphasised that ‘adjudicators’33 should be ‘unpaid 
volunteers’ drawn from the ranks of practising attorneys and advocates.34 
Since the establishment of the small claims courts in 1985, commissioners have served on a 
volunteer, unremunerated basis. The Department of Justice pays travel and subsistence 
expenses for official duties undertaken by commissioners. Sometimes commissioners do not 
bother to claim expenses because the claims procedure is cumbersome and slow, prompting 
many to perform their functions gratis.35  
The volunteer system should work well given that there are just under 25 000 attorneys and 5 
000 advocates in the country.36 Those numbers should be able to service 405 small claims 
courts.37 The difficulty, however, is that not all attorneys and advocates are prepared to serve. 
The issue of safety at the courts and the lack of adequate logistical support turn many away 
from serving.38This has been the case since the inception of the courts. Furthermore, in rural 
and peri-urban areas, the issue of available commissioners is problematic as there are not 
                                                             
32 Report § 13.31. 
33 See §5.1above. 
34 Report §13.3. 
35 Department of Justice Narrative Report on the Small Claims Court Audit 6.  See also Law Society of South 
Africa Annual Report 2007-2008 39. 
36 As at April 2015, there were 23712 attorneys in the country. There were approximately 5000 registered law 
students in the country. Of the qualifying students, about 3000 go on to register articles in a given year: 
Manyathi-Jele N ‘Latest Statistics on the Legal Profession’ (August 2015) De Rebus 13. It is fair to conclude 
that there are ±25000 attorneys in the country at the present time. As at 26 April 2012 there were 4762 advocates 
in the country: see Department of Justice and Constitutional Development National Assembly Question for 
Written Reply: Parliamentary Question No 947 of 26 April 2012. It is thus safe to speculate that there are ± 5000 
advocates in the country at the present time. 
37 See §4.2. 
38 See §4.7. 
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many law firms in those areas, and advocates, by and large, hold chambers in the large city 
centres.   
According to the national audit of small claims courts,39 there were 1036 commissioners in 
2007, of whom 186 were inactive. The Western Cape had the most commissioners with 244 
active commissioners, followed by Gauteng at 123 and Kwa-Zulu Natal at 108. The Northern 
Cape, one of the most economically challenged provinces in South Africa and with a large 
rural community, had a measly 31 active commissioners. The Free State, Limpopo, 
Mpumalanga and the North West provinces fared slightly better with 41, 67, 70, and 43 active 
commissioners respectively. The numbers suggest that the provinces with large cities tend to 
fare better than those that do not have significant metropolitan areas.40 
To alleviate the problem of a lack of commissioners, the legislature in 2013 amended the 
SCCA by adding the following provision: 
‘A commissioner appointed in terms of paragraph (a) in respect of a specific court shall be deemed to 
be appointed for any court established under section 2 in that province.’41 
In the past, a commissioner was appointed for a particular ‘district’.42 This prevented a 
commissioner from serving other districts in the same province. The amendment now permits 
a commissioner to sit anywhere in a province if his or her services are required. The mobility 
of commissioners will help to staff courts where there is a shortage of commissioners. 
Aside from amending the SCCA, the Department of Justice also actively recruited 
commissioners to serve the courts. Today there are approximately 1921 commissioners 
nationwide. A particularly useful initiative has been the recruitment of retired and sitting 
                                                             
39 See §3.8. 
40 It must be noted that the figures do not tally. The discrepancy is also apparent from Tables 1 and 2 in §6.4. 
These are official statics supplied by the Department of Justice. Consequently, they are reported as provided. 
Despite the error margin, the statistics provide insight into the cohort of commissioners and how they are 
geographically divided.  
41 SCCA, s 9(1)(c). Paragraph (c) was inserted by the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 42 of 2013, which came 
into operation on 1 April 2014. 
42 For the meaning of ‘district’ see s 1 of the SCCA. 
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magistrates to serve as commissioners.43  Magistrates bring a considerable level of judicial 
expertise to the small claims courts. They also ensure that the courts can sit during regular 
business hours.44 Volunteer practitioners hold sessions after hours and on weekends. As noted 
in chapter 4, the Hoexter Commission’s model45 of holding court sessions after hours was to 
accommodate volunteer commissioners. However, evening courts do not work for the elderly, 
single parents, those with safety concerns and those who have to travel long distances to reach 
court.46 
When the provisions of the Legal Practice Act47 come into full force, they will undoubtedly 
assist in staffing the courts with more commissioners. The Act envisages that legal 
professionals will in the future perform community service on a continuing basis to meet their 
professional obligations.48 In terms of s 29(2)(e) of the Legal Practice Act, community service 
is broadly defined and includes ‘any other service which … [a] legal practitioner may want to 
perform, with the approval of the Minister.’ Serving as a commissioner in a small claims 
court thus falls within the ambit of the provision.  
The Legal Practice Act will not, however, address the geographical representation of 
practitioners in the various provinces. The only solution seems to be that the Department of 
Justice must employ a combination of full-time remunerated and part-time volunteer 
commissioners to preside in the courts, especially in the provinces and rural districts where 
                                                             
43 In an address on 19 May 2017, the Deputy Minister of Justice said: 
‘Of the 1921 Commissioners presiding in our Small Claims Court, 55 are magistrates. These 
magistrates offer their time and expertise, free of charge, and after hours, to assist in this important 
task.’ 
See Address by the Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, the Hon JH Jeffery, MP, at the 
Judicial Officers Association of South Africa (JOASA) Gala Dinner, held at the Aviator Hotel and Conference 
Centre, Kempton Park, Johannesburg, 19 May 2017, published at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/m_speeches/2017/20170519-Joasa_dm.html (last accessed on 14 December 2017). 
44 In Palmridge, Johannesburg for example, presiding magistrates hold small claims sessions during regular 
office hours. I am thankful to Ms E de Klerk, the Senior Magistrate of Palmridge, for this information.  
45 Report §13.23. 
46 See §4.7. 
47 28 of 2014 (hereafter referred to as the ‘Legal Practice Act’).  
48 The Legal Practice Act, ss 6(5)(b), 26(1)(c), 29, 85(5).  
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there is a lack of commissioners.49 Of course, there is no reason why magistrates cannot sit as 
commissioners on a roster basis. In some districts where the communities are small, 
magistrates do not have enough work. Magistrates in those areas can sit as commissioners of 
the small claims courts, and hold weekly daytime and evening sessions to serve different 
needs.  
If the small claims courts are incorporated into the magistrates’ courts, as was suggested in 
chapter 4, the incorporation will not affect presiding officers of the small claims courts. The 
government can continue to recruit volunteer practitioners to serve the small claims court 
track of the magistrates’ courts. The assimilation of small claims courts into the magistrates’ 
courts may change the attitude of magistrates when it comes to serving as commissioners of 
the small claims courts. They may be more inclined to serve the small claims courts as a sister 
division of the magistrates’ courts. Currently, the small claims courts are separate courts, and 
as such, they suffer from the stigma of inferiority. Status-driven magistrates might be 
disinclined to sit in the small claims courts. This may change with an integrated approach.  
5.4  RACE AND GENDER REPRESENTATION OF COMMISSIONERS  
The judiciary is criticised for consisting of elites who cannot relate to ordinary, and especially 
poor, South Africans.50 It is particularly important for magistrates’ courts and small claims 
courts presiding officers to reflect the demographic profile of South Africa as they preside 
over the courts of first access to the public. Transformation of the judiciary means that 
judicial officers must reflect a cross-section of society in terms of language, culture, race, 
religion, sexual orientation and class. Class is something that is often overlooked.  Litigants 
appearing before presiding officers must be able to identify with them because of their 
                                                             
49 The Kenyan Small Claims Court Act, s 6(4), provides: ‘An Adjudicator may serve on a full time or part time 
basis.’  
50 See generally Andrews ‘The South African Judicial Appointments Process’ (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 565; Wesson, du Plessis ‘Fifteen Years on: Central Issues Relating to the Transformation of the South 
African Judiciary’ (2008) South African Journal of Human Rights 187; Dugard ‘Court and the Poor in South 
Africa: a Critique of the Systemic Judicial Failures to Advance Transformative Justice’ (2008) South African 
Journal of Human Rights 214; Carpenter ‘Judiciaries in the Spotlight’ (2006) 34 CILSA 361ff. 
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common backgrounds and life experiences.  It is reassuring to find a judicial officer who may 
be a single parent, living with a disability, or who grew up in a township, and can truly 
understand and empathise with the plight of the vulnerable and the marginalised.  
It is unclear to what extent small claims commissioners meet the transformation agenda in 
South Africa. Most of them are attorneys and advocates. Presumably some of them might 
come from historically disadvantaged backgrounds. The tables below reflect why much more 
work needs to be done on this front. 
The following information was extracted from the national audit of small claims courts. The 
figures are quite startling and do not require much interpretation. Suffice it to say, females 
and the coloured community fared particularly poorly. This information prompted the 
Department of Justice to take immediate action.  By 2015, many more commissioners were 
appointed, and the gender imbalance was addressed to some extent: see Table 2 below.  
Table 1: Race and gender of commissioners as at November 200751 
 
 
                                                             
51 Source: Department of Justice.  I am thankful to the project office for sharing this information.  It must be 
noted that the figures do not tally with the provincial breakdown of commissioners in §5.3. The totals also do not 
add up. The figures are reported as provided. Even with the errors, the conclusions are correct. Women are 
substantially unrepresented and people of colour generally fair dismally when it comes to the racial composition 




White  Indian  Coloured  Black White  Indian  Coloured  Black 
Eastern Cape 89 3 4 22 6 1 - 8 
Free State 42 - - 2 - - - - 
Gauteng 143 9 2 20 18 - - 3 
Limpopo 36 4 - 37 5 - - 1 
Mpumalanga 48 - - 21 5 - - - 
North West 29 - - 13 3 - - - 
Northern Cape 34 1 2 - - - - - 
Western Cape 239 3 7 1 12 - 2 - 
Kwa-Zulu Natal 59 77 - 11 - 14 - - 













Clearly, the Department of Justice took steps to address the gender gap. However, the 
disparity between males and females remains problematic. The difficulty stems from the legal 
profession, which continues to be male-dominated.53 The statistics above do not address the 
issue of race.  On account of the missing data, this aspect remains inconclusive. Be that as it 
may, the race issue must be highlighted. By addressing race, one also addresses the issue of 
language in the courts. Multilingual commissioners  can communicate with litigants in 
indigenous languages. This reduces the need for interpreters and instils public confidence in 
the small claims courts.54 If mediation is introduced in the courts, commissioners who serve 
as mediators must speak the language of the parties. Effective mediation requires one-on-one 
interactions between the parties and the mediator.55 Multilingual commissioners drawn from 




                                                             
52 Source: Department of Justice. 
53  See Centre for Applied Legal Studies ‘Transformation of the Legal Profession’ University of the 
Witwatersrand (2014).  
54 See §4.6. 
55 See §10.7.  
Name of province Number of commissioners 
Eastern Cape 222 (183 male; 39 female) 
Free State 65 (59 male; 6 female) 
Gauteng 383 (319 Male; 64 female) 
KwaZulu-Natal 252 (199 male; 53 female) 
Limpopo 122 (114 male; 8 female) 
Mpumalanga 111 (100 male; 11 female) 
Northern Cape 47 (40 male; 7 female) 
North West 75 (68 male; 7 female) 
Western Cape 353 (301 male; 52 female) 
 1 630 Commissioners  
(1 383 Male; 247 Female) 
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5.5 THE INDEPENDENCE OF COMMISSIONERS  
(a)  Commissioners are not members of the civil service 
Research reveals that the status and independence of commissioners of the small claims 
courts were not probed post-1994. Following the Hoexter Commission’s recommendation, 
commissioners are not members of the civil service.56 In their capacity as unpaid volunteers, 
commissioners are not viewed as employees of the State. Consequently, the Department of 
Justice does not see them as ‘judicial officers’. This probably explains why no-one has 
interrogated the constitutionality of s 9(3) of the SCCA. In terms of the provision:  
‘A commissioner shall hold office during the Minister’s pleasure.’  
Although a commissioner may resign by notice in writing to the Minister, s 9(4) provides: 
 ‘The Minister may at any time withdraw the appointment of a commissioner if in his opinion 
there is sufficient reason for doing so.’  
(b)  Judicial independence – the theory  
In a democratic dispensation predicated on a separation of powers between the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary, judicial independence is said to be fundamental for preserving the 
authority of the courts to uphold constitutional rules and norms, and accordingly, the rule of 
law. 57  Unlike other legal systems, where judicial independence is derived from either 
international law or indirectly from other constitutional provisions, the South African 
Constitution expressly makes provision for it.58 Section 165 of the Constitution provides: 
‘(1)  The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts; 
(2)  The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must 
apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice; 
(3) No person or organ of the state may interfere with the functioning of the courts; 
(4) Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to 
ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts...’. 
                                                             
56 Report §13.3. 
57 See generally Cachalia ‘Separation of Powers, Active Liberty and the Allocation of Public Resources: The E-
Tolling Case’ (2015) 132 SALJ 285ff. 
58 Hogg ‘The Bad Idea of Unwritten Constitutional Principles: Protecting Judicial Salaries’ in Dodek, Sossin 
(eds) Judicial Independence in Context 28.  
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Section 166 of the Constitution defines a ‘court’ as the Constitutional Court,59 Supreme Court 
of Appeal, 60  High Court, 61  a magistrate’s court 62  and ‘any other court established or 
recognised in terms of an Act of Parliament,63 including any court of a status similar to either 
the High Courts or the Magistrates’ Courts.’ Given that legislation establishes small claims 
courts, the judicial authority of the small claims courts in terms of s 166(e) of the Constitution 
is indisputable. Consequently, small claims courts are entitled to the independence promised 
to courts in s 165 of the Constitution. 
According to the literature, judicial independence is said to encompass three fundamental 
protections: (a) administrative and procedural freedom; (b) security of tenure of judicial 
officers; and (c) financial (remuneration) security of judicial officers.64 As far as the small 
claims courts are concerned, the topic of financial security is a non-issue. Commissioners are 
by and large unpaid volunteers. Where magistrates are employed to serve as commissioners, s 
12 of the Magistrates Act65 governs their salaries. Section 12 contains sufficient safeguards to 
ensure that the remuneration of magistrates is free from State interference.66 
                                                             
59 Section 166(a). 
60 Section 166(b). 
61 Section 166(c). 
62 Section 166(d). 
63 Section 166(e). Italics supplied.  
64 De Lange v Smuts 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) paras [59], [70]; Dodek, Sossin (eds) Judicial Independence in 
Context 6. See also Gordan, Bruce Transformation and the Independence of the Judiciary in South Africa 7-8. 
65 90 of 1993 (hereafter referred to as the ‘Magistrates Act’).  
66 In terms of s 12, the President is required to legislate the salaries of magistrates, acting on the recommendation 
of the Magistrates Commission. The objects of the Commission are set out in s 4 of the Act, which provides as 
follows: 
‘The objects of the Commission shall be –  
(a) to ensure that the appointment, promotion, transfer or discharge of, or disciplinary steps against, 
judicial officers in the lower courts take place without favour or prejudice, and that the applicable 
laws and administrative directions in connection with such action are applied uniformly and 
correctly; 
(b) to ensure that no influencing or victimization of judicial officers in the lower courts takes place; 
(c) to endeavour to promote the continuous training of judicial officers in the respective lower courts 
and to make recommendations in regard thereto to the Minister; 
(d) to compile a code of conduct for judicial officers in the lower courts; 
(e) to advise the Minister and to make recommendations to him or her regarding the administrative 
matters applicable to magistrates, including proposals regarding legislation purporting to regulate 
the conditions of service and relevant matters regarding magistrates, separately; 
(f) to carry out investigations and make recommendations to the Minister regarding the matters 
mentioned in section 13(3)(a); 
(g) to advise the Minister or to make recommendations to him or her regarding the requirements for 
appointment and the appointment of judicial officers in the respective lower courts; and 
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(c)  Procedural and administrative independence 
When it comes to procedural freedom, small claims courts were less independent in the past. 
As noted in chapter 4, the Minister of Justice is currently responsible for making rules for the 
small claims courts. However, as noted in chapter 4 this position will change when the 
Judicial Matters Amendment Act67 comes into operation.68 In the future, the Rules Board for 
Courts of Law (the ‘Rules Board’), established in terms of the Rules Board for Courts of Law 
Act,69 will make the procedural rules of the small claims courts. About the independence of 
the Rules Board, Gordan and Bruce state: 
‘The Board consists of members of the legal profession, and while the Minister of Justice must approve 
the rules, he or she does not have the power to make any rules.’70 
The former Chief Justice of South Africa, Arthur Chaskalson, acknowledged the institutional 
independence of the Rules Board.71 Furthermore, the SCA confirms the powers of the Rules 
Board to make rules for the courts.72 One must assume that the independence of the Rules 
Board was interrogated during the process of drafting the SCA, and was determined to be 
constitutionally sound. It is imperative that an independent and impartial authority legislates 
court procedures because adjectival laws are not benign. Left in the hands of the perverse, 
poorly crafted court procedures can subvert the rule of law.73 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
(h) to advise the Minister or to make recommendations to him or her or to report to the Minister for the 
information of Parliament regarding any matter which, in the opinion of the Commission, is of 
interest for –  
(i) the independence of the dispensing of justice; and 
(ii) the efficiency of the administration of justice, 
in the lower courts.’ 
The purpose of the Commission is to ensure the independence of the magistracy, and this includes protection 
against interference with the salaries of magistrates.  
67 8 of 2017.  
68 See §4.2. The President signed the Act but its commencement date has not been proclaimed.  
69 107 of 1985 (hereafter referred to as the ‘Rules Board for Courts of Law Act’). 
70 Gordan, Bruce (n64) 25-26. 
71 A Chaskalson ‘Background to the Judicial Bills’ General Council of the Bar of South Africa, Human Rights 
Committee: Conference on the Justice Bills: Judicial Independence and Restructuring of the Courts (17 
February 2007) – also available at http://www.sabar.co.za/conference_transcript.pdf (last accessed on 14 
November 2017). 
72 SCA, s 30. 
73 In Lawyers for Human Rights v Rules Board for Courts of Law 2012 JDR 0601 (GNP), the court struck down 
court procedures drafted in terms of s 7(3) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘hereinafter 
referred tto as PAJA’). This incident illustrates how a poor set of procedural rules can subvert the aims and 
objectives of legislation intended to foster open and transparent government as mandated by s 33 of the 
Constitution. See also Quinot ‘New Procedures for the Review of Administrative Action’ (2010) 25 SAPL 646. 
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In conformity with s 173 of the Constitution,74 s 8 of the SCA devolves aspects pertaining to 
the administration of justice in the superior courts to the Chief Justice75 and, in the case of 
magistrates’ courts,76 to the Judge President of the relevant division of the High Court under 
which a magistrate’s court falls.77 Small claims courts are not mentioned in s 8. Under the 
SCCA, all aspects of court administration and oversight are in the hands of the Minister of 
Justice. This aspect requires attention. It is submitted that the Judge President of the relevant 
division of the High Court should exert some78 influence over the small claims courts. Of 
course, if the small claims courts are integrated into the magistrates’ courts,79 the Judge 
President’s powers over the magistrates’ courts will by implication also extend to the small 
claims courts.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Usually rules of procedure lie within the province of the Rules Board. However, according to PAJA, parliament 
is required to approve the PAJA rules made by the Rules Board. Quinot discusses (at 649-651) the legislative 
history of the PAJA rules and how parliamentary and ministerial interference led to a breakdown of relations 
between the Rules Board and the Department of Justice. The Rules Board was unhappy with the amendments 
that parliament’s Justice Portfolio Committee had effected to the PAJA rules that the Rules Board had drafted. 
Before the rules were implemented, the PAJA rules were challenged and struck down by the court in Lawyers 
for Human Rights v Rules Board for Courts of Law. After the Lawyers for Human Rights case, the Rules Board, 
pursuant to a public consultation process, redrafted the PAJA rules and submitted them to parliament in 2014. 
The National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces approved these rules without objection.  
Unfortunately, the new PAJA rules are not yet operational as they await cabinet approval.  In the meantime, 
however, the courts are using the HCR 53 procedure: see Quinot (at 647-648). 
74 Section 173 of the Constitution provides: 
‘The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power to 
protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into account the 
interests of justice.’ 
75 By virtue of GG 335500 of 23 August 2010, the President established a new National Department known as 
the Office of the Chief Justice. The purpose of the Office is to: 
• Ensure that the Chief Justice can properly execute his mandate as both the head of the Constitutional Court 
and the head of the Judiciary; 
• enhance the institutional, administrative and financial independence of the Office of the Chief Justice; and 
• improve organisational governance and accountability, and the effective and efficient use of resources. 
 For more information see http://www.judiciary.org.za/doc/Establishment-of-the-OCJ-2010-2013.pdf (last 
accessed 15 January 2018). 
76 The magistrates’ courts do not have inherent power to regulate their own process. They are creatures of 
statute: see §6.2. The Rules Board makes the procedural rules of the magistrates’ courts under s 6 of the Rules 
Board for Courts of Law Act. This ensures that their procedures are free from unwanted political interference. 
Because the magistrates’ courts fall under the administrative jurisdiction of the relevant division of the High 
Court within whose seat the particular court is located, the SCA gives effect to the inherent jurisdiction of the 
High Courts to exercise control over the magistrates’ courts.   
77  SCA, s 8(4)(c). In particular, the Judge President has to ensure that the magistrates’ courts abide by the Chief 
Justice’s ‘Norms and Standards for the Exercise of Judicial Functions’ GN 147 in GG 37390 of 28 February 
2014.                                                                                                     
78 The Department of Justice should, by and large, be responsible for the day-to-day court administration and the 
fiscal management of the small claims courts. However, like the magistrates’ courts, the Judge President should 
ensure that the small claims courts abide by service delivery norms and standards. The involvement of the Judge 
President will boost the standing of the courts and he or she can take up issues facing the courts within his or her 
district.  
79 See §4.7. 
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(d) Security of tenure 
What is particularly egregious is that the Minister of Justice has the ultimate power to hire and 
to fire commissioners. This is in sharp contrast to the position in the superior courts where s 
174 of the Constitution applies, and in the magistrates’ courts, where the Magistrates Act is 
applicable. For the superior courts, the Judicial Service Commission (‘JSC’)80 is required to 
investigate, deliberate and recommend candidates to the President for appointment to the 
bench.81 In the case of magistrates, the Minister can only appoint a magistrate to the bench 
after he or she has consulted with the Magistrates Commission.82 To relieve a superior court 
judge or a magistrate from active duty for misconduct, inefficiency or incapacity, the JSC83 or 
the Magistrates Commission,84 as the case may be, must investigate the judicial officer 
concerned.  Upon conclusion of the investigation, the JSC or the Magistrates Commission 
must make the appropriate recommendation to the Minister who is tasked, if impeachment is 
recommended, to obtain a resolution from Parliament.85 None of these safeguards extends to 
small claims court commissioners. 
(e)  Are commissioners judicial officers? 
Commissioners are not appointed like other judicial officers. By tradition,86 the provincial law 
societies or the bar councils nominate their members for appointment as commissioners on 
the invitation of the Department of Justice. After the nominations are received, the Minister of 
Justice, if he or she determines the nominee to be suitable, makes the appointment.87 Nothing 
precludes a legal practitioner or academic who meets the criteria for appointment from 
                                                             
80 Established in terms of the Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994. 
81 For the JSC’s appointments process see Andrews ‘The Judiciary in South Africa: Independence or Illusion?’ 
in Dodek, Sossin (eds) Judicial Independence in Context 480-482. See also Procedure of the Judicial Service 
Commission GN T 423 GG 24596 of 27 March 2003.  
82 Magistrates Act, s 10. 
83 For the disciplinary procedures of the JSC see GN R864 GG 35802 of 18 October 2012.  
84 For the process to be adopted by the Commission see GN R1240 GG 19309 of 1 October 1998. 
85 Constitution, s 177; Magistrates Act, s 17(4). 
86 This process evolved organically and is not mandated by the SCCA.  
87 SCCA, s 9. 
 
 116 
petitioning the Minister directly. There is no legislative provision that requires the Minister to 
consult with any external body when appointing a commissioner drawn from the legal 
profession. Of course, when magistrates sit as commissioners, their appointment would have 
been conducted in terms of the Magistrates Act, and hence they would have undergone the 
appointment procedures in terms of that Act.  
It could be argued that there is no need to appoint commissioners in an independent process 
that is similar to the manner in which magistrates are appointed because commissioners are 
not judicial officers per se, but lay volunteers. However, this argument is weak. Even though 
most commissioners are unremunerated volunteers, they perform a judicial function under the 
authority of the State. The small claims court is not a tribunal or some informal forum; it is a 
court. The SCCA spells this out. It is axiomatic from the Act that commissioners are 
dispensing civil justice. Their orders are final and binding and cannot be appealed.88 An order 
of a small claims court is executable anywhere in the country, albeit through the judgment 
enforcement machinery of the relevant magistrate’s court.89 
Whether a presiding officer is in the formal employ of the State or not does not make a 
difference.  In All India Judges' Association v Union of India; State of Himachlal Pradesh v 
High Court of Himacha Pradesh; Shamsher Bahadur Singh v State of Bihar, the Supreme 
Court of India stated:  
‘The judicial service is not service in the sense of "employment". The judges are not employees. As 
members of the judiciary, they exercise the sovereign judicial power of the state. They are holders of 
public offices in the same way as the members of the council of ministers and the members of the 
legislature. When it is said that in a democracy such as ours, the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary constitute the three pillars of the state, what is intended to be conveyed is that the three 
essential functions of the state are entrusted to the three organs of the state, and each one of them in turn 
represents the authority of the state. However, those who exercise the state power are the ministers, the 
legislators and the judges, and not the members of their staff who implement or assist in implementing 
their decisions. The council of ministers or the political executive is different from the secretarial staff 
or the administrative executive which carries out the decisions of the political executive. Similarly, the 
legislators are different from the legislative staff. So also the judges from the judicial staff. The parity is 
between the political executive, the legislators and the judges and not between the judges and the 
administrative executive.... The judges at whatever level they may be, represent the state and its 
authority unlike the administrative executive or the members of the other services. The members of the 
                                                             
88 Ibid s 45. 
89 See chapter 9. 
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other services, therefore, cannot be placed on a par with the members of the judiciary, either 
constitutionally or functionally.’90 
 
The high office of a judicial officer does not derive from a contract of employment 
entrenching benefits and perks. A person acquires the status of judicial officer by virtue of his 
or her judicial function. Accordingly, the right to judicial independence attaches to a judicial 
office by virtue of its form and function.91 
If one looks at the oath that a commissioner takes at the time of assuming office, one will note 
that it is virtually identical to the one taken by magistrates.92 In it, the commissioner declares 
that he or she ‘will administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour, prejudice… in 
accordance with the laws and customs of the Republic of South Africa.’93 The oath evidences 
that commissioners are judicial officers and that they are entitled to judicial independence.  
Section 48 of the SCCA provides: 
‘(1)  Any person who wilfully insults a commissioner during the session of his court, or a clerk or 
messenger or other officer present at that session, or who wilfully interrupts the proceedings of 
a court or otherwise misbehaves himself in the place where the session of a court is held, shall, 
without prejudice to the provisions of section 4(3), be liable to be sentenced summarily or 
upon summons to a fine not exceeding R500 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six 
months, or to such imprisonment without the option of a fine. 
 (2)  When a commissioner sentences any person under this section, he shall without delay transmit 
to the registrar of the [High Court] having jurisdiction for consideration and review by a judge 
in chambers, a statement, certified by him to be true and correct, of the grounds and reasons 
for the action taken by him, and shall also furnish to the person sentenced a copy of that 
statement.’ 
 
As regards the power to hold someone in contempt of court, the Constitutional Court (per 
Ackermann J) in De Lange v Smuts94 held: 
‘[157] The reluctance to confer powers of civil contempt upon institutions other than courts of law is 
not peculiar to our legal system. In the United Kingdom, as well, both the Legislature and the Courts 
have demonstrated an unwillingness to confer powers of civil contempt upon tribunals or agencies that 
are not courts of law. In the United States of America, as well, the Supreme Court has held that 
administrative agencies may not be given powers of coercive imprisonment. 
[158] It seems to me that there are sound reasons for the legislative and judicial reluctance, illustrated 
above, to extend powers of coercive imprisonment to institutions other than courts. Indefinite 
imprisonment for coercive purposes is potentially an extremely dangerous mechanism. Like 
imprisonment for punitive purposes, it is a form of deprivation of physical freedom which requires 
thorough procedural safeguards. Our Constitution provides detailed and careful procedures to be 
followed when a person is charged with a crime, including the requirement that the trial should take 
                                                             
90 [1994] LRC 115 (SC) at 121c–h. See also Wallis ‘Judges: Servants of Justice or Civil Servants?’ (2012) SALJ 
652ff.  
91 De Lange v Smuts supra [160]. 
92 MCA, s 9(2)(a).  




place before an 'ordinary court'. Imprisonment for coercive purposes should be attended by substantially 
similar safeguards. It is probably for this reason that institutions other than courts of law have 
generally not been granted the powers of coercive imprisonment by the Legislature. This reluctance is 
embedded in an understanding of the nature of courts, on the one hand, and the requirements of 
appropriate procedural constraints upon the exercise of the power of coercive imprisonment, on the 
other. 
[159] The requirement that it is only a court, or an institution similar to a court, that may exercise 
powers that involve indefinite deprivation of liberty for coercive purposes is based not only on the 
nature of the officer presiding but also on the institution itself. There can be no doubt that for the 
requirements of procedural fairness to be met, the presiding officer must be impartial and independent. 
Independence of a presiding officer is … assured by security of tenure and financial security. But the 
independence and impartiality of the presiding officer is only the first aspect of judicial independence. 
In addition to the independence and impartiality of the presiding officer, it seems to me that the 
institution or proceedings over which the officer presides must also exhibit independence and 
impartiality in the judicial sense.’95 
Some may argue that the issue of judicial independence is not that important in the small 
claims courts, as the courts cannot preside over matters involving the State. However, as will 
be shown in chapter 7, the issue of what constitutes the State for the purposes of the SCCA is 
a grey area. Furthermore, even if national, provincial or local government cannot sue and be 
sued in the small claims courts, individuals in the employ of the State can sue and be sued in 
their personal capacities. It is thus quite likely that undue influence could be exerted on a 
commissioner who is beholden to the position because it gives him or her status or notoriety 
in a community.  
In the locus classicus case of Valente v The Queen,96 the Canadian Supreme Court held that 
the notion that a judicial officer can be removed from office at someone’s ‘pleasure’97 is 
incongruent with domestic and international98 guarantees of judicial independence. The court 
stated: 
                                                             
95 Italics supplied. 
96 [1985] 2 S.C.R 673 (hereafter referred to as ‘Valente’).  
97 Ibid [37]. The court at [35] drew attention to the views of Lord Denning – 
‘To these opinions on the importance of tradition as a safeguard of judicial independence may be added 
the following statement by Lord Denning in The Road to Justice (1955), at pp. 16-17:  
“The County Court judges have some measure of protection but the stipendiary magistrates 
and the justices of the peace have no security of tenure at all. They hold office during 
pleasure....  
Nevertheless, although these lesser judges can theoretically be dismissed at pleasure, the great 
principle that judges should be independent has become so ingrained in us that it extends in 
practice to them also. They do in fact hold office during good behaviour and they are in fact 
only dismissed for misconduct. If any Minister or Government Department should attempt to 
influence the decision of any one of them, there would be such an outcry that no Government 
could stand against it.”’ 
98 Ibid [24]. 
 
 119 
‘…that the judge be removable only for cause, and that cause be subject to independent review and 
determination by a process at which the judge affected is afforded a full opportunity to be heard. The 
essence of security of tenure [in terms of the Canadian Charter] is a tenure, whether until an age of 
retirement, for a fixed term, or for a specific adjudicative task, that is secure against interference by the 
Executive or other appointing authority in a discretionary or arbitrary manner.’99 
In Valente the court, per Justice Le Dain, articulated the test for judicial independence as 
follows: 
‘Although judicial independence is a status or relationship resting on objective conditions or 
guarantees, as well as a state of mind or attitude in the actual exercise of judicial functions, it is sound, I 
think, that the test for independence for purposes of s. 11(d) of the Charter should be, as for 
impartiality, whether the tribunal may be reasonably perceived as independent. Both independence and 
impartiality are fundamental not only to the capacity to do justice in a particular case but also to 
individual and public confidence in the administration of justice. Without that confidence the system 
cannot command the respect and acceptance that are essential to its effective operation. It is, therefore, 
important that a tribunal should be perceived as independent, as well as impartial, and that the test for 
independence should include that perception. The perception must, however, as I have suggested, be a 
perception of whether the tribunal enjoys the essential objective conditions or guarantees of judicial 
independence, and not a perception of how it will in fact act, regardless of whether it enjoys such 
conditions or guarantees.’100 
The Constitutional Court has incorporated the Valente dicta into the South African 
jurisprudence on judicial independence.101 
From the perspective of a reasonable layperson, the unbridled hiring and firing powers of the 
Minister of Justice entrenched in the legislation create a reasonable perception of bias and 
jeopardise the commissioner’s ability to objectively dispense justice without fear, favour or 
prejudice. 102   It is submitted that the power given to the Minister to hire and fire 
commissioners at will is unconstitutional. 
In the past, parliament was supreme, and the executive had almost untrammelled power to 
subdue the courts. Under the Constitution, this is no longer the case. The government is 
obliged to take steps to ensure the independence of the judiciary so that the latter can fulfil its 
functions without suspicion. The SCCA should be amended to firstly remove the offending 
provisions that impinge on the judicial independence of commissioners. Secondly, the 
independence of commissioners must be expressly entrenched in the legislation. 
                                                             
99 Ibid [31]. 
100 Ibid [22]. 
101 De Lange v Smuts supra [70]-[72].  
102 President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 1999 (4) SA 147 
(CC) para [35]. 
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(f)  Disciplining commissioners  
The SCCA does not contain express provisions for disciplining commissioners for 
misconduct or inefficiency.103 It appears that the Minister of Justice is responsible for this as 
well. How exactly he or she is expected to receive and deliberate on complaints is opaque. 
This vagueness is a further erosion of the independence of the small claims courts.  It also 
raises access to justice issues, as citizens should be able to hold presiding officers accountable 
if their conduct brings the administration of justice into disrepute.  
In the case of magistrates who serve as commissioners, the Magistrates Act and the 
Regulations104 thereto would govern the process of disciplining them. One of the functions of 
the Magistrates Commission is to carry out misconduct investigations and to make 
recommendations to the Minister regarding the suspension and removal from office of 
magistrates. To this extent, the Regulations passed under the Act articulate the disciplinary 
process in considerable detail. It has to be noted that the Magistrates Act only deals with 
sitting magistrates. In the case of retired magistrates who serve as commissioners of small 
claims courts, the fall-back legislation would be the unsatisfactory SCCA.  
A proper disciplinary process should be written into the SCCA. To this extent, regard can be 
had to either the Magistrates Act and the Regulations passed in terms thereof, or to the 
                                                             
103 Under the Regulations for Judicial Officers in Lower Courts, 1994 GN R361 GG15524 of 1 March 1994, a 
judicial officer can be held guilty of misconduct if he or she: 
‘(a)  is found guilty of an offence; 
(b)  contravenes any provision of these Regulations; 
(c)  contravenes the Code of Conduct, if there is one; 
(d)  is negligent or indolent in the carrying out of his duties; 
(e)  uses intoxicants or stupefying drugs excessively; 
(f)   accepts, without the permission of the Minister, or demands in respect of the carrying out of or 
the  failure to carry out his duties any commission, fee or pecuniary or other reward, not being the 
 emoluments payable to him or her in respect of his duties, or fails to report to the Minister the 
offer of  such a commission, fee or reward; 
(g)  misappropriates or makes improper use of any property of the State; 
(h)  absents himself or herself from his office or duty without leave or valid cause; 
(i)  makes a false or incorrect statement, knowing it to be false or incorrect, with a view to 
obtaining any  privilege or advantage in relation to his official position or his duties or to the 
prejudice of the  administration of justice; or 
(j)  refuses to execute a lawful order.’ 
104 Complaints Procedure Regulations, 1998 GN R 1240 GG 193090 of 1 October 1998.  
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Sheriffs Act.105 The Sheriffs Act empowers the South African Board for Sheriffs to establish a 
disciplinary committee, responsible for disciplining sheriffs against whom allegations of 
misconduct are laid.106 If a Small Claims Courts Board is established – as proposed in chapter 
4 – the Board must be empowered by legislation to address complaints against 
commissioners. It would be for the Board to establish a disciplinary committee and to make 
recommendations to the Minister for the suspension or removal of a commissioner.  
Alternatively, South Africa could follow the position taken in the Kenyan Small Claims Court 
Act, which provides: 
‘The provisions of the Judicial Service Act relating to the removal and discipline of Magistrates shall 
apply with necessary modifications to the discipline and removal of Adjudicators.’107 
If one were to follow the Kenyan model, then the Magistrates Commission could be 
empowered to discipline commissioners. This model would make particular sense if the small 
claims courts were incorporated into the magistrates’ courts.108 Whatever model is adopted, 
the SCCA must make provision for a disciplinary process to foster judicial independence and 
to promote good governance and access to justice.  
5.6 CONCLUSION 
The small claims courts cannot operate without commissioners. They are integral to the 
success of the courts. What this chapter has shown is that there is a need for proper training of 
commissioners, especially at the time of appointment. Racial and gender diversity is essential 
to instil public confidence in the small claims courts. Improving the demographic profile of 
commissioners will also address language challenges in the courts.  
The Hoexter Commission’s model of holding court sessions after hours and on weekends, 
while laudable, does not make justice accessible to all people. The courts must function 
during normal office hours too. To achieve this, the small claims courts cannot be reliant on 
                                                             
105 90 of 1986.  
106 Ibid, s 18. 
107 Kenyan Small Claims Court Act, s 46. 
108 As proposed in §4.7.  
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volunteer practitioners only. The Department of Justice must employ more full-time 
commissioners or sitting magistrates to preside in small claims matters. This is especially 
relevant in the rural areas where there is a shortage of presiding officers.  More should be 
done to persuade retired practitioners and magistrates to serve in the courts.  
The SCCA must entrench the independence of commissioners. In this regard, thought must be 
given to the procedure for the appointment and dismissal of commissioners. Unconstitutional 
aspects of the SCCA must be repealed and replaced. A procedure must be laid out in the 
legislation for the disciplining of commissioners. The latter is essential to ensure 
accountability and service delivery in the small claims courts. 
Finally, thought must be given to whether the term ‘commissioner’ should be retained. Given 
the chequered history of South Africa’s lower court system, the presiding officer of the small 




JURISDICTION OF THE SMALL CLAIMS COURTS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
he rules of jurisdiction determine the competence of a court to hear a matter.1 Unlike 
other rules of procedure, which are adjectival in nature, the rules of jurisdiction are 
substantive.2 Consequently, they are governed by statute and the common law, and are not 
legislated by delegated legislation, such as rules of court. In so far as the rules of court deal 
with jurisdiction, the rules are only declaratory of the original legislation. 
The time for determining jurisdiction is when the process initiating legal proceedings is served 
on the defendant.3 Jurisdiction, once established, cannot generally be lost.4 
Jurisdiction rules should not be taken lightly. If a litigant does not raise an objection to 
jurisdiction in limine,5 the court may raise the issue of jurisdiction mero motu (i.e. of its own 
accord).6 The effect of successfully raising jurisdiction as a legal issue is that the cause of action 
is abated.7 The matter would have to start afresh in the court of correct jurisdiction. The effect 
of an abated matter is that prescription is deemed not to have been interrupted by the service of 
																																																								
1  Graaff-Reinet Municipality v Van Ryneveld's Pass Irrigation Board 1950 (2) SA 420 (A) at 424; Veneta 
Mineraria Spa v Carolina Collieries (Pty) Ltd 1987 (4) SA 883 (A) at 886D; Ewing McDonald & Co Ltd v M & 
M Products Co 1991 (1) SA 252 (A) at 256H; Spendiff v Kolektor (Pty) Ltd 1992 (2) SA 537 (A) at 551C; Ndamase 
v Functions 4 All  2004 (5) SA 602 (SCA) at 605H. 
2  Theophilopoulos ‘Arresting a Foreign Peregrinus: BID Industrial Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Strang and a New 
Jurisdictional Lacuna’ (2010) Stell LR 132 at 141. 
3 Mills v Starwell Finance (Pty) Ltd 1981 (3) SA 84 (N) at 89B–90H. 
4 Voet 5.1.64; Mills v Starwell Finance (Pty) Ltd 1981 (3) SA 84 (N) at 85; Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd v Smit 
1992 (3) SA 333 (A) at 344A–C; Transnamib Bpk v Voorsitter, Nasionale Vervoerkommissie 1993 (1) SA 457 (A) 
at 473A–J; Pistorius Pollak on Jurisdiction 12–14.  
5 The issue of jurisdiction is usually raised as point in limine (a preliminary procedural point). A court will not 
hear the merits of a case until it has ruled on the preliminary procedural point.  
6 Wallace v Wood (1883) 3 EDC 211; Wienand v Goldschmidt (1886) 5 EDC 257; Stephan Brothers v Engelbrecht 
(1894) 11 SC 248; Garda v Bonato 1913 TPD 810. 
7 Willis v Cauvin (1883) 4 NLR 97 at 98; Riversdale Divisional Council v Pienaar (1885) 3 SC 252 at 255; 
Vidavsky v Body Corporate Sunhill Villas 2005 (5) SA 200 (SCA) at 207C–F; Geyser v Nedbank Ltd: In re 




process.8 It is, therefore, quite likely that a litigant may find himself or herself in a position of 
not being able to reinstitute an abated action in the court of correct jurisdiction, because 
prescription9 has run its course.  
In terms of the SCCA, a decision of the court is final and binding and not appealable.10 A 
decision of the court may, however, be taken on review.11 One of the grounds of review is the 
‘absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court.’12 It is, therefore, important for a litigant to be 
cognisant of the rules of jurisdiction.   
To deal with jurisdiction comprehensively, this chapter is divided into seven parts. Part I deals 
with several aspects. Firstly, it considers small claims courts as creatures of statute. Thereafter, 
a brief discussion of the relationship between jurisdictional rules and access to justice will 
ensue. This follows on from the more comprehensive treatment of the relationship between 
access to justice and the small claims courts in chapter 1 and hence, arguments that have already 
been made will not be repeated. Lastly, the concurrent jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts 
vis-à-vis small claims courts will be considered.  
Part II looks at the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts and all aspects incidental 
thereto. Recommendations will be made for how to determine a ‘small claim’ in the future.  
																																																								
8 See in this regard Ngqula v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2013 (1) SA 155 (SCA) para [18]. 
9 The Prescription Act 68 of 1969 governs prescription.  The Act makes provision for two types of prescription: 
acquisitive and extinctive prescription. Extinctive prescription deals with the termination of civil causes of action 
on account of the passage of time. Chapter III of the Act sets out the time periods within which a claimant must 
institute a civil claim.  The rules of prescription are also substantive in nature:  Bolton v Travelers Insurance Co 
475 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1973). In Sun Oil Co. v Wortman 486 U.S. 717, 736 (1988) (Brennan J concurring) the 
court held: 
‘The statute of limitations a State enacts represents a balance between, on the one hand, its substantive 
interest in vindicating substantive claims and, on the other hand, a combination of its procedural interest 
in freeing its courts from adjudicating stale claims and its substantive interest in giving individuals repose 
from ancient breaches of law.’  
10 Act 61 of 1984, s 45. 
11 SCCA, s 46. 
12 SCCA, s 46 (a). 
	
	 125	
Parts III and IV will critically analyse ss 12-24 of the SCCA, with reference to causes of action 
that the small claims courts are competent to hear (part III), and jurisdiction in respect of 
persons (part IV).   
The discussions in parts II, III and IV are consonant with the general three-step approach to 
determining the jurisdiction of the small claims court. When confronted with the question of 
whether the small claims court has jurisdiction to entertain a matter, a litigant will invariably 
ask three questions: 
(a) Does the claim fall within the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims court? – Part II. 
(b) If the claim falls within the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims court, does the court 
have jurisdiction to entertain the cause of action?  – Part III. 
(c) If the claim falls within the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims court, and the court 
can entertain the cause of action, which local territorial small claims court should the matter 
be taken to? – Part IV. 
Part V will look at the constitutional jurisdiction of the small claims courts. The constitutional 
jurisdiction of small claims courts has not been canvassed in the literature. This may be so 
because the court has limited constitutional jurisdiction. However, the impact of s 39(2) of the 
Constitution requires examination.  
In all of the discussions that follow, problematic aspects of jurisdiction will be identified, and 
recommendations for reform will be made.  
By way of comparative analysis, part VI will look at the jurisdictional rules of the Kenyan 
Small Claims Court Act. 13  The Act marks a refreshing addition to African procedural 
jurisprudence. A discussion of its jurisdictional features is thus warranted.  Part VII concludes 
the chapter.  
																																																								





6.2 SMALL CLAIMS COURTS ARE CREATURES OF STATUTE  
In terms of the common law, lower courts lack inherent jurisdiction.14  All courts at magistrates’ 
courts level and lower (such as small claims courts) are regarded as creatures of statute.  
Inherent jurisdiction is reserved for the superior courts (the High Courts, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and the Constitutional Court).15 As such, the superior courts are generally empowered 
to hear any matter and make any order, unless limited by law.16 They may also regulate their 
own process where the interest of justice so requires.17 As creatures of statute, lower courts are 
limited by the powers specifically conferred on them by their empowering legislation. This 
phenomenon has caused commentators and courts to pronounce that the jurisdiction of the 
																																																								
14 See generally Connolly v Ferguson 1909 TS 195 at 198; Bosiu v Landdros, Marquard 1959 (1) SA 81 (O) at 
87F; Hatfield Town Management Board v Mynfred Poultry Farm (Pvt) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 737 (SR) at 739E–F; 
Samuel v Pagadia 1963 (3) SA 45 (D) at 48C; Hydromar (Pty) Ltd v Pearl Oyster Shell Industries (Pty) Ltd 1976 
(2) SA 384 (C) at 386H–387A; Gqalana v Knoesen 1980 (4) SA 119 (E) at 120; Mason Motors (Edms) Bpk v Van 
Niekerk 1983 (4) SA 406 (T) at 409D–F; Suid-Westelike Transvaalse Landbou Koöperasie v Kotze [2000] 1 All 
SA 170 (NC) at 174d–e; Narodien v Andrews 2002 (3) SA 500 (C) at 514E–F; B v B 2008 (4) SA 535 (W) at 
543C–E. 
15 Section 173 of the Constitution provides:  
‘The Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court of South Africa each has the 
inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into 
account the interests of justice.’ 
The phrase inherent power means the same thing as inherent jurisdiction: see Harms Civil Practice in the Superior 
Courts Vol I (Issue 56) A3.2. 
16 Cilliers, Loots, Nel Herbstein and van Winsen: The Civil Practice of the High Courts and Supreme Court of 
Appeal of South Africa (hereinafter referred to as ‘Herbstein & Van Winsen’) 49 state: 
‘... whereas inferior courts may do nothing which the law does not permit, superior courts may do 
anything that the law does not forbid.’  
See also Connolly v Ferguson 1909 TS 195 at 198. 
17 Universal City Studios Inc v Network Video (Pty) Ltd 1986 (2) SA 734 (A); Krygkor Pensioenfonds v Smith 
1993 (3) SA 459 (A); White v Moffett Building & Contracting (Pty) Ltd 1952 (3) SA 307 (O); California Spice 
and Marinade (Pty) Ltd [1997] 4 All SA 317 (W); Soller v Maintenance Magistrate, Wynberg 2006 (2) SA 66 




lower courts is limited to the four corners of their empowering legislation. 18  Erasmus 19 
succinctly states the position:  
‘The magistrate's court20 is a creature of statute21  and has no jurisdiction beyond that granted by the 
statute creating it. It has no inherent jurisdiction such as is possessed by the superior courts and can claim 
no authority which cannot be found within the four corners of its constituent Act.’22 
As creatures of statute, lower courts are also bound by all delegated legislation governing them. 
As such, they are bound by rules of court created by a delegated authority in terms of any 
empowering legislation.23 As far as small claims courts are concerned, commissioners are 
constrained by the provisions of not only the SCCA, but also the SCCRs governing the courts. 
If the rules are deemed to be ultra vires or unconstitutional, the court must either proceed with 
																																																								
18 Mabaudi v Mhora (CIV(A) 427/05) [2011] ZWHHC 60 (03 March 2011) the court held:  
‘It has repeatedly been stated that the magistrates court is a creature of statute and has no jurisdiction 
beyond that granted by statute. It has no inherent jurisdiction such as is possessed by the superior courts 
and may claim no authority which cannot be found within the four corners of its statute.’  
19 As cited in Van Loggerenberg Jones and Buckle: The Civil Practice of the Magistrates’ Courts of South Africa 
Vol 1 at 32 (hereinafter be referred to as ‘Jones & Buckle’).   
20 The statement is apposite to small claims courts as well, as they, too, fall within the lower court tier. 
21 De Vos ‘Jones & Buckle: The Civil Practice of the Magistrates' Courts in South Africa I: The Act and Jones & 
Buckle: The Civil Practice of the Magistrates' Courts in South Africa II: The Rules’ (2012) Stell LR 408 at 409-
410 argues that the description ‘creatures of statute’ in relation to magistrates’ court is correct. But he cautions 
that: ‘[T]he use of the phrase “creatures of statute” to describe the jurisdiction of the magistrates' courts in the 
context of contrasting them with the superior courts may lead to a wrong perception. In his view this definition 
creates the impression that the superior courts are not creatures of statute, which he holds is incorrect. Each one of 
the High Courts in South Africa, dating back to the Supreme Court in the Cape, which was established by the First 
Charter of Justice of 1827, was “a creation of a statute” (see Chunguete v Minister of Home Affairs 1990 (2) SA 
836 (W) 842H; HR Hahlo & E Kahn The Union of South Africa: The Development of its Laws and Constitution 
(1960) 205-206). Furthermore, de Vos goes on to state: 
‘[T]he concept “inherent jurisdiction” is also used in a somewhat ambiguous way. The perception is 
created that it is a kind of general jurisdiction, which is also not correct. In Chunguete's case Flemming J 
(as he then was) subjected the High Court's innate or general jurisdiction, which includes its inherent 
jurisdiction, to a thorough analysis and concluded that the latter power, in terms of which the courts can 
inter alia regulate their own process, is confined to the “procedural field” (Chunguete v Minister of Home 
Affairs 1990 (2) SA 836 (W) 847E). This position has of course been changed by section 173 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”) by virtue of which a High Court 
is also empowered to “develop the common law”. Needless to say, the concept “common law” is wide 
enough to include both procedural and substantive law. This, in my view, does not detract from the 
essence of the court’s inherent jurisdiction, as a power to be exercised in the procedural field. The 
Constitution has simply added another dimension to the court's inherent jurisdiction, which is to adapt 
procedural and substantive common law when necessary. 
It seems that what the definition tries to convey by using the concept “inherent jurisdiction” is that the 
general jurisdiction of the High Courts is much more extensive than that of the magistrates' courts. That 
is of course correct but the true reason for this distinction is that the creating statutes of the High Courts 
created a far broader, almost unrestricted kind of general or innate jurisdiction than what was achieved 
with the Magistrates Courts' Act (see Chunguete v Minister of Home Affairs 1990 (2) SA 836 (W) 842I-
843C).’  
22 Underline supplied. The word ‘Act’ in the above statement should be replaced with the word ‘legislation’. It is 
common cause that as creatures of statute, inferior courts are also bound by all delegated legislation governing 
them: Tshisa v Premier of the Free State 2010 (2) SA 153 (FB) at [11] and the authorities there cited. 
23 Tshisa v Premier of the Free State 2010 (2) SA 153 (FB) at [11]; Paleker ‘Civil Procedure of the Magistrates’ 
Courts’  Vol 5 (Third Reissue) Law of South Africa §363 (hereinafter referred to as ‘LAWSA’). 
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the matter as if there is no issue with the rule, or refuse to hear the matter on the basis that it is 
too complicated for the court to hear. 24  Unlike the HCRs, the SCCRs do not give the 
commissioner any discretion to relax the application of the rules.25 The lack of discretion is 
consonant with the idea that lower courts – as creatures of statute – are precluded from 
regulating their own processes. Therefore, in essence, small claims courts are strictly bound by 
the SCCA and SCCRs.26 
6.3 JURISDICTION AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the impact of the Constitution, and more specifically, the Bill of 
Rights27 on court procedure has been canvassed in many cases. Courts are concerned about 
litigation rules that are irrational, contradictory and/or unduly technical, for this impacts on 
access to the courts28 and the right to equal treatment before the law.29 
The rules of jurisdiction must be subject to constitutional scrutiny and vigilant assessment. They 
are not benign rules; they act as gatekeepers to litigants accessing the courts. It is trite that a 
court will not consider the merits of a case if it is established that the court does not have 
jurisdiction.30 Raised as points in limine, jurisdiction rules can prevent litigants from obtaining 
the ear of the court.  
For a long time, there was a lack of critical engagement with the rules of jurisdiction in the 
lower courts. It is submitted that it is more urgent than ever for the rules of jurisdiction of the 
lower courts to be debated. As courts of first access for the general public, the lower courts play 
a fundamental role in securing the rule of law. As a cheaper alternative to the superior courts, 
																																																								
24  The small claims court does not have jurisdiction to declare legislation (even delegated) ultra vires or 
unconstitutional. See the discussion in Part V. 
25 See in this regard HCR 27(3) and MCR 60(9). See also further discussion in §8.6. 
26 LAWSA §363. 
27 Constitution, Chapter 2. 
28 Constitution, s 34.  
29 Constitution, s 9(1)..  




the lower courts play an important role in preventing self-help, anarchy and mob justice. If it is 
difficult for people to access the courts, they are precluded from having their disputes resolved 
by peaceful means.31 
6.4 JUDGMENT OF THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT IS ENFORCEABLE 
 ANYWHERE IN THE REPUBLIC VIA THE EXECUTION MACHINERY OF THE 
 MAGISTRATES’ COURTS  
Under the SCA32 and the MCA,33 the effect of suing in any High Court or magistrate’s court of 
competent jurisdiction is that the judgment of the court is enforceable anywhere in the Republic. 
The SCCA does not contain a similar provision. The reason for this is that a judgment of a small 
claims court, while final and binding, cannot be executed through its own machinery. If the 
judgment debtor does not voluntarily settle the judgment creditor’s claim, then according to s 
41(1) of the SCCA, the claim must be enforced ‘by execution in the magistrate’s court having 
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the Magistrates’ Courts Act… and the 
judgment creditor may proceed as if the judgment was granted in the magistrate’s court.’ Once 
a matter is transferred to a magistrate’s court for execution, the judgment is deemed to have 
originated in the magistrate’s court. Consequently, ss 4(3) and 4(4) of the MCA take effect: 
‘(3)  Every process issued out of a court shall be in force throughout the Republic. 
(4)  Any process issued out of any court may be served or executed by the [sheriff] of the court 
 appointed for the area within which such process is to be served or executed.’  
6.5 THE MAGISTRATES’ COURTS RETAIN CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
The small claims courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction. The magistrates’ courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction to hear any matter that falls within the small claims courts’ 
																																																								
31 Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC) at [22]. 
32 SCA, s 42(2). 
33 MCA, s 4(3)-(4). 
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jurisdiction.34 It must be noted that any term in an agreement to oust the jurisdiction of the small 
claims court to hear a matter that falls within the court’s jurisdiction is void.35 
The plaintiff, as the principal litigant, has the exclusive right to decide whether he or she wishes 
to sue in the small claims court, or in a magistrate’s court.36 The decision to bypass the small 
claims court comes at no peril to the plaintiff. He or she cannot, for example, be penalised for 
ignoring the small claims court by being prevented from recovering costs in the magistrate’s 
court.37 This situation is undesirable and requires legislative intervention because the idea of 
courts having vertical concurrent jurisdiction is archaic and holds little practical value.38 
PART II 
MONETARY JURISDICTION 
6.6 THE MONETARY JURISDICTION OF SMALL CLAIMS COURTS 
At present the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts is R15 000.39  The monetary 
jurisdiction of the court is subject to several miscellaneous provisions contained in the SCCA. 
By and large, these miscellaneous provisions were incorporated wholesale from the MCA. 
																																																								
34 SCCA, s 24(1). 
35 SCCA, 24(2). 
36 LAWSA §401. See also Report 198 §(i).  
37 The courts have held that if the magistrates’ courts have jurisdiction to hear a matter and the plaintiff takes the 
matter to the High Court, the High Court can discourage the approach by making an appropriate costs order against 
the plaintiff. The costs order could include the recovery of costs on the magistrates’ courts tariffs. See in this 
regard: Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Bester 1987 (1) SA 812 (W) at 819D; Mofokeng v General Accident 
Versekering Bpk 1990 (2) SA 712 (W); McGlashan v Bush 1932 WLD 89 at 93; Van der Lith's Estate v Kruger 
and Van der Lith 1932 TPD 81 at 82; Hunt v Campbell 1945 WLD 1 at 4. A similar position does not hold true 
for small claims courts as legal costs cannot generally be granted in the small claims courts. See SCCA, s 37.  
38 Pound ‘The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice’ (1906) 40 American Law 
Review 729.  
39 GN 185 in GG 37450 of 18 March 2014. 
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(a)  Abandonment 
The SCCA permits a plaintiff to abandon a portion of his or her claim in order to bring the 
claim within the monetary jurisdiction of the court.  Section 18 of the SCCA provides: 
‘(1)  In order to bring a claim or counterclaim within the jurisdiction of a court, a party may in his [or 
her]40 summons or statement of defence, or at any time thereafter, explicitly abandon a part of 
that claim or counterclaim. 
(2) That part of a claim or counterclaim so abandoned, shall thereby be extinguished: Provided that 
if the claim or counterclaim is granted in part only, the abandonment shall be deemed first to 
apply to that part of the claim or counterclaim which was not granted.’ 
Where a portion is abandoned, the plaintiff is still required to prove the full claim. In so far as 
the full claim cannot be proved, the amount not proved will first be deducted from the 
abandoned portion.41 This is to the plaintiff’s advantage and is explained as follows:  
‘Where part of a claim is abandoned …, it is fully extinguished. If, however, the claim is upheld in part 
only, the abandonment is deemed first to take effect upon that part of the claim that is not upheld. The 
effect of these provisions is that part of the plaintiff’s claim which is not upheld must be subtracted from 
the part of the claim which has been abandoned.  Thus, for example, where a plaintiff has suffered 
damages in the sum of [R17000], but the claim was reduced to [R15000] to bring it within the court’s 
jurisdiction and on an apportionment of damages, the plaintiff is held to be entitled to only 20% of his or 
her damages, the plaintiff will be entitled to judgment in the sum of [R3400] [being 20% of R17000]. 
Conversely, where a plaintiff proves damages in excess of [R15000], judgment will be limited to R15000. 
Stated differently, the plaintiff will recover [R15000] or whatever he or she proves, whichever is the 
lesser amount.’42 
 
(b) Interest and costs  
Interest accrued on a claim or costs associated with the litigation are not considered in the 
calculation of the value of the claim. Thus, if a claim is for R15 000 plus costs, the claim will 
still fall within the jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, any claim for ‘general or alternative 
relief’ is not taken into account.43 
As a general rule, the small claims courts do not order costs. However, s 37 of the SCCA makes 
provision for very few instances when costs can be awarded: 
‘Costs awarded in terms of this Act may only include –  
(a)  court fees; 
																																																								
40 The SCCA refers to the gender pronoun ‘he’. In conformity with modern drafting trends, a future version of the 
Act must be gender sensitive. 
41 The provision is identical to s 38 of the MCA. For an interpretation of that section see:  LAWSA § 58. 
42 LAWSA §394. The numerical values in the example have been adapted to take into account the current monetary 
jurisdiction of the small claims courts. 
43 SCCA, s 17(3). 
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(b)  the prescribed amount for the issue of the summons; 
(c)  the fees and travelling expenses of the [sheriff]44 of the court.’45  
The reference to ‘general or alternative relief’ refers to the salutary prayer contained in 
pleadings for ‘further and/or alternative relief’ and does not refer to specific relief contained 
therein.46 
(c) Deduction of an admitted debt 
Aside from abandonment, the SCCA also makes provision for the deduction of an admitted 
debt so as to bring a claim within the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims court.  Section 
19 provides: 
‘In order to bring a claim or counterclaim within the jurisdiction of a court a party may, in his [or her] 
summons or statement of defence or at any time thereafter, deduct from his [or her] claim or counterclaim, 
whether liquidated or unliquidated, any amount admitted by him to be due by him [or her] to the other 
party concerned.’47 
The practical effect of a deduction, and the advantages and pitfalls of a deduction over an 
abandonment, are succinctly explained as follows:48 
 ‘…where a plaintiff’s claim is for [R20 000] and the defendant has a potential counterclaim for R5000, 
the plaintiff may deduct R5000 in respect of the latter, in order to bring his or her claim within the court’s 
jurisdiction. If the plaintiff proves his or her claim in full and the defendant proves R5000, the plaintiff 
will recover [R15 000]. However, should the plaintiff only be able to prove, say, R10 000, the amount 
deducted by the plaintiff (R5000) is deducted from that amount and not from the higher amount or 
amounts [and hence the plaintiff will only receive R5000 at the end of the day]. 
The question whether a plaintiff should abandon part of his or her claim or admit and subtract a potential 
counterclaim, could, depending on the circumstances, be of great importance.  For example: P abandons 
R1000 in order to bring her claim of [R16000] within the jurisdiction of the court, and D counterclaims 
for R1000. If both parties prove their claims in full, P will get judgment for [R14000]. Should P, however, 
admit that she owes D R1000 and deduct this amount from her claim, she would be entitled to judgment 
of [R15000].  There are no hard and fast rules. Depending on the circumstances, it may be more 
advantageous to choose the one route instead of the other.’49 
Even though the above practical illustrations are helpful in terms of highlighting the differences 
between a deduction and abandonment, they require clarification. They seem to create the 
																																																								
44 The Act refers to the ‘messenger’ of the court. All references to the ‘messenger’ of the court must be read as the 
‘sheriff’ of the court. See in this regard Sheriffs Act 90 of 1986. The SCCA thus requires amendment. 
45 See SCCRs, Annexure 2. 
46 See Jones & Buckle (service 10) Act259. See also Combustion Technology (Pty) Ltd v Technoburn (Pty) Ltd 
[2002] JOL 10218 (C). 
47 This provision is identical to s 39 of the MCA. 
48 LAWSA §395. 
49 The numerical values in the example have been adapted to take into account the current monetary jurisdiction 
of the small claims court. 
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impression that the plaintiff may only deduct what amounts to a counterclaim.50 From the 
wording of s 19, it is clear that for a deduction to be considered one does not need a 
counterclaim. The party seeking to establish jurisdiction may deduct ‘any amount admitted by 
him [or her] to be due by him [or her] to the other party concerned.’ Thus, on a claim in respect 
of a sale agreement, the plaintiff may deduct an amount that is owing to the defendant in respect 
of a delict. While the latter claim is not a counterclaim, it is a claim that falls within the purview 
of s 19, and hence, the deduction will be allowed.   
(d)  Splitting of claims not permitted 
Section 20 of the SCCA prohibits splitting of claims to bring a matter within the jurisdiction of 
the court. In a sale agreement consisting of a number of goods for example, one will not be able 
to break up what is essentially one sale into several mini sales. 
(e)  Cumulative Jurisdiction 
A plaintiff may combine several different causes of action in one summons.51 The heading of s 
21 of the SCCA (‘cumulative jurisdiction’) is vague, but the effect of the section is that multiple 
actions can be brought in one summons, provided that they do not separately exceed the 
monetary jurisdiction of the small claims court. Thus, if a plaintiff has a contractual claim for 
R15 000 and a delictual claim for R15 000 against the same defendant, both actions can be 
brought in the same summons, and the court will adjudicate each matter separately.  
(f) Consent to jurisdiction 
Section 22 of the SCCA declares that the parties may not consent to confer jurisdiction on the 
court to hear a matter over which it would otherwise lack jurisdiction. This provision applies to 
all aspects of the jurisdictional rules.  
																																																								
50 See discussion on counterclaims below. 
51 De La Koski v Bredell, Brown & Co 1911 TPD 114 at 117; Darby v Levinsohn 1926 NPD 146 at 147; Mahomed 
& Son v Mahomed 1959 (2) SA 688 (T) at 691; Marais v Du Preez 1966 (4) SA 456 (E) at 457-458. 
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In contradistinction, s 45 of the MCA, while prohibiting the parties from consenting to a cause 
of action being heard in the magistrates’ courts over which the courts do not have jurisdiction, 
allows parties by consent to extend the monetary jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts. 
Furthermore, s 45 allows parties to consent to the locality of a specific magistrate’s court when 
proceedings have already been instituted or are about to be instituted.  
It is submitted that the legislature is correct to prohibit consent from overriding the general 
jurisdiction of the small claims courts, whether relating to monetary jurisdiction or relating to 
cause of action. To allow consent to override the monetary jurisdiction of the court would lead 
to an abuse of process. It would overburden the courts and undermine their ethos of affording 
assistance to litigants with small claims. However, in so far as the legislature excludes the 
possibility of parties consenting to the jurisdiction of a specific court, it is submitted that the 
Act should be amended to make such consent possible. The Act should be amended in a manner 
that will enable parties, as a matter of convenience, to consent to the jurisdiction of a particular 
court at the time when the proceedings have been instituted or are about to be instituted. Prior 
consent52 should not be permitted as this might result in abuse.  
It must be acknowledged that the legislature is currently in the process of amending s 45 of the 
MCA. According to s 3 of the Courts of Law Amendment Act,53 s 45 of the MCA will be 
amended as follows: 
‘3. Section 45 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1944, is hereby amended— 
(a) by the substitution for subsection (1) of the following subsection: 
‘‘(1) [Subject to the provisions of section forty-six, the court shall have jurisdiction to determine 
any action or proceeding otherwise beyond the jurisdiction if the parties consent in writing thereto: 
Provided that no court other than a court having jurisdiction under section twenty-eight shall, 
except where such consent is given specifically with reference to particular proceedings already 
instituted or about to be instituted in such court, have jurisdiction in any such matter] Subject to 
the provisions of section 46, the parties may consent in writing to the jurisdiction of either the court for 
the district or the court for the regional division to determine any action or proceedings otherwise beyond 
its jurisdiction in terms of section 29(1).’’; and 
(b) by the addition of the following subsection: 
																																																								
52 For example, consent contained in an agreement. 
53 7 of 2017. 
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‘‘(3) Any consent given in proceedings instituted in terms of section 57, 58, 65 or 65J by a defendant or 
a judgment debtor to the jurisdiction of a court which does not have jurisdiction over that defendant or 
judgment debtor in terms of section 28, is of no force and effect.’’.’54 
The explanatory memorandum to the Act explains the justification for the amendment as 
follows: 
‘This clause seeks to amend section 45 of the MCA which deals with consent to the jurisdiction of a court. 
Clause 3 seeks to provide that parties can consent to the jurisdiction of a magistrate’s court to determine 
causes of action otherwise beyond its jurisdiction in terms of section 29(1). Either the district or regional 
division of the magistrate’s court may deal with an action otherwise beyond its jurisdiction if the parties 
consents [sic] in writing to the jurisdiction of such district or regional division of the magistrate’s court. 
A new subsection (3) stipulates that consent given in proceedings in terms of sections 57, 58, 65 and 65J 
of the MCA to the jurisdiction of a court which does not have jurisdiction over the defendant or judgment 
debtor is of no force and effect. Although the original purpose of section 45 was to allow parties to consent 
to the jurisdiction of a lower court where the amount of the claim exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of 
the lower court, the proviso in section 45 as it currently exists has been used to consent to the jurisdiction 
of a specific magistrate’s court. In consenting to the jurisdiction of a specific magistrate’s court, 
consumers are often required or find themselves consenting to the jurisdiction of a magistrate’s court far 
away from where the consumer is either residing, carrying on business or employed. In consequence the 
consumer end up not being able to access [sic] such far away courts to challenge the order should the 
consumer wish to do so. In University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice 
And Correctional Services and Others55 the Court declared that section 45 does not permit a judgment 
debtor to consent in writing to the jurisdiction of a magistrate’s court other than that in which the judgment 
debtor resides or is employed, in respect of the enforcement of a credit agreement to which the NCA 
applies.’  
It is unclear from the proposed amendment and the accompanying memorandum whether the 
legislature intends to make it impossible in all circumstances for parties to consent to the 
jurisdiction of a particular magistrate’s court. The memorandum suggests that the purpose of 
the amendment is to limit consent to the jurisdiction of a particular court: where the consent to 
judgment procedure applies (ss 57 and 58); where the clerk makes an order pursuant to an offer 
by a judgment debtor to pay off a judgment debt in instalments (s 65); in the case of emoluments 
attachment orders (s 65J); and where the National Credit Act56  (the ‘NCA’) applies. The 
amendment viewed against the memorandum is thus confusing to understand. Be that as it may, 
it is submitted that the parties should be able to consent to the jurisdiction of a particular small 
claims court, the reason being that the mischief that the proposed amendment to s 45 seeks to 
address in the magistrates’ courts is, by and large, not applicable to the small claims courts.  
																																																								
54 Words in square brackets signify deletions from the existing provision, and words in underline signify insertions. 
55 2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC). 
56 Act 34 of 2005. 
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The procedures in ss 57, 58, 65 and 65J of the MCA are not part of the small claims court 
procedure.  In so far as one is permitted to sue in the small claims court  – per s 15(d) of the 
SCCA – on a claim arising from a credit agreement as defined in the NCA, it is submitted that 
if one accepts the argument that will be made later (see part III) to the effect that the small 
claims courts should be precluded from hearing any claim that falls within the NCA, an 
amendment to s 22 of the SCCA to cater for consent to locality should be permitted. It must 
also be borne in mind that there are many more small claims courts today than there were in 
1985.57 Perhaps, the reason why the legislature did not introduce consent to locality in 198558 
was on account of there being few pilot sites proclaimed when the courts were first introduced. 
Today, there are many sites.59  Litigants should be free to voluntarily choose their small claims 
court on the basis of convenience and to override the territorial jurisdiction of the small claims 
court. This will save costs because people will not have to travel far to the seat of the court that 
has jurisdiction according to the rules, when there is a more convenient court close by. 
(g)  Counterclaim exceeding the jurisdiction of the court 
According to s 47 of the MCA, where a defendant raises a counterclaim exceeding the monetary 
jurisdiction of the small claims court, the defendant is not obliged to abandon a portion of its 
claim or to deduct an admitted debt. The court is obliged to stay the action so that the claim in 
convention (main claim) and counterclaim can be brought in a court that has jurisdiction to hear 
both claims.60 The difficulty, however, is that the SCCA does not contain a similar provision. 
In Swart v Sher,61 the plaintiff issued summons against the defendant in the small claims court 
for payment in terms of a contract of services. The defendant counterclaimed for the deposit 
that had been paid pursuant to the contract. He alleged that he was entitled to reimbursement as 
																																																								
57 The small claims courts came into operation on 24 August 1985. 
58 See §3.3. 
59 See §3.8. 
60 MCA, s 41. 
61 1987 (2) 454 (SE). 
	
	 137	
the plaintiff had performed defectively. The counterclaim exceeded the monetary jurisdiction 
of the small claims court. The commissioner hearing the case refused to stop proceedings, even 
though the defendant was able to show that he instituted proceedings in the magistrate’s court, 
albeit after the plaintiff filed his claim in the small claims court. In an application to the High 
Court to interdict the commissioner (first respondent) from proceeding further, the court, per 
Zietsman J, held as follows: 
‘[T]he mere allegation by a defendant in the small claims court that he intends bringing against the 
plaintiff a counterclaim for relief in excess of the small claims court's jurisdiction will not automatically 
lead to the stopping or staying of the proceedings brought by the plaintiff in the small claims court. There 
is no provision in the Small Claims Court Act 61 of 1984 or in the Rules made by the Minister in terms 
of s 25 of the Act (published under Government Notice R1893 in Government Gazette 9909 dated 30 
August 1985) equivalent to s 47 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944. If a defendant has a 
counterclaim which exceeds the jurisdiction of the small claims court but which is in no way connected 
with the plaintiff's claim, and will not be affected by a decision made in respect of the plaintiff's claim in 
the small claims court, he will be able to bring his claim against the plaintiff in another court of competent 
jurisdiction. This will not, however, affect the jurisdiction of the small claims court in respect of the 
plaintiff's claim. 
However the position is… different where the respective claims of the parties are inter-related and depend 
upon a determination of the same issues. In such a case a decision in favour of the plaintiff on the 
plaintiff's claim in the small claims court may, on the principle of res judicta, prevent a court of higher 
jurisdiction from coming to a different conclusion on the same issues when considering the defendant's 
counterclaim. Similarly, a decision in favour of the defendant on the plaintiff's claim in the small claims 
court may prejudice any defence the plaintiff may thereafter wish to raise to the defendant's counterclaim 
in the higher court. The effect of such a decision could mean that the small claims court, in deciding on 
the plaintiff's claim, has at the same time determined the fate of the defendant's counterclaim which is a 
claim beyond its jurisdiction. A small claims court cannot determine claims beyond its jurisdiction even 
if all parties consent thereto (s 22 of the Act). 
It may be that a mere statement by a defendant that he has a counterclaim… against the plaintiff and that 
his counterclaim will require the determination of issues which are also relevant to the plaintiff's claim 
will not in itself be sufficient to stop or stay the proceedings in the small claims court, and that the 
commissioner will be required to satisfy himself that the defendant's statement is made in good faith and 
that he in fact intends bringing such a claim against the plaintiff in a court of competent jurisdiction. 
However, if, prima facie, the defendant satisfies him on these points he will in my opinion be obliged to 
stay or stop the proceedings in the small claims court in order to enable the defendant to bring his action 
against the plaintiff in the higher court. The plaintiff will then be able to advance his claim in that higher 
court in the form of a counterclaim.’62 
From the dictum above, it is clear that before there is a stay of action, the commissioner has to 
make two enquiries. He or she must determine whether:  
• The counterclaim is incidental63 to the main claim (i.e. arising from the same law and facts); 
and  
																																																								
62 Ibid 457B-J. 
63 For more discussion on incidental see Part IV § 7.15 (c) 
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• the defendant is acting in good faith in that he or she intends to bring an action in a court of 
competent jurisdiction.   
In both instances, prima facie evidence is required, as opposed to clear evidence.64 
In the interest of making the law accessible to the layperson, the court’s approach to staying of 
actions should be entrenched in the SCCA. 
6.7 METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING THE SMALL CLAIMS COURTS’ 
 MONETARY JURISDICTION 
At their establishment, the small claims courts’ monetary jurisdiction was relatively on par with 
the monetary jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts. 65  In fact, the Hoexter Commission 
proposed that the jurisdiction of the courts could be, but should not exceed, half the jurisdiction 
of the magistrates’ courts.66  As time passed, however, the jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts 
overtook the jurisdiction of the small claims courts by a large margin.  
Table 1: History of the changes of the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Courts 
vis-à-vis the district67  magistrates’ courts  
 
Proclamation Jurisdiction of the small claims 
courts 
Jurisdiction of the magistrates’ 
courts 
Government Notice R. 185 in 
Government Gazette No. 37450 
of 18 March 2014 
R15 000 R200 000 at the time of 
proclamation and now R400 
000 
Government Notice 985 in 
Government Gazette No. 
33696 of 27 October 2010 
R12 000 R100 000 
Government Notice No. R.313 
in Government Gazette No. 
26113 of 12 March 2004 
R7000 R100 000 
																																																								
64 Swart v Sher supra 458B. 
65 See §3.3. 
66 Report §13.2. 
67 In the past, the civil section of the magistrates’ courts was not divided into district and regional courts. The 
distinction between district courts and regional courts was established with the coming into force of the Regional 
Courts Amendment Act 31 of 2008 on 9 August 2010. The current jurisdiction of the district court is R200 000 
and the regional court from R200 000 to R400 000. When comparing the jurisdiction of the small claims courts to 
the magistrates’ courts, the comparison must be made with district courts as they represent the entry level 
magistrates’ courts.  See also notes 73 and 74 below. 
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Government Notice No. R. 
1402 in Government Gazette 
No. 16661 of 15 September 
1995 
R3000 R50 000 
Government Notice No. R.4707 
in Government Gazette No. 
26113 of 30 May 1991 
R2000 * R5000 liquid claims 
R3000 illiquid claims   
Government Notice No. 900 in 
Government Gazette No.9209 
of 2 May 1984 
R1000  R5000 liquid claims 
R3000 illiquid claims   
 
The present jurisdictional gap between the small claims courts and the district magistrates’ 
courts is far too large and is perhaps the most significant obstacle to access to justice in the 
small claims courts. In this section two issues will be considered:  
• The reasons why the jurisdiction of the small claims courts never kept up in relative terms 
with the jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts; and  
• how to calculate the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts in the future. 
 (a)  Reasons why the small claims courts’ monetary jurisdiction is so low when compared 
to the magistrates’ courts  
The South African legal profession, like so many other professions within the country and 
elsewhere in the world, is by and large self-regulating. Even though there is some government 
oversight, the profession maintains its independence by self-regulation.68  The government 
shows enormous deference to regulatory bodies within the legal profession, especially when it 
comes to making new policy or creating laws that affect professional standing and indeed, the 
work of the profession.  
The legal profession vets all amendments affecting the courts and makes inputs to the relevant 
government agencies. A member of the legal profession may do so individually, or via his or 
her professional body tasked with deliberating or commenting on any new legislative or policy 
																																																								
68 See Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014. 
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development. As a bloc, therefore, the legal profession is a very powerful lobby group. It is 
enormously protective of its turf in terms of preventing an encroachment on its core functions, 
reputation, and business opportunities.  
On the surface, the legal profession has always welcomed an increase in the monetary 
jurisdiction of the small claims courts.  On closer inspection, however, it is fair to say that the 
profession has always held its ground in terms of ensuring that any increase was measured and 
conservative. The profession has never openly petitioned for a dramatic increase in the small 
claims courts’ jurisdiction. The reason for this, of course, is that legal representation is not 
permitted in the small claims courts. The wider one casts the net of small claims, the more 
business the profession is likely to lose. While the members of the profession have never used 
the ‘loss of business’ argument to prevent an increase in the jurisdiction of the courts, they have, 
as a matter of course, relied on logistical arguments to ensure that the courts’ jurisdiction is 
conservatively increased. 69 They often argue that an increase in the monetary jurisdiction of 
the courts will overburden the courts with more work than the courts can realistically handle.70 
The second reason why the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts has not kept up 
with the monetary jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts has to do with the way in which the 
tariff tables71 were historically drafted by the Rules Board for Courts of Law72 (the ‘Rules 
Board’) in the magistrates’ courts. General Provision 1 of Part I of Table A of Annexure 2 of 
the MCRs currently provides: 
																																																								
69 See annual reports of the Law Society of South Africa: http://www.lssa.org.za/about-us/annual-reports (last 
accessed 1 March 2016) and in particular, the reports of the small claims courts’ committee.  
70 See the discussion in chapter 4. 
71 The tariff tables are appended to the Magistrates’ Courts Rules (Annexure 2) and the Uniform Rules of Court 
(Rule 70). They set out the tariffs which attorneys and advocates may charge clients on the lowest party-party 
basis.  In the overwhelming majority of cases, a court will order the unsuccessful party (either plaintiff or 
defendant) to pay the winner’s party-party costs. The winner will be compensated in terms of the tariff tables for 
the reasonable and necessary costs of litigation. Party-party costs make up roughly 60% of the cost of litigation.  
The other 40% will be recovered from the client and represents the difference between the party-party fee and 
what the legal representative is entitled to charge in terms of the fee agreement that the attorney has with the client. 
In South Africa, most attorneys charge on an hourly basis. For more information see Peté, Hulme, du Plessis et al 
Civil Procedure – A Practical Guide 290ff. 
72 For the powers and functions of the Rules Board for Courts of Law, see §3.4. 
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‘When the amount in dispute is less than or equal to the amount of R7000 costs shall be taxed on Scale 
A; when the amount in dispute exceeds the amount of R7000, but is less than or equal to R50 000, costs 
shall be taxed on Scale B; when the amount in dispute exceeds R50 000, but is less than or equal to the 
maximum jurisdictional amount determined by the Minister from time to time in respect of the 
magistrates’ courts for districts,73 costs shall be taxed on Scale C; when the amount exceeds the maximum 
jurisdictional amount determined by the Minister from time to time in respect of magistrates’ courts for 
districts and the process is issued out the magistrates’ courts for a regional division74 or when the matter 
is in respect of a cause of action in terms of s 29(1B)(a)75 of the Act, costs shall be taxed on Scale D.’ 
To illustrate how scales A, B, C and D work, consider the following extract from the most 
recent table76 of tariffs:  
‘Part III77 











1   Instructions to sue or defend or to 
counterclaim or defend a counterclaim, perusal 
of all documentation and consideration of merits 
and all necessary consultations to issue summons 
R487,00 R647,50 R778,00 R1011,50 
2   Summons R244,50 R340,00 R406,50 R528,00 
2A   Particulars of Claim or Declaration R244,50 R340,00 R406,50 R528,00 
3   Appearance R41,00 R41,00 R49,50 R64,00 
4   Notice under rule 12(1)(b) and (2) R41,00 R41,00 R49,50 R64,00 
5   Plea R244,00 R340,00 R406,50 R528,00 
6   Claim in reconvention R244,00 R340,00 R406,50 R528,00 
7   Reply, if necessary R244,00 R340,00 R406,50 R528,00 
8   Drawing up of all documents not specifically 
mentioned, including request for further 
particulars, schedule of documents, all affidavits, 
subpoenas, any notice not otherwise provided for 









9   Production of documents for inspection, or 
inspecting documents, per quarter of an hour or 











73 Currently the district magistrates’ courts’ jurisdiction is R200 000: GN 217 in GG 37477 of 27 March 2014 with 
effect from 1 June 2014. 
74 Currently, the regional magistrates’ courts’ jurisdiction is R201 000-R400 000: GN 217 in GG 37477 of 27 
March 2014 with effect from 1 June 2014. 
75 Section 29(1B)(a) concern matrimonial proceedings.  
76 This table reflects the tariffs as at 15 March 2017. 
77 Part III of Table A of Annexure 2 of the MCRs. 
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Under the tariff tables each aspect of litigation is itemised, and an appropriate fee is attached 
on the party-party78 tariff. For a long time, Scale A of the tariff was linked to the monetary 
jurisdiction of the small claims courts. Hence, the current R7 000 reflects a time when the 
monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts was set at that amount. As the jurisdiction of 
the small claims courts grew, Scale A was adjusted to reflect the change.  
The effect of linking Scale A with the small claims courts’ monetary jurisdiction was that a 
plaintiff who, as a matter of choice,79 bypassed the small claims courts and instituted a claim in 
the magistrates’ courts was only able to recover costs from the opposing losing80 party on the 
lowest scale (Scale A) of the tariffs. The net result of this was an increase in the cost of litigation 
to the litigant. On a small claim, the cost to the litigant for legal representation in the 
magistrates’ courts often exceeded what was recoverable from the other party.81 Of course, this 
would have impacted negatively on litigants. Restraining the sudden and rapid increase in the 
monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts was a mechanism by which the legal profession 
prevented more matters from falling into Scale A of the tariffs, thereby causing less prejudice 
to litigants who chose to sue in the magistrates’ courts for small claims.82 
In 2012, the Rules Board, quite correctly, decided to detach Scale A from the small claims 
courts’ monetary jurisdiction. Consequently, the current value of Scale A (R7 000) is less than 
																																																								
78 See the discussion in footnote 71 above.  
79 See discussion at §6.5. 
80 See the discussion in footnote 71 above for a discussion of the winner-takes-all-system of costs in South Africa. 
81 McQuoid-Mason ‘Access to Justice in South Africa: Are there Enough Lawyers?’ (2013) 3  Oñati Socio-legal 
Series 561 at 574.  
82 To illustrate the problem practically, take the following example: John (client) mandates Sally (attorney) to 
institute action against Wallace in respect of a motor vehicle accident. Sally informs John that she charges a 
professional fee of R1000 per hour. The value of the claim is R6500. Instead of suing in the small claims court, 
John as dominus litis decides to sue Wallace in the magistrates’ court. Since the value of the claim is less than 
R7000, if John wins the case he will recover costs (party-party) from Wallace on Scale A of the tariffs. Thus he 
will recover from Wallace R244, 50 for the summons that was issued and served, for example. However, if it took 
Sally an hour to draft the summons, she will recover from her client, John, the difference between her fee and what 
was recovered from Wallace. It thus stands to reason that when a matter fall into Scale A of the tariffs, the winning 
party recovers less from the other party than would have been the case had the claim fell into Scales B or C. The 
legal profession thus had an interest to keep the threshold limit for claims falling into Scale A low, because if 
matters fell into that category, their clients would be prejudiced. Unfortunately, because Scale A was linked to the 
small claims jurisdiction, the legal profession opposed increases in the jurisdiction of the court for fear that the 
threshold limit for Scale A would also increase. 
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the present monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts (currently set at R15 000). For as 
long as the magistrates’ courts share concurrent jurisdiction83 with the small claims courts, 
disconnecting Scale A from the small claims courts’ monetary jurisdiction is rational and 
correct. If the legislature wants to discourage litigants from using the magistrates’ courts in 
respect of claims that fall within the small claims courts’ jurisdiction, it must do so directly.84 
To rely on indirect methods often results in unintended consequences. 
The delinking of Scale A from the small claims courts’ monetary jurisdiction serves as an 
invitation to the Department of Justice to increase the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims 
courts, as the negative impact of doing that on magistrates’ court litigants is far less than what 
it was in the past. It is likely that, on account of the delinking, the Department of Justice might 
face less opposition from the legal profession to a substantial increase in the jurisdiction of the 
small claims courts. There is, in any event, a growing feeling in the country that the legal 
profession needs to do more to address access to justice concerns.85 The small claims courts 
provide an ideal opportunity to address that sentiment.  
(b) Calculating the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts 
When calculating the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts, one may be inclined to 
compare the monetary jurisdiction of South African small claims courts with those in foreign 
jurisdictions. This is rather unhelpful and provides artificial results. On a survey of foreign 
jurisdictions, monetary limits range from a few hundred rand to many thousands of rands – after 
engaging in currency conversion. A numerical pattern is not discernible.86 What is apparent is 
																																																								
83 See §7.5. 
84 See discussion in §4.7. 
85 See generally chapter 3. 
86 Examples of small claims jurisdictional limits:  
Kenya: In terms of Small Claims Court Act, small claims courts can hear matters up to Ks100 000. Section 11 
authorises the Chief Justice to set limits and empowers him or her to set ‘local limits’. For more discussion, see 
discussion at Part VI below. 
England and Wales: England and Wales does not have a separate small claims court. Such claims are handled by 
the county court after being allocated to the small claims track of the county court system. Small claims take place 
under a special set of rules. Low-value cases, including most non-personal injury cases up to £10 000, are usually 
assigned to the small claims track, producing a small claims action in the county court. Consultation is underway 
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that the monetary jurisdiction of courts is governed by the prevailing socio-economic 
circumstances set against the general backdrop of the cost of litigation. It is submitted that 
within the South African context one must be governed by similar considerations. 
Some may argue that the jurisdictional limit of the small claims courts must be determined by 
adjusting the courts’ monetary jurisdiction by the inflation rate, or perhaps, the Consumer Price 
Index. It is submitted that these variables are not useful. 
																																																								
on raising the limit to £15,000. It should be noted that the limit is only a guideline. The court may allocate a case 
to the small claim track where the claim is over the guideline if it is considered that the case is simple enough that 
it is an appropriate way of disposing of the matter. 
Australia: Northern Territory:  A small claim is up to $25 000; Queensland: Queensland Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal deals with minor civil disputes, which involve amounts up to $25 000; South Australia: a minor claim is 
up to $25 000 in value; Western Australia: a minor claim involves a claim that does not exceed $10 000. 
Brazil: Under Article Three of Law No. 9,099/1995, civil claims involving an amount up to 40 (forty) monthly 
minimal wages or R$ 24 880 (October 2012) may be filed before a Special Civil Court. 
Canada: Nova Scotia: The maximum claim that may be recovered in the small claims court is $25 000; British 
Columbia: The maximum claim that may be recovered in the Small-Claims Division of the Provincial Court is 
$25 000; Manitoba: Small-Claims Courts adjudicate claims up to $10 000; New Brunswick: Small claims courts 
can adjudicate claims up to  $12 500; Ontario: The limit for a small claim is $25 000; Quebec: Small-Claims Court 
can hear claims up to $ 15 000; Saskatchewan: The Civil Division of the Saskatchewan can hear small claims up 
to $ 20 000. 
European Union: A European Small Claims Procedure for cross-border claims was established on 1 January 2009 
for processing claims with values up to 2000 EUR. 
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Table 2: R1 00087 adjusted according to the mean average inflation of 8.2%88 from 
August 198589 to March 2018.  
 
The above diagram illustrates inflation as a marker for determining the jurisdiction of the small 
claims courts. It is clear that if this marker is used, then the present jurisdiction of the courts 
exceeds the target. The current jurisdiction of the courts (R15 000) fares better than the 
projection of R12 500. 
Inflation, or for that matter, the Consumer Price Index, should not be the marker for determining 
the jurisdiction of the court. These variables are valuable for determining the general cost of 
living. However, they are not useful for determining the cost of specialised services, such as 
																																																								
87 R1000 was the commencement value of the small claims courts’ monetary jurisdiction at the time of their 
establishment in 1985. See Table 1 above. 
88 The following diagram sets out the level of inflation for the period 24 August 1985 to 31 December 2016. 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa.  
South Africa’s inflation rate reached an all time high of 20.70 percent in January 1986 and a record low of 0.20 
percent in January of 2004. 
89  Small claims courts came into operation on 24 August 1985. 
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legal services. The jurisdiction of the court should be priced having regard to the market cost 
of litigation. The cost of litigation in South Africa is incredibly high and rivals the cost of 
litigation in many first-world countries. Rampant poverty and inequality90 prevent many people 
from being able to access the courts. South Africa also has the problem of the ‘missing middle’. 
The overwhelming majority of middle class people cannot access the courts and would also not 
qualify for state-sponsored legal assistance through the Legal Aid system.91 
To use rigid financial indices to peg the small claims courts’ jurisdiction is wrong. Some 
commentators may highlight that the Rules Board does in fact use the Consumer Price Index to 
update the tariffs of costs for the magistrates’ courts, the High Court and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. However, such an argument would miss the point that those tariffs relate to party-party 
costs, 92  recoverable from the unsuccessful party, and do not affect the ‘reasonable and 
professional fees’93 that practitioners can charge their clients over and above party-party costs. 
The ‘reasonable and professional fees’ are, by and large, unregulated in the traditional sense 
																																																								
90 Winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics, Joseph Stiglitz writes in his book The Price of Inequality 29: 
‘More-equal societies have Gini coefficients of .3 or below. These include Sweden, Norway, and 
Germany. The most unequal societies have Gini coefficients of .5 or above. These include some counties 
in Africa (notably South Africa with its history of grotesque racial inequality) and Latin America–long 
recognized for their divided (and often dysfunctional) societies and polities.’    
91 Klaaren ‘The Cost of Justice’ (Unpublished Briefing Paper) writes: 
‘Legal services in South Africa are expensive, particularly for the poor. In 2005, AfriMAP concluded 
“the major barrier to access to justice in South Africa remains the high cost of legal services. ...[T]he 
average South African household would need to save a week’s worth of income in order to afford a one-
hour consultation with an average attorney.” Things do not seem to have improved significantly. In 2013, 
Dugard and Drage reported that “[SERI] clients with a monthly income of R600 ... are frequently charged 
fees in the region of R 1,500 ... just for an initial consultation.” (2013). Even in terms of High Court rules 
(which are often interpreted loosely) a 15-minute consultation may cost R177.50 and a page of drafting 
can be charged at R50... These fees restrict access to justice for the poor, especially civil justice which is 
largely not available from Legal Aid South Africa. These fees also restrict access to justice across the 
board for the not-so-poor, for instance persons in a household earning over R6000 a month and thus not 
qualifying for Legal Aid.’ 
According to Statistics South Africa 60% of South African workers earned a monthly salary of R4300 a month in 
2014: Mojapelo ‘Do 60% of South African workers earn less than R5,000 a month?’ Business Day ( 23 March 
2016);  See also Gloppen Social Rights Litigation as Transformation: South African Perspectives Michelsen 
Institute 3,9. And see the discussion in chapter 1 about the ‘missing middle’ problem and the limitations of the 
Legal Aid system.  
92 See discussion at footnote 71 above. 
93 Practitioners determine their professional fees on an hourly rate depending on the complexity of a matter and 
the locality where the legal advice is sought. In the big city centres, legal services are more expensive. In Pretoria 
for example, the services of a candidate attorney would be in the range of R1500 per hour and the services of a 
partner in a firm would be as much as R6000 per hour: http://www.mcoetzeelaw.co.za/news-articles/25-the-cost-
of-an-attorney-in-south-africa (last accessed 1 March 2017). 
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and depend on what the legal fraternity considers to be appropriate having regard to a myriad 
of considerations.94 When determining their fees, members of the legal profession do not 
necessarily apply the Consumer Price Index or the rate of inflation. The profession often takes 
into account fluid considerations such as the cost of doing business in South Africa and other 
market-related forces95 that impact on professional work. 
To determine the jurisdiction of the small claims courts (and hence, when a claim can be 
considered a small claim), it is submitted that one has to work out the point at which it is not 
financially viable to sue in the magistrates’ courts. In an instructive article, Judge Dunstan 
Mlambo, Judge President of the North and South Gauteng High Court, commented in 2012 that 
attorneys ‘who act prudently and ethically will advise their clients not to take claims for less 
than R 43 00096 to trial in the magistrates’ courts’. The Judge concluded:  
‘Consequently, R 43 000 should be the jurisdictional limit of the Small Claims Courts. A more precise 
jurisdictional limit could be determined by research, including market research, but I trust that what is set 
out above is sufficient to demonstrate that a jurisdictional limit of R 7 000, or even R 12 000,97 for the 
Small Claims Courts is inadequate.’98 
It is axiomatic that Judge Mlambo made his recommendation based on the market cost of 
litigation and not on market-related indices such as the Consumer Price Index.  Extensive 
market research with regard to the actual cost of litigation is needed to determine the jurisdiction 
of the small claims courts. Such research must be conducted regularly. It will also ensure that 
there is greater parity between the jurisdiction of the small claims courts and the district 
magistrates’ courts, as was the case in 1985 when the small claims courts were established. 
																																																								
94  For the manner in which fees are determined for the advocates by the General Council of the Bar, see: 
http://www.sabar.co.za/GCB-UniformRules-of-Ethics-updated-July2012.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017). For 
the manner in which fees are determined for the attorneys’ profession see: http://capelawsoc.law.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/RulesForTheAttorneysProfessionMar2016-1.pdf (last accessed on 1 March 2017).  
95 Such as the availability of work, the level of competition and expertise needed to successfully practice in a 
particular legal area, and the seniority of the legal professional. 
96 Attorneys at a Costs Indaba held by the Rules Board for Courts of Law in February 2014 echoed similar 
sentiments. At the Indaba, an attorney representing one of the organising bodies of the profession went so far as 
to state that she advised clients not to sue in the magistrates’ court if the claim was less than R80 000:  M 
Manyathi-Jele ‘Costs Indaba’ De Rebus (April 2014) 14. See also Eramus ‘Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil 
Procedure – Republic of South Africa’ cited at http://www 
personal.umich.edu/~purzel/national_reports/South%20Africa.pdf (last accessed 24 November 2016).  
97 At the time when Judge Mlambo was writing the jurisdiction of the small claims court was R7000 and there was 
talk of increasing the amount to R12 000.  
98 Mlambo ‘The reform of the Costs Regime in South Africa: Part 2’ Advocate (2012) 22 at 29. 
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What we have today is an artificial determination of the monetary jurisdiction of the small 
claims courts, which does not promote access to justice. The small claims courts’ monetary 
jurisdiction is out of kilter with the economic realities in the country.  
It is submitted that having regard to the socio-economic realities in the country, the monetary 
jurisdiction of the small claims courts should be in the region of R60 000 to R80 000.99  
6.8  TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the small claims courts is limited by territoriality. In terms of the SCCA, the 
area of jurisdiction of a court ‘shall be the area or district for which it was established’.100 As 
noted before,101 the Minister of Justice may by notice in the Gazette – 
‘(a)  establish for any area consisting of one or more districts or a part of a district a court 
 for the adjudication of claims in terms of this Act, called a small claims court; 
(aA)  determine the seat of such a court…’  
The effect of the above provision is that a litigant must sue in the court of appropriate territorial 
jurisdiction after applying the rules of jurisdiction. The purpose of territoriality is to ensure that 
litigants cannot forum shop and that the administration of justice is not hamstrung by inordinate 
amounts of claims being brought in certain courts, while other courts have little or no work. 
PART III 
CAUSE OF ACTION  
6.9 MATTERS BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE SMALL CLAIMS COURTS 
Section 16 of the SCCA identifies several types of actions that small claims courts cannot hear. 
The section provides: 
‘A court shall have no jurisdiction in matters –  
(a) in which the dissolution of any marriage, or of a customary union as defined in section 35 of the 
Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927), is sought; 
(b) concerning the validity or interpretation of a will or other testamentary document; 
																																																								
99 §This amount is motivated by the discussion in notes 91, 93, 94, 96 above. 
100 SCCA, s 12. 
101 See chapter 4.  
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(c)  concerning the status of a person in respect of his mental capacity; 
(d)  in which is sought specific performance without an alternative claim for payment of damages, 
except in the case of- 
(i)  the rendering of an account in respect of which the claim does not exceed the amount 
determined by the Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette; 
(ii)  the delivery or transfer of any property, movable or immovable, not exceeding in value 
the amount determined by the Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette 
determined for the purposes of this section; 
(e)  in which is sought a decree of perpetual silence; 
(f)  in which is sought damages in respect of –  
(i)  defamation; 
(ii)  malicious prosecution; 
(iii)  wrongful imprisonment; 
(iv)  wrongful arrest; 
(v)  seduction; 
(vi)  breach of promise to marry; 
(g)  in which an interdict is sought.’ 
 
(a)  Section 16(a): ‘in which the dissolution of any marriage, or of a customary union as 
 defined in section 35 of the Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927), is 
 sought’ 
Only the High Courts and the regional magistrates’ courts may grant divorce orders under the 
Marriage Act,102 the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act103 or the Civil Union Act.104 
They may also hear nullity suits.105 The district magistrates’ courts are precluded from hearing 
such actions. Section 16(a) is thus in keeping with the hierarchical structure of the courts with 
regard to status matters.106 
Section 35 of the Black Administration Act 107  has been repealed. 108  The words ‘or of a 
customary union as defined in section 35 of the Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 
1927)’ are thus meaningless and should be deleted from the provision. 
																																																								
102 Act 25 of 1961. 
103 Act 120 of 1998. 
104 Act 17 of 2006. 
105 MCA, s 29(1B).  
106 See generally Pistorius Pollak on Jurisdiction (1993) 133ff.  
107 38 of 1927. 
108 Section 35 has been repealed by s 1 (7) of the Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment of 
Certain Laws Act 28 of 2005. 
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(b)  Section 16(b): ‘concerning the validity or interpretation of a will or other 
 testamentary document’ 
Actions concerning the validity and construction of wills have historically been reserved for 
the superior courts.109 In keeping with that principle, the SCCA precludes a court from hearing 
a matter involving wills. It must be noted, however, that a court can engage in the interpretation 
of a will where the interpretation is necessary to deliberate a claim over which it does have 
jurisdiction. 
Section 17(2) of the SCCA provides: 
‘Where the amount claimed or other relief sought does not exceed the jurisdiction of a court, the court 
shall not be deprived of that jurisdiction merely because it is necessary for the court, in order to arrive at 
a decision, to give a finding upon a matter beyond its jurisdiction.’  
In Le Roux v Le Roux the magistrate’s court was faced with the question of whether it could 
interpret a will to give effect to a mortgage bond. On an interpretation of s 37(2) of the MCA – 
which is worded identically to s 17(2) of the SCCA – the court held that it could interpret the 
will in order to consider the defence relating to the rectification of the mortgage bond, as it was 
argued that the mortgage bond should have reflected the terms of the will. The process of 
interpretation, though beyond the jurisdiction of the court, held the court, was ancillary to a 
cause of action over which the court had jurisdiction, namely the mortgage bond.110 
(c) Section 16(c): ‘concerning the status of a person in respect of his mental capacity’  
Mental capacity is a status issue. Such matters are classically reserved for the superior courts 
under the common law. The SCCA thus confirms a rule that has been in place since time 
																																																								
109 See also MCA, s 46(2)(a). 
110[1998] 2 All SA 315 (O) at 318I. However, in Fourie v Fourie 1998 (1) SA 509 (C) the court held that s 37(2) 
had to be restrictively interpreted and that in light of the general prohibition against lower courts hearing matters 
involving wills, the courts should not engage in the process of interpreting wills even if the process of interpretation 
is ancillary to the main matter. It is submitted that the latter decision should not be followed in so far as it fails to 
appreciate that the purpose of s 37(2) is to permit a court to grant judgment on an ‘amount claimed’ or ‘relief 
sought’ that falls within the jurisdiction of the court and it is necessary, in order to arrive at a decision, to make a 
finding upon an issue that is beyond its jurisdiction. See also Tshisa v Premier of the Free State 2010 (2) SA 153 
(FB) para [10].   
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immemorial. There may be some argument for the lower courts to hear certain types of status 
matters – mental capacity being one of them. However, it would be inappropriate for small 
claims courts to hear such matters as it would be too difficult for such matters to be litigated in 
a court that does not allow for legal representation. The evidential issues would also be too 
complex and time-consuming for the small claims courts. 
Unlike the MCA,111 the SCCA makes no provision for the appointment of a curator ad litem to 
represent a litigant who has limited or no legal capacity. Rule 13(8)(b) of the SCCRs provides 
in respect of service of process by the sheriff: 
‘(8) Where two or more persons are to be served with the same process, service shall be effected upon 
each, except –  
(a) in the case of two or more persons sued in their capacity as trustees of an insolvent estate, 
liquidators of a company, executors, curators or guardians, when service may be effected by 
delivery to any one of them in any manner hereinbefore prescribed…’.112 
The reference to ‘curator’ in the above rule, it would appear,113 is to the curator bonis,114 and 
not a curator ad litem, where the former is sufficient under the common law115 to defend 
proceedings for an incapacitated defendant. 
(d)  Section 16(d): ‘in which is sought specific performance without an alternative claim 
 for payment of damages’ 
This provision mirrors s 46(2)(c) of the MCA. According to the common law, a court will, as a 
general rule, lean in favour of granting specific performance. However, where the court finds 
that it would be inappropriate to do so, the court will grant damages as a surrogate for specific 
																																																								
111 MCA, s 33. 
112 Italics supplied.  
113 This is inferred on account of the absence of a provision similar to s 33 of the MCA. 
114 A curator bonis must be distinguished from a curator ad litem. The former is appointed by court order to manage 
the estate of an incapacitated person, whereas the latter is appointed to institute or defend litigation for an 
incapacitated person. The former retains the position for as long as the incapacity exists, whereas the latter loses 
his or her office as soon as the litigation is resolved. 
115 An instance under the common law where the curator bonis can defend proceedings is where someone is 
declared a prodigal (spendthrift). The curator bonis will manage the affairs of the prodigal and will also be served 
with process if the prodigal is sued. The reason for this is that, unlike a minor or a person with a severe mental 
disability, a prodigal, generally possesses the cognition to appreciate the nature of litigation. There is thus no need 
to appoint a curator ad litem. See further Jones & Buckle (service 10) Act 233 fn 3.    
	
	 152	
performance.116 In the High Court one can, as a matter of right, claim specific performance. 
There is no need to quantify a claim for specific performance with an alternative claim for 
damages.117 If the High Court finds that it cannot grant specific performance, the plaintiff is 
permitted to amend its pleadings to quantify the claim for specific performance with an 
alternative claim for damages and to lead evidence thereon. To save time and expense, the High 
Courts have informally developed the ‘double-barrel procedure’ to encourage parties to 
quantify a claim for specific performance with an alternative claim for damages.118 
The difference between High Court and lower court procedure is that whereas the requirement 
to quantify a claim for specific performance has developed organically in the High Courts, the 
requirement forms part of the jurisdictional rules in the lower courts,119 and is a remnant of the 
historical limitation placed on the lower courts to grant money judgments only.120 It is open to 
debate whether it makes sense in the modern era to perpetuate a restriction of a bygone era.  
For some time there was confusion in the law reports about the meaning of ‘specific 
performance’ in s 46(2)(c) of the MCA. The first question that arose was whether the reference 
to ‘specific performance’ was to specific performance ad factum praestandum (a factual 
obligation) only, or whether it included specific performance ad pecuniam solvendam (a 
monetary obligation). If specific performance referred to both, a plaintiff would be faced with 
the absurd situation of having to quantify a claim for performance sounding in money with the 
same amount framed as damages in order for the court to have jurisdiction over a matter. After 
some debate,121 the provincial divisions of the High Court took the position that the reference 
to ‘specific performance’ in s 46(2)(c) refers to specific performance ad factum praestandum 
																																																								
116 Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v B N Aitken (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 398 (A) at 440G–H; Associated South African Bakeries 
(Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Bäckereien (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 893 (A) at 913C–D; National Union of Textile 
Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) at 781H.  
117 Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) at 781H.  
118 Custom Credit Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Shembe  1972 (3) SA 462 (A) at 470D; Consol Ltd t/a Consol Glass v 
Twee Jonge Gezellen (Pty) Ltd (2) 2005 (6) SA 23 (C) at 42B–E. 
119 Malkiewicz v Van Niekerk and Fourouclas Investments CC [2008] 1 All SA 57 (T) at 60f. 
120 Jones and Buckle (service 10) Act 302-303. 
121Carpet Contracts (Pty) Ltd v Grobler 1975 (2) SA 436 (T) at 442C–D. 
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and not ad pecuniam solvendam.122 By parity of reasoning, the same position holds true in the 
small claims courts. 
The second question that arose was whether ‘specific performance’ is limited to contractual 
claims, or whether it includes delictual123 or statutory performance. Though the courts are split, 
it would appear that, for magistrates’ courts’ procedure, the tide leans in favour of holding that 
the claim for specific performance refers to contractual performance only, and not to other types 
of performance.124  It has been held that this interpretation is consonant with s 30 of the MCA, 
which permits the magistrates’ courts to grant prohibitory and mandatory interdicts.125 This 
interpretation, however, does not bode well for the small claims courts, because unlike the 
magistrates’ courts, they cannot grant interdicts. 126  Hence, if ‘specific performance’ is 
interpreted restrictively, it would create ambiguity about whether they would be entitled to grant 
factual relief as a matter of right (i.e. without a quantification in damages) where the relief 
																																																								
122 Tuckers Land & Development Corporation (Edms) Bpk v Van Zyl  1977 (3) SA 1041 (T) at 1045D followed in 
Otto v Basson 1994 (2) SA 744 (C). 
123 For example, an order to retract a defamatory article in a newspaper or to repair a wall: see Malkiewicz v Van 
Niekerk and Fourouclas Investments CC [2008] 1 All SA 57 (T). 
124 In Oliver v Stoop (1978) 1 SA 196 (T) at 201B and 202C-D, the court held that ‘specific performance’ referred 
to contractual obligations only.  In Zinman v Miller 1956 (3) SA 8 (T) at 12D-E, the Full Court, in an obiter dictum 
per Rumpff J (with Martiz JP and Williamson J concurring) thought that the reference to ‘specific performance’ 
in s 46(2)(c) of the MCA included delict and statute. A similar sentiment was expressed in Carpet Contracts (Pty) 
Ltd v Grobler 1975 (2) SA 436 (T) at 439G-H where Viljoen J (Cillié JP concurring) stated: 
‘It may be argued that “specific performance” as the term is used in sec. 46 (2) (c) has a wider connotation 
than specific performance as the term is usually accepted in relation to the law of contract. This was in 
actual fact decided in the case of Zinman v Miller, 1956 (3) SA 8 (T), decided by the Full Court of this 
Division, where RUMPFF, J., as he then was, gave the judgment of the Court. He said at p. 12D: 
“The reference to 'specific performance' in sec. 46 (2) (c) is a reference in my opinion to claims 
which a plaintiff seeks ordinary relief of a final nature based on an obligation, in terms of which 
the defendant is bound to render specific performance.”  
In other words any obligation, including an obligation arising e. g. from delict, could give rise to a claim 
for specific performance, but in this particular case we have to deal with an obligation arising ex 
contractu; and it follows that our enquiry will be limited to "specific performance" in relation to contract.’ 
The modern view seems to be leaning in favour of Oliver v Stoop supra. In this regards see Malkiewicz v Van 
Niekerk and Fourouclas Investments CC [2008] 1 All SA 57 (T) at 60e-f. 
125 In Malkiewicz v Van Niekerk and Fourouclas Investments CC [2008] supra the court held at 60e-f. 
‘In my view the conclusion of the court in Olivier v Stoop (supra) was correct. It is supported by the 
authors of Jones and Buckle, The Civil Practice of the Magistrates’ Courts in South Africa 9ed at 191-
192 and Pretorius, Burgerlike Prosesreg in die Landdroshowe volume 1 at 53-54. 
It is undeniably so that the normal context of the concept “specific performance” is the field of contract. 
Where section 30 confers jurisdiction in respect of interdicts on magistrates’ courts, it would largely 
nullify that jurisdiction if it would be subject to the restriction that an interdict can only be sought if there 
is an alternative prayer for damages. Interdicts in the High Court are rarely, if ever, sought on that basis.’  
126 See discussion in §6.9(g).  
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sought is not framed as an interdict. It is submitted that the prohibition against specific 
performance may in any event have to be revisited if the parties agree to specific performance 
following a process of mediation.127 
Section 16(d), like s 46(2)(c) of the MCA, contains exceptions to the jurisdictional rule of 
quantifying a claim for specific performance with an alternative claim for damages. Small 
claims courts are permitted to grant specific performance in claims involving the rendering of 
an account, as well as for the delivery and transfer of property (movable and immovable). This 
means that a small claims court can, for example, enforce the real right of ownership (rei 
vindicatio) without requiring the plaintiff to quantify that claim in monetary terms. The courts 
can also enforce personal rights arising from contract that require a defendant to deliver 
property. It is interesting to note that the exception applies to both movable and immovable 
property. From statistical information,128 it would appear that the small claims courts hardly 
ever preside over claims involving immovable property, where title or possession is sought. 
Unless the jurisdictional monetary limit of the small claims courts is increased dramatically, it 
is highly unlikely that the small claims courts will ever preside over claims involving real and 
personal rights to immovable property.129 It therefore seems nonsensical for the SCCA to refer 
to ‘immovable’ property. Following the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act, the SCCA should 
only make provision for the ‘delivery and recovery of movable property.’130 
																																																								
127 See the discussion in chapter 10.  
128 See Table 3 below. 
129 In a study concluded in December 2015 by First National Bank, a major South African commercial bank, the 
average cost of housing in South Africa was determined: 
 Average House Price Price 
1 Major Metro Areas R1 213 493 
2 Upper Income Area R2 641 917 
3 Middle Income Area R1 396 396 
4 Lower Income Area R868 887 
5 Affordable Area R461 407 
6 *Former Black Township R323 472 
7 Holiday Towns R952 965 
Source: https://businesstech.co.za/news/wealth/107185/this-is-how-much-the-average-house-costs-in-south-
africa/ (last accessed 14 December 2016).  
130 See Kenyan Small Claims Court Act, s 12 (1)(c). See discussion in Part VI below..  
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(e) Section 16(e):‘in which is sought a decree of perpetual silence’ 
At present, only the High Courts may entertain an application for a decree of perpetual silence. 
Magistrates’ courts are precluded from granting orders of perpetual silence.131 A decree of 
perpetual silence is a common-law remedy to bring an end to threats of litigation that never 
ensues.132 The constitutionality of this remedy has not been tested. However, since the small 
claims courts cannot hear such matters, there is no need to consider the remedy any further, 
other than to state that it is strange that this provision appears in the SCCA at all. 
(f)  Section 16(f): ‘in which is sought damages in respect of defamation, malicious 
 prosecution, wrongful imprisonment, wrongful arrest, seduction, breach of promise to 
 marry’ 
In its deliberations, the Hoexter Commission noted that having regard to ‘the simplified 
procedures to be adopted with regard [to] both the pleading and to the conduct of the trial in the 
small claims court’, it was appropriate for the jurisdiction in respect of causes of action to be 
‘appreciably more limited than that of the magistrates’ court.’133  Aside from the restrictions 
listed in s 16(a) to (e) of the SCCA, it proposed that the courts should not be permitted to hear 
claims involving damages for defamation, malicious prosecution, wrongful imprisonment, 
wrongful arrest, seduction, and breach of promise to marry.134 The legislature agreed. 
It is submitted that the decision to limit the jurisdiction of the court is not inherently 
problematic. It is consistent with the approach taken in many foreign jurisdictions.135 Several 
of the causes of action enumerated in s 16(f) are, by and large, in respect of claims directed at 
the State. It is common cause, however, that the State may not sue and be sued in the small 
																																																								
131 MCA, s 46(2)(d). 
132 See for further discussion Garber v Witwatersrand Jewish Aged Home 1985 (3) SA 460 (W). 
133 Report §13.46. 
134 Report §13.48.  
135 Report § 11.12.1, 10.4.4. 
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claims court.136 In so far as some of the claims (such as breach of promise to marry and 
defamation) involve natural persons, these claims are not inherently complicated and therefore, 
one must question whether the small claims courts should be excluded from hearing such types 
of claims. One must remember that a small claims court can in any event refuse to hear a matter 
that is deemed to be too complicated. Should complex issues of evidence arise the court can 
refer the parties to a magistrate’s court.137 
It is important to note, however, that small claims courts can hear personal injury claims, 
provided that such claims are not regulated by other areas of the law that oust the jurisdiction 
of the small claims courts.138 
(g)  Section 16(g): ‘in which an interdict is sought’ 
In its Report, the Hoexter Commission highlighted that small claims courts historically served 
the function of enforcing money judgments, and that it was not common for the courts to 
entertain claims for specific performance.139 On a preponderance of experiences in international 
jurisdictions, the Commission recommended that the courts’ jurisdiction should by and large 
																																																								
136 SCCA, s 14(2). See chapter 7.  
137 SCCA, s 23. 
138 The Road Accident Fund 56 of 1998 does not define the word ‘court’ in the Act. The Fund is a statutory body 
with legal personality (The Road Accident Fund Act, s 2(1)). It is exclusively funded by the State and hence, is a 
state entity. It would thus appear that the Fund cannot be sued in the small claims court as the State cannot be sued 
in the small claims court (SCCA, s 14(2)). This is also consonant with the ‘Practice Note’ issued by the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Fund in the January/February (2008) De Rebus 38 to the following effect: 
‘In the case of legal proceedings having to be commenced, it is the court (High Court or magistrate's 
court, depending on the amount claimed) within whose geographical area of jurisdiction the accident 
occurred that would have the requisite jurisdiction in a particular matter. Alternatively, the court (High 
Court or magistrate's court, again depending on the amount claimed) within whose geographical area of 
jurisdiction the Road Accident Fund (the Fund) has its principal place of business… 
Where legal proceedings have to be commenced in the High Court the Fund is not entitled to consent to 
jurisdiction in respect of a court that does not possess jurisdiction to entertain the action in accordance 
with the provisions of s 19 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, read with s 15(2) of the Road Accident 
Fund [sic]. 
However, the Fund may consent to a particular magistrate courts's [sic] jurisdiction in terms of s 45(1) of 
the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 or alternatively, the Fund may elect not to object to the jurisdiction 
of a particular magistrate court [sic], in terms of s 28(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act. 
This practice note withdraws and replaces the practice note published in 1997 (June) DR 383, as it relates 
to the jurisdiction and institution of legal proceedings.’ 
139 Report §, 6.4.1, 7.3, 8.1.2, 9.8, 10.2.1, 10.4.4, 13.4.5, 13.4.6, 13.4.7, 13.4.8. 
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be limited to granting money judgments. In its final recommendations, the Commission, 
however, did not expressly preclude the granting of interdicts.140 
In the original version of the SCCA, s 16(g) did not feature. The subsection was inserted after 
an amendment to the Act.141 
It seems correct for the small claims courts not to grant interdicts as a freestanding remedy. To 
do so would subject the courts to an inordinate amount of work. It could lead to an abuse of the 
court process, and would create complex conundrums when trying to figure out how a request 
for an interdict stacks against the monetary jurisdiction of the court.  
6.10 JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF CAUSES OF ACTION 
Section 15 of the SCCA provides:  
‘Subject to the provisions of this Act, a court shall have jurisdiction in respect of causes of action in –  
(a) actions for the delivery or transfer of any property, movable or immovable, not exceeding in value 
the amount determined by the Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette; 
(b) actions for ejectment against the occupier of any premises or land within the area of jurisdiction of 
the court: Provided that where the right of occupation of the premises or land is in dispute between 
the parties, that right does not exceed in clear value to the occupier the amount determined by the 
Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette; 
(c) actions based on or arising out of a liquid document or a mortgage bond, where the claim does not 
exceed the amount determined by the Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette; 
(d) actions based on or arising out of a credit agreement as defined in section 1 of the National Credit 
Act, 2005 (Act 34 of 2005), where the claim or the value of the property in dispute does not exceed 
the amount determined by the Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette; 
(e) actions other than those already mentioned in this section, where the claim or the value of the matter 
in dispute does not exceed the amount determined by the Minister from time to time by notice in the 
Gazette; 
(f) actions for counterclaims not exceeding the amount determined by the Minister from time to time by 
notice in the Gazette, in respect of any cause of action mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e).’ 
 
																																																								
140 Report § 13.4.8. 
141 Small Claims Courts Amendment Act 63 of 1989, s 2. 
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(a)  Section 15(a): ‘actions for the delivery or transfer of any property, movable or 
 immovable, not exceeding in value the amount determined by the Minister from time to 
 time by notice in the Gazette’ 
This provision allows a court to consider actions in rem (for example, the real right of 
ownership) or in personam (for example, arising from contract)142 involving movable and 
immovable property provided that the market value143 of the property does not exceed R15 000. 
While one can appreciate movable property claims coming before the small claims courts, it is 
difficult to conceive of immovable property claims being litigated there considering that the 
monetary jurisdiction of the courts is very low. It is submitted that if the provision is to be 
meaningful, the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts has to be dramatically 
increased. What may also be needed is for the Minister of Justice to stipulate a different 
monetary jurisdiction for the courts in claims involving immovable property. To that end, it is 
suggested that a survey must be conducted of the cost of low-income housing in South Africa 
and that the mean market value of such property be used as the indicator for the small claims 
courts’ monetary jurisdiction in respect of immovable property claims.144 Alternatively, the 
reference to immovable property should be deleted.  
(b)  Section 15(b): ‘actions for ejectment against the occupier of any premises or land 
 within the area of jurisdiction of the court: Provided that where the right of 
 occupation of the premises or land is in dispute between the parties, that right does 
 not exceed in clear value to the occupier the amount determined by the Minister from 
 time to time by notice in the Gazette’ 
																																																								
142 See discussion above at §6.10(e). 
143 Van der Merwe v Van der Merwe 1973 (1) SA 436 (C) para [20]. 
144 See note 129 above.  
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In light of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act145 
(‘the PIE Act’), the small claims courts have very limited jurisdiction to grant eviction orders. 
For the most part, their jurisdiction covers eviction orders in respect of commercial property 
only.146 The small claims courts cannot grant eviction orders involving residential premises 
occupied by natural persons, as the PIE Act reserves such jurisdiction for the magistrates’ courts 
and the High Courts.147 However, the small claims courts can grant judgments for outstanding 
rental. Each month’s rental constitutes a separate cause of action. Provided that all the causes 
of action on the arrear rental fall within the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts, 
they can be claimed in the same summons.148 
In the case of commercial property, an eviction order will only be granted if the claim falls 
within the monetary jurisdiction of the court. To calculate the value of the claim one has to 
determine the value of the right to occupation by the occupier (i.e. the tenant). The value of the 
right can be, but is not limited to, the cost of hiring alternative premises for the lease period, or 
the profit expectation that the tenant would have had for the duration of the lease. The amount 
of the rental is not the determinant for the value of occupation because as the courts have stated, 
rental constitutes the benefit to the landlord and not the tenant.149 It is unclear whether the small 
claims courts are effective to hear many matters involving commercial property. Again, the 
biggest stumbling block is the low monetary jurisdiction of the courts. Clearly, the value of 
occupation may fall within the monetary jurisdiction of the courts in cases where the lease is 
terminable on one month’s notice. But once the lease duration is greater than that, it becomes 
incredibly difficult to see how the courts can preside over evictions in respect of commercial 
property. 
																																																								
145 Act 19 of 1998. 
146 See in this regard Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Bosch v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA).  
147 Section 1 (iii) of the PIE Act defines ‘court’ as: ‘any division of the High Court or the magistrate’s court in 
whose area of jurisdiction the land in question is situated…’  
148  See §6.6(e) above. 
149 Langham Court (Pty) Ltd v Mavromaty 1954 (3) SA 742 (T) at 746F–747A; Jordaan v De Beer Scheepers 1975 
(3) SA 845 (T) at 848D–849H.  
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(c)  Section 15(c): ‘actions based on or arising out of a liquid document or a mortgage 
 bond, where the claim does not exceed the amount determined by the Minister from 
 time to time by notice in the Gazette’ 
When determining a claim arising out of a liquid document150 or mortgage bond, one should 
not calculate the value of the claim by looking at the amount on the face of the document. 
Rather reference should be made to the outstanding amount owing by the debtor to the creditor 
at the date when the process initiating the action is served on the debtor (the defendant).151 
Section 15(c) must be interpreted with reference to s 15(d) as discussed below. 
(d)  Section 15(d): ‘actions based on or arising out of a credit agreement as defined in 
 section 1 of the National Credit Act, 2005 (Act 34 of 2005), where the claim or the 
 value of the property in dispute does not exceed the amount determined by the 
 Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette’ 
A ‘credit agreement’ is defined quite widely in the NCA. It includes a mortgage bond and a 
liquid document, which has been entered into by a creditor provider (natural or juristic person) 
and a debtor.152 For a credit agreement to fall within the purview of the Act, the transaction 
giving rise to the agreement must be at ‘arms-length’.153 A transaction is considered to be at 
arms-length if it is entered into between persons that are not in a familial relationship, where 
the parties are independent of each other, and the nature of the transaction is such that the credit 
provider strives to obtain the maximum advantage that may be gained from entering into the 
agreement, for example, by levying interest on sums forwarded at the prevailing market rates.154 
																																																								
150 A liquid document has all of the following characteristics: It is a written instrument, signed by the defendant, 
or his or her agent, evidencing an acknowledgement of indebtedness, which is unconditional, of a fixed amount in 
money. Classic examples of liquid documents would be cheques, promissory notes, architects certificates, 
mortgage bonds and acknowledgement of debts. See LAWSA § 46. 
151 Jones & Buckle (service 10) Act139-140. 
152 NCA, s 1. 
153 NCA, s 4(1). 
154 NCA, s 4(2) 
	
	 161	
Before a credit provider can obtain judgment on a credit agreement as defined by the Act, the 
credit provider has to jump through several hoops, one of which is that the credit provider 
should afford the credit receiver an opportunity to seek the assistance of a debt counselor with 
a view to restructuring the debt. This is governed by ss 129155 and 130156 of the NCA. In the 
																																																								
155 Section 129 provides:  
‘(1)  If the consumer is in default under a credit agreement, the credit provider- 
(a)    may draw the default to the notice of the consumer in writing and propose that the 
consumer refer the credit agreement to a debt counsellor, alternative dispute resolution 
agent, consumer court or ombud with jurisdiction, with the intent that the parties 
resolve any dispute under the agreement or develop and agree on a plan to bring the 
payments under the agreement up to date; and 
(b) subject to section 130 (2), may not commence any legal proceedings to enforce the 
agreement before- 
(i) first providing notice to the consumer, as contemplated in paragraph (a), or in 
section 86 (10), as the case may be; and 
(ii) meeting any further requirements set out in section 130. 
(2)  Subsection (1) does not apply to a credit agreement that is subject to a debt restructuring order, 
or to proceedings in a court that could result in such an order. 
(3)  Subject to subsection (4), a consumer may at any time before the credit provider has cancelled 
the agreement, remedy a default in such credit agreement by paying to the credit provider all 
amounts that are overdue, together with the credit provider's prescribed default administration 
charges and reasonable costs of enforcing the agreement up to the time the default was remedied. 
(4)  A credit provider may not reinstate or revive a credit agreement after- 
(a) the sale of any property pursuant to- 
(i) an attachment order; or 
(ii) surrender of property in terms of section 127; 
(b) the execution of any other court order enforcing that agreement; or 
(c) the termination thereof in accordance with section 123. 
(5) The notice contemplated in subsection (1) (a) must be delivered to the consumer- 
(a) by registered mail; or 
(b) to an adult person at the location designated by the consumer. 
(6)  The consumer must in writing indicate the preferred manner of delivery contemplated in 
subsection (5). 
(7)  Proof of delivery contemplated in subsection (5) is satisfied by- 
(a) written confirmation by the postal service or its authorised agent, of delivery to the 
relevant post office or postal agency; or 
(b) the signature or identifying mark of the recipient contemplated in subsection (5) (b).’ 
156 Section 130 provides: 
‘(1)  Subject to subsection (2), a credit provider may approach the court for an order to enforce a 
credit agreement only if, at that time, the consumer is in default and has been in default under 
that credit agreement for at least 20 business days and- 
(a) at least 10 business days have elapsed since the credit provider delivered a notice to the 
consumer as contemplated in section 86 (10), or section 129 (1), as the case may be; 
(b) in the case of a notice contemplated in section 129 (1), the consumer has- 
(i) not responded to that notice; or 
(ii) responded to the notice by rejecting the credit provider's proposals; and 
(c) in the case of an instalment agreement, secured loan, or lease, the consumer has not 
surrendered the relevant property to the credit provider as contemplated in section 127. 
(2)  In addition to the circumstances contemplated in subsection (1), in the case of an instalment 
agreement, secured loan, or lease, a credit provider may approach the court for an order 
enforcing the remaining obligations of a consumer under a credit agreement at any time if- 
(a) all relevant property has been sold pursuant to- 
(i) an attachment order; or 
   (ii) surrender of property in terms of section 127; and 
(b) the net proceeds of sale were insufficient to discharge all the consumer's financial 
obligations under the agreement. 
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magistrates’ courts, a credit provider is required to plead compliance with the provisions of ss 
129 and 130 in the summons, and the magistrate has to be satisfied that all aspects of the NCA 
have been meticulously complied with before the court will grant judgment.157 The procedure 
for complying with the Act is exacting. To complicate matters further, the Act is not the model 
																																																								
(3)  Despite any provision of law or contract to the contrary, in any proceedings commenced in a 
court in respect of a credit agreement to which this Act applies, the court may determine the 
matter only if the court is satisfied that- 
(a) in the case of proceedings to which sections 127, 129 or 131 apply, the procedures 
required by those sections have been complied with; 
(b) there is no matter arising under that credit agreement, and pending before the Tribunal, 
that could result in an order affecting the issues to be determined by the court; and 
(c) that the credit provider has not approached the court- 
(i) during the time that the matter was before a debt counsellor, alternative 
dispute resolution agent, consumer court or the ombud with jurisdiction; or 
(ii) despite the consumer having- 
(aa)  surrendered property to the credit provider, and before that property 
has been sold; 
(bb) agreed to a proposal made in terms of section 129 (1) (a) and acted 
in good faith in fulfilment of that agreement; 
(cc) complied with an agreed plan as contemplated in section 129 (1) (a); 
or 
(dd) brought the payments under the credit agreement up to date, as 
contemplated in section 129 (1) (a). 
(4)  In any proceedings contemplated in this section, if the court determines that- 
(a) the credit agreement was reckless as described in section 80, the court must make an 
order contemplated in section 83; 
(b) the credit provider has not complied with the relevant provisions of this Act, as 
contemplated in subsection (3), or has approached the court in circumstances 
contemplated in subsection (3) (c) the court must- 
(i) adjourn the matter before it; and 
(ii) make an appropriate order setting out the steps the credit provider must 
complete before the matter may be resumed; 
(c) the credit agreement is subject to a pending debt review in terms of Part D of Chapter 
4, the court may- 
(i) adjourn the matter, pending a final determination of the debt review 
proceedings; 
(ii) order the debt counsellor to report directly to the court, and thereafter make 
an order contemplated in section 85 (b); or 
(iii) if the credit agreement is the only credit agreement to which the consumer is 
a party, order the debt counsellor to discontinue the debt review proceedings, 
and make an order contemplated in section 85 (b); 
(d) there is a matter pending before the Tribunal, as contemplated in subsection (3) (b), the 
court may- 
(i) adjourn the matter before it, pending a determination of the proceedings before 
the Tribunal; or 
(ii) order the Tribunal to adjourn the proceedings before it, and refer the matter to 
the court for determination; or 
(e) the credit agreement is either suspended or subject to a debt re-arrangement order or 
agreement, and the consumer has complied with that order or agreement, the court must 
dismiss the matter.’ 
157 MCR 5(7), 6(11). See also Roussouw v FirstRand Bank Limited 2010 (6) SA 429 (SCA) at 455C-G. 
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of clarity and has been the subject of several court decisions because of interpretational and 
other problems.158 
To expect a presiding officer in the small claims court to wade through the NCA and the 
Regulations159 passed in terms of the Act160 is a tall order indeed.  The provisions of the Act 
are simply too complex for consideration in the small claims courts. Even though juristic 
persons are precluded from suing in the small claims courts – and it is therefore unlikely that 
the courts will be saddled with claims involving accredited credit providers161 – it is likely that 
the courts could hear matters involving natural persons who have extended and received loans 
where the Act is applicable to the transaction concerned. Anecdotal evidence reveals that many 
presiding officers routinely use s 23162 of the SCCA to avoid hearing matters that involve the 
NCA. It is submitted that those presiding officers are acting correctly. The legislature needs to 
seriously reconsider s 15(d) of the SCCA and repeal the jurisdiction of the small claims courts 
to hear matters involving the NCA. Section 15(d) was conceived at a time before the NCA came 
into operation. After its promulgation, the legislature simply amended the section to recognise 
the NCA, without giving much consideration to the complexities heralded by the Act. These 
complexities have been highlighted in many court decisions163 and it is unwise to impose those 
complexities on small claims courts. It must also be borne in mind that small claims litigants 
																																																								
158 See, inter alia, Carter Trading (Pty) Ltd v Blignaut 2010 (2) SA 46 (ECP Voltex (Pty) Ltd v Chenleza CC 2010 
(5) SA 267 (KZP); Nedbank Ltd v Wizard Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2010 (5) SA 523 (GSJ); Renier Nel Inc v Cash on 
Demand (KZN) (Pty) Ltd 2011 (5) SA 239 (GSJ); Absa Technology Finance Solutions Ltd v Pabi's Guest House 
CC 2011 (6) SA 606 (FB); Voltex (Pty) Ltd v SWP Projects CC 2012 (6) SA 60 (GSJ); Absa Technology Finance 
Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Viljoen t/a Wonderhoek Enterprises 2012 (3) SA 149 (GNP); Absa Technology Finance 
Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Michael's Bid A House CC 2013 (3) SA 426 (SCA); Absa Technology Finance Solutions 
(Pty) Ltd v Michael's Bid A House CC 2013 (3) SA 426 (SCA); RMB Private Bank (A Division of FirstRand Bank 
Ltd v Kaydeez Therapies CC (in Liquidation) 2013 (6) SA 308 (GSJ); Rodel Financial Service (Pty) Ltd v 
Naidoo 2013 (3) SA 151 (KZP); Absa Technology Finance Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Michael's Bid A House CC 2013 
(3) SA 426 (SCA); Hattingh v Hattingh 2014 (3) SA 162 (VB); Asmal v Essa 2016 (1) SA 95 (SCA). 
159 National Credit Regulations GN R489 in GG 28864 of 31 May 2006, as amended. 
160 NCA, s 171 read with Schedule 3 (7). 
161 NCA, s 40. 
162 Section 23 provides that a small claims court commissioner can refuse to hear a matter if the matter is too 
complex.  
163 See note 158 above. See also for further discussion Otto and Otto The National Credit Act Explained; Scholtz, 
Otto, Van Zyl et al Guide to the National Credit Act. 
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are unrepresented, and may be unaware of their rights in terms of the NCA. If commissioners 
do not fastidiously apply the provisions of the Act, miscarriages of justice will inevitably occur. 
Removing matters that fall within the NCA from the reach of the small claims courts will 
undoubtedly affect the character of the courts as forums to sue for debts owed. In many 
jurisdictions,164 small claims courts play an important role in recovering debts extended as 
loans. Unfortunately, in South Africa, the NCA with its complex processes and procedures has 
made it difficult for such claims to be heard in the small claims courts. The NCA makes no 
provision for special procedures for small claims. Perhaps it should.  
(e)  Section 15(e): ‘actions other than those already mentioned in this section, where the 
 claim or the value of the matter in dispute does not exceed the amount determined by 
 the Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette’ 
This catch-all provision allows the small claims courts to hear matters that are not excluded by 
common law, statute and s 16 of the SCCA. The provision is identical to s 29(1)(g) of the MCA. 
In the interpretation of that section, commentators have said that the provision gives the courts 
wide latitude to hear a myriad of matters involving contract and delict, but also other types of 
claims such as those based on unjust enrichment, for example. Of course, in the small claims 
courts, jurisdiction to hear delict matters is circumscribed by s 16(f)165 of the SCCA. Needless 
to say, s 15(e) is subject to the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts. 
In the past, s 15(e) permitted small claims courts to hear a wide range of consumer-related 
matters involving defective goods and services. This was in keeping with the historical 
evolution of small claims courts internationally as consumer tribunals.166 It is therefore most 
																																																								
164 Australia, Canada, Kenya, United Kingdom and United States of America.  
165 See discussion above.  
166 See, Steele ‘The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts’ (1981) American Bar Foundation Research 
Journal 293. See also generally the Hoexter Commission’s Report chapter 10. 
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unfortunate to note that the power of the small claims courts to preside over consumer-related 
matters has been severely hampered in recent times.  
Since 2002, the legislature has passed legislation to provide wide-ranging protection to 
consumers.  The first was the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act,167  which 
provides safeguards in the online and electronic transaction spheres.  The second was the NCA, 
which regulates the credit industry to protect consumers from reckless credit services. The third 
was the Consumer Protection Act168 (‘CPA’), which applies to most consumer markets, and 
agreements that are not covered by the NCA.169  
Section 69 of the CPA has far-reaching consequences for the small claims courts and for other 
civil courts, in so far as it relates to the power of the courts to hear consumer matters. Section 
69 is headed ‘Enforcement of rights by consumer’ and provides as follows: 
‘A person contemplated in section 4 (1) may seek to enforce any right in terms of this Act or in terms of 
a transaction or agreement, or otherwise resolve any dispute with a supplier, by –  
(a) referring the matter directly to the Tribunal, if such a direct referral is permitted by this Act in 
the case of the particular dispute; 
(b) referring the matter to the applicable ombud with jurisdiction, if the supplier is subject to the 
jurisdiction of any such ombud; 
(c) if the matter does not concern a supplier contemplated in paragraph (b) –  
(i) referring the matter to the applicable industry ombud, accredited in terms of section 82 
(6), if the supplier is subject to any such ombud; or 
(ii) applying to the consumer court of the province with jurisdiction over the matter, if there 
is such a consumer court, subject to the law establishing or governing that consumer 
court; or  
(iii) referring the matter to another alternative dispute resolution agent contemplated in 
section 70; or 
(iv) filing a complaint with the Commission in accordance with section 71; or 
(d) approaching a court with jurisdiction over the matter, if all other remedies available to that 
person in terms of national legislation have been exhausted.’ 
The above section affords consumers various methods of resolving their disputes. The section 
does not apply to ‘service providers’. This is clear from the reference to s 4(1)170 of the Act.  
																																																								
167 Act 25 of 2002. 
168 Act 68 of 2008. 
169 For a comprehensive analysis of the CPA see, Naudé, Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection 
Act (hereinafter referred to as Commentary) 
170 Section 4(1) provides:  
‘Any of the following persons may, in the manner provided for in this Act, approach a court, the Tribunal 
or the Commission alleging that a consumer’s rights in terms of this Act have been infringed, impaired 
or threatened, or that prohibited conduct has occurred or is occurring: 
(a)  A person acting on his or her own behalf; 
(b)  an authorised person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in his or her own name; 
	
	 166	
To understand s 69 fully, one needs to reconcile the section with the rest of the Act. In terms of 
the Act, the principal bodies tasked with resolving consumer disputes are the National 
Consumer Commission171 and the National Consumer Tribunal.172 Further entities may be 
employed to resolve disputes: ombuds with jurisdiction; 173  industry ombuds;174  consumer 
courts;175 alternative dispute resolution agents;176 and civil courts as a last resort.177 While s 69 
is non-prescriptive about the hierarchy according to which the entities mentioned in the section 
must be approached,178 it is clear that a civil court with jurisdiction over a matter may only be 
approached ‘if all other remedies available to [the consumer] in terms of national legislation 
have been exhausted.’179 Civil courts are thus forums of last resort, but only where the CPA 
applies. This is an important qualification, because in terms of s 2(10) of the CPA, where a 
consumer wishes to rely on common-law rights (such as those entrenched by the law of contract 
or delict) and not on the Act, the consumer will not have to follow the routes of redress in s 69, 
but may ‘immediately approach a civil court…’.180 This will classically be the case where the 
transacting parties cannot be construed as ‘consumer’ and ‘service provider’ as defined in s 1 
of the Act.  
It is not difficult to appreciate why the legislature restricted access to the courts as first ports of 
call.  Costs, time, and efficiency are some of the reasons for opting for alternative dispute 
																																																								
(c)  a person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of affected persons; 
(d)  a person acting in the public interest, with leave of the Tribunal or court, as the case may be; and 
(e)  an association acting in the interest of its members.’ 
171 CPA, s 85. 
172 CPA, s 26. 
173 See for discussion: van Heerden ‘Protection of Consumer Rights and Consumer’s Voice’ in Commentary 
(Revision Service 1) 69-9. 
174 See for discussion: Commentary (Revision Service 1) 69-10 
175 Section 1 of the CPA defines a ‘consumer court’ as ‘a body of that name, or a consumer tribunal, that has been 
established in terms of applicable provincial legislation.’ From the definition is it clear that these are not formal 
courts per se but rather administrative tribunals. For further discussion on this point see: van Heerden n173 
(Revision Service 1) 69-10. 
176 Commentary (Revision Service 1) 69-12. 
177 CPA, s 69(d).  
178 Commentary (Revision Service 1) 69-2. 
179 See also s 115 of the CPA for further confirmation of the proposition that the courts cannot be approached as a 
matter of first instance.  
180 See also Commentary (Revision Service 1) 69-2. 
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resolute mechanisms.181 The difficulty, however, is that the legislature lost sight of the small 
claims courts, which have historically offered quick and inexpensive redress to consumers. As 
van Heerden notes: 
‘…it can be argued that it is conceivable that many disputes involving vulnerable consumers will involve 
relatively small amounts which could be dealt with by the small claims courts in an efficient, speedy and 
cheap manner. To insist that the consumer who has already access to a small claims court first exhaust 
the other redress options contemplated in s 69 might not always be in such consumer’s best interest. As 
such, the constitutional right to access to the courts might be unjustifiably infringed if immediate access 
to the small claims courts is barred.’182 
To complicate matters further, a consumer is not always entitled to obtain damages when an 
alternative dispute mechanism is used. If the body concerned makes an order to the effect that 
there has been a contravention of the Act, the consumer would have to institute a court action 
to recover damages. The logic, in that instance, of requiring the consumer to approach the court 
as a last resort, is thus questionable.183 
Van Heerden calls for the amendment of s 69. She argues that, at the very least, small claims 
courts should be afforded the right of hearing consumer claims without the need for alternative 
remedies to be exhausted first. There is merit in her suggestion, as there are considerably more 
small claims courts in South Africa than consumer commissions, tribunals, ombuds etc. If one 
has regard to some of the objectives of the CPA, namely:  to reduce and ameliorate any 
disadvantages to consumers ‘who are low-income persons or persons comprising low-income 
communities’, ‘who live in remote, isolated or low-density population areas and communities’; 
and to provide ‘an accessible, consistent, harmonized, effective and efficient system of redress 
for consumers’, then it appears the small claims courts tick all the boxes.184 It is thus unclear 
what can be gained from limiting the jurisdiction of small claims courts under s 69 of the CPA.  
																																																								
181 Section 3(g) of the CPA provides that one of the purposes of the Act is to create an enabling environment for a 
consistent, accessible and an efficient system of consensual dispute resolution. 
182 Commentary (Revision Service 1) 69-15. 
183  In Digital SMS Marketing CC v National Consumer Commission case no NCT/3584/2011/101(1) of 1 
November 2012 (NCT) and Audi SA (Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission NCT/4058/2012/101(1)(P) CPA 
it was held that the Tribunal was not empowered to make a damages award.  
184 CPA, s 3. 
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(f)  Section 16(f): ‘actions for counterclaims not exceeding the amount determined by the 
 Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette, in respect of any cause of action 
 mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e)’ 
This section confirms that small claims courts can hear counterclaims that fall within their 
monetary jurisdiction, provided that the nature of the counterclaim falls into the substantive 
areas of law that may be heard by them. However, as will be discussed in part IV, the 
counterclaim in question has to be ‘incidental’ to the main claim. This is not evident on a 
reading of s 16(f). It will be recommended in part IV that legislative reform is needed to enable 
the small claims courts to hear non-incidental counterclaims 
Section 16(f) has to be read with s 14(4) of the SCCA. In terms of the latter provision, the small 
claims court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a counterclaim ‘based in whole or in part 
upon a cession or assignment of rights.’  This provision, it is submitted, ensures that small 
claims matters remain uncomplicated, and that third parties do not abuse the small claims court 
process by bringing claims in courts when they are, but for a cession or assignment of rights, 
otherwise ineligible to do so. 
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6.11  STATISTICAL EVALUATION OF SMALL CLAIMS COURT MATTERS BASED ON CAUSE OF ACTION 
Table 3: Small claims matters by cause of action for the period 2012-2014185 



































Eastern Cape  992 905 1032 437 2394 2158 2033 2031 7828 9620 6576 3453 3916 4611 
Free State  200 116 265 209 955 795 1000 662 7861 5528 4794 953 3331 2244 
Gauteng  359 1346 2611 1582 5928 3508 5375 2999 16727 9876 1719 5523 14036 7829 
KZN  668 1157 884 813 1112 903 1787 2085 7202 6023 4721 3280 4224 4094 
Limpopo 256 192 485 263 3444 1525 1091 942 7525 5530 2089 2450 6172 4496 
Mpumalanga  178 627 180 191 552 786 841 721 2778 2460 1390 1096 1727 1701 
North West  94 67 394 204 2440 1767 962 649 4877 3950 4142 1832 3405 2941 
Northern Cape  1431 0 61 36 126 144 213 187 1313 1092 4429 352 415 359 
Western Cape  1264 49 1228 447 620 393 2606 2110 4412 3535 5553 2754 2376 2184 








Table 4: Small claims matters by cause of action for the period 2014-2015186   
 
Cause of Action  Number of 
matters 
Amount (million) % of 
total 
claims 
Action against occupier  1387 8 553 440.19 3% 
Action arising from liquid documents  307 1 810 170.64 1% 
Credit agreements  3621 15 055 681.00 8% 
Damage to property  5324 34 190 312.72 11% 
Money lent and advanced  6342 22 275 048.04 13% 
Money owed  16387 73 641 592.61 34% 
No services rendered  5185 24 275 491.67 11% 
Return of goods  3884 18 644 219.27 8% 
Services Rendered  5211 22 252 795.78 11% 
Grand Total  47648 220 698 751.92 100%  
 
If there was any doubt whether small claims courts make a significant contribution to the 
administration of justice in South Africa, then the two tables above should put that doubt to 
bed. The small claims courts are popular, and make a significant contribution in every South 
African province. One can only imagine what the position would be if the courts’ monetary 
jurisdiction was increased, and if some of the jurisdictional impediments to accessing the courts 
were relaxed. 
From the tables above, one can also draw the following observations: 
• The courts hear very few rental disputes. This may be because, as noted above, the courts 
cannot grant eviction orders in residential occupancy disputes. At most, a landlord can claim 
																																																								
186 Source: Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. 
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outstanding rental. It is also the case that many rental disputes are dealt with quite 
successfully by Rental Housing Tribunals established in terms of the Rental Housing Act.187  
Tribunals have been established all over the country, especially in the large city centres.188 
They have proven to be extremely successful in terms of resolving disputes between 
landlords and tenants quickly and efficiently. One can also access them free of charge.189 
• One can only assume that the reference to ‘credit agreements’ in the statistics is to credit 
agreements defined in terms of the NCA. As discussed before, the small claims courts are 
permitted to hear claims involving credit agreements arising from the NCA. The amount of 
credit agreement claims that are heard in the small claims courts is startlingly high, bearing 
in mind that juristic persons cannot sue in the small claims courts. One can thus infer that 
the credit agreement claims are being pursued by natural persons against other natural 
persons, or by natural person plaintiffs against juristic defendants – although logic dictates 
that the latter scenario is by no means the norm.  One can only hope that the presiding 
officers hearing those claims are following the procedures laid down in the NCA190 for 
protecting the rights of credit receivers.  
• It is interesting to note that the 2012-2014 statistics refer to ‘liquid actions’, but the 2014-
2015 statistics refer to ‘liquid document’ actions. The reason for the difference is unclear. 
A liquid document is a document that ex facie acknowledges unconditional indebtedness. 
Claims based on such documents could also fall under the NCA.191 A liquid action under 
the 2012-2014 statistics is much wider as it refers to all claims that are capable of speedy 
and prompt ascertainment,192 for example, a claim for the outstanding amount on a sale.  
																																																								
187 Act 50 of 1999, Chapter 4. 
188 http://www.legaltalk.co.za/rental-housing-tribunal/ (last accessed on 24 March 2017). 
189 See https://www.westerncape.gov.za/sites/www.westerncape.gov.za/files/hs-humansettlements-rental-
housing-tribunal-annualreport-2015-2016.pdf (last accessed on 24 March 2017). 
190 In particular, the procedures laid down in ss 129 and 130 of the Act. For more discussion see §6.10(d) above. 
191 See definition of credit agreement in s 1 of the NCA. 
192 Fatti’s Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd v Vendick Spares (Pty) Ltd 1962 (1) SA 736 (T). 
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• It would seem that the small claims courts continue to hear many consumer-related matters. 
One can only infer that these matters deal with claims that do not fall under the CPA. As 
noted above, the small claims courts cannot be approached as a matter of first resort in 
matters that fall under the CPA. If, however, presiding officers are hearing matters that fall 
within the CPA, then those judgments would be defective and reviewable, as one of the 
grounds for review in the small claims courts is the lack of jurisdiction.193  
• Damage to property looms large in the statistics. Following a request for information that 
was sent to the Department of Justice, it was highlighted that this item encapsulated a range 
of possibilities and could, for example, include damage to a motor vehicle following a motor 
vehicle accident.  
• While the 2012-2014 table contains an item for ‘other’, the 2015-2016 table does not 
contain an ‘other’ category. The reason for the anomaly cannot be explained, save to state 
that those collecting the official data may not have been attuned to a further categorisation. 
‘Other’ refers to the full range of contractual and delictual claims. Following a request for 
information that was sent to the Department of Justice, it was suggested that ‘other’ also 
included claims relating to stock theft in the rural areas, claims relating to stokvels,194 and 
claims against municipalities. It would appear that municipalities are frequently sued in the 
small claims courts for incorrect municipal charges. This is most interesting given that the 
State cannot sue and be sued in the small claims courts.195 
																																																								
193 SCCA, s 46(a). 
194 Section 1 of the NCA defines as ‘stokvel’ as:  
‘ a formal or informal rotating financial scheme with entertainment, social or economic functions, which- 
(a) consists of two or more persons in a voluntary association, each of whom has pledged mutual support 
to the others towards the attainment of specific objectives; 
(b) establishes a continuous pool of capital by raising funds by means of the subscriptions of the 
members; 
(c) grants credit to and on behalf of members; 
(d) provides for members to share in profits from, and to nominate management of, the scheme; and 
(e) relies on self-imposed regulation to protect the interest of its members.’ 
A stokvel is a credit agreement in terms of the Act: s 8(2)(c). 
195 For the meaning of ‘State’ see the discussion in chapter 7. 
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The statistics above, though not offering a wealth of insights, do assist in understanding the 
types of matters that come before small claims courts. They also give credence to the usability 
and popularity of small claims courts as courts of first access to many South Africans. They 
make a significant contribution to economic development and social cohesion. This is evident 




6.12 WHICH SMALL CLAIMS COURT SHOULD THE MATTER BE TAKEN TO? 
Once it is established that a matter falls within the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims 
court, and that the court can hear the cause of action, the plaintiff is required to sue in the 
appropriate court.  
6.13 JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF PERSONS  
Section 14(1) of the SCCA sets out the rules to enable a plaintiff,196 as principal litigant, to 
select the relevant court.  Section 14(1) provides: 
‘14. Jurisdiction in respect of persons 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), a court shall have jurisdiction in respect of –  
(a)  any person who resides, carries on business or is employed within the area of jurisdiction of the 
court; 
(b) any partnership, as defendant, which has business premises situated or any member of which 
resides within the area of jurisdiction of the court; 
(c)  any person in respect of any proceedings incidental to any action instituted in that court by such 
person; 
(d)  any person, whether or not he resides, carries on business or is employed within the area of 
jurisdiction of the court, if the cause of action arose wholly within that area; 
(e)  any defendant, whether in convention or reconvention, who appears and takes no objection to 
the jurisdiction of the court; 
(f)  any person who owns immovable property within the area of jurisdiction of the court in actions 
in respect of such property or a mortgage bond thereon.’  
																																																								
196 For who may be ‘plaintiff’ see s 7 of the SCCA. 
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In accordance with the common-law principle actor sequitur forum rei,197 the reference to 
‘person’ in subsection (1) is to the defendant. In many respects, s 14 is similar to s 28(1) of the 
MCA.198  Consequently, the way in which the courts and academics have interpreted and 
commented on s 28(1) of the MCA is applicable to s 14(1) of the SCCA.  
(a)  Section 14(1)(a): ‘Any person who resides, carries on business or is employed within 
 the area of jurisdiction of the court’ 
Section 14(1)(a) permits a plaintiff to sue a defendant in the small claims court that is situated 
in the area where the defendant resides, carries on business, or is employed.  
Residence must be distinguished from domicile. Domicile is a person’s legal residence and is 
governed by the provisions of the Domicile Act. 199  Domicile requires one to exercise a 
																																																								
197 Sciacero & Co. v Central South African Railways 1910 TS 119, the Court, per Innes CJ, held at 121: 
‘The general rule with regard to the bringing of actions is actor sequitur forum rei. The plaintiff ascertains 
where the defendant resides, goes to his forum, and serves him with the summons there.’  See also Voet 
5.1.64.  
198  The MCAprovides: 
‘28 Jurisdiction in respect of persons 
(1) Saving any other jurisdiction assigned to a court by this Act or by any other law, the persons in 
respect of whom the court shall, subject to subsection (1A), have jurisdiction shall be the 
following and no other: 
(a) Any person who resides, carries on business or is employed within the district or 
regional division; 
(b)  any partnership which has business premises situated or any member whereof resides 
within the district or regional division; 
(c) any person whatever, in respect of any proceedings incidental to any action or 
proceeding instituted in the court by such person himself or herself; 
(d)  any person, whether or not he or she resides, carries on business or is employed within 
the district or regional division, if the cause of action arose wholly within the district 
or regional division; 
(e)  any party to interpleader proceedings, if- 
(i) the execution creditor and every claimant to the subject matter of the 
proceedings reside, carry on business, or are employed within the district or 
regional division; or 
(ii) the subject-matter of the proceedings has been attached by process of the 
court; or 
(iii) such proceedings are taken under section 69 (2) and the person therein referred 
to as the 'third party' resides, carries on business, or is employed within the 
district or regional division; or 
(iv) all the parties consent to the jurisdiction of the court; 
(f) any defendant (whether in convention or reconvention) who appears and takes no 
objection to the jurisdiction of the court; 
(g) any person who owns immovable property within the district or regional division in 
actions in respect of such property or in respect of mortgage bonds thereon.’  
199 Act 3 of 1992.  
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deliberate intention to reside at a particular place indefinitely.200 Residence, on the other hand, 
requires one to make a place one’s home by returning there regularly.201 To this extent, the 
courts have said that residence is something less than domicile and something more than mere 
physical presence.202 Whereas a person can only have one domicile, one could, according to 
South African law, have multiple residences. The important thing is that when a defendant is 
sued in a court, the court must have jurisdiction over the area where he or she is physically 
resident at the time when the summons is served.203 
To determine whether a defendant resides within the jurisdiction of a court is a factual inquiry. 
The courts take myriad factors into account to establish residence. This is classically illustrated 
in Zwyssig v Zwyssig.204 The plaintiff and defendant were divorced in Florida, United States of 
America. Judgment was entered in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant for a certain 
sum of money. The plaintiff then sought provisional sentence205 against the defendant in the 
Witwatersrand Local Division of the High Court for the amount of the judgment entered against 
the defendant by the Florida court. The plaintiff relied on residence as the basis of jurisdiction. 
The defendant raised several defences, one of which was that he did not reside within the area 
of the court, and consequently, the court did not have jurisdiction over him. Having regard to 
the personal circumstances of the defendant, the court held: 
																																																								
200 Toumbis v Antonio 1999(1) SA 636 (W). 
201 In Beedle & Co v Bowley (1895) 12 SC 401 at 403, the Court held: 
‘When it is said of an individual that he resides at a place it is obviously meant that it is his home, his 
place of abode, the place where he generally sleeps after the work of the day is done.'  
The Beedle dictum was cited with approval in Mayne v Main 2001 (2) SA 1239 (SCA) at 1243G–H. In Cowie v 
Pretoria Municipality 1911 TPD 628 at 633 the Court held: 
‘In order to constitute residence, a party must possess, at least, a sleeping apartment, but an uninterrupted 
abiding at such a dwelling is not requisite. Absence, no matter how long, if there be the liberty of returning 
at any time, and no abandonment of the intention to return whenever it may suit the party's pleasure or 
convenience so to do, will not prevent a constructive legal residence.’  
202 Martiz v Erasmus 1914 CPD 120; Ngadi v Temba (1905) SC 574. Pistorius (n4) 56 fn14 criticises the rule and 
asks the pertinent question: ‘Why should a plaintiff be prejudiced by the defendant’s arrangements?’ 
203 In Hogsett v Buys 1913 CPD 200 at 205 the court stated: 
'It has never been laid down what degree of permanence is required in residence; but at all events it ought 
to be shown that the person sought to be brought within the jurisdiction had some interest in the place 
where he was served, in the sense that there was some good reason for regarding it as his place of ordinary 
habitation of the date of service.' 
204 1997 (2) SA 467 (W).  
205 A judgment of a foreign court is enforced by the provisional sentence procedure: Jones v Krok 1995 (1) SA 
677 (A).  
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‘It has repeatedly been emphasised that it is impossible to lay down a definition of the concept of 
residence. There are a number of factors which must be taken into account, each of which may go some 
way towards proving that residence has been established. In a particular case, the absence of one or more 
of these factors may be more than compensated by the presence of others. Some factors are more 
important than others. The duration of the stay, the acquisition of property and the procurement of 
employment are each obviously more significant than, for instance, the frequency of the visits, the number 
of friends or acquaintances resident within the area, or the amount of money spent on each visit, all of 
which is equally compatible with the habits of a peripatetic business executive. 
It is useful to begin the enquiry with a comparison of the conduct under scrutiny and that of the casual 
visitor or holiday-maker. Residence is something more than a casual visit and something less than 
domicile. Applying these tests to the facts of the case [the defendant] was hard pressed to contend that a 
South African residence had not been established. It plainly had...’.206 
In Mayne v Main,207 a foreign-domiciled defendant was, inter alia,208 found to have resided 
within the jurisdiction of the court, because his love interest resided there, and he was known 
to have returned to South Africa for extended periods of time in order to be with her. The court 
thus applied the adage ‘home is where the heart is’ for the purpose of establishing 
jurisdiction.209 
A defendant ‘carries on business’ where he or she trades for his or her own account. This must 
be distinguished from the situation where a defendant is employed. Employment signifies the 
																																																								
206 Zwyssig v Zwyssig 1997 (2) SA 467 (W) at 471C-E. 
207 Mayne v Main supra. 
208 In Mayne v Main supra, the court (paras [15]-[16]) forensically analysed the defendant’s duration of stay in 
South Africa over several years and also took into account his business interests in the country. In this regard the 
court held: 
‘During all this time the respondent, with two exceptions, spent an annual holiday at Plettenberg Bay 
over the Christmas period. He therefore throughout maintained a regular link with South Africa. The 
extent to which the work done by the respondent in South Africa, and the time he spent here, increased 
over the years, particularly from 1994 onwards, is well illustrated by the following admitted or common 
cause facts. In 1990 the respondent spent a total of 55 days in South Africa, of which 25 days were on 
holiday. The corresponding figures for 1991 were 45 and 22 days respectively. In 1992 the respondent 
spent 27 days in South Africa, all of them on holiday. In 1993 there was a significant jump to 132 days 
spent here, 32 of them on holiday. These figures increased in 1994 to 263 and 61 days respectively. In 
that year the respondent entered and left the country on eight occasions. During the period 1 January 1995 
to 31 July 1995 the respondent spent 174 days in South Africa, and over the whole of 1995, 270 days. 
Leaving aside the holiday periods, the vast majority of the time spent by the respondent in South Africa 
in 1994 and 1995 was on the Witwatersrand or, to be more specific, Johannesburg. 
 
In keeping with his burgeoning interest in South Africa from 1994, the respondent (in the form of 
Dayspring) set up an office in Johannesburg. It was equipped with all the basic technology (such as 
computers and the like) needed to enable him to communicate with the persons and corporations he 
represented. He also arranged for the acquisition (on lease agreement) of a motor vehicle to serve his 
needs. Dayspring's expenses were initially paid via a non-resident account. Later, in December 1995, 
More 2000 became the local management company for Dayspring. The respondent was its representative 
and a signatory on its banking account. Local business was transacted through it and it became the vehicle 
through which all expenses incurred in South Africa, by both Dayspring and the respondent personally, 
were paid.’  
209 Mayne v Main supra [25]. 
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presence of a master-servant relationship in terms of a contract of employment with fixed and 
perpetual remuneration. Whereas a schoolteacher could be sued in the small claims court of the 
locality of his or her employment, an independent contractor would have to be sued where he 
or she operates or conducts his or her business. The place where the contractor performs 
services may not be the place where he or she carries on business.  
By and large, establishing jurisdiction in the small claims courts against natural person 
defendants on the basis of residence, business locality, or employment is not contentious. 
Difficulties, however, arise when defendants happen to be juristic persons or trusts.  
(i) Companies 
In the case of companies, a distinction must be drawn between the position before the 
commencement of the Companies Act of 2008 and the position after the commencement of the 
Act. 210  Prior to the Companies Act of 2008, the case of Bisonboard Ltd v K Braun 
Woodworking Machinery (Pty) Ltd211 read with the Companies Act of 1973212 had settled the 
question of where a company resides and carries on business. In Bisonboard, the court held that 
a company has a fictitious residence213 and that jurisdiction may be established on the principle 
of actor sequitur forum rei. A defendant company, it was held, may be sued in the court where 
its registered head office is situated or where its principal place of business is located.214 The 
principal place of business, held the court, is located where the company has its central control 
and general administration.215 The registered head office of a company, on the other hand, is 
the address chosen for that precise purpose in its incorporation documents.216 The court held 
																																																								
210 72 of 2008 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Companies Act of 2008’). This Act came into operation on 1 May 
2011. 
211 1991 (1) SA 482 (A). 
212 61 of 1973 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Companies Act of 1973’). 
213 Bisonboard Ltd v K Braun Woodworking Machinery (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 482 (A) at 497-498 (hereafter 
referred to as ‘Bisonboard’). . 
214 Ibid at 495C. 
215 Ibid at 496B. 
216 Ibid at 501I-502B. 
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further that the residence of a company and the place where it carries on business will invariably 
coincide for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction.217 
With the coming into force of the Companies Act of 2008, it has been held that, on an 
interpretation of s 23(3) of the Act, a company only has one place of residence, namely, where 
its registered head office is located, and that this address corresponds with its principal place of 
business.  Section 23(3) provides: 
‘(3) Each company or external company must – 
(a) continuously maintain at least one office in the Republic; and  
(b) register the address of its office, or its principal place if it has more than one office – 
(i) initially in the case of – 
(aa) a company, by providing the required information on its Notice of Incorporation; 
 or 
(bb) an external company, by providing the required information when filing its 
 registration in terms of subsection (1); and 
(ii) subsequently, by filing a notice of change of registered office, together with the prescribed 
fee.’  
In Sibakhulu Construction (Pty) Ltd v Wedgewood Village Golf Country Estate (Pty) Ltd,218 a 
matter involving the business rescue of a company, the court was required to determine whether 
jurisdiction on the basis of the residence of the company had been established in terms of s 
19(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act.219 In this regard, the court, per Binns-Ward J, held: 
• Under the Companies Act of 1973, express provision was made in respect of which court 
had jurisdiction. Section 12(1) of the Companies Act of 1973 provided: 
‘The court which has jurisdiction under this Act in respect of any company or other body corporate, 
shall be any provincial or local division of the High Court of South Africa within the area of the 
jurisdiction whereof the registered office of the company or other body corporate or the main place of 
business of the company or other body corporate is situate.’220 
 
• The Companies Act of 2008 contains no equivalent provision to s 12(1). Jurisdiction in 
respect of matters arising under the Companies Act of 2008 must therefore be determined 
																																																								
217 Ibid 1991 (1) SA 482 (A) at 489G. 
218 2013 (1) SA 191 (WCC).  
219 Act 59 of 1959. 
220  Sibakhulu Construction (Pty) Ltd v Wedgewood Village Golf Country Estate (Pty) Ltd (Nedbank Ltd 
Intervening) 2013 (1) SA 191 (WCC) para [10]. 
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on common-law grounds, unless it can be said that a proper reading of the Act reflects a 
different intention.221 
• Under the Companies Act of 1973, companies often chose an address for convenience rather 
than the office of the company itself. Frequently, a company’s registered office correlated 
with the address of its auditor.222 On an interpretation of the Companies Act of 1973, service 
of any process could be effected on the company at its registered office or principal place 
of business.223 This interpretation was supported by the court in Bisonboard.224 Section 
23(3) of the Companies Act of 2008, on the other hand, makes it clear that the registered 
office is the only office that must be maintained and that it cannot be an address of a third 
party used for convenience.225 
• Whereas the Companies Act of 1973 expressly acknowledged the possibility of a distinction 
between a company's registered office and its principal place of business, the Companies 
Act of 2008 requires the registered office and the principal place of business for 
jurisdictional purposes to be at one and the same address.226 
In light of the above, the court ruled: 
‘The result would be that there would in respect of every company be only a single court in South Africa 
with jurisdiction in respect of winding-up and business rescue matters…227 
Furthermore, winding-up and business rescue are also matters which are interlinked in such a manner by 
the provisions of the 2008 Act that it is undesirable for reasons of comity between courts of equal status, 
efficiency, commercial convenience and certainty that they be amenable to proceedings in concurrent 
jurisdictions. These are considerations militating in favour of the recognition of a regime that recognises 
a company only to be resident in one place rather than two, thereby assuring that only one court will have 
jurisdiction.’228 
																																																								
221 Ibid [11]. 
222 Ibid [17]. 
223 Ibid [19]. 
224 1991 (1) SA 482 (A). 
225  Sibakhulu Construction (Pty) Ltd v Wedgewood Village Golf Country Estate (Pty) Ltd (Nedbank Ltd 
Intervening) supra [20]. 
226 Ibid [21]. 
227 Ibid [23]. 
228 Ibid [23]. 
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Commentators argue that the court’s reasoning is of general application and is not limited to 
the facts of the case.229 Section 23(3) has effectively disposed of the possibility of there being 
two grounds on which to establish jurisdiction against a defendant company as the distinction 
between the registered head office and the principal place of business for jurisdictional purposes 
no longer exists.230 It is unclear whether the legislature did this intentionally or inadvertently. 
Whatever the reason is, there are repercussions for establishing jurisdiction against companies 
in all matters, and in all courts.  
For the small claims court litigant, s 23(3) of the Companies Act comes as cold comfort. Unlike 
litigants in the High Courts or the magistrates’ courts, small claims court litigants are 
unrepresented. They have to litigate matters themselves and are personally responsible for all 
court processes. They do not have the luxury of instructing correspondent attorneys in other 
towns and cities to file claims and to prepare for court hearings. A small claims court litigant 
has to travel to the seat of the court to issue summons and to appear at the hearing. If the claim 
is particularly small, the expense of travelling to the seat of the court may exceed the value of 
the claim. For the impecunious litigant, weighing up the cost of the immediate capital outlay 
for travel against providing food and shelter for his or her family can so easily result in that 
person forgoing civil justice. This does not bode well for access to justice in a court that was 
designed to make litigation an affordable reality for the poorer litigant. The limiting of 
jurisdictional grounds has dire consequences.231  
It may be argued that the problem above – and any other similar jurisdictional problem – could 
be overcome by applying s 13 of the SCCA. In terms of this provision: 
‘An action may, with the consent of all the parties, or upon the application of one of the parties who 
satisfies the court that the hearing of the action in that court may result in undue expense or inconvenience 
to him, be transferred by the court to any other court, and in such a case the latter court shall, 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act contained, have jurisdiction to hear that action.’ 
																																																								
229 See Van Loggerenberg Erasmus Superior Court Practice (service 2, 2016) A2-98 (hereinafter referred to as 
Superior Court Practice). 
230 See also LAWSA §35 footnote 14. 
231 See also Moulton ‘The Persecution and Intimidation of The Low-Income Litigant as Performed by the Small 
Claims Court in California (1968-1969) 21 Stanford Law Review 1672. 
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It is axiomatic that the provision allows for the transfer of actions from one court to another on 
the grounds of expense and inconvenience. The court to which a matter is transferred will be 
deemed to have jurisdiction, even though it would not ordinarily have jurisdiction according to 
the rules of jurisdiction. The difficulty with relying on this provision, it is submitted, is that the 
litigant must institute action in the court of correct jurisdiction first,232 and then request the 
transferring court, on application, to transmit the matter to any other court. The expense of the 
initial phase of securing the transfer may be a deterrent to instituting proceedings at all. Consent 
of all the parties to obtain a transfer is always possible, but experience shows that a litigant is 
unlikely to consent to the relaxation of litigation rules if there is a tactical advantage to be 
gained. It is also the case that one litigant often uses the economic impoverishment of the other 
litigant to his or her advantage.  This is more so the case when a natural person sues a 
commercial enterprise and the latter possesses greater financial means.233 
There are several possibilities to overcome the difficulty of establishing jurisdiction against 
companies. First, the Companies Act of 2008 could be amended to broaden the grounds on 
which jurisdiction may be established against companies. Many of the larger companies in 
South Africa operate administrative centres in the major cities in all of the provinces of South 
Africa. What harm can there be in establishing jurisdiction on the basis of a company’s 
administration center in a particular province or region? The literature, in any event, is silent 
on why the legislature decided to make it more difficult to establish jurisdiction against a 
company when the jurisdictional principles under the Companies Act of 1973 as supported by 
Bisonboard234 worked so well for a very long time.  
																																																								
232 This to be inferred from the phrase ‘hearing of the action in that court.’ For a court to ‘hear an action’ it must 
have jurisdiction to do so.  
233 See chapter 4. See also M Galanter ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change’ (1974-1975) 95 Law and Society Review 95ff. 
234 Supra.  
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A second suggestion would be to amend the table of tariffs and costs235 of the small claims 
courts so as to make it possible for natural persons to recover reasonable travelling costs when 
suing juristic persons. Juristic defendants have deeper pockets. Presiding officers should have 
the discretion to award travelling costs to plaintiffs where the interests of justice so require. The 
difficulty, of course, is this: at what point should the costs be awarded? If costs are awarded at 
the end of the hearing, the provision of costs would not assist poor litigants who do not have 
the money to make the initial capital outlay. If costs are awarded pendente lite236 this may lead 
to abuse. Nothing would prevent a litigant from lodging a sham claim dressed up as a good 
claim, to take the travel costs that have been awarded to him or her, and to abandon the claim 
altogether. This risk, it could be argued, may be low given s 30 of the SCCA. The section 
provides: 
‘30 Withdrawal of claims 
(1)  A plaintiff may at any time, whether before or during the hearing of his action, withdraw his claim with 
 the consent of the court and on such conditions as the court may determine, whereupon the proceedings 
 shall be ceased. 
(2)  If proceedings are ceased as contemplated in subsection (1), the plaintiff may bring a fresh action with 
 the consent of the court.’ 
The provision envisages that a litigant will not have a free hand to abandon a claim. What is 
unclear, however, is what the position will be if the plaintiff simply fails to appear at court. 
Presumably, his or her claim will be struck out. If this happens, the defendant will not be able 
to recover any pendente lite costs that may have been made available to the plaintiff. The 
provision of pendente lite costs is thus not a good idea. 
A third proposition would be to expedite and simplify the mechanisms for issuing of claims in 
the small claims courts so that litigants do not physically have to go to the seat of the court to 
issue summonses. As will be discussed in chapter 8, the issuing of summonses in the small 
claims courts needs to be overhauled so that litigants can issue and serve summonses online or 
by other electronic means. After a summons is issued, the litigant should be permitted to transfer 
																																																								
235 SCCRs, Annexure 2. 
236 That is, before the litigation.  
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the matter to any other court. In conjunction with the simplified issuing of summons process, 
an administrative process could be formulated to enable a presiding officer in chambers to 
decide on the papers whether to transfer a matter to any other small claims court. This will, of 
course, require an amendment to s 13 of the SCCA. 
Fourthly, s 13 of the SCCA could be amended to enable a natural person litigant to approach 
any small claims court in any district and to request that court, on good cause shown, to assume 
jurisdiction over a particular matter involving a juristic person.237 This will entail a radical 
departure from the normal rules of jurisdiction in the small claims courts. If one is committed 
to access to justice and to legal transformation consonant with the right to equality before the 
law, then out-of-the-box solutions are needed. It would mean that the common-law principle 
‘actor sequitur forum rei’ will have to be jettisoned in these exceptional cases. It is submitted 
that the interests of justice would be better served if one took a more flexible approach in the 
small claims courts to the question of jurisdiction. Such flexibility is consistent with the aims 
and objectives of small claims courts and gives credence to the right of access to the courts. 
Flexibility will not jeopardise the administration of justice in terms of allowing for forum 
shopping, as every litigant would have to make out a good case for wanting a particular small 
claims court to assume jurisdiction over a matter.  
When deciding to transfer a matter or to assume jurisdiction over a matter, a court should have 
regard to the convenience to both parties, the convenience to the court, and the general 
dispensing of justice. To prevent abuse of process and to mitigate instances of unwarranted 
review proceedings, it is submitted that the presiding officer should provide reasons for either 
allowing or refusing the application. To suggest that the SCCA cannot be amended as suggested 
above would be wrong. One has only to refer to s 27 of the SCA for an example of where the 
legislature has generously relaxed the rules of jurisdiction in the High Courts, and facilitated 
																																																								
237 See See Moulton (n231) 1672.  
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the transfer of matters from one High Court to another to prevent claims from being abated on 
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.238  
A fifth possibility would be to jettison the actor sequitur forum rei principle so that jurisdiction 
may established where either the plaintiff or the defendant resides, carries on business, or is 
employed. The actor principle is attributed to the inherent limitations associated with the 
Roman-Dutch system of ensuring an enforceable judgment. 239 Suing in the defendant’s court 
assisted in ensuring that the courts of Holland could grant enforceable judgments. Aside from 
the physical presence of the defendant, the defendant invariably owned property in the 
territorial area of the court. Given that South Africa is a unitary state and that all judgments are 
enforceable anywhere in the Republic, 240  it makes little sense to over-emphasise the 
enforcement of a judgment as the underlying basis of particular jurisdictional rules. Given that 
judgments are easily enforceable in the Republic and that the jurisdictional rules of private 
international law do not require a slavish adherence to the actor principle, the principle can be 
relaxed.241   
																																																								
238 Section 27 of the Superior Courts Act provides: 
‘27  Removal of proceedings from one Division to another or from one seat to another in same 
Division 
(1)  If any proceedings have been instituted in a Division or at a seat of a Division, and it appears to 
the court that such proceedings- 
(a) should have been instituted in another Division or at another seat of that Division; or 
(b) would be more conveniently or more appropriately heard or determined- 
(i) at another seat of that Division; or 
(ii) by another Division, 
that court may, upon application by any party thereto and after hearing all other parties thereto, 
order such proceedings to be removed to that other Division or seat, as the case may be. 
(2)  An order for removal under subsection (1) must be transmitted to the registrar of the court to 
which the removal is ordered, and upon the receipt of such order that court may hear and 
determine the proceedings in question.’ 
This section has been generously interpreted by the courts. See in this regard Superior Courts Practice (service 2, 
2016) A2-140Aff and the authorities cited therein. 
239 Voet 5.1.64. 
240 See §6.4. 
241 Perdue ‘Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box’ (1991) 32 Boston College Law Review 529ff and see 
the authorities there cited for a movement towards ‘transient jurisdiction’ predicated on effective service of 
process and not on where the defendant resides. See also discussion in Part VI below. 
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(ii) Close Corporations 
The jurisdiction of close corporations is governed by s 7 of the Close Corporations Act,242 
which provides as follows: 
‘For the purposes of this Act any High Court and any magistrate's court, within whose area of 
jurisdiction the registered office or the main place of business of the corporation is situated, shall 
have jurisdiction.’ 
 
Strangely s 7 does not refer to the small claims courts at all. However, s 7(1) of the SCCA 
expressly provides: 
‘Only a natural person may institute an action in a court and, subject to the provisions of section 14(2), a 
juristic243 person may become a party to an action in a court only as defendant.’ 
It is quite clear, therefore, that close corporations, as juristic persons, can be sued in the small 
claims courts.  
In the future, however, close corporations will feature less in the small claims courts. The reason 
for this is that since the coming into force of the Companies Act of 2008, it is no longer possible 
to register a close corporation in South Africa. Existing close corporations have a choice of 
either retaining their current form or converting to companies.244 Many close corporations also 
liquidate over time, thereby reducing the number of active close corporations in the country.245  
																																																								
242 Act 69 of 1984. 
243 The phrase ‘juristic person’ is not defined in the SCCA.  
244 Companies Act 71 of 2008, schedule 2. 
245 The following table is illustrative of the steady trend of close corporation liquidations. 
 




Trusts are not juristic persons. They are regarded as sui generis entities.246 They cannot sue and 
be sued in their own names. In line with the common law, if one wants to sue a trust in a small 
claims court, one would have to cite the trustees of the trust in their representative capacities.247 
Thus to sue a trust in the small claims court, a plaintiff would have to sue the trustees of a trust 
and in that way extract a debt owed by the trust. There are two difficulties in this regard. 
The first difficulty arises when there are multiple trustees. A plaintiff would only be able to 
establish jurisdiction in terms of s 14(1)(a) of the SCCA where all the trustees collectively 
reside, carry on business or are employed. If the trustees reside, carry on business, or are 
employed in different jurisdictional areas, the plaintiff would have to rely on an alternative 
ground of jurisdiction – such as the area where the whole cause of action arose.248 The same 
problem exists in the magistrates’ courts.249 
It is much easier in the High Courts to establish jurisdiction against multiple defendants. Section 
21(2) of the SCA allows the High Court to exercise jurisdiction over any person who resides, 
carries on business or is employed outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the court and who 
has been joined to proceedings as a further defendant. As long as the court has jurisdiction over 
one or some of the defendants according to the normal rules of jurisdiction, the court will 
automatically have jurisdiction over defendants over whom it would ordinarily not have 
																																																								
246 Braun v Blann and Botha 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) at 859E. 
247 Rosner v Lydia Swanepoel Trust 1998 (2) SA 123 (W) at 126H-I. For further discussion as regards why a trust 
can be sued in the small claims court, see the discussion in chapter 7.  
248 See discussion below for the difficulties with this proposition.  
249 Jones & Buckle (service 10, 2016) Act 96A states: 
‘Where two executors of an estate resided in different districts it was held that, as they must be sued 
jointly, the Supreme Court was the only competent forum. There does not appear to be any provision in 
the Act to remedy this position, unless the cause of action arose wholly within one district (s 28(1)(d), or 
there is an appearance by the defendant without an objection to the jurisdiction of the court (s 28(1)(f), 
or the action is in relation to immovable property within the district (s 28(1)(g)) or unless there is consent 
(s 45).’  
Although the above statement is made within the context of multiple executors, the position is applicable to 
multiple trustees who must also be sued jointly and severally on behalf of a trust. See also Hughes v Estate 
Fitzgerald (1910) 20 CTR 494.  
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jurisdiction. In Mossgas (Pty) Ltd v Eskom, the court held that the purpose of the provision was 
to avert ‘[t]he [jurisdictional] difficulty which would arise when defendants who are liable to a 
plaintiff on the same cause of action … are resident in different jurisdictions…’.250 Section 
21(2) expands the jurisdiction of the court. At the same time, it makes it convenient for a 
plaintiff to establish jurisdiction in a case involving multiple parties. One cannot see why a 
similar provision cannot be introduced into the SCCA.251 This would definitely make it easier 
to sue trustees acting in their representative capacities. It would also assist a plaintiff to sue 
multiple parties in a delictual or contractual matter.  
The second difficulty with suing trusts is that it is not so easy to determine the identities of the 
trustees at the time when the action arises. Trust documents are lodged with the office of the 
Master of the High Court at the time of their establishment. However, trust deeds are frequently 
amended to reflect new trustees. These amendments are often not lodged.252 Consequently, it 
can be quite difficult to determine the identities of trustees at the time of litigation.  Suing the 
wrong trustee can jeopardise the claim because jurisdiction would not be established. 
																																																								
250 In Mossgas (Pty) Ltd v Eskom 1995 (3) SA 156 (W). It has to be noted that the court was interpreting the s 
19(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. Section 21(2) of the SCA is identical to s 19(1)(b).  See also Majola 
v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1976 (1) SA 874 (SE). 
251 This is more so the case because one can already establish jurisdiction in the small claims court against multiple 
partners of a partnership by suing in the court where any partner resides: see s 14(1)(b) of the SCCA. There is thus 
no reason why the same latitude cannot be extended to a trustee of a trust. 
252 Section 4 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 requires trust instruments and amendments to trust 
instruments to be lodged with the Master of the High Court. While the provisions of s 4 are pre-emptory, trust’s 
amendments are often not lodged by trustees. To compound matters further, it can be very difficult for a third party 
to obtain information about a trust as the record system in the Master’s office is not properly mechanised. Unless, 
one is in possession of the trust information (such as registration details), and knows where the trust was registered, 
one can easily find that the information pertaining to a trust is not accessible. For the unrepresented lay-litigant in 
the small claims courts, this poses a particular problem as he or she would have to travel to seat of relevant Master’s 
office and would have to be in possession of relevant details relating to the trust.  To compound matters further, 
the Master’s office in the various centres is often in disarray: see http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/masters-
office-of-high-court-in-chaos-1233690 (last accessed 24 March 2017); https://www.pressreader.com/south-
africa/the-witness/20170217/281681139635955 (last accessed on 24 March 2017); 
http://sentineltrust.co.za/Advisory/problems-experienced-with-the-pretoria-master/ (last accessed on 24 March 
2017); http://allafrica.com/stories/200809020511.html (last accessed  on 24 March 2017). 
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The solution to the two problems above is to enable a trust to be sued in its own name as a 
matter of procedural convenience. At present, SCCR 27, which is similar253 to MCR 54 and 
HCR 14, allows certain non-juristic entities to be sued in their own names as a matter of 
procedural convenience.  The rule provides: 
‘27 Actions by and against partners, a person carrying on business in a name or style 
other than his own name, syndicate or association 
(1)  Any person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name or two or more 
persons who are co-partners may be sued in such name or style or in the name of the partnership. 
(2) The provisions of this rule shall also mutatis mutandis apply to an unincorporated company, 
syndicate or association.’ 
 
On an interpretation of MCR 54 and HCR 14, the courts have held that the effect of the rules is 
not to change the common law as they do not endow the entities mentioned in them with 
separate personality. They simply seek to make it convenient for these entities to be parties to 
proceedings as a matter of procedural convenience.254 When these entities are sued, it is the 
responsibility of the party who relies on the rules to use the special mechanisms within the rules 
to flush out the identities of the natural persons who were in effective control of the entities at 
the time when the cause of action arose.255 It is submitted that the theoretical interpretation 
given to MCR 54 and HCR 14 is applicable to SCCR 27 – the practical difference being that in 
the small claims courts, the presiding officer will illicit the relevant information from the 
representative of the entity as regards the identities of the persons who are/were in effective 
control of the entity concerned. It is submitted that if SCCR 27 was amended to make provision 
for a trust, the presiding officer would similarly be able to investigate the identities of the 
trustees. On conclusion of the inquiry, the presiding officer would ipso facto join those persons 
to the proceedings. The effect of the joinder would not be to make the trustees personally 
																																																								
253 The Rules are similar but not the same. They differ in that in MCR 54 and HCR 14 the entities mentioned in 
the Rule can sue and be sued in the courts, whereas under SCCR 27, the entities mentioned can only be sued in 
the small claims court. For further discussion on this point, see Chapter 8 §. 
254 See D F Scott (EP) (Pty) Ltd v Golden Valley Supermarket 2002 (6) SA 297 (SCA). 
255 See ibid. 
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liable.256 It would just mean that the judgment granted would be proper in terms of the common 
law.257 
 
(iv) Firms, associations, sole proprietorships, body corporates, syndicates 
None of these entities are juristic persons. They are all businesses or voluntary associations that 
have natural persons behind them. Under the common law, the individuals behind these entities 
would have had to be sued in their personal capacities in respect of a cause of action arising 
																																																								
256 See §7.4. 
257 In Cupido v Kings Lodge Hotel 1999 (4) SA 257 (E), the court held: 
‘It is so that Rule 14 does not make specific mention of a trust who conducts a business under a name 
other than its own. Nonetheless, the nature and purpose of the trust, particularly the so-called business 
trust, have undergone a metamorphosis to the extent where the trust frequently competes directly with 
conventional business organisations on the open market. (Honoré‚ (op cit at 74).) Trusts are often viewed 
as independent entities. For example a trust may possess assets, incur liabilities for debts and can also be 
sequestrated. (Magnum Financial Holdings (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v Summerly and Another 
NNO 1984 (1) SA 160 (W).) Moreover, in certain circumstances a trust (similar to partnerships) is treated 
as if a person. 
“But though a trust is not apart from statute a juristic person, there are cases which decide that, 
for purposes such as insolvency the trust estate is distinct from the private estate of the trustee. 
In the law of income tax a trust is treated by statute as a person. It is a practice in certain Deeds 
Registries to register land or real rights in land in the name of a trust. The Trust Property Control 
Act 1988 now describes in general terms that "trust property shall not form part of the personal 
estate of the trustee except insofar as he as a trust beneficiary is entitled to the trust property'' 
and it imposes on the trustee a duty to separate clearly the trust property from his own personal 
property.” (Honoré‚ (op cit at 7).) 
In recent years business trusts have become increasingly popular. (Pace and Van der Westhuizen Wills 
and Trusts at 6.) They often participate in business in unison with corporations and other recognised 
commercial structures. It is not unusual for financial institutions to create trusts in order to administer 
corporate interests under the name and guise of such trusts. The profit motive which predominates in 
business has siphoned through to the self-styled business trust. There is in many respects very little 
practical difference between the common business enterprise or corporation and the business trust. These 
developments have made it difficult for a plaintiff who intended on suing a defendant to always be sure 
whether he was dealing with a trust, a corporate body or a private individual. Honoré‚ (op cit at 75) 
emphasises the difficulties which can arise for a litigating party where he had concluded business with a 
trust: 
“It is relatively difficult for those doing or contemplating business with a trust to discover the 
terms of the trust instrument or the names of the trustees. There is no requirement that their 
names be listed in business documents as in the case of companies and close corporations. By 
the Trust Property Control Act, s 18, any person may obtain a copy of the trust instrument if in 
the opinion of the Master he has sufficient interest in the document to do so. This may not, 
however, enable him to discover the names of the trustees since their names may not appear in 
the trust instrument.” 
Once it is accepted that Rule 14 was enacted for the purpose of streamlining the method of citation of 
litigants and in particular to obviate technical defences being taken with regard to the citation of the 
litigating parties, then there can be no reason why the provisions of Rule 14 should not be applied in 
respect of trusts, particularly where a trust conducts its business under a name other than by which the 
trust is known…’ 
	
	 190	
from the business of the entity. Jurisdiction would have been established against each member 
individually.  
To ameliorate the complexity of establishing jurisdiction against each individual member, 
SCCR 27 permits a plaintiff to sue these entities in their own name as a matter of procedural 
convenience. The effect of this is that jurisdiction may be established on the principle of actor 
sequitur forum rei258 where the entity carries on business. The presiding officer will use his or 
her investigative powers at the hearing to identity the natural persons behind the mask so that 
all of the relevant members can be joined as parties to the proceedings. Once joined, all the 
members would be personally liable for a judgment made against the entity on the basis of joint 
and several liability.259  
The reference in SCCR 27(1) to ‘[a]ny person carrying on business in a name or style other 
than his own name’ is to the sole proprietorship, even though the phrase is not used in the rule. 
Body corporates are also not mentioned in the rule. However, SCCR 27(2), which refers to an 
‘unincorporated company, syndicate or association’ is wide enough to include a body 
corporate.260 
There is little doubt that SCCR 27 – like its counterparts in the magistrates’ courts261 and the 
High Court262 – serves a laudable purpose, as it simplifies the rules for establishing jurisdiction 
in an indirect manner. For that reason, it is recommended that the rule be retained, but redrafted. 
Small Claims Court Rule 27 should be redrafted to read more simply. In addition, the entities 
mentioned in the rule should be revisited and expanded. There is no reason why, as stated above, 
the rule should not apply to trusts.263 As noted above, there are inherent problems with suing 
																																																								
258 See §6.13. 
259 See D F Scott (EP) (Pty) Ltd v Golden Valley Supermarket supra. 
260 See ibid [1]. 
261 MCR 54. See discussion above. 
262 HCR 14. See discussion above. 
263 See footnote 257 above. 
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trusts in the small claims courts. If the rule was redrafted to permit a trust to be sued in its own 
name without reference to trustees, this would go a long way to resolving the issues confronting 
the plaintiff wishing to sue a trust. But it may also mean that s 14(1)(b) of the SCCA will have 
to be amended.  
(b)  Section 14(1)(b): ‘Any partnership, as defendant, which has business premises 
 situated or any member of which resides within the area of jurisdiction of the court’  
A partnership is a contractual relationship between two or more people under which each of 
them contributes or undertakes to contribute towards an enterprise to be carried on jointly 
between them with the object of making and sharing a profit. As an entity a partnership is not 
a juristic person. It does not have a personality separate to that of the individuals forming it (i.e. 
the partners).264 
Under the common law, a partnership could not be sued in its own name. The partners had to 
be sued jointly and severally.265 However, in terms of the MCA266 and the MCRs,267 as well as 
the HCRs,268 a partnership can be sued in its own name. Jurisdiction can be established against 
a defendant partnership on the basis of where it carries on its business or on the basis of where 
any partner resides. In conformity with this general rule, the SCCA also establishes the 
jurisdictional rule whereby a partnership can be sued in the court of the area where its business 
premises are located or where any member thereof resides. Once jurisdiction is established in 
respect of a single partner, all the other partners can be brought to the seat of the court. Any 
judgment made by the court would be enforceable against the personal assets of any individual 
partner, irrespective of where he or she may reside in the Republic.269 The joinder of one is thus 
the joinder of all. 
																																																								
264 R Sharrock Business Transactions Law (2011) 503ff. 
265 Ibid 503. 
266 MCA, s 28(1)(b). 
267 MCR 54. 
268 HCR 14. 
269 See D F Scott (EP) (Pty) Ltd v Golden Valley Supermarket supra; Cupido v Kings Lodge Hotel supra. 
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That a partnership may be sued in its own name finds further support in SCCR 27 (discussed 
above).270 If a partnership is sued in its own name, the presiding officer would invariably have 
to inquire into the identities of every partner so that any judgment which the court grants will 
be enforceable not only against the partnership assets, but also against each individual partner.  
(c) Section 14(1)(c): ‘any person in respect of any proceedings incidental to any action  
 instituted in that court by such person’ 
It is often the case that a plaintiff institutes action against a defendant by establishing 
jurisdiction according to the rules of jurisdiction, and the defendant desires to raise a 
counterclaim (claim in reconvention) to the plaintiff’s action (claim in convention). Section 
14(1)(c) allows a defendant to bring a counterclaim in the same court that hears the claim in 
convention. The practicality of doing so is evident. It prevents a multiplicity of actions and is 
consequently convenient, saves time, and saves expense. 
At first blush s 14(1)(c) seems uncontroversial. However, the provision has been misconstrued 
in the small claims courts. The confusion is around the word incidental in the provision. Many 
presiding officers and litigants incorrectly think that it is permissible to bring any type of 
counterclaim in the small claims courts. For a counterclaim to be entertained, it has to be 
incidental.  
Section 14(1)(c) was copied verbatim from s 28(1)(c) of the MCA. On an interpretation of s 
28(1)(c) the courts have held that the word incidental is significant. For a claim to be incidental 
it has to arise from the main claim. Peté et al provide the following practical illustration within 
the context of magistrates’ courts procedure: 
‘It is often the case, however that the counter-claim has nothing to do with the claim in convention. For 
example, assume that A sues B for an alleged breach of contract and that B wants to counter-claim for 
injuries sustained during an alleged assault on him by A. The counter-claim (assault resulting in injury), 
did not arise out of the same facts as the claim in convention (breach of contract). Therefore, the counter-
claim is not incidental to the claim in convention, and B may not rely on s 28(1)(c) for jurisdiction. If we 
assume that A does not reside, carry on business, and is not employed, in the district or regional division 
																																																								
270 See discussion on page 65 above. 
	
	 193	
of the particular Magistrates’ Court in which he has sued B, and that the alleged assault on B did not 
occur in that district or regional division, B will probably have to bring his action for assault not as a 
counter-claim, but as a separate action in a separate court which has jurisdiction to hear that claim.’271 
On account of the mirroring legislative provisions, the above illustration is applicable to small 
claims court matters as well. 
It is unclear why the drafters of the MCA decided to use the word incidental in s 28(1)(c), given 
that it was not necessary in terms of the Roman-Dutch law for a counterclaim to be incidental 
to the main claim.  In Brunette v Stanford,272 the court held that the reason why counterclaims 
had been allowed by the Dutch courts was that it was in the interest of the State to bring legal 
matters to finality (‘ut sit finis litium’) and to prevent a multiplicity of claims. To this extent, 
the court (per Cloete J) stated: 
‘By looking at the text-books I think it will be found clearly laid down that the principle of reconventional 
claims was introduced into the Dutch law simply because it was for the interest of the state, "ut sit finis 
litium." When an action was, therefore, brought against a defendant, if he had any kind of cross action, 
of whatever nature, against the same party who brought the original suit, it was competent for him at once 
in pleading to make his claims in reconvention, so that the pleadings would go on pari passu to the day 
of trial, and prevent the plaintiff from getting judgment against the defendant when that defendant might 
have otherwise meritorious claims as a valid set-off. These reconventional claims, by being thus pleaded 
at once, prevented the necessity of defendant taking out fresh summonses, or beginning other proceedings 
which really might lead to very great injury. It was in this way that reconventional claims came to be 
mixed up with conventional. On the day of trial, when the plaintiff chose to put down his case in 
convention, the defendant has thus also a right to put down his case in reconvention; and, if he obtain a 
judgment in this reconvention, he may at once bring that judgment as a satisfaction or deduction from, or 
even obtain a larger amount than the claim of the plaintiff. It is therefore emphatically laid down in the 
text-books that in an action of account, there may be a cross-action for slander or one raising any other 
matter whatever. With regard to the question of giving security, as the defendant's counsel has admitted 
that he is perfectly ready to give security, it is as well that should be done, because although it may happen 
that the property may realise less than the amount of the mortgage, it may also happen that it may realise 
more.’273 
It would appear from the case law that the MCA altered the relaxed common-law position in 
the magistrates’ courts. The drafters of the SCCA unceremoniously dragged the small claims 
courts by their bootstraps to adopt the magistrates’ courts position. It is submitted that as long 
as a small claims court has jurisdiction to entertain the substance of the counterclaim, the court 
																																																								
271 Peté, Hulme, du Plessis et al Civil Procedure – A Practical Guide 2ed 67. The writers go on to state further: 
‘Jones and Buckle agree with this general approach and describe that they believe to be the scope of s 
28(1)(c) as follows: 
“It is submitted that the language of s 28(1)(c) points to matters which are really incidents of the 
claim in convention, that is, interlocutory orders, orders for costs, issue of execution, setting 
aside of judgment, etc, and which may have to be made against a defendant as well as against a 
plaintiff...”’  
272 (1859) 3 Searle 221. 
273 Ibid at 226. 
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should be entitled to hear the counterclaim, even if it does not arise from the main claim. This 
would prevent a multiplicity of actions.  
The SCCA should be amended and the word incidental should be deleted so that small claims 
courts have more flexibility to hear counterclaims in the form of ‘set-off’. Such a relaxed 
approach would be consistent with the aims and objectives of small claims courts, which are to 
promote the expeditious resolution of disputes without the intrusion of undue technicality. It 
would also be in conformity with the way that counterclaims are dealt with in small claims 
courts in other jurisdictions.274 
(d) Section 14(1)(d): ‘any person, whether or not he resides, carries on business or is 
employed within the area of jurisdiction of the court, if the cause of action arose wholly 
within that area’ 
This provision allows a plaintiff litigant to establish jurisdiction in the small claims court on 
the basis of where the cause of action arose. There is nothing wrong with establishing 
jurisdiction on the basis of cause of action. However, what is problematic is that the provision 
requires that the cause of action must have arisen ‘wholly’ within the jurisdiction of the court. 
Again, like so many other provisions in the SCCA, this provision is identical to one which 
exists in the magistrates’ courts, namely s 28(1)(d) of the MCA. 
The word ‘wholly’ has been the subject of litigation. The courts have said that for a cause of 
action to arise wholly within the jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff must show that all of the 
material facts (the facta probanda) that are necessary to establish a particular substantive cause 
																																																								
274 In Indiana (Indiana Small Claims Court Rules, as amended 1 January 2017, Rule 5A) California and New York, 
for example, the counterclaim does not have to be incidental to the main claim. The same is the case in England 
and Wales: see Sime A Practical Approach to Civil Procedure 194ff.  In the European small claims procedure, 
however, the counterclaim has to be incidental to the main claim:  Kramer ‘A Major Step in the Harmonization of 
Procedural Law in Europe: the European Small Claims Procedure: Accomplishments, New Features and Some 
Fundamental Questions of European Harmonization’ in Jongbloed (ed) The XIII World Congress of Procedural 
Law: The Belgian and Dutch Reports (253-283 at 264. It should also be noted that the Kenyan Small Claims Court 
Act seems to limit counterclaims to contractual disputes (s 12(1)(e)). However, it is not required for the 
counterclaim to be incidental to the main claim.  See discussion in Part VI below. 
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of action must have arisen in the jurisdictional area of the court.275 In a delict matter, it is 
necessary to show that all the facts to fulfill the constitutive elements of the delict occurred in 
the same jurisdictional area. 276  In the case of contract, offer, acceptance, breach and/or 
performance must have occurred in the territory of the court concerned.277 Needless to say, the 
requirement is quite onerous as many transactions straddle court borders – often within the 
same province. 
Peté et al are critical of s 28(1)(d) of the MCA. They argue that the word ‘wholly’ unnecessarily 
restricts the jurisdiction of the lower courts.  They point out that the rules of jurisdiction in the 
High Court are more relaxed. To establish jurisdiction on the basis of cause of action in the 
High Court, the plaintiff need merely show – in accordance with private international law rules 
pertaining to jurisdiction – that some of the elements of the cause of action arose within the 
jurisdictional area of a particular court.  They argue that the same position should be applicable 
in the lower courts.278 As regards small claims courts they observe as follows: 
‘Assume that [a] resident…orders tiles to the value of R5000-00 from a dealer who has a branch in 
Umhlanga. Assume also that, like many businesses in the formal sector, the dealer is a company or close 
corporation. The agreement is concluded at the dealer’s Umhlanga premises, with the goods to be 
delivered to the resident’s home in Durban North. Assume that that the dealer has another branch of its 
business in Port Shepstone on the South Coast of KwaZulu-Natal. The resident pays R5000 to the dealer, 
but the goods fail to arrive. The dealer begins to make excuses for late delivery, then begins to avoid the 
resident’s calls and finally ignores the letter of demand despatched by the resident’s attorney… As the 
dealer would possibly foresee, the resident’s attorney eventually advises the resident to proceed with the 
matter in the small claims court, as the amount involved does not make the attorney’s involvement 
economically viable. 
The intention behind the creation of the small claims courts was to provide a cheap and effective 
alternative to the magistrates’ courts for small claims… [T]he jurisdictional sections to the Magistrates’ 
Courts Act have been reproduced with little discernable change in the Small Claims Courts Act, meaning 
that the same jurisdictional problems which arise in the magistrates’ courts will affect litigants in the 
small claims courts also.’279 
They go on to state: 
																																																								
275 McKenzie v Farmer’s Co-operative Meat Industries Ltd 1922 AD 16 at 23; King’s Transport v Viljoen 1954 
(1) SA 133 (C) at 138A-139G. 
276 Thomas v BMW South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1996 (2) SA 106 (C). See also Hulme, Peté ‘A New Look at an Old 
Question – Precisely Where Does A Cause of Action Based on Contract or Delict arise in the case of Civil Claims 
in the Magistrates’ Courts and Small Claims Courts?’ (2011) Obiter 304 at 319ff. 
277 Jonker v Esterhuizen 1927 CPD 225 at 227; Herholdt v Rand Debt Collecting Co 1965 (3) SA 752 (T) at 756G-
575A; Buys v Roodt (nou Otto) 2000 (1) SA 535 (O) at 539I-540A. 
278 Hulme, Peté (n276) 321. 
279 Hulme, Peté (n276) 307-308. 
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‘Since the agreement was concluded in the dealers’ Umhlanga premises, with the goods delivered to the 
consumer’s home in Durban North, the conclusion of the contract and the breach (that is, the failure to 
deliver the tiles), occurred within the jurisdiction of two separate courts namely, the Durban and Verulam 
[small claims courts]. Therefore, on the basis of the law as it currently stands, the cause of action did not 
arise wholly within the jurisdiction of a single court, and the plaintiff is precluded from using [s 14(1)(d)] 
to proceed in either of the [small claims courts].  He is obliged to ulitise [s 14(1)(a)] … with all the costs 
which that entails. In all probability, he will decide not to go ahead with the matter and will abandon is 
claim.’280 
Peté et al are correct. Section 14(1)(d) is untenable. It creates unnecessary obstacles to 
establishing jurisdiction in the small claims courts. It is submitted that the word ‘wholly’ should 
be deleted from the provision as this would best serve to widen the rules of jurisdiction, remove 
unnecessary technicality, and foster access to the courts. 
(e) Section 14(1)(e): ‘any defendant, whether in convention or reconvention, who appears 
and takes no objection to the jurisdiction of the court’ 
Section 14(1)(e) creates an implied submission to the jurisdiction of the small claims court and 
mirrors section s 28(1)(e) of the MCA. A defendant is precluded from raising an objection to 
the territorial jurisdiction of the court if he or she ‘appears’ and does not raise an objection. It 
is important to note that a defendant cannot submit to the jurisdiction of the court to hear a 
matter that exceeds the monetary jurisdiction of the court. The defendant also cannot consent 
to give the court jurisdiction over causes of action and remedies in respect of which the court 
does not have jurisdiction by virtue of the SCCA.  
For the purposes of magistrates’ courts’ procedure, the word ‘appears’ has been interpreted to 
refer to the situation where the defendant pleads and does not object to the jurisdiction of the 
court. 281  However, in some instances, the courts have held that the defendant should be 
permitted to object to the jurisdiction of the court even after the defendant has pleaded, as long 
as the objection is raised before litis contestatio.282 Whatever the situation may be, in the small 
																																																								
280 Hulme, Peté (n276) 314. 
281 William Spilhaus & Co (MB) (Pty) Ltd v Marx 1963 (4) SA 994 (C) at 999A-G; Commericial Union Assurance 
Co Ltd v Waymark 1995 (2) SA 73 (Tk) at 80G-81A. 




claims courts the defendant’s plea is optional.283 Therefore, it is unclear how an appearance 
will be determined when there is no plea. Because the small claims courts do not have a formal 
system of pleadings, the SCCA and SCCRs make no mention of litis contestatio. 284 
Furthermore, litigants are unrepresented. It is thus uncertain how s 14(1)(e) operates in practice.  
In principle, it should not be controversial for a small claims court to assume jurisdiction over 
a matter in respect of which it lacks territorial jurisdiction – as long as the substance and the 
monetary value of the claim fall within the jurisdiction of the court. It was argued earlier that 
the small claims courts should have the power to assume jurisdiction over matters on the basis 
of convenience,285 even if the particular matter does not fall within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the court. Section 14(1)(e) of the SCCA is consonant with the spirit of that idea. It is submitted 
that as a general proposition, the small claims courts should be permitted to assume jurisdiction 
over matters that would otherwise fall outside of their territorial jurisdiction and that the 
wording of s 14(1)(e) should be amended to give effect to that general power.  To that end the 
following wording is proposed: any defendant, whether in convention or reconvention, who 
appears and takes no objection to the jurisdiction of the court, or where the court on a balance 
of convenience, determines that it should exercise jurisdiction over a claim.  
The amendment would make it possible for the small claims courts to exercise jurisdiction on 
the basis of an implied submission, as well as on the basis of assumed jurisdiction, premised on 
convenience.286 This wide latitude will make it far easier for people to sue in the small claims 
courts and will prevent matters from being disposed of on the technicality of territorial 
jurisdiction. For the small claims courts, we should subscribe to low-level principles of 
																																																								
283 SCCA, s 29(3). 
284 Contrast the position in the magistrates’ courts per MCR 21A and in the High Courts per HCR 29.  
285 See discussion page on page 58 above. The argument was made within the context of being able to sue 
defendant companies more easily.  
286 See discussion at page 61. 
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territorial jurisdiction. A court should be allowed to exercise jurisdiction over a matter if it is 
convenient for all the parties.  
(f) Section 14(1)(f): ‘any person who owns immovable property within the area of 
jurisdiction of the court in actions in respect of such property or a mortgage bond 
thereon’ 
In terms of this provision, jurisdiction may be established in the court where the defendant owns 
immovable property. However, the action in question has to be in respect of the property 
concerned or in respect of a mortgage bond registered over the property. For a claim to be in 
respect of property, it does not matter whether the claim is in rem or in personam,287 provided 
that there is a direct causal relationship between the claim and the immovable property in 
question.288 
PART V 
THE CONSTITUTION  
6.14 THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE SMALL CLAIMS COURTS 
 
Chapter 8 of the Constitution sets out the hierarchy of the courts. Small claims courts fall under 
the ‘lower court’ category.289 As such, they may not ‘enquire into or rule on the constitutionality 
of any legislation or any conduct of the President.’290  The reference to ‘legislation’ means all 
original and delegated legislation.291  
The constitutional limits and powers of small claims courts may be further circumscribed by 
additional legislation. To this end, s 49 of the SCCA provides: 
																																																								
287 See §6.10(a).  
288 Kleynhans v Wessels 1998 (4) SA 1060 (SCA).  
289 Constitution, s 166 read with s 170. 
290 Constitution, s 170. 
291 Currie, De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 111 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Handbook’). 
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‘Jurisdiction as to plea of ultra vires 
No court shall be competent to pronounce upon the validity of a provincial ordinance, a regulation, order 
or by-law made under a statute or a statutory proclamation of the State President, and every court shall 
assume that every such ordinance, regulation, order, by-law or proclamation is valid.’ 
Section 49 reinforces the idea that small claims courts cannot preside over matters where the 
validity of legislation or executive action is brought into question. Having regard to the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act,292 it is indisputable that small claims courts also 
cannot adjudicate any administrative action matters, whether in the form of review proceedings 
or otherwise.293 
It is submitted that s 49 of the SCCA should be retained, but for the sake of clarity, the section 
should be redrafted along the lines of s 110 of the MCA.294 Section 110 provides: 
‘(1)  A court shall not be competent to pronounce on the validity of any law or conduct of the President. 
(2)  If in any proceedings before a court it is alleged that — 
(a) any law or any conduct of the President is invalid on the grounds of its inconsistency with a 
provision of the Constitution; or 
(b) any law is invalid on any ground other than its constitutionality,  
the court shall decide the matter on the assumption that such law or conduct is valid: Provided that the 
party which alleges that a law or conduct of the President is invalid, may adduce evidence regarding the 
invalidity of the law or conduct in question.’ 
 
Section 49 should be redrafted to mirror the provisions of s 110(1). However, subsection (2) of 
the proposed new s 49 should read: 
(2)  If in any proceedings before a court it is alleged that — 
(a) any law or any conduct of the President is invalid on the grounds of its inconsistency 
with a provision of the Constitution; or 
(b) any law is invalid on any ground other than its constitutionality,  
the court shall conduct the matter in terms of s 23.  
 
The insertion of subsection (2) above will give presiding officers clear guidance about their 
responsibility when constitutional invalidity is alleged. Section 23 of the SCCA enjoins a court 
to stop proceedings when complex matters of law arise. In line with the Constitution, it seems 
only appropriate for a matter to be halted when the validity of legislation, or for that matter, the 
common law is brought into question. Currently, s 49 and s 110 make no mention of the 
																																																								
292 Act 3 of 2000.  
293 See definition of ‘court’ in s 1 of the Act. 
294 This section was inserted into the Magistrates’ Courts Act by s 1 of the Magistrates’ Courts Amendment Act 
80 of 1997.  
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common law.295 This is because historically lower courts could not change the common law. 
Only superior courts could do so, relying on their inherent jurisdiction. 296  The inherent 
jurisdiction of the superior courts is confirmed in s 173 of the Constitution.297 
In the interpretation of s 110 of the MCA, commentators have argued that even though lower 
courts have limited jurisdiction, it does not mean that they have no constitutional jurisdiction 
at all. While they cannot apply the Bill of Rights or the rest of the constitutional provisions 
directly298 to any law (and that includes the common law), they can apply the Bill of Rights 
indirectly,299 as that does not involve a pronouncement on the validity of any law. As Currie 
and De Waal note: 
 ‘Rather, it [indirect application] involves the interpretation of legislation and the development of the 
common law so that both are in accordance with the Bill of Rights.’300 
There is thus no impediment to prevent a small claims court from indirectly applying the Bill 
of Rights to a matter that comes before it. 
6.15  INDIRECT APPLICATION  
The indirect application of the Bill of Rights draws authority from s 39(2) of the Constitution 
which provides:  
 ‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, 
tribunal or forum must promote, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’ 
 
																																																								
295 Jones &Buckle (service 10, 2016) Act678 state:  
‘The word “law” is defined in s 2 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 as “any law, proclamation, 
ordinance, Act of Parliament or other enactment having the force of law”. The word “law” as defined in 
the Interpretation Act has been held to refer to the enactment of a body having legislative authority and 
not to the common law. Section 170 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, prohibits 
magistrates' courts from enquiring into or ruling on the constitutionality of any legislation or any conduct 
of the President. Despite the absence of any reference to the common law in either s 170 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, or in s 110, magistrates' courts clearly do not have 
the power to rule on the constitutionality of any rule embodied in the common law. Magistrates' courts 
are creatures of statute and have no jurisdiction beyond that granted by the statute creating them. No 
statutory jurisdiction has been accorded to magistrates' courts to enquire into or rule on the validity of the 
rules of common law or to develop the common law.’ 
296 See §6.2. 
297 See Jones & Buckle (service 10, 2016) Act 678. See n295 above. 
298 For a discussion on the direct application of the Bill of Rights, see Handbook 34-55. 
299 For a discussion on the indirect application of the Bill of Rights, see Handbook 113. 
300 Handbook 113.  
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Section 39(2) does not draw a distinction between higher and lower courts. When interpreting 
a statute a court, tribunal or forum is obliged to positively promote the Bill of Rights.301 The 
courts have stated that the ‘purport and objects’ also refer to s 1 of the Constitution, the founding 
values.302 
6.16  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION   
In several court decisions303 it has been held that the courts bear a duty to interpret all legislation 
in conformity with the Bill of Rights even if a litigant has failed to rely on s 39(2). Where 
legislation is capable of being read in conformity with the Constitution, the courts are duty 
bound to read it accordingly.304  This approach is subject to a major qualification, namely, 
deference to the doctrine of precedent. If a higher court has interpreted a statute after 27 April 
1994,305 a lower court is bound to abide by that interpretation. A lower court would not be able 
to override that interpretation on an application of s 39(2).306 Small claims courts are bound by 
the decisions of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court of 
the province in which they are located. The decision of a High Court of another province is 
persuasive authority, but not binding authority, irrespective of whether the matter was heard by 
a single judge or a full court.307 
To illustrate the point: Assume that A brings an action in delict against B in the small claims 
																																																								
301 Mkhize v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 2001 (1) SA 338 (LC), the Labour Court 
held that the CCMA is a ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of s 38 of the Constitution and that a commissioner was 
therefore obliged by s 39(2) of the Constitution to entertain a constitutional argument relating to the exclusion of 
evidence in violation of the right to privacy.   
302 See Handbook 57. 
303 See the authorities cited in note 304.  
304 See De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) para [85]; Hyundai Motor Distributors v Smit NO 2001 (1) 
SA 545 CC [23]; and see K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) para [17]. See also Handbook 
58.  
305 27 April 1994 is the date of the first South African democratic elections. It is also the date when the Interim 
Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993) came into operation. Even though the 
Interim Constitution was later replaced by the Constitution of South Africa, 1996, 27 April 1994 is seen to be the 
definitive date for the decisive break from the past and the ushering in of the new legal order.  
306 S v Walters 2002 (4) SA 6123 (CC) para [61]; Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) para 
[29]. 
307 Hahlo, Khan The South African Legal System and its Background 256-257. 
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court. In the course of proceedings, A needs to establish that B owes him a duty of care. There 
is a statute that has a direct bearing on whether such a duty exists. In the interpretation of that 
statute, the small claims court would be obliged to ensure that any decision that it renders is in 
conformity with the Constitution. When interpreting the statute in question, the court would 
have to keep the values of the Constitution (as encapsulated in the Bill of Rights) uppermost in 
its mind. If the court can interpret the statute in a manner that is in conformity with the 
Constitution without a declaration of invalidity, the court can proceed to do so. However, if the 
interpretation would be strained or if it is clear that the statute, on an ordinary reading, is so 
blatantly incongruent with the Constitution, the small claims court would not be able to proceed 
further.308 The court would have to halt proceedings and advise the parties that the matter needs 
to be taken to the High Court as the matter falls outside of the jurisdiction of any of the lower 
courts. 
Assume further that the statute is capable of being interpreted in conformity with the 
Constitution, but a superior court, whose decision is binding precedent on the small claims court 
in question, has after 27 April 1994 made a ruling on the interpretation of that statutory 
provision. The small claims court would not be able to ignore that decision, even if that decision 
did not consider the issue of constitutionality. The small claims court would be bound to give 
effect to that ruling. At best the court could rule that a constitutional issue has arisen and that 
justice would be better served if the matter was taken to the High Court for consideration. To 
this extent, the court would rely on s 23 of the SCCA to divert the matter. Lower courts are not 
free to ignore precedent. They must abide by precedent and must proceed cautiously.309 
																																																								
308 See Mateis v Ngwathe Plaaslike Munisipaliteit 2003 (4) SA 361 (SCA); Hyundai Motor Distributors v Smit 
NO 2001 (1) SA 545 CC at para [24].  
309 Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: in re S v Walters 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC) at para [61]; Afrox Healthcare 
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6.17  DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW   
In K v Minister of Safety and Security, the Constitutional Court stated that the duty to apply s 
39(2) requires all courts ‘to be alert to the normative framework of the Constitution not only 
when a startling new development of the common law is in issue, but in all cases where the 
incremental development of a [common-law] rule is in issue.’310  The courts are duty bound to 
be vigilant of the common law to ensure that it is consonant with the sprit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights.311 
When a lower court is confronted with the possibility of the common law being inconsistent 
with the Constitution, the court must see if it can interpret the common law in a manner that is 
consistent with the Constitution. If it cannot interpret the common law to be consistent with the 
Constitution, the common law would be unconstitutional and would require development. The 
difficulty that lower courts face is that they cannot develop the common law. Common-law 
development falls to the superior courts.312 A small claims court would thus have to stop 
proceedings and inform the plaintiff that the matter needs to go to a superior court.313  
To illustrate the point, let us take the following scenario: A sues B in the small claims court for 
breach of contract. A relies on a term of the contract which amounts to a restrictive covenant. 
After a limitations analysis,314 the court finds that the restrictive covenant is discriminatory on 
a listed ground in terms of s 9315 of the Constitution. Would the court be obliged to stop 
proceedings? The answer depends on whether the court is expected to develop the common 
law.  It is trite that contracts should be upheld, unless they are deemed to be against public 
policy.316 Freedom of contract (pacta sunt servanda)317 and the rule against enforcing contracts 
																																																								
310 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) para [17]. 
311 See also Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) paras [33]-[39]. 
312 S v Thebus 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) para [31]. 
313 The court can rely on s 23 of the SCCA. 
314 Constitution, s 36. 
315 Section 9 of the Constitution entrenches the right to equality. 
316 See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
317 See ibid [57] and [87]. 
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that are against public policy318 are both common-law precepts. The Constitutional Court has 
held that the common-law principle of freedom of contract is not absolute, and that it can be 
limited where the contract is offensive to public policy.319 Today, public policy is grounded in 
the Constitution and, more specifically, the Bill of Rights.320 Given that the court, in the above 
factual scenario, is not being asked to develop any common-law rules but merely to give effect 
to the Bill of Rights within an existing common-law framework,321 there is no need for the court 
to stop proceedings. The court can decide the matter and give effect to constitutional values by 
refusing to enforce the restrictive covenant. It would do so by infusing the common-law public 
policy basis for setting aside contracts with constitutional values. The infusion, however, would 
have to be mindful of precedent. If the small claims court in question finds post-27 April 1994 
precedent that recognises the validity of the restrictive covenant, the precedent in question will 
tie the hands of the presiding officer.  
If one changed the scenario above to assume that the restrictive covenant itself was expressly 
recognised by the common law, then to overcome the restrictive covenant the court would have 
to develop the common law by specifically declaring the common-law rule unconstitutional. If 
this were the case, the small claims court would only be able to give effect to the Constitution 
by changing the common law. Since the small claims courts (as lower courts) cannot develop 
the common law and also cannot apply the Bill of Rights directly, the most appropriate course 
would be to stop proceedings and to invite the plaintiff to take the matter to a superior court.  
6.18  TRAINING OF PRESIDING OFFICERS    
To prevent miscarriages of justice in small claims courts, it is imperative that presiding officers 
acquire adequate training as regards their constitutional mandate. There is no indication from 
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The Law of Contract in South Africa 21ff. 
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any of the training322 that has been made available to commissioners thus far, that they have 
been specifically educated on their constitutional role and responsibilities. While one can 
clearly legislate the small claims courts’ lack of direct constitutional authority, it is difficult to 
legislate the courts’ indirect constitutional responsibilities because it is easier to legislate 
negative duties than positive responsibilities. Only adequate training can ensure that presiding 
officers can meet the challenge of applying their constitutional authority impartially and 
without favour, fear or prejudice.323 
 
PART VI 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE KENYAN SMALL CLAIMS COURTS UNDER THE 
KENYAN SMALL CLAIMS COURT ACT: SOME OBSERVATIONS 
6.19 MONETARY JURISDICTION 
Section 2 of the Kenyan Small Claim Courts Act legislates the monetary jurisdiction of the 
courts. The ‘prescribed limit’ of the court is ‘one hundred thousand shillings324 or such other 
sum as the Chief Justice may determine by notice in the Gazette.’ The Chief Justice, as the head 
of court, is thus clearly entitled to raise the jurisdictional monetary limit of the courts. As noted 
earlier, 325  in South Africa, the Minister of Justice is responsible for determining the 
jurisdictional limits of the courts. There seems to be merit in conferring the determination of 
jurisdictional limits on the head of the judiciary. This would also be consistent with ss 173 and 
165(6) of the Constitution. It would, however, mean that the powers and functions of the Chief 
Justice under s 8 of the SCA would have to be expanded. 
																																																								
322 See discussion in chapter 3. The Guidelines for Commissioners (2010), published by the Department of 
Justice, makes no mention of the constitutional responsibilities of the small claims courts.  
323 See Jagwanth ‘The Constitutional Responsibilities of Lower Courts’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 201 at 224. 
324 As at 12 June 2016, the rand equivalent was R13016, 34. 
325 See Chapter 4. 
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The Chief Justice of Kenya is also empowered to determine the ‘local limits of the jurisdiction 
of [the] Small Claims Court.’326 The purpose of this is to ensure that the courts are ‘accessible 
in every sub-county’ and that they meet the aim of being ‘decentralized units of judicial service 
delivery’.327 On various occasions, this chapter has highlighted the need for increasing the 
monetary jurisdictional limit of the South African small claims courts. If there is a fear that the 
dramatic increase of the limit will render small claims courts unwieldy due to sudden increases 
in workloads, then it seems that the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act provides an interesting 
alternative. South Africa could easily increase the jurisdiction of the small claims courts in its 
financial and commercials hubs; whereas the jurisdiction of the courts in other areas, where 
logistical arrangements do not support a dramatic increase in monetary jurisdiction, could be 
incrementally increased.  
6.20 JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF CAUSES OF ACTION 
Kenyan small claims courts have jurisdiction to determine ‘any civil claim’328 relating to: 
• A contract of sale and supply of goods or services; 
• a contract relating to money held and received; 
• liability in tort (delict) in respect of loss or damage caused to any property or for the delivery 
and recovery of movable property; 
• compensation for personal injuries; and  
• set off and counterclaim under any contract.329  
The courts are specifically precluded from hearing actions ‘founded upon defamation, libel, 
slander, malicious prosecution or is upon a dispute over a title to or possession of land, or 
employment or labour relations.’330  
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What is immediately discernable from the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act is that the provisions 
relating to causes of action read so much simpler than the South African counterpart. The Act 
makes it clear that there is a closed list of claims that the courts can hear. By being so clear, the 
legislature has avoided having to set out the jurisdictional rules relating to causes of action in 
overly technical terms.  
In keeping with the historical evolution of small claims courts, all consumer-related matters 
may be heard in the courts. The Kenyan courts do not suffer from the limitations imposed by s 
69 of the South African CPA.331 
The Kenyan small claims courts can easily hear debt recovery claims as they are not subject to 
the complex processes and procedures of the South African NCA.332 Interestingly, while the 
courts can hear damage to property claims (movable and immovable), they cannot hear disputes 
arising from title to or possession of land. The restriction makes perfect sense given that the 
jurisdictional limits of small claims courts are not conducive to hearing immovable property 
claims involving title to or possession of land.333 A limiting feature is that counterclaims or set-
off may only be entertained in respect of contractual claims. It is submitted that perhaps, it 
would have been better to allow for counterclaims in tort (delict) matters too. However, the fact 
that set-off is permitted suggests that the counterclaim in question need not be incidental to the 
main claim.334 As long as two debts are due, they may be set-off against each other.335 
6.21 JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF PERSONS 
The determination of the locality to sue is much more relaxed in the Kenyan Small Claims 
Court Act. The claimant (plaintiff) may sue either where he or she ‘resides’ or ‘carries on 
																																																								
331 See the discussion on page 42ff above. 
332  See discussion on on page 38ff above. 
333 See discussion on page 36ff above. 
334 See discussion on page 70ff above. 
335 See Van der Merwe, Lubbe Contract – General Principles (2003) 515.  
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business’ or where the respondent (defendant) ‘resides’.336 The principle of actor sequitur 
forum rei therefore has been relaxed.337  
Where there are multiple plaintiffs such as trustees of a trust or executors of a deceased estate, 
there is no need to establish that a jurisdictional link exists in respect of all such parties. In 
terms of s 16(1) of the Act, ‘two or more persons [having] claims against the same respondent’ 
may bring their claims in the name of ‘one of such persons as the representative of some or all 
of them’ provided that the authority to act is given in writing.338 
The Act makes no reference to jurisdiction being established on the basis of ‘employment’. It 
is submitted that the absence of ‘employment’ as a jurisdictional link is quite nuanced, as it 
prevents a defendant from being embarrassed by service of process at the place of his or her 
employment – which is where service of process could take place in the South African context 
for the court of the defendant’s employment locality to have jurisdiction over the matter.339  
A court where the ‘cause of action arose’ or ‘where the contract to which the claim relates was 
either made or was intended to be performed’ will also have jurisdiction to hear a matter.340 It 
is axiomatic that the ‘whole’ cause of action does not have to have arisen in the jurisdiction of 
the court. The plaintiff only needs to establish that a part of the cause of action arose in the 
jurisdiction of the court. This is a far cry from the South African position where it is notoriously 
difficult to establish jurisdiction on the basis of cause of action.341  
The Kenyan Small Claims Court Act deals with jurisdiction in an uncomplicated way. The 
provisions are short and to the point. There is no mention of ‘specific performance’ or various 
rules detailing the calculation of monetary claims.342 A matter either falls within the jurisdiction 
																																																								
336 Kenyan Small Claims Court Act, s 15(1)(a) read with s 15(1)(e). 
337 See discussion on page 62 above. 
338 Kenyan Small Claims Court Act, s 16(1). See discussion on page 64. 
339 See discussion on page 52ff above. 
340 Kenyan Small Claims Court Act, s 15(1)(c). 
341 See discussion on page 72ff above. 
342 See § 6.6 and discussion on page 29 above. 
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of the court or it does not.  Perhaps, most significantly, the Act does not prevent the State from 
being sued in the small claims courts. This speaks to the confidence of the Kenyans as regards 
the place of small claims courts in the overall civil justice system.  
PART VII 
6.22  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has exhibited the complex nature of establishing jurisdiction in South African 
small claims courts. The complexity is to a large extent attributed to the way in which the SCCA 
was drafted. The legislature, by and large, copied the cumbersome provisions of the MCA into 
the SCCA. The legislative drafting process displays a lack of creative design for what was to 
be a unique set of courts. The rules of jurisdiction are complex. Therefore, they do not promote 
access to justice. Instead, they hamper access to justice.  
The complexities of establishing jurisdiction run like a thread throughout the procedures of the 
small claims courts. This will be appreciated in the next chapter, which deals with parties to 




PARTIES IN THE SMALL CLAIMS COURTS 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
ho may sue and be sued in the small claims courts has been the subject of debate. Should 
the State be permitted to sue and to be sued in the small claims courts? What about juristic 
persons? There is the overwhelming consensus that juristic persons should be capable of being sued 
in the small claims courts. But, differences of opinion exist about whether they should be permitted 
to sue.  
It is not contentious that natural persons should sue and be sued in the small claims courts. After all, 
the purpose of small claims courts is to hear the ‘ordinary day-to-day grievances and disputes 
involving the common [person]’ who cannot afford the cost of litigation in a small claim.1 What 
remains unsettled in the literature is whether natural persons should be allowed to bring actions in 
their personal capacities only, or whether they should be allowed to institute actions in the names of 
their alter egos, such as partnerships, sole proprietors, firms, etc. Even though these are not juristic 
persons, people often operate small businesses via these vehicles. 
An ancillary question to the debate of who may sue and be sued in the small claims courts is whether 
legal representation should be permitted. Should lawyers be allowed to represent clients in the small 
claims courts and if they are allowed, what role should they play? Does the lack of legal representation 
prejudice the lay litigant?  
                                                             





This chapter will address the above issues, having regard to the South African socio-economic 
context, as well as the relevant provisions of the SCCA and SCCRs. Where relevant, 
recommendations will be made for reform.  
7.2  RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Section 7 of the SCCA provides:  
‘7. Parties who may appear in court 
(1)  Only a natural person may institute an action in a court and, subject to the provisions of section 14 (2), 
a juristic person may become a party to an action in a court only as defendant. 
(2)  A party to an action shall appear in person before the court and, subject to the provisions of subsection 
(4), shall not be represented by any person during the proceedings. 
(3) ...... 
  
(4)  A juristic person shall be represented in a court by its duly nominated director or other officer.’ 
 
The above section was amended by the Small Claims Courts Amendment Act.2 The Amendment Act 
deleted subsection (3) of the original version of the SCCA. The former subsection 3 read as follows: 
‘(3) A minor or other person who does not have the capacity to institute or defend proceedings in a court of 
law unassisted, shall be assisted in a court by his parent, spouse, guardian, as the case may be.’ 
 
The implications of the Amendment Act and the deletion of subsection (3) will be canvassed in §7.4 
below. 
Tucked away in s 14(2) of the SCCA appears the following provision: 
 ‘(2) No action shall be instituted against the State in a court.’  
It is axiomatic from a reading of s 7(1) read with s 14(2) that the State can neither sue nor be sued in 
a small claims court. The definition of ‘the State’ as well as the constitutional implications of the 
State’s exclusion from the small claims courts are discussed in §7.3 below.  
Aside from the SCCA, the SCCRs also have a bearing on parties and their locus standi to appear in 
                                                             
2 92 of 1986. 
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the small claims courts. In this regard, there are two rules that require analysis: rules 23 and 27. Small 
Claims Court Rule 23 provides: 
‘23. Representation of parties 
(1)  It shall not be necessary for any person to file a power of attorney to act on behalf of a legal entity, but 
the authority of any person acting for such a party may be challenged by the other party during the 
proceedings after he has noticed that such person is so acting and thereupon such person may not 
without the leave of the court so act further until he has satisfied the court during the proceedings that 
he has authority so to act. 
(2)  If a party dies or becomes incompetent to continue an action the action shall thereby be stayed until 
such time as an executor, trustee, guardian or other competent person has been appointed in his place 
or until such incompetence shall cease to exist. 
(3)  Where an executor, trustee, guardian or other competent person has been so appointed, the court may, 
on verbal application, order that he be substituted in the place of the party who has so died or become 
incompetent.’ 
The above provision allows for a substitution of parties where legal incapacity or death intervenes 
during proceedings pending before the court.  
Small Claims Court Rule 27 was discussed in chapter 6.3 For the sake of convenience, the Rule bears 
repetition: 
‘27. Actions by and against partners, a person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name, 
syndicate or association 
(1)  Any person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name or two or more persons 
who are co-partners may be sued in such name or style or in the name of the partnership. 
(2)  The provisions of this rule shall also mutatis mutandis apply to an unincorporated company, syndicate 
or association.’ 
 
Small Claims Court Rules 23 and 27 are discussed in §7.4 below.   
All of the above provisions inform the current state of the law as regards parties and their locus standi 
to sue and to defend proceedings in the small claims courts. 
                                                             
3 See §6.13. 
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7.3 THE ‘STATE’ AS A PARTY 
(a)  What is ‘the State’ for the purposes of the Small Claims Courts Act? 
The SCCA is clear: ‘the State’ may not be sued in the small claims courts.4 The fact that only natural 
persons can sue in the small claims courts5 means that the State may not sue as a plaintiff either.  
 ‘The State’ is not defined in the SCCA or the Interpretation Act.6 One may be inclined to refer to the 
Constitution. Section 239 of the Constitution provides: 
‘organ of state means –  
(a) any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government; or 
(b)    any other functionary or institution- 
(i)    exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution; or 
(ii)    exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation, but does 
not include a court or a judicial officer.’ 
The Constitution’s definition of ‘organ of state’ is not indicative of what ‘the State’ means in all 
legislation, or more particularly the SCCA. The correct approach to determine the meaning of ‘the 
State’ is found in Thomas v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans.7 In that case, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal was required to interpret the phrase ‘including the State’ for the purposes of s 35(1) 
of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act.8 It is common cause that the statute 
in question did not define ‘the State’.9 Relying on the decision in Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard,10 
the Supreme Court of Appeal held:  
‘A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that the words in a statute must be given their ordinary 
grammatical meaning, unless to do so would result in an absurdity. There are three important interrelated riders 
to this general principle, namely: 
(a) that statutory provisions should always be interpreted purposively; 
(b) the relevant statutory provision must be properly contextualised; and 
(c) all statutes must be construed consistently with the Constitution, that is, where reasonably possible, 
legislative provisions ought to be interpreted to preserve their constitutional validity. This proviso to 
the general principle is closely related to the purposive approach referred to in (a). 
                                                             
4 See §7.2. 
5 SCCA, s 7(1). 
6 33 of 1957. 
7 2015 (1) SA 253 (A). 
8 130 of 1993. Thomas v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans supra [1].   
9 Thomas v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans supra [9]. 
10  2014 (4) SA 474 (CC) para [28]. 
 
 214 
In addition this court has said that the process of interpretation is objective and '(t)he inevitable point of departure 
is the language of the provision itself read in context and having regard to the purpose of the provision and the 
background to the preparation and production of the document.’11 
The court drew attention to Holeni v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa.12  In 
Holeni, the question arose whether ‘the Land Bank [can] be considered to be the State as referred to 
in s 11(b) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969.’13 Navsa JA held: 
‘(t)he State as a concept does not have a universal meaning. Its precise meaning always depends on the context 
within which it is used.’14 
Relying on the dictum in Holeni, the court in the Thomas case concluded: 
‘What is clear from this is that the term ‘the State’ may have different meanings in different contexts and in 
different legislation.’15 
What is clear from Holeni and Thomas is that s 239 of the Constitution is not indicative of what 
constitutes ‘the State’ for all legislation. The meaning of ‘the State’ in legislation has to be 
‘contextualised’. Furthermore, a statute does not have to be read in conformity with the Constitution 
in all cases, especially where the statute is not subject to a constitutional challenge. Since the meaning 
of ‘the State’ in s 14(2) of the SCCA is not subject to a constitutional challenge, s 239 of the 
Constitution has no bearing on the content of the phrase. The meaning of ‘the State’ in the SCCA has 
to be determined by having regard to the prevailing context at the time when the SCCA was drafted 
and enacted.   
The Hoexter Commission Report16 does not help to identify the legislative intent behind the use of 
the phrase ‘the State’ in the SCCA. At no point in the Report does the Commission recommend that 
‘the State’ should not sue and be sued in the small claims courts.  
                                                             
11 Thomas v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans supra [8]. 
12 2009 (4) SA 437 (SCA).   
13 Holeni v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa supra [10]. 
14 Holeni v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa supra [11]. 
15 Thomas v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans supra [10]. 
16 Discussed in chapter 2. 
 
 215 
In an instructive article17 written in 1982, Baxter tried to make sense of the meaning of the phrase 
‘the State’ in the then-prevailing constitutional and administrative law jurisprudence.18 He lamented 
that phrases such as ‘the Republic’, ‘the State’ and ‘the Government’ ‘are tossed about with gay 
abandon’,19 and that it is often difficult to fathom what was meant when these terms were used in 
legislation. Baxter distinguished between ‘the State’ and ‘the Government’. The latter term, he 
argued, was much wider than the phrase ‘the State.’ ‘The Government’ referred to the ‘legislative, 
executive and judicial branches and covered all the various organs of the State’.20 Baxter found that 
after South Africa became a Republic in 1961, the word ‘State’ replaced the word ‘Crown’ in South 
African legislation.21 The word ‘State’ as a synonym for the ‘Crown’ was something more than ‘the 
administration’22 but less than ‘the Government’, as ‘the State’ did not, for example, include the 
judiciary.  
Baxter noted that what was meant by ‘the State’ differed under national law when compared to 
international law.  Under international law, ‘State’ referred to a particular territory and the people 
within it. Hence, in international law one talks of ‘State parties’.23  The ‘State’ under national law 
referred to certain agencies of ‘the Government’.  The difficulty, however, was that it was not easy 
to discern what the legislature intended when it referred to ‘the State’ because the phrase was often 
repeated ‘laconically’24 and inconsistently in legislation. 25 Baxter concluded: 
‘“[T]he State” appears to be used collectively as a collective noun for: 
                                                             
17 Baxter ‘“The State” and other Basic Terms in Public Law’ (1982) 99 SALJ 212. 
18 See also L Baxter Administrative Law (1984). In this work, Baxter draws heavily from the research conducted for his 
article ‘“The State” and other Basic Terms in Public Law’ (n17). 
19 Baxter (n17).  
20 Baxter (n17) 216. 
21 Baxter (n17) 221. 
22 Baxter (n17) 235 writes: ‘“Administration” is one of the most notoriously ambiguous terms in public law…’ He goes 
on to say: 
 ‘… since all organs of government perform all three functions [executive, legislative and judicial], we are driven 
to saying that “the administration”  consists of all the organs of “the State” apart from those almost solely 
concerned with legislating (that is Parliament, the provincial councils and the homeland legislative assemblies) 
or adjudicating (the Supreme Court and (?) magistrates’ courts, but not administrative courts).’  
23 Baxter (n17) 221-222. 
24 Baxter (n17) 223. 
25 Baxter (n17) 224. 
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(a) the collective wealth (“estate”) and liabilities of the sovereign territory known as the “Republic of South 
Africa” which are not owned or owed by private individuals or corporations; and  
(b) the conglomeration or organs, instruments and institutions which have as their common purpose the 
“management” of the public affairs, in the public interest, of the residents of the Republic of South 
Africa as well those of her citizens abroad in their relations with the South African “Government”.’26 
Baxter qualified the above summary with the following caveat: ‘This description can never be 
anything more than a rough guide.’27 After surveying various legislative enactments in force in the 
1980s, as well as pronouncements of the courts, Baxter concluded that when the legislature used the 
phrase ‘the State’ in legislation, the reference was in almost all cases to the executive of the 
government and in some instances to the provincial organs of the government.28 From Baxter’s 
analysis, it appears that ‘the State’ rarely referred to local government. This interpretation makes 
perfect sense and explains why municipalities, which were more localised forms of government in 
the 1980s, were frequently sued in the small claims courts.29 They were not seen as part of ‘the State’ 
for the purposes of the SCCA.  
Having regard to Baxter’s analysis and the test employed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the 
Thomas30 case, one can conclude that the reference to ‘the State’ in the SCCA is to what we would 
call today the ‘national government’ (including the executive). It probably also includes what is 
known in modern parlance as the ‘provincial government’. One cannot, however, be absolutely 
certain about the latter interpretation because the courts have not interpreted the meaning of ‘the 
State’ in the SCCA. Baxter found, provincial authority was often, but not always, considered to be 
part of ‘the State’ in 1980s legislation.  What appears certain from Baxter’s analysis is that it is highly 
unlikely that ‘the State’ as conceived in the 1980s, when the SCCA was drafted and later enacted, 
included local government (municipalities).31 
                                                             
26 Baxter (n17) 225-226. 
27 Baxter (n17) 225. 
28 Baxter (n17) 227. 
29 In am indebted to Mr Van Greese for this information. He also serves as the Chair of the Small Claims Committee of 
the Law Society of South Africa. 
30 Thomas v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans supra.   
31 Bredenkamp The Small Claims Court states: 
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Chapter 6 drew attention to the fact that municipalities are currently sued in the small claims courts32 
– a situation that is contrary to the current ‘official’33 position. Given the discussion above, it would 
thus appear that the small claims courts do have jurisdiction to hear claims involving local 
government and that the presiding officers of some small claims courts are following past practice. 
Their interpretation of the SCCA is consistent with the approach adopted in the Thomas34  and 
Holeni35 cases – that the meaning of ‘the State’ can differ from s 239 of the Constitution, in so far as 
‘the State’ may ‘have different meanings in different contexts and in different legislation.’   
The SCCA should be amended to contain a definition of ‘the State’, as this will clarify matters. If it 
is intended that the State should be precluded from being a party in the small claims courts in the 
future, the definition of ‘the State’ should include national and provincial government. However, it 
is submitted that the definition should exclude local government. Service delivery at local government 
level is an issue in South Africa.36 Litigants should be able to hold local government accountable in 
                                                             
‘A plaintiff desiring to sue a State Department will have to use another competent court such as the Magistrates’ 
Court.’  
Although Bredenkamp makes no mention of municipalities in his commentary, the writer connects the ‘the State’ in the 
SCCA with ‘State Department’, which is indicative of a more centralised form of government, as opposed to 
municipalities, which are localised forms of government.   
32 See §6.11. 
33 The Western Cape Government and the Department of Justice seem to think that municipalities and Local Government 
cannot be sued in the small claims court: https://www.westerncape.gov.za/service/small-claims-courts (last accessed 1 
April 2017); http://www.justice.gov.za/scc/scc.htm (last accessed 1 April 2017). The information is incorrect because the 
State’s interpretation relies on s 239 of the Constitution. That interpretation overlooks the legislative history and the 
context of the SCCA. Older websites are emphatic that municipalities can be sued in the small claims courts. See, for 
example: https://ossafrica.com/esst/index.php?title=Using_the_Small_Claims_Court (last accessed on 1 April 2017). 
This website was last updated in April 2009. The modern interpretation seems to stem from the publication by the 
Department of Justice of Small Claims Courts: Guidelines for Commissioners. See §3.8 for the origins of this publication.  
In the publication, the following is incorrectly stated at 30: 
‘The term “State” includes the provincial administrations and municipalities (Local Government).’  
After 2010 and coinciding with the publication of the Guidelines, information websites took the position that 
municipalities cannot be sued in the small claims courts. Despite these information sites and the Department of Justice’s 
official position, it is nevertheless interesting to note that some commissioners still hear matters involving municipalities. 
This issue has not come before the superior courts. The reason for this might well be that after a judgment is made against 
the municipality, the sheriff, who is responsible for the execution of the judgment, simply ignores it. 
34 Thomas v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans supra.  
35 Holeni v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa supra .  
36 De Visser, Steytler ‘Confronting the State of Local Government: The 2013 Constitutional Court Decisions’ (2017) 7 
Constitutional Court Review 1; Bilchitz ‘Citizenship and Community: Exploring the Right to Receive Basic Municipal 
Services in Joseph’ (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 45. In a keynote address titled ‘The Major Risks Facing South 
Africa Going Forward from the Public Protectors Point of View and Consequences of Risks that have Materialised in 
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the small claims courts for claims that fall within their jurisdiction. Residents should not have to incur 
exorbitant costs when enforcing claims against local government. Permitting people to sue local 
government in the small claims courts might marginally37 improve services at local government level. 
It will afford citizens (especially the poor, living in informal settlements) the ability to exercise their 
basic rights to proper services, without having to resort to violent protests38 as a vehicle for social 
justice. In many cases, where local government is sued in the courts, parties claim money owed to 
them in respect of incorrect assessments39 relating to rates and levies40 or they sue for damages41 
pursuant to poor municipal services. There is no reason why this type of claim cannot be brought in 
a small claims court if it is of such a value that it falls within the monetary jurisdiction of the small 
claims courts.  
                                                             
Respect of the Impact of Government, Business and Citizens’ delivered by Adv K Malunga, the Deputy Public Protector 
of South Africa, at the Risk Management South Africa Conference held on 17 September 2015, the following was stated: 
‘Arguably the greatest single failure of governance in South Africa is at local government level, as the lives of 
far too many citizens – especially those in small towns and rural areas – remain basically unchanged. Ironically 
by volume we as Public Protector South Africa receive the highest number of complaints against municipalities.’ 
37 The causes of a lack of service delivery are complicated and require a multifaceted approach as identified by Fjeldstat 
‘What’s Trust got to do with it? Non-payment of Service Charges in Local Authorities in South Africa (2004) 42 Journal 
of Modern African Studies 539-562.  Fjeldstat indicates that one cannot lay all blame at the doorsteps of the Government 
because since 1994 there has also been what he calls a ‘culture of entitlement’ whereby people expect services without 
paying for them.  Vandalism, theft and a lack of social cohesion have also contributed to the service delivery difficulties 
in the country. See also City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) para [93]; Liebenberg v Bergrivier 
Municipality 2013 (5) SA 246 (CC) para [80].  
38 Powell, M O’Donnovan, De Visser Civil Protests Barometer 2007-2014 state at 6: 
‘Ever since data was first recorded in 2007 it is clear that an ever increasing proportion of protests involve 
violence...In 2007 just less than half (46 percent) of all protests were associated with some form of violence. By 
2014 83 percent of protests involved violence on the part of the protesters or the authorities.  
… Physical attacks on individuals were less prominent (315 protests). The destruction of property (including 
arson) was recorded more often than attacks on individuals (a combined total of 372 protests). Two-thirds of the 
types of violence recorded at protests thus went beyond “mere” intimidation and involved the destruction of 
property, assault, looting and even death.’ 
39 Beamish ‘New Property Owners Held Liable for Defaulters Dues’ (30 April 2014) in Moneyweb reported that in the 
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality ‘[m]unicipal accounts are notoriously inaccurate and are often hugely 
overinflated.’ See also: http://www.biznews.com/undictated/2016/03/03/my-r89-000-water-bill-any-suggestions-on-
what-to-do-now/ (last accessed 1 November 2016); http://www.knysnaplettherald.com/news/News/Southern-Cape-
Property/137109/Court-decides-against-municipal-rates (last accessed 1 November 2016).  
40 People often pay rates and levies under a state of duress. It is not uncommon for municipalities to turn off people’s 
water or electricity supply if their rates and levies are not up to date. Municipalities also reserve the right to sell people’s 
houses to recover outstanding money for rates and levies. See Beamish (note 39). 
41 For example, personal injury due to a badly maintained pavement, or damage to a vehicle on account of a pothole: 
Hume v Divisional Council of Cradock (1880) 1 EDC 104; Jordaan v Worcester Municipality  (1893) 10 SC 159; 
Halliwell v Johannesburg Municipal Council 1912 AD 659. For a list of municipality cases, see Boberg The Law of Delict 
– Acquillian Liability  Vol 1.. See also du Bois ‘State Liability in South Africa: A Constitutional Remix’ (2010) 25 Tulane 
European and Civil Law Forum 139 at 149ff.  
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A monetary judgment granted in a small claims court against local government is executable. The 
State Liability Act,42 which amongst other things restricts the enforcement of judgments against 
national and provincial government,43 does not apply to municipalities.44 
It is interesting to note that in Kenya45 and other places46 the State or organs of State47 may be sued 
in small claims courts. This speaks to the confidence of those governments in their small claims 
courts.  
If the small claims courts had jurisdiction to hear claims against the State, there is little doubt that 
litigation against the State would increase.  This could be detrimental to the public purse, but only in 
the short term. The long-term gain would be that State performance would improve, and this could 
result in the reduction of claims overall. Furthermore, if the small claims courts had a measure of 
limited jurisdiction to hear claims against the State, the State would in all likelihood save a significant 
amount in legal costs.48  Matters would be resolved quickly and efficiently through an official, 
impartial and unbiased court process in which legal representation is not permited. The State would 
                                                             
42 20 of 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘State Liability Act’). 
43 Section 4 read with s 4A of the State Liability Act. See also Paleker The South African Sheriff’s Guide – Practice and 
Procedure (revision service 1, 2016) 10-3, 10-4. 
44 In terms of s 152(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003, a municipality can, 
however, apply to the High Court for debt relief and restructuring. When this happens, all legal proceedings, including 
the execution of legal processes, will be stayed. 
45 As long as a matter falls within the jurisdiction of the small claims court, the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act of 2016 
does not restrict the categories of persons who may be sued. There is no provision in the Act that makes the State immune 
from litigation in the small claims court. See §6.21.  
46 See Saskatchewan: Small Claims Courts Act, 1997, ss 2(a), (d), (f). In California local government agencies can sue 
and be sued in the small claims courts: The California Code of Civil Procedure Ch 5.5, Art 4, s 116.420 (c); Pagter, 
McCloskey, Reinis ‘The California Small Claims Court’ (1964) 52 California Law Review 876 at 884, 887. 
47 In New York, a municipality may be sued: see Kaye, Lippman A Guide to Small Claims Courts in the NYS City, Town 
and Village Courts (2014) 2.   
48 Van Onselen ‘Counting the Costs of the Government’s Legal Fees’ (21 February 2017) Financial Mail writes that in 
2016 alone the Government spent R873 million on legal services, and that was only at national department level. See 
also ‘South Africa’s Department of Home Affairs Legal Fees Total Almost R50 million’: 
https://www.immigrationsouthafrica.org/blog/department-of-home-affairs-tackled-democratic-alliance/ (last accessed 1 
April 2017); Op-Ed ‘Personal Legal Cost Orders Against Rogue Public Officials are the Frontline in the War Against 
Impunity’ Daily Maverick (19 April 2017): https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-04-19-op-ed-personal-legal-
cost-orders-against-rogue-public-officials-are-the-frontline-in-the-war-against-impunity/#.WQxKRVKB2ZM (last 
accessed 1 April 2017); Op-Ed ‘Making Legal Costs Personal Would Reduce Silly State Cases’ Accountability Now (17 




also be showing good faith to its citizens in terms of providing an accessible, cheap and efficient 
forum for the ventilation of limited types of disputes. 
The intensity and scale of service delivery protests in recent years are the greatest threat to the rule 
of law and democratic values.49 To deny the poor and the marginalised accessible and legitimate 
forums to resolve their disputes will only intensify their efforts to obtain redress by all means possible, 
even violent conflict.  For these reasons the small claims courts should, as a minimum, adjudicate 
claims against local government. As localised grassroots courts, operating within communities, small 
claims courts have the potential of making a significant contribution in terms of ameliorating feelings 
of alienation and helplessness experienced by so many. Having the courts adjudicate matters might 
also result in the reduction of damage to infrastructure, which seems to be the inevitable consequence 
of violent protests. 
(b) Is it unconstitutional to immunise the State from being sued in the small claims courts? 
A legislative ouster of the jurisdiction of some courts to hear certain matters is not unconstitutional 
if there is a good reason for the limitation. The Labour Relations Act,50 for example, establishes 
mechanisms for the resolution of labour-related disputes.51 The small claims courts, magistrates’ 
courts and High Courts are precluded from hearing labour matters. The Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration and the Labour Court, established in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 
must resolve labour disputes. Special labour dispute resolution mechanisms are said to best protect 
workers’ rights. Another example is the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation 
of Land Act,52 which provides that only the magistrates’ courts and the High Courts may grant 
                                                             
49 See address by the Deputy Public Protector in note 36.  
50 66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Labour Relations Act’). 
51 Labour Relations Act, Chapter VII.  
52 19 of 1998. 
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eviction orders.53 This is to secure tenants’ rights to housing.54 A third example is that of the validity 
and interpretation of wills, which are matters that the High Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over,55 
as they relate to the status of people.  
Claims against the State can be heard in the magistrates’ courts56 and the High Courts. The courts 
have wide jurisdiction to hear civil claims involving the State. Consequently, it cannot be said that 
the prohibition relating to claims against the State in the small claims courts is automatically 
unconstitutional. To make such an argument one would have to argue that the Constitution has been 
violated in some way. 
One could perhaps make the case that s 34 of the Constitution is violated in that litigants have 
restricted access to justice in matters involving ‘the State’. Litigants are more likely to be able to 
afford to sue the State in the small claims courts than in the other courts. However, as noted in chapter 
1, the right of access to justice is not absolute and may be subject to limitations. The right does not 
guarantee that the State must make litigation affordable in every instance. Such a proposition would 
place an enormous burden on the State to allocate vast resources to the justice sector.  At best, the 
State must take progressive steps to make courts available to hear civil claims. The State must also 
provide the infrastructure and the legislative framework to make litigation speedy, effective and 
generally affordable so that litigants’ rights to equality,57 equal treatment before the law,58 and 
dignity59 are realised.  But ‘the State’ can limit the types of matters that some courts are allowed to 
hear if such a limitation would be in the interest of the administration of justice and good governance.  
                                                             
53 See the definition of ‘court’ in s 1.  
54 Constitution, s 26. 
55 MCA, s 46(2)(a). 
56 MCA, s 28(2); SCA, s 21, and the interpretation thereto in van Loggerenberg Erasmus Superior Courts Practice 
(Original Service, 2015) A2-100.  
57 Constitution, s 9 
58 Constitution, s 9(1)  




There may be sound policy reasons for removing matters involving the State from the jurisdiction of 
small claims courts, such as: (i) to better maintain control over the public purse; (ii) to enable the 
State to appeal matters in the public interest; and (iii) to efficiently manage its human resources and 
administrative processes. On account of the lack of an appeals process,60 and the truncated and 
informal procedures in the small claims courts,61 it may not be in the public interest to pursue some 
or all claims involving the State in the small claims courts. The State may not have adequate human 
agents within its available resources to effectively represent it in the small claims courts. It is trite 
that cases come before the small claims courts much faster than those in the magistrates’ courts. There 
is no system of pleadings or pre-trial procedures.62 The State could easily find itself in a situation 
where it is regularly unable to defend proceedings in the small claims courts because bureaucratic 
procedures prevent it from preparing for cases quickly. This will prejudice the tax payer because 
defaults judgments63 will be levied against the public purse. On the flipside, the functioning of the 
courts may be compromised. Presiding officers may be inclined to grant the State postponements for 
extended periods of time so that it may adequately prepare for court. This might, in turn, have the 
unintended consequence of limiting the efficiency of the courts as forums of speedy redress. 
Consequently, the mere limitation on the small claims courts to hear matters involving the State is 
not in itself unconstitutional. The limitation must be seen in the broader context, having regard to the 
role and function of small claims courts, and the expectations on these courts to provide simplified 
processes and procedures. 
                                                             
60 SCCA, s 45 
61 See discussion in chapter 8.  
62 See discussion in chapter 8. 
63 Where a defendant fails to appear at court on the date of the trial, the court can grant default judgment in favour of the 
plaintiff: SCCA, s 35(1). See also discussion in chapter 9. 
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Notwithstanding the above considerations, there may be a moral imperative for the State to engage 
its citizens in an easily accessible forum.  Open, transparent and accountable government are 
cornerstone values enshrined in the Constitution.64 When citizens are unable to hold organs of State 
accountable because they do not have the means to access courts, it does not bode well for justice as 
many wrongs will go unchecked.  
The unaffordability of litigation by the poor and middle-income people65 in South Africa threatens 
the democratic participation of many millions who cannot access justice and the equal protection of 
the law.66 To exclude the small claims courts altogether from holding organs of State accountable 
sends a message that the State does not take the access to justice dilemma in South Africa seriously 
enough to warrant even low-level engagement with the needs of the citizenry. It is submitted that the 
SCCA should be amended and that, as a minimum, small claims courts should hear matters involving 
local government.  
(c) The State should be sued but should not sue in the small claims courts 
If the position is adopted in the future whereby the State or some organs of the State can be parties to 
proceedings in the small claims courts, the State must have a qualified right to appear in the small 
claims courts, in that the State should not be permitted to sue in the small claims courts.  
The law, and more specifically, procedural law must be vigilant of the power imbalance between the 
State and the citizen. The State occupies the powerful position of being able to use the machinery of 
                                                             
64 Constitution, s 1(d); South African Government Mid-Term Self-Assessment Report – National Action Plan 2013-2015 
3.  
65 See the discussion about the ‘missing middle’ in chapter 1.  
66 Habscheid ‘The Fundamental Principles of the Law of Civil Procedure’ (1984) 17 The Comparative and International 
Law Journal of Southern Africa 1 at 22 writes: 
‘Indeed, to interpret the plaintiff’s access to court as a right one can exercise against the state is not an expression 
of extreme dogmatism, but rather a conception which condemns every denial of justice, whether formal or real, 
open or covert, as a betrayal by the state. And it appears that certain dilatory procedural practices, as well as 




government, which includes its laws (adjectival and substantive), to subvert the rights of citizens.67 
The small claims courts should remain as forums wherein natural person plaintiffs, and perhaps 
juristic plaintiffs,68 can sue. The small claims courts should not be forums for the State, in any of its 
guises, to bring actions against citizens.69  
A decision of a small claims court is final and cannot be appealed.70 It seems morally unfair for 
defendant citizens to be bound by judgments made in favour of the State in respect of which there is 
no right of appeal.71 The lack of appeal against the State may also undermine the constitutional 
imperative of open, transparent and accountable government.  
The moral and constitutional objection is, however, absent if a citizen plaintiff initiates proceedings 
against the State because the plaintiff would have the choice of either instituting an action in the 
magistrates’ courts or the small claims courts. If an action is instituted in a magistrates’ court, the 
plaintiff will enjoy the right of appeal.72 If the plaintiff elects to sue in a small claims court, he or she 
would be waiving the right to appeal.  
                                                             
67 The rules of procedure can affect the application, development and interpretation of substantive law. See in this regard 
Habscheid (n66). Civil processes and procedures that constitute the law of civil procedure are not benign. They can 
materially affect the substantive rights of people. For an illustrative example, see: Lawyers for Human Rights v Rules 
Board for Courts of Law and Another [2012] 3 All SA 153 (GNP).  
68 See the discussion in §7.5 below.  
69 It is not common for the State to sue citizens. However, there is nothing to preclude the State from enforcing contractual 
obligations or bringing delictual actions. It is trite that the small claims courts can hear actions based on contract or delict: 
see chapter 6.  
70 SCCA, s 45. A decision of a small claims court can only be taken on review. The grounds of review are limited: SCCA, 
s 46. 
71 In countries where the State is permitted to sue in the small claims courts, it is generally (though not always) the case 
that a decision of the small claims court can be taken on appeal.  For example, see s 38(1) of the Kenyan Small Claims 
Courts Act of 2016; Code of Civil Procedure of California, Part 1, Title 1, Chapter 5.5, Article 7, s 116.710.  
72 In chapter 9 it is argued that the SCCA should be amended to permit magistrates to refer matters to the small claims 
court if the claim falls within the jurisdiction of the small claims court. If this suggestion is accepted, in cases involving 
the State, the magistrate would have to factor in the lack of an appeals process in the small claims court, and this 
consideration should be sufficient to allow the plaintiff to continue in the magistrates’ court.  
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If an appeal mechanism is introduced into the small claims courts,73 the arguments above would no 
longer be applicable and there would be no principled objection to the State initiating actions in the 
small claims courts. 
(d)  The Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain Organs of State Act74 
When an organ of State is sued, the plaintiff is required to comply with the Institution of Legal 
Proceedings Against Certain Organs of State Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘PACOS’).  PACOS is 
binding whenever an ‘organ of [S]tate’ is sued. For the purposes of the Act75, an organ of State refers 
to national, provincial and local government.76 In terms of PACOS, national departments, Provincial 
departments, municipalities, functionaries or institutions exercising a power or performing a function 
under the Constitution or a provincial constitution are all organs of State.77 
The Act applies to ‘debts’ owed by organs of State. A ‘debt’ is any obligation arising from any cause 
of action such as contract, delict or statutory liability, stemming from either acts or omissions, for 
which an organ of State is liable. It is trite that the debt could also result from vicarious liability in 
the law of delict.78 
In terms of s 3(1) of PACOS, no legal proceedings for the recovery of a debt may be instituted against 
an organ of State unless the creditor has given the organ of State in question notice in writing of his 
or her intention to institute the legal proceedings. The organ of State may consent in writing to the 
institution of the legal proceedings without notice.  
                                                             
73 But see discussion in chapter 8.  
74 40 of 2002. For the legislative history of this statute see Paleker ‘Letters of Demand (Interpellatio Extraiudicialis): 
Form and Substance’ (2005) 30 Journal for Juridical Science 68. 
75 See discussion at §7.3. 
76 PACOS, s 1.  
77 PACOS, s 1(1). 
78 PACOS, s 1(1). For more on the subject see Boonzaier ‘State Liability in South Africa: A More Direct Approach’ 
(2013) 130 SALJ 330ff. 
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The notice of intention to institute legal proceedings must be served on the organ of State within six 
calendar months from the date on which the debt became due.79 The notice must briefly set out the 
facts giving rise to the debt and particulars of the debt as are within the knowledge of the creditor.80 
A debt is not due until the creditor has knowledge of the identity of the organ of State and of the facts 
giving rise to the debt. The creditor is regarded as having acquired such knowledge as soon as the 
creditor could have acquired the information by exercising reasonable care, unless the organ of State 
wilfully prevented its acquisition.81 A defect in the content of the notice can be waived by the organ 
of State.82 
If an organ of State relies83 on a creditor's failure to serve a notice, the creditor may apply to a court 
having jurisdiction for condonation of the failure.84 The court may grant condonation if it is satisfied 
that the debt has not prescribed, good cause exists for the failure by the creditor, and the organ of 
State is not unreasonably prejudiced by the failure.85  
Section 4 of PACOS sets out how a notice must be served, namely hand delivery, certified mail, 
electronic mail, or facsimile.86 Where the notice was sent by electronic mail or facsimile, the creditor 
must, within 7 days87 from the date upon which the notice was sent, take all reasonable steps to ensure 
that the notice has been received.88 In addition, the creditor must deliver by hand or send by certified 
mail a certified copy of the notice to the relevant officer or person, together with an affidavit 
indicating the date on which, the time at which, and the e-mail address or facsimile number to which, 
                                                             
79 PACOS, s 3(2)(a). 
80 PACOS, s 3(2)(b). 
81 PACOS, s 3(3). 
82 PACOS, s 3(1)(b)(ii). 
83 From the tenor of s 3(4), it seems clear that a court cannot mero motu take notice of a failure by a creditor to give notice 
to an organ of State of an intention to institute legal proceedings.  
84 PACOS s 3(4)(a). 
85 PACOS, s 3(4)(b).  
86 PACOS, s 4(1). 
87 The seven-day period is reckoned to be calendar days.  
88 PACOS, s 4(1)(a). 
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the notice was sent, as well as proof that it was sent or transmitted. The steps taken to ensure that the 
notice was received by the officer or person to whom it was sent must also be set out. The affidavit 
must state whether confirmation of receipt of the notice has been obtained and, if applicable, the name 
of the officer or person who has given that confirmation.89 
Section 4(1) lists the functionaries on whom a notice must be served. In the case of a municipality, 
the notice must be served on the municipal manager.90 
Section 5 of PACOS provides for the service of process on organs of State. No process may be served 
before the expiry of 30 days calculated from the date of service of the notice above upon the relevant 
organ of State.91 Where process has been served prematurely, it is regarded as having been served on 
the first day after the expiry of the requisite 30-day period.92 
From the above, it is evident that if a municipality (or for that matter, any organ of State) is sued in a 
small claims court, compliance with PACOS is mandatory. The unrepresented litigant may not know 
that compliance is required. The necessity of the assistance of the clerks of the courts93 and legal 
asssitants94 cannot be underestimated. If the required notice of proceedings is not sent as stipulated 
in PACOS, the plaintiff would have to seek condonation by way of ‘application’. The small claims 
courts generally cannot hear applications, and there is no formal procedure stipulated in the SCCA or 
the SCCRs for bringing applications. Consequently, one can only infer that such applications will be 
brought orally from the plaintiff’s bench, and the court will proceed inquisitorially to determine 
whether the requirements for condonation are met.  
                                                             
89 PACOS, s 4(2)(b). 
90 PACOS, s 4(1)(b). 
91 PACOS, s 5(2). 
92 PACOS, s 5(3). 
93 For a discussion of the functions of the clerk of the court, see chapter 4.  
94 For more on the functions of legal assistants, see chapter 4 and see the discussion in §7.5.  
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In so far as some municipalities are or have been sued in the small claims courts,95 there should have 
been compliance with PACOS. If the SCCA is amended in the future to include a definition of ‘State’ 
so that municipalities can officially be sued,96 then it is recommended that the SCCRs should be 
amended to cater for condonation proceedings in terms of PACOS. A full-blown application for 
condonation is not feasible. The SCCRs should make provision for an informal oral application 
procedure. Furthermore, the clerks and legal assistants must be trained to ensure that the notice in 
terms of PACOS is sent to the municipal manager before court proceedings are initiated. 
7.4 NATURAL PERSONS 
The effect of s 7(1) read with s 7(4) of the SCCA is that natural persons can sue and be sued in the 
small claims courts. There are several qualifications to this general rule. 
(a)  Mental or other incapacity 
In the past, it was possible for an incapacitated person to be represented by a parent, spouse or 
guardian in a small claims court. However, the deletion of subsection (3) from s 7 by the 1986 
Amendment Act97 removed such a possibility. It is interesting to note that SCCR 13(8)(b) makes 
reference to a ‘curator’. Rule 13(8)(b) deals with service of process. It provides: 
‘(8)  Where two or more persons are to be served with the same process, service shall be effected upon each, 
except –  
   (b)  in the case of two or more persons sued in their capacity as trustees of an insolvent estate, 
   liquidators of a company, executors, curators or guardians, when service may be effected by 
   delivery to any one of them in any manner hereinbefore prescribed’. 
 
It is difficult to reconcile SCCR 13(8)(b) with s 7 of the SCCA. The rule provides that a process may 
be served on the legal representatives of a defendant when the defendant suffers from some sort of 
incapacity, whether mental or otherwise. Presumably, the purpose behind the rule is to enable the 
                                                             
95 See §7.3(a).  
96 See §7.3(a).  
97 See §7.2.  
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representatives to appear in court on behalf of the defendant who is incapacitated. Small Claims Court 
Rule 13(8)(b) was drafted in 1985. The existence of the rule no longer makes sense in light of the 
deletion of s 7(3) of the SCCA. The rule is thus ultra vires. Pending the removal of the rule, it should 
be ignored. The position today is that if a presiding officer is of the opinion that a party lacks capacity, 
the presiding officer must halt proceedings so that the matter can be instituted in a magistrate’s court, 
where a curator ad litem can be appointed for the litigant concerned.98 
SCCR 23(1) and SCCR 23(2) may also be ultra vires.99 With the deletion of s 7(3), substitution of a 
litigant with a third party is not possible. The legislative intent behind the deletion of subsection (3) 
was clearly to remove the possibility of persons other than the litigants themselves appearing before 
the court. This seems to make sense, given that small claims courts’ commissioners are expected to 
proceed inquisitorially, and to gather information principally from the litigating parties. Furthermore, 
since the rules of evidence are not applicable in the small claims courts,100 and there are no formal 
pleadings or discovery procedures, the oral testimony of the litigant is vital to the outcome of a case.101 
Even though a deceased or incapacitated person can be substituted by an executor or curator in a 
magistrate’s court,102 it must be remembered that procedure in the magistrates’ courts is more formal. 
The incapacitated litigant also has the benefit of legal representation in a magistrate’s court. The legal 
representative might be in possession of consultation notes drafted during the client’s lifetime or 
when the client was lucid. Such possibilities are, by and large, not applicable in the small claims 
courts.  
The deletion of s 7(3) must have been in response to a practical problem relating to the inability of 
representatives of incapacitated or deceased litigants to fulfil the obligation of presenting credible 
                                                             
98 See s 33 of the MCA. 
99 See §7.2 for these provisions.  
100 See chapter 8.  
101 See chapter 8. 
102 MCR 52(3). 
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oral evidence on behalf of such persons. The presence of representatives would also make nonsense 
of the rule that legal representation is not permitted in the small claims courts,103 because in many 
cases the representatives of incapacitated persons would be attorneys or advocates.104 
(b)  Minors 
According to the common law, minors105 can sue and be sued.106 If a minor is 7 years or below, the 
minor cannot sue or be sued in his or her own name. The minor has to be represented by his or her 
guardian. If the minor is above the age of 7, either (i) the minor can sue or be sued in his or her own 
name but be assisted by his or her guardian; or (ii) the minor’s guardian can sue or be sued in his or 
her representative capacity on the minor’s behalf.107 The deletion of s 7(3) has made it impossible for 
minors to sue or to be sued in the small claims courts, even where parents or guardians represent 
them. Litigation involving minors must be instituted in the magistrates’ courts.  
It is unclear why minors are precluded from suing and being sued in the small claims courts. Young 
people with legitimate claims should be allowed to bring claims in the small claims courts either in 
their personal capacities or duly assisted by adult guardians. In New York, for example, minors (who 
are defined as persons below the age of 18) are permitted to sue with the assistance of their parents 
                                                             
103 SCCA, s 7(2).  
104 Boezaart ‘The Role of the Curator Ad Litem and Children’s Access to the Courts’ (2013) De Jure 707 at 712-713. 
105 That is, persons below the age of 18: see Children’s Act 38 of 2005, s 17. 
106 Under the common law, a minor’s guardian is generally not liable for a minor’s delicts or for contractual obligations 
that the minor has entered into. A minor’s parent or guardian is also not responsible for the costs of the opposition in 
respect of civil proceedings. The minor remains liable for his or her own delicts if delictual liability can be established 
against the minor. In the case of the minor’s contract, the parents/guardians are liable to a limited extent, namely for the 
provisions of goods and services that are deemed to be necessary for the minor’s well-being and maintenance. For more 
on the subject: see Hahlo ‘Actions by Minors’ (1955) 72 SALJ 137 at 138; Cilliers, Loots, Nel Herbstein & Van Winsen: 
The Civil Practice of the High Courts of South Africa 163; van Heerden, Cockrell, Keightley et al Boberg’s Law of 
Persons and the Family 878-895, 803 and the authorities cited at fn 135. 
107 Peté, Hulme, du Plessis et al Civil Procedure – A Practical Guide 16-17 (hereinafter referred to as Civil Procedure – 
A Practical Guide).  
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and guardians.108 The same applies in Saskatchewan, Canada.109 The Small Claims Courts Rules of 
Ontario, Canada contain a very interesting provision. Rule 4.01(2) provides: 
 ‘A minor may sue for any sum not exceeding $500 as if he or she were of full age’.110 
There is no reason why the South African small claims courts cannot accommodate minors’ actions. 
The purpose of small claims courts is to give a voice to those who cannot afford costly litigation. 
Why should a minor have to sue or be sued in a magistrate’s court when the claim falls within the 
jurisdiction of the small claims courts?  
Minors are elligible to testify in civil proceedings. Under the common law, there is no specific age at 
which a child is deemed to be competent to testify in court. Even very young children can testify. The 
governing principle is that a child witness must be able to distinguish between truth and falsehood 
and understand the importance of telling the truth; and must be able to communicate effectively.111 
Provided that this governing principle is adhered to, there is no reason why a child plaintiff or 
defendant in the small claims court could not be examined by a presiding officer.  
(c)  Married persons 
With the abolition of marital power,112 married people have equal standing to sue and defend legal 
proceedings.113 A party married out of community of property can institute and defend an action 
without spousal consent in a small claims court. If a party is married in community of property, 
spousal consent to institute and defend proceedings would be necessary in so far as the cause of action 
                                                             
108  Lippman, Pfau, Fisher et al Your Guide to Small Claims & Commercial Small Claims in New York City, Nassau 
County, Suffolk County 2.  
109 The Small Claims Act, 1997 (Chapter S-50.11 of the Statutes of Saskatchewan), s 15(2)(b). 
110 O. Reg 258/98: Rules of the Small Claims Court, as amended 1 January 2017.  
111 Schwikkard, Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (2015) 451.   
112 In the past, women married out of community of property were subject to the marital power of their husbands. Section 
29 of the General Law Fourth Amendment Act 132 of 1993 retrospectively abolished marital power.  
113 Civil Procedure – A Practical Guide 19. 
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affects the joint estate.114 It must be noted, however, that while spousal consent is stated as a statutory 
requirement in this case, the validity of legal proceedings does not depend on it.  
Under the Matrimonial Property Act,  lack of consent does not vitiate proceedings, even where the 
marriage is in community of property and the joint estate is affected. In the case of a marriage in 
community of property where the joint estate is affected, a judgment of the court is extracted first 
from the separate property of the spouse who did not obtain spousal consent, and if there is 
insufficient property, the court’s judgment is executed against the joint estate. On the dissolution of 
the marriage, whether by death or divorce, an adjustment is made in favour of the out-of-pocket 
spouse. The adjustment is a matter for the spouses and does not affect the initial creditor’s claim.115  
The above rules apply in the small claims courts as well, irrespective of whether the parties are 
married in terms of the Marriage Act,116 the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act117 or the Civil 
Union Act.118 The relevant provisions of the Matrimonial Property Act are applicable to all of these 
different types of marriages.  
Since Islamic marriages are not yet recognised, ‘spouses’ married by Islamic law are treated in the 
same way as spouses married out of community of property – meaning that spousal consent for 
litigation is not required. 119 
Despite the abolition of marital power, SCCR 10(4) contains an anachronism that is unconstitutional. 
The rule deals with the citation of parties in a small claims court summons. It provides:  
‘(4) The summons shall also –  
                                                             
114 Section 17 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Matrimonial Property Act’) and 
see Civil Procedure – A Practical Guide 20. 
115 Matrimonial Property Act, s 17. 
116 25 of 1961.  
117 120 of 1998. 
118 17 of 2006. 
119  Moosa, Abduroaf ‘Faskh (Divorce) and Intestate Succession in Islamic and South African Law: Impact of the 
Watershed Judgment in Hassam v Jacobs and the Muslim Marriages Bill’ (2014) Acta Juridica 160.  
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 (a)  show the surname of the defendant by which he is known to the plaintiff, the defendant's sex and residence 
 or place of business, and, where known, his first name or initials, and, in the case of a woman, her marital 
 status …’ 
On a similar provision, which prevailed in the High Court (namely, HCR 17(4)), the court in Nedcor 
Bank Ltd v Hennop120 held: 
‘Further, the reference to the defendants' sex and women's marital status as required by Rule 17(4) is certainly 
 outmoded and anachronistic. It indeed offends the equality provisions contained in the Constitution of the 
 Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. The preamble speaks of equality between men and women and s 
 9(1) provides that every person shall have the right to equality before the law and s 9(3) is emphatic that no 
 person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly on the grounds of sex, gender or disability. 
 In my view, in these enlightened times, the omission to state the defendants' sex and, in the case of a woman, 
 her marital status in the summons is of no consequence and certainly not amenable to render the plaintiff's 
 application for summary judgment to be fatally defective.’ 
 
This decision prompted the Rules Board for Courts of Law to amend HCR 17(4) and MCR 5(4). It is 
submitted that the Rules Board should in the future121 amend SCCR 10(4) so that the rule accords 
with constitutional values.122  
(d)  Aliases of natural persons 
Where a natural person trades in a name other than his or her own, he or she can be sued in the small 
claims court in the name of his or her alias. A natural person, however, cannot sue in the name of an 
alias. On a reading of SCCR 27,123 this is not immediately apparent because there is a dissonance 
between the heading of SCCR 27 and the content of the rule. The heading is framed in both the active 
and the passive, in that it refers to ‘[a]ctions by and against…’. The content of the rule, however, is 
framed in the passive. Clearly, on an ordinary and literal interpretation, the legislative intent is that 
the rule only applies to the situation where aliases are sued. It is trite law that a heading to a provision 
in legislation is only relevant when the content of a provision is ambiguous.124 The content of SCCR 
                                                             
120 2003 (3) SA 622 (T) at 626G-J. 
121 See discussion in chapter 5 relating to the proposed legislation to confer power on the Rules Board for Courts of Law 
to make rules for the small claims courts.  
122 See also chapter 8.  
123 The provisions of SCCR 27 is set out in §8.2. 
124 Chotabhai v Union Government (Minister of Justice and Registrar of Asiatics) 1911 AD 13 at 24; Turfontein Estates 
Ltd v Mining Commissioner, Johannesburg 1917 AD 419 at 431.  
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27 is unambiguous. Consequently, the position is that SCCR 27 only allows defendants to be sued in 
the names of their aliases. This is in contrast to HCR 14 and MCR 54.125 
High Court Rule 14 and MCR 54 allow for a range of entities (aliases of natural persons) mentioned 
in those rules to sue and to be sued in their own names as a matter of procedural convenience. The 
drafters of the SCCRs, on the other hand, intended to limit the application of the principle. Their 
decision is consistent with the rule that juristic persons (large and small) cannot sue in the small 
claims courts. If the drafters had allowed unincorporated entities to sue in their own names, this would 
have conflicted with the current position that excludes juristic persons from suing in the small claims 
courts. If, however, the SCCA is amended in the future126 to enable juristic persons to sue in the small 
claims courts, SCCR 27 should be amended in line with HCR 14 and MCR 54 so as to enable 
unincorporated entities to sue in their own names.  
As discussed in chapter 6, to sue an alias in its own name comes with certain complications. In order 
to attach the assets of the defendants behind the alias, the identities of those persons would need to 
be flushed out. While MCR 54 and HCR 14 contain processes and procedures for doing precisely 
that, the SCCRs are deficient in this respect. It would appear that the presiding officer is required to 
investigate the identities of the natural persons behind the alias. This aspect of the SCCRs requires 
some attention because it is unclear what the presiding officer is expected to do when persons who 
are identified are not physically present in court. Can the court ipso facto join those persons to the 
proceedings in absentia? Surely this cannot be so, as it would fly in the face of the audi alteram 
partem principle. Is the court expected to subpoena those parties to court? The difficulty with such a 
proposition is that there is currently no provision to summon a person (witness) before a small claims 
court.127 Is the court obliged to dismiss the matter on the basis that the court cannot make a finding? 
                                                             
125 See also Bredenkamp (n31) 8. 
126 See the discussion in §7.5. 
127 See the discussion in §8.19. 
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Would the court have to recommend that the matter be heard in a magistrate’s court, where MCR 54 
would be applicable? What seems more likely is that the court could grant judgment against the entity 
concerned. The judgment would be enforceable against the entity’s assets only, and not against the 
natural persons behind the entity.128 
For a judgment to be enforceable, it would be important that ownership of the entity has not passed 
hands prior to judgment because if that has occurred, the judgment would not be executable even 
against the entity’s assets.129 
The Saskatchewan Small Claims Courts Act of 1997 contains a useful provision which may be of 
assistance in the situation outlined above. Section 13 of the Saskatchewan Act allows for a ‘third 
party’ who is not a party to the proceedings to be drawn into the proceedings by applying to court for 
the service of a ‘third party’ notice.130 The plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be, must simply 
believe that ‘he or she may be entitled to recover all or part of a judgment from a person [the third 
party] who is not a party to the claim or counterclaim’.131 In the notice, the third party is informed of 
the nature of the claim. Importantly, the presiding officer ‘may refuse to issue a notice of third party 
claim if the judge thinks that the third-party claim: (a) is without reasonable grounds; (b) discloses 
no triable issue; or (c) is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the court’s process.’ With a few adaptions, 
the Saskatchewan third party procedure could be implemented in South African small claims courts 
to enable a court to draw persons who were not originally cited in proceedings into an action. 
Presumably, once the court establishes the identities of the individuals behind the alias from the 
defendant who appears at the first hearing, the court could postpone the matter to enable service of 
the third-party notice on the persons concerned. On the next hearing date and with all the parties 
                                                             
128 DF Scott (EP) (Pty) Ltd v Golden Valley Supermarket 2002 (6) SA 297 (SCA) paras [13], [18]. 
129 Ibid [18]. 
130 A specimen notice is contained in The Small Claims Regulations, 1998 (Chapter S50.11 Reg 1), as amended, Form C. 
131 The Small Claims Act, 1997 (Chapter S-50.11 of the Statutes of Saskatchewan), s 13(1). 
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present – or with proof of service of the third-party notice – the court would be in a position to 
deliberate the matter to finality. The court's judgment would then be enforceable against the personal 
assets of all the individuals who were drawn into the action. 
Currently a trust cannot be sued in its own name in the small claims courts. As discussed in chapter 
6, this requires reconsideration as there are practical difficulties that arise.132 The SCCA and SCCRs 
must be amended to permit a trust to sue in its own name and to allow for the flushing out of the 
names of the trustee(s) by the elicitation of the information from the trust’s representative (who may 
be the trustee) in court. Unlike the aliases mentioned in SCCR 27, the judgment of the court would 
only be enforceable against the trust’s assets and not against the trustees’ personal estates. It is settled 
law that a trustee is in a fiduciary position vis-à-vis a trust and does not enjoy beneficial ownership 
in the trust assets.133 Hence, the trustee is not personally liable for the debts and obligations of a trust. 
It is thus less complicated to sue a trust in its own name and to enforce the court’s judgment. 
7.5 JURISTIC PERSONS  
Juristic persons134 may be sued in the small claims courts. However, they cannot sue. In Raman v 
Barlow Motor Investments (Pty) Ltd T/A Natal Motor Industries, Prospecton 135  the applicant 
(plaintiff), a natural person, instituted an action against a juristic person in the small claims court. The 
respondent (defendant) counterclaimed. The counterclaim was successful, and the court dismissed 
                                                             
132 See §6.13. 
133 Braun v Blann and Botha 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) at 859F–H; BOE Bank Ltd (Formerly NBS Boland Bank Ltd) v Trustees 
for the time being of the Knox Property Trust [1999] 1 All SA 425 (D) at 435b. 
134 In South African law, a statutory juristic person is: a company, incorporated in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008; 
a close corporation, incorporated in terms of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984; or any other body incorporated by 
statute in terms of which it is conferred separate legal personality. The common law makes provision for a further type 
of person namely, the universitas.  Under the common law, the universitas is permitted to sue and be sued in its own 
name. To be a universitas the constitution of the entity must permit the entity to institute and defend proceedings, to 
acquire rights and obligations its own name, and should allow for perpetual succession: Molotlegi v President of 
Bophuthatswana 1989 (3) SA 119 (B) at 125G–I; African National Congress v Lombo 1997 (3) SA 187 (A) at 195I–
196J; Interim Ward S 19 Council v Premier, Western Cape Province 1998 (3) SA 1056 (C) at 1060G–1061A; Rail 
Commuter Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail (No 1) 2003 (5) SA 518 (C) at 554C–557C.  
135 1999 (4) SA 606 (D). 
 
 237 
the applicant’s action. The applicant took the matter on review to the High Court, arguing that on a 
‘literal and strict interpretation’ of s 7(1) of the SCCA, a juristic person was not permitted to sue in a 
small claims court, even as a plaintiff in reconvention.136 The court, per Hurt J, reasoned as follows: 
• Section 7(1) should not be interpreted as precluding a juristic person from raising a counterclaim 
after having been brought before the court by the plaintiff as a defendant in convention. The 
reference to the institution of an action in s 7(1) is to the act of initiating proceedings by way of 
an action in a small claims court. Bringing a counterclaim cannot be said to be ‘instituting an 
action’. Moreover, s 29 of the SCCA prescribes that a written demand must be sent before any 
summons is issued.137 This would not be applicable to a counterclaim, where the defendant is 
already before the court because the plaintiff has issued summons.138 
• On an interpretation of ss 34(b),139 35(1)140 and 35(2)(b)141 of the SCCA, it is clear that when the 
legislature used the word ‘defendant’ in the context of those provisions, the legislature was plainly 
referring to the ‘plaintiff in reconvention.’ If the legislature had intended to exclude the possibility 
of a juristic plaintiff in reconvention from bringing a counterclaim in a small claims court, the 
legislature would have been more explicit. 142 
• In many instances, the facts upon which a claim is based are inextricably interwoven with the 
facts pertaining to a counterclaim. The court held that ‘[s]ubstantial problems could arise from 
                                                             
136 Raman v Barlow Motor Investments (Pty) Ltd T/A Natal Motor Industries, Prospecton supra at 608C-D. 
137 For a discussion of s 29 see chapter 8. 
138 Raman v Barlow Motor Investments (Pty) Ltd T/A Natal Motor Industries, Prospecton supra at 608D-G. 
139 The section provides:  
  ‘A court may, after the hearing of an action, grant –  
   . . .  
 (b) judgment for the defendant in respect of his defence or counterclaim in so far as he has proved it’.  
140 Section 35(1) deals with the situation where a defendant has confessed to liability or failed to appear, and ends with 
the words, '. . . and the court may dismiss any counterclaim by the defendant.' 
141 The section provides: 
‘. . .(T)he court may, on application by the defendant –  
. . . 
(b)with regard to a counterclaim, grant judgment for the defendant in so far as he has proved the plaintiff's 
liability and the amount of the counterclaim to the satisfaction of the court.' 
142 Raman v Barlow Motor Investments (Pty) Ltd T/A Natal Motor Industries, Prospecton supra at 609D-609G. 
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the possibility of the claim and the “counterclaim” being decided by two different courts, each 
dealing with precisely the same set of facts.’143 It consequently appeared ‘most consonant with 
the concepts of justice and of achieving the intention of the legislator’ to hold that a juristic person 
can bring its counterclaim simultaneously with the plaintiff’s claim in convention.144 
Significantly, the court held: 
‘It must be borne in mind, in deciding precisely what the Legislator meant by using the words 'only as 
defendant' in s 7(1), that the basic object of the Small Claims Courts Act is to provide an expeditious, 
inexpensive and final decision of small claims without the problems ordinarily created by the more 
sophisticated forms of litigation available in the magistrate's court or High Court. This object would, in my 
view, be defeated if a claim in reconvention lodged by a juristic person had in every instance to be removed to 
the arena of another court.’145  
 
(a)  The view of the Hoexter Commission  
The Hoexter Commission (after surveying foreign law) acknowledged that there were divergent 
positions as regards whether juristic persons should be permitted to sue in the small claims courts. In 
its Report146 the Commission stated: 
‘The Commission considers that a South African small claims court should serve primarily (or perhaps even 
exclusively) the interests of the individual claimant. For purposes of launching the pilot projects147 …the 
Commission agrees with the suggestion made in the Kentridge Memorandum148 …that only natural persons 
should be permitted to sue. Any final decision as to whether the range of plaintiffs should be extended, and if 
so, to what extent, ought in the Commissions opinion to be deferred until the results obtained from the operations 
of the pilot projects have been carefully monitored.’ 
The Commission did not shut the door on the possibility of juristic persons suing in the small claims 
courts. The Commission proposed that at the inception of the small claims courts pilot project149 
juristic persons should have a limited right to appear in the small claims courts. A revised position 
                                                             
143 Raman v Barlow Motor Investments (Pty) Ltd T/A Natal Motor Industries, Prospecton supra at 608I-609A. 
144 Raman v Barlow Motor Investments (Pty) Ltd T/A Natal Motor Industries, Prospecton supra at 609A-B. 
145 Raman v Barlow Motor Investments (Pty) Ltd T/A Natal Motor Industries, Prospecton supra at 608H-I. 
146 Report §13.16. 
147 The small claims courts were first introduced on a pilot basis. See chapter 2.  
148 Adv Schreiner SC (as he then was) made the ‘Kentridge Memorandum’ .entitled Small Claims Procedure in the USA’ 
which was prepared in 1976 by Adv S L Kentridge SC at the request of the General Council of the Bar available to the 
Commission. See Report §5.6. 
149 See chapter 2. 
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was to follow after the pilot phase. Sadly, the pilot phase was never properly evaluated, and over time 
the prohibition on allowing juristic persons to sue became concretised. The literature on South 
African small claims courts is silent on the issue. At the 2003 Small Claims Court Conference150 and 
in the subsequent National Action Plan,151 the issue of juristic persons being allowed to sue in the 
small claims courts did not come up. This is a matter that is thus ripe for consideration.  
(b)  Arguments for and against juristic persons suing in the small claims courts  
Proponents and opponents of allowing juristic persons to sue in the small claims courts are equally 
vociferous when it comes to stating their positions. The following arguments and counter-arguments 
are raised in the literature.  
(i)  Juristic persons will have an unfair advantage as ‘repeat-players’ 
It is argued that if juristic persons are permitted to sue in the small claims courts, it will give them an 
unfair advantage because even if legal representation is not permitted, employees with formal legal 
training will represent them. Over time these representatives, and accordingly, the juristic persons 
they represent, will acquire expertise in litigating in the small claims courts. Their proficiency will 
prejudice natural person litigants who are not frequent users of the courts. Juristic persons are 
notorious ‘repeat-players’ 152  in the courts, whereas natural person litigants are classic ‘one-
shotters’,153 and hence need protection.154 The lack of representation for individuals will result in 
corporations working the system to their advantage. There is also a possibility that they will build a 
rapport with presiding officers who may become inclined to go easy on them.155 
                                                             
150 See §3.6. 
151 See §3.7. 
152 See chapter 1 for a discussion of Galanter’s hypothesis.  
153 See chapter 1 for a discussion of Galanter’s distinction between ‘one-shotters’ and ‘repeat-players’.  
154 For a discussion of the ‘repeat-player’ and the ‘one-shotter’ dichotomy, see chapter 1.  
155 See Moulton ‘The Persecution and Intimidation of The Low-Income Litigant as Performed by the Small Claims Court 
in California’ (1968-1969) 21 Stanford Law Review 1667. 
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However, even if juristic persons are ‘repeat-players’ in the courts, and may acquire a certain level 
of expertise if they litigate, the limited jurisdiction of the small claims courts makes it unlikely that 
the types of matters that come before them will be of such a nature so as to give juristic persons a 
substantial advantage. With the simplified processes and procedures of the small claims courts, 
‘repeat-players’, who usually exploit the technicalities of litigation rules,156  will be unable to do so. 
Furthermore, if mediation is introduced in the small claims courts, this will further reduce the 
potential for commercial parties to exploit their frequent use of the courts to their advantage.157 
At present, juristic persons are permitted to be represented by officers.158 Nothing precludes an officer 
from having legal qualifications. In the South African context, therefore, it would be contradictory to 
overemphasise the privilege that a juristic person would enjoy if it were the plaintiff in a matter, as a 
juristic person already enjoys the benefit of having legal expertise, if it so wishes, as a defendant or 
as a plaintiff in reconvention. The benefit would apply irrespective of whether the juristic person is 
the plaintiff or the defendant. The presiding officer who proceeds inquisitorially159 will act as the 
buffer to ensure that both sides have equal opportunities in court. The expertise of a company official 
will be balanced by the participation of the presiding officer who will ensure that the natural person’s 
interests are protected.160 Furthermore, the relaxed procedural and evidential rules, and the absence 
of adversarialism in small claims courts will ensure that the environment is not unduly litigious. If 
there is real concern about juristic persons acquiring a substantial advantage, the SCCA can be 
amended to expressly provide that a juristic person must be represented in court by a duly authorised 
director or officer, who shall not have been admitted to the attorneys’ or advocates’ professions. 
                                                             
156 See Galanter ‘Why the “Have” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974) 9:1 Law and 
Society Review 98.  
157  See Sarat ‘Alternatives in Dispute Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims Court’ (1975-1976) 10 Law & Society 
Review 341 at 366. See also chapter 10.  
158 SCCA, s 7(4).  For the provisions of the subsection see §7.2.  
159 See chapter 8.  
160 See also Moulton (n155) 1665. 
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Admittedly, such a provision will not exclude the possibility of the officer having paralegal training 
or being a legal graduate. It is thus difficult to restrict an officer from having some legal knowledge, 
especially since legal training is often regarded as a useful attribute for an executive position.   
(ii)  Juristic persons will change the character of the small claims courts  
Fear is expressed that if juristic persons are permitted to sue in the small claims courts, they will 
change the character of small claims courts from people’s courts to debt-collecting agencies.161 They 
will clog up the court rolls and affect the quality of justice in the small claims courts. 
There is a counter-argument to this. In the large city centres, commercial enterprises may dominate 
the small claims courts. But, studies have shown that in rural areas, commercial parties are less 
prevalent and the character of small claims courts would remain unaffected if juristic persons were 
permitted to sue. International studies also show that public usage can vary significantly between 
courts and that claimants in larger communities are more evenly distributed.162 However, limitations 
can be placed on juristic persons. For example, legislation can direct that juristic persons may institute 
a limited number of actions per year in a particular small claims court or that they cannot have more 
than a certain number of matters enrolled at any particular time.163 In some jurisdictions, such 
                                                             
161 Moulton (n155) 1658ff; RA Kagan ‘The Routinization of Debt Collection: An Essay on Social Change and Conflict 
in the Courts’ (1984) 18 Law & Society Review 323 at 333. 
162 Moulton (n155) 1658 fn 7; Pagter (n46) at 876ff. 
163 This was the case in Ohio, Maine and New Hampshire. The discretion a small claims judge had to limit the number of 
claims a corporation could bring in the small claims court was, however, repealed in the 1950s for Maine and New 
Hampshire, and in 1999 in the case of Ohio. Formerly, the Ohio Revised Code §1925.08 provided: 
‘No more than twenty-four (24) claims may be filed by a single person, firm, or cooperation within the calendar 
year except the County Treasurer, to which the limit does not apply.’ 
Today commercial parties can sue unrestricted in these jurisdictions. For more US States which placed limitations on the 
number of actions that could be brought in the small claims court see Weller, Ruhnka, Martin ‘Success in Small Claims: 
Is a Lawyer Necessary’ (1977) 61 Judicature 176 at 178. One other possibility is to have two divisions in the small claims 
court: one for commercial claims and one for individual claims. See in this regard CD Robinson ‘A Small Claims Division 
for Chicago’s New Divisional Court’ (1963) Chicago Bar Review 421 at 424. This suggestion cannot be supported in the 
South African context. Two divisions will add to administratative problems within the courts (see chapter 4) and will 
make little practical difference.  
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limitations have proved quite effective, and there is no reason why other jurisdictions cannot 
implement similar measures.164 
The National Credit Act165 (‘NCA’) is applicable to all credit providers in South Africa. The NCA 
has exacting requirements to protect the rights of credit receivers.166 Currently, the SCCA permits 
credit providers to sue in the small claims courts as long as they are not juristic persons.167 If juristic 
persons were permitted to sue in the small claims courts, there is a real danger that credit providers 
might see the small claims courts as cheaper, speedier and less exacting forums to recover debts.  If 
presiding officers are not adequately trained, the protections offered by the NCA could be 
compromised. At present, it is unclear whether presiding officers are in fact abiding by the complex 
provisions of the NCA.168 If the recommendation in chapter 6 that small claims courts should not 
have jurisdiction to deal with any matter that falls under the NCA is implemented,169 these concerns 
will be alleviated.  
The possibility of debt collection agencies appearing in the small claims courts – a concern in other 
jurisdictions170 – is remote. Section 14(4) of the SCCAprovides: 
‘A court shall not have jurisdiction in respect of any claim or counterclaim based in whole or in part upon the 
cession or assignment of rights.’ 
Following international practice,171 the Hoexter Commission precluded claims based on cession from 
being heard in the small claims courts. The prohibition on the cession and assignment of rights is a 
successful mechanism for keeping debt collection agencies out of the small claims courts.172 
                                                             
164 Anonymous Author ‘Small Claims Courts as Collection Agencies’ (1952) 4 Standford Law Review 237 at 242. 
165 34 of 2005. 
166 See discussion in §6.10. 
167 SCCA, s 15(d). 
168 See discussion in §6.10. 
169 See discussion in §6.10. 
170 Pardum ‘Examining the Claims of a Small Claims Court: A Florida Case Study (1981) 65 Judicature 25 at 26; Ruhnka, 
Weller with Martin ‘Small Claims Courts – A National Examination’ (1981) 41ff. 
171 See, for example, The Code of Civil Procedure of California, Part I, Chapter 5.5, Article 4, s 116.420; Weller et al 
(n163) 178. 
172 Ruhnka et al (n170) at 43. 
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With effective court management, court rolls are unlikely to be burdened by corporate plaintiffs.  
South Africa has capacity to service a myriad of parties in the small claims courts. There are more 
than 405 small claims courts in the country.173 City centres have multiple small claims courts. There 
are approximately 25000 attorneys in the country and 5000 advocates. 174 A significant proportion of 
these professionals are eligible to preside in the small claims courts. Many law academics from the 
17 law schools and many retired magistrates can serve in the small claims courts.175 There may be 
difficulties with infrastructure, but small claims courts are not anchored to court buildings. Court 
proceedings can be conducted in public buildings such as schools, church halls and community 
centres. 
(iii)  Small claims courts are consumer courts 
The third argument against allowing juristic persons to sue in the small claims courts is allied to the 
second argument above. The view is sometimes expressed that small claims courts were designed to 
cater for the consumer rights movement. If one allows juristic persons to sue in the small claims 
courts, the historical rationale for the courts will be lost.176  
However, it can be argued that the history of the courts should not permanently anchor them to a 
particular design. The purpose of the courts is to provide cost-effective and speedy access to justice 
for litigants with small claims. If a juristic person cannot sue in the small claims court, it has to sue 
in another court in a matter that may fall within the small claims courts’ substantive and monetary 
                                                             
173 See §3.8. 
174 As at April 2015 there were 23712 attorneys in the country. There were approximately 5000 registered law students 
in the country. Of the qualifying students, approximately 3000 go on to register articles in a given year: Manyathi-Jele 
‘Latest Statistics on the Legal Profession’ (August 2015) De Rebus 13. It is fair to conclude that there are ±25000 attorneys 
in the country at the present time. As at 26 April 2012 there were 4762 advocates in the country: Department of Justice 
and Constitutional Development National Assembly Question for Written Reply: Parliamentary Question No 947 of 26 
April 2012. It is thus safe to speculate that there are ± 5000 advocates in the country at the present time. 
175 See chapter 5.  




jurisdiction. The natural person defendant will have to face higher legal costs in defending the matter. 
From a cost-benefit perspective, it makes sense to allow juristic persons to sue in the small claims 
courts.  
If juristic persons are allowed to sue in the small claims courts, it may benefit larger corporations, but 
it most certainly will also benefit small businesses.177 It is in the interest of economic development 
for small businesses to be able to bring claims in the small claims courts. 
The consumer rights movement was not the cause of the development of small claims courts in South 
Africa. From the Hoexter Commission Report it is clear that the purpose of the courts was to provide 
deracialised platforms to hear small claims matters and to improve access to the courts for all 
citizens.178  Mindful of the limited number of pilot courts, the Commission sought to limit the 
categories of small claims court plaintiffs. Given that small claims courts today are prevalent in the 
overwhelming majority of magisterial districts in South Africa, the original motivation for limiting 
the appearance of juristic persons has fallen away.  
Access to justice is a problem in South Africa. Many juristic persons have deep pockets and can 
afford to litigate matters to the hilt in the magistrates’ courts. Many poorer litigants and middle-
income litigants cannot afford to defend proceedings because of the high cost of legal 
representation.179 It makes sense, therefore, to open the doors of the small claims courts so that 
people’s prospects of achieving justice can be expanded. Mouton, who is critical of corporation 
plaintiffs in the Californian small claims courts, concedes: 
‘If business … were barred from small claims court, where would these claimants go? If they simply filed in 
municipal or justice courts and obtained default judgments – which in these courts can be entered by the clerk – 
with higher costs attached, would a low-income defendant be any better off? The greater expense and complexity 
of standard court procedure might result in some of the smaller claims not being sued on at all. Others, however, 
                                                             
177 Pagter (n46) 891. 
178 See §2.4. 
179 See chapter 1. 
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might be assigned to collection agencies, whose intentional harassment could subject the low-income debtor to 
even greater abuse than that resulting from somewhat inadvertent malfunctioning of small claims courts.’180 
The prohibition against legal representation, the informality of court procedures and the relaxation of 
evidence rules assist to level the playing field between the ‘one-shotter’ natural litigant and the 
‘repeat-player’ juristic person. The inquisitorial process, the presence of legal assistants, multilingual 
presiding officers,181 and well-trained staff will also ensure that natural person litigants are adequately 
prepared to defend cases. If mediation is introduced in the small claims courts,182 it will prevent 
‘repeat-players’ from using their litigation experience to overpower less frequent users of the courts. 
 (c)  Why juristic persons and other entities should be permitted to sue in the small claims courts 
and recommendations for reform   
Twenty-three years into democracy, the civil justice system faces challenges. The rule of law remains 
relatively intact. However, access to the rule of law is compromised. 183  Socio-economic 
marginalisation is at the heart of the issue.184 The gap between the rich and poor keeps growing and 
the cost of litigation prevents even the middle class from accessing the courts.185 The time has come 
for bold measures to level the playing field between ‘the haves’ and ‘the have nots’.186 A radical 
rethinking of the theoretical framework of procedure is required to address some of the problems.187  
Having regard to the context within which South African small claims courts exist, juristic persons 
should be permitted to sue in the small claims courts. It is more affordable for the ordinary citizen to 
defend proceedings in the small claims courts. Why should a litigant have to defend a small claim in 
a magistrate’s court at a greater cost?  
                                                             
180 Moulton (note 155) 1674-1675. See also Whelan ‘Small Claims Courts: Heritage and Adjustment’ in Whelan (ed) 
Small Claims Courts – A Comparative Study (1990) 213. 
181 See chapter 5. 
182 See chapter 10. 
183 See chapter 1. 
184 See discussion in chapter 1. 
185 See §6.7 fn 90, 91. See also chapter 1. 
186 See Galanter (note 156) 98ff. 
187 Theophilopoulos ‘Constitutional Transformation and Fundamental Reform of Civil Procedure’ (2016) TSAR 68. 
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If businesses were permitted to sue in the small claims courts, small business owners could pursue 
claims more cheaply and much more expeditiously.188 This would be consonant with access to justice 
for all. 189 Currently, commercial matters are diverted to other courts at greater cost to the poorer 
litigant.190 This not only prejudices low income individuals, but also small businesses. To encourage 
the establishment of small businesses for job creation, the procedural system should reduce the cost 
of doing business in South Africa. As McGill notes: 
‘Allowing business plaintiffs access to the small claims court can be defended on consumer protection, 
commercial market efficiency, and historical grounds. Forcing business to take its disputes to a more expensive, 
complicated, or slower forum does not serve the interests of the consumer defendant or the public at large. 
Consumers will be placed in higher jeopardy and will be unable to defend without representation. Even for 
undefended actions, increased costs ultimately will be borne by the consumer.’191 
As discussed earlier, non-juristic business entities should be permitted to sue in their own names in 
the small claims courts as a matter of procedural convenience. 192  The SCCRs must provide a 
mechanism for the names of the natural persons behind the entities to be identified. It is, therefore, 
proposed that in the small claims court summons,193 the names of such persons must be stipulated. 
Each person on the list must be served a copy of the summons. To this extent the rules for service of 
process must be changed and simplified.194  
                                                             
188 Axworthy ‘Controlling the Abuse of Small Claims Courts (1976) 22 McGill Law Journal 480 at 482; Coates, Gantz, 
Heathcote ‘Small Claims in Indiana’ (1969-1970) Indiana Legal Forum 517 at 535. 
189 In New Zealand corporations can sue and be sued in small claims courts. Spiller ‘The Small Claims System: A 
Comparison of the South African Small Claims Court and the New Zealand Disputes Tribunal’ (1997) 5 Waikato Law 
Review 35 at 45 states: 
‘It is submitted that the New Zealand approach which allows access to applicants that are corporations better 
reflects the underlying philosophy of the small claims system as the provider of access to justice for all.’  
In Canada only Quebec restricts corporations and provinces from being plaintiffs. All the other provinces allow juristic 
entities to sue. This is in keeping with the idea of ‘justice for all’. See McGill ‘Challenges in Small Claims Design’ in 
Trebilcock, Duggan, Sossin (eds) Middle Income Access to Justice 357. 
190 Prujiner ‘L'ambiguité "small claims courts" et ses effets sur leur adaptation québecoise’ (1971) 12 C de D 175 cited in 
Axworthy (n188) 490 argues that a model whereby small claims matters are simply diverted to other courts does not 
address the difficulties confronting the poor litigant. Diversion impoverishes the poor litigant and is, therefore, a flawed 
model.  
191 McGill (n189) 358. 
192 See §7.4.  
193 In chapter 8 it is argued that the small claims ‘summons’ should be called the ‘statement of claim’ to introduce further 
simplicity to the procedure. 
194 Service of summons is discussed in chapter 8. 
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A plaintiff commercial entity (whether incorporated or unincorporated) should be precluded from 
proceeding in a small claims court unless a representative has been authorised by resolution of all its 
members to appear in court. These mechanisms will ensure that the audi alteram partem principle is 
satisfied. An entity that does not comply with these requirements must face the prospect of its claim 
being struck out by the court. It must also be borne in mind that a presiding officer will always have 
the discretion to halt proceedings where the claim is deemed to be too complex or where fairness 
compels the matter be heard in a magistrate’s court.195 This discretion should exist even when a 
magistrate’s court refers a matter to a small claims court.196 
Finally, the significant number of small claims courts in South Africa,197 together with the renewed 
enthusiasm of the legal profession for its members to serve as commissioners in the courts198 must 
dispel uncertainties about the ability of small claims courts to cope with an increased workload if 
juristic persons and other non-juristic entities are allowed to sue in them.  
7.6 LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
(a)  The Hoexter Commission 
In its Report, the Hoexter Commission was ‘strongly of the view that in the South African small 
claims courts the requirements of justice would best be served by imposing a total bar on legal 
representation of either party at trial.’ The Commission felt that to have legal representation would 
increase ‘the cost to litigants’ and that the reduction of costs is the ‘very problem which small claims 
courts were designed to solve.’199 
                                                             
195 SCCA, s 23.  
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197 See §3.8. 
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Drawing on experiences in the United States, 200  Australia and the United Kingdom, 201  the 
Commission found that the absence of legal representation goes hand-in-hand with inquisitorial 
proceedings, and when the two are coupled together, the result is an ‘easier and speedier fact-finding 
process.’202 To introduce legal representation at inquisitorial small claims proceedings would create 
an ‘insidious temptation to the [presiding officer] to relinquish his [or her] inquisitorial role, and to 
lapse into a more familiar adversary system of resolving disputes.’ The Commission went on to state 
that legal representation has the uncanny ability to ‘infuse into proceedings that air of formality and 
technicality which is fundamentally alien to the real spirit of the small claims procedures.’ Legal 
representation would ‘give to the rich litigant an improper advantage over the poor opponent.’203 
As a caveat to its recommendation the Commission stated: 
‘The Commission wishes to state quite unequivocally that in South Africa a small claims court will operate 
successfully only if, at the stage of the filing of the claim by the plaintiff, and thereafter during the entire process 
of pre-trial preparation, specialised assistance of full-time and salaried legal and paralegal staff is available both 
to the plaintiff and the defendant.’204  
                                                             
200 The Commission referred to the California Small Claims Court. The position in California today is still that legal 
representation is not permitted. To this extent The Code of Civil Procedure of California, Part I, Chapter 5.5, Article 5 
provides: 
‘116.530.  
(a) Except as permitted by this section, no attorney may take part in the conduct or defense of a small claims 
action. 
(b) Subdivision (a) does not apply if the attorney is appearing to maintain or defend an action in any of the 
following capacities: 
(1) By or against himself or herself. 
(2) By or against a partnership in which he or she is a general partner and in which all the partners are attorneys. 
(3) By or against a professional corporation of which he or she is an officer or director and of which all other 
officers and directors are attorneys. 
(c) Nothing in this section shall prevent an attorney from doing any of the following: 
(1) Providing advice to a party to a small claims action, either before or after the commencement of the action. 
(2) Testifying to facts of which he or she has personal knowledge and about which he or she is competent to 
testify. 
(3) Representing a party in an appeal to the superior court. 
(4) Representing a party in connection with the enforcement of a judgment.’ 
The Californian position accords with the South African position as regards the type of involvement that a legal 
practitioner may have in small claims matters.  
201 Report §13.10. 
202 Report §13.10. 
203 Report §13.11. 
204 Report §13.14. 
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While the SCCA has always precluded legal representation, sadly the government has done very little 
to fulfil the expectations of the Commission as set out in the caveat. At the 2003 Small Claims Court 
Conference, delegates lamented the lack of legal assistants in the small claims courts.205 For a short 
while the Department of Justice, together with the Cape Law Society, embarked on a project to 
involve law students in the small claims courts. It was envisaged that senior law students would fulfil 
the role of legal assistants as contemplated in s 11(1) of the SCCA 206  read with SCCR 5. 207 
Regrettably, nothing came of the endeavour.208 
(b)  A constitutional right to legal representation? 
Neither the common law209 nor the Constitution guarantees a right to legal representation in civil 
proceedings.210 Even if the right is implied by s 34, the right would not be absolute.211 In appropriate 
circumstances, a limitation of the right would be justified. Presumably, a limitation would be justified 
‘in proceedings which are conducted simply in order to facilitate access to justice by saving costs 
and time.’212 As Currie and De Waal note: 
‘In the case of the Small Claims Court, for example, the recognition of the right to legal representation would 
undermine the purpose of the [Small Claims Court] Act.’213 
Notwithstanding the statement above, a blanket rule against legal representation in the small claims 
courts may not withstand constitutional scrutiny in every case. A court may very well find that in 
some circumstances legal representation is necessary to ensure procedural fairness.214 For example, 
                                                             
205 See §3.7. 
206 For the provisions of s 11(1), see the discussion below.  
207 For the provisions of SCCR 5, see the discussion below. 
208 See §3.8. 
209 Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee 2002 (5) SA 449 (SCA) para [5]; 
Dabner v South African Railways and Harbours 1920 AD 583 at 598. 
210 Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others v Law Society of the Northern Provinces 2014 
(2) SA 321 (SCA) para [19]. 
211 Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others v Law Society of the Northern Provinces supra 
[26]. 
212 Currie, de Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 742 (hereinafter referred to as Handbook) 
213 Handbook 742. 
214 In Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee supra the court stated at para [11]: 
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if children were permitted to sue in small claims courts, they may need legal representation.215 A 
particularly poorly educated litigant who is unable to motivate his or her case to the presiding officer 
may also need legal assistance.  
Field studies216 have shown that a prohibition against legal representation in small claims courts, 
though not a violation of the right to due process,217 can prejudice some litigants, most notably the 
poorly educated litigant. Even though the processes and procedures of the small claims courts are 
less formal, poorly educated litigants can find the environment intimidating. Their negative 
experience can be exacerbated by a particularly intimidating presiding officer. Even where the 
presiding officer creates a welcoming environment, poorly educated litigants are known to struggle 
with even the most basic court processes and procedures.218 No matter how relaxed the small claims 
courts procedures may be when compared to regular litigation, for the lay litigant who is also poorly 
educated, they may still appear complex. A typical problem is that of pleading a case. If a case is not 
pleaded properly, the court may be unwilling to countenance new evidence or may draw adverse 
inferences on the credibility of witnesses, especially where the paper version of events contradicts 
                                                             
‘There has always been a marked and understandable reluctance on the part of both legislators and the Courts to 
embrace the proposition that the right to legal representation of one's choice is always a sine qua non of 
procedurally fair administrative proceedings. However, it is equally true that with the passage of the years there 
has been growing acceptance of the view that there will be cases in which legal representation may be essential 
to a procedurally fair administrative proceeding. In saying this, I use the words 'administrative proceeding' in 
the most general sense, ie to include, inter alia, quasi-judicial proceedings. Awareness of all this no doubt 
accounts for the cautious and restrained manner in which the framers of the Constitution and the Act have dealt 
with the subject of legal representation in the context of administrative action. In short, there is no constitutional 
imperative regarding legal representation in administrative proceedings discernible, other than flexibility to 
allow for legal representation but, even then, only in cases where it is truly required in order to attain procedural 
fairness.’ (Italics inserted for emphasis). 
See also WABZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous [2004] FCAFC 30; Latimer, Hocken,  Marsden 
‘Legal Representation in Australia before Tribunals, Committees and other Bodies’ (2007) 14 Murdoch University E Law 
Journal 122. 
215 See also s 28(1)(h) of the Constitution, which provides: 
‘Every child has the right to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at the state expense, 
in civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result.’ (Italics inserted for 
emphasis). 
216 Moulton (n155) 1975ff. 
217 Prudential Insurance Co v Small Claims Court 76 Cal. App. 2d 379 at 383-384. 
218 Weller et al (note 163) 182ff; Ruhnka et al (n170) 59ff. 
 
 251 
the oral testimony in court.219 The rules of evidence can also present a challenge. While the small 
claims court system relaxes the rules of evidence, the evidential burden is not relaxed. The claimant 
still has to prove his or her case on a balance of probabilities relying on credible evidence.220 While 
the hearsay rule may be relaxed, for example, a court will be disinclined to rely solely on hearsay 
evidence. The court will want some sort of supporting evidence. Documentary evidence must also 
be properly introduced. Courts rely on different types of documentary evidence to deliberate certain 
claims. The larger the claim is, the more exacting the court may be about the evidence required to 
prove the claim. The poorly educated litigant might not have the knowledge, skill or appreciation to 
present the proper standard of evidence.221 The problem is magnified when the proceedings are 
conducted in a language that is not the litigant’s home language. Even if translation services are 
provided, the litigant may still feel overawed by court proceedings.222 
Literacy and education levels in South Africa remain a problem. There are significant amounts of 
people who have difficulty reading and writing.223 For them, access to the courts is a challenge even 
with the simplified small claims court procedures. The small claims courts’ public education 
programme, which was a ‘key result area’ of the National Action Plan has, by and large, failed.224 It 
is thus unclear how people are expected to navigate the small claims courts when they are highly 
reliant on third party assistance. Of course, nothing precludes litigants from obtaining the services of 
a trained legal professional to help them to prepare court documents and evidence properly. But once 
they appear in court they are required to fend for themselves. For the poorest of the poor, the services 
                                                             
219 Pleadings in the South African small claims courts are still too formal. See discussion in chapter 8. 
220 See chapter 8. In a civil case, the court has to be satisfied on a ‘balance of probabilities’ (the civil standard of proof): 
Schwikkard, Van der Merwe (n111) 580. On credible evidence, see Schwikkard, Van der Merwe (n111) 534. 
221 Lewis ‘Litigants in Person and their Difficulties in Adducing Evidence: A Study of Small Claims in an English 
County Court’ (2007) 11 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 24ff. 
222 Language in the small claims courts is discussed in chapter 4. 
223 See §3.8. 
224 See §3.7, 3.8.  
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of a legal professional – even a low-level one, such as a candidate attorney – are not something they 
can easily afford.  
In legal systems where well-trained, patient, competent and professional people staff the courts, the 
lack of legal representation does not translate into prejudice.225 They provide support to litigants 
every step of the way. Support includes helping litigants to fill in court papers, and providing guidance 
on the collection of evidence and case presentation. Every aspect of the pre-trial process is covered. 
As the hearing date approaches, members of staff educate litigants on court etiquette to reassure them 
if they are feeling intimated by the process.226  
The lack of dedicated clerks of the small claims courts, 227  the absence of legal assistants (as 
contemplated by the Hoexter Commission), and the general chaotic nature of the offices of the clerks 
of many magistrates’ courts – which is where small claims litigants presently file their claims228 – 
makes approaching the courts a less than pleasurable experience.229  
                                                             
225 Report §3.13. 
226 Frame ‘Fundamental Elements of the Small Claims Tribunal System in New Zealand’ in Whelan (n170) 81 
227 See chapter 4. 
228 See chapter 4. 
229 In the attorneys’ magazine, De Rebus (December 2010) 5, an attorney writes:  
‘I read the letter of a Sandton attorney in De Rebus (October 2010) 7 regarding the state of the High Court with 
feelings, inter alia, of sorrow, anger, disappointment, embarrassment, frustration, annoyance, helplessness and 
not an inch of surprise. The writer quite rightfully points out the dismal state of the South Gauteng High Court 
in Johannesburg. Even on writing this I feel a sense of annoyance that the Department of Justice apparently felt 
it helpful to change the name of the court from the former “Witwatersrand Local Division” to the “South 
Gauteng”, yet, as with so many other things in this sunny country nobody bothers with making sure anything 
underneath the pretty new name works...It is indeed not only the South Gauteng High Court that suffers from 
this infectious, ravaging disease, but most of the courts, including the lower courts around the country. Although 
I cannot speak for many courts in other provinces, I certainly have experience in and around most of the courts 
in Gauteng and from what I hear from  my colleagues elsewhere, the situation in other provinces is not much 
better...By far the worst court I have ever set my foot in is the Johannesburg Magistrates’ Court. Not only are 
the staff exceedingly unpleasant, rude and unhelpful, but they are also probably the laziest, most incompetent 
people I have ever come across. The so-called admin “system” (system? where?) is an absolute farce.’  
The views of this writer are echoed by an attorney writing in De Rebus (January-February 2011) at 6 who says:  
‘Our profession, and more importantly, the public are frustrated and prejudiced by the long delays caused by the 
failure of administrators of many magistrates’ courts to carry out their duties properly...The shambles is a serious 
indictment on the administration of justice in South Africa. If it is not reversed South Africa could be regarded 
as not a good place to do business.'  
See also Editor ‘Law Society of South Africa Speaks Out on Conditions in Johannesburg and on Errant Magistrates’ 
(January-February 2011) De Rebus 17, Welgemoed ‘Echoing “Enough is Enough”’ (August 2011) De Rebus 4. 
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The Department of Justice needs to urgently appoint legal assistants in the small claims courts. 
Section 11(1) of the SCCA provides: 
‘The magistrate of the district in which the seat of a court is situated, shall appoint so many clerks and assistant 
clerks of the court, interpreters and legal assistants for that court as may be necessary for the performance of the 
prescribed functions.’230 
Small Claims Court Rule 5 fleshes out the duties of a legal assistant in the following terms: 
‘(1)  The legal assistant shall render to any person who has so requested him advice in regard to any action 
 which falls within the jurisdiction of the court. 
(2)  If he [or she] is so requested, the legal assistant shall render assistance with the drafting of the process 
 of court…’  
The legal assistants could be volunteer attorneys or candidate attorneys wanting to do pro bono 
work.231 They could even be senior law students wanting to do community service.232 But, there is 
also no reason why they cannot be lay people233 who are properly trained as paralegals.234  
(c)  Legal representation should not be permitted in the small claims courts  
Despite all the challenges mentioned above, it is submitted that formal legal representation must not 
be permitted in the small claims courts. Aside from the costs associated with legal representation, the 
presence of lawyers will slow down the operation of the courts. They will make the process of 
litigating in the courts overly technical and litigious.235 Well-heeled litigants will obtain counsel and 
low-income litigants will forgo representation in the belief that the less technical procedures will level 
                                                             
230 Italics supplied.  
231 The Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 envisages that legal professionals will in the future be required to perform 
community service as part of their vocational training and also on a continuing basis to meet their professional obligations: 
see ss 6(5)(b), 26(1)(c), 29, 85(5). In terms of s 29(2)(e) of the Legal Practice Act, community service is broadly defined 
and includes ‘any other service which the candidate legal practitioner or the legal practitioner may want to perform, with 
the approval of the Minister.’ 
232 See §3.8. 
233 Neither the SCCA nor the SCCRs stipulate the qualifications of a legal assistant. 
234 Moulton (n155) 1682 argues: 
‘The small claims court is one forum in which or "lay advocates" could serve an important function. An informed 
layman – who would become as familiar with the court’s procedures and with the issues involved in typical 
contract or landlord-tenant proceeding as the "experienced claims agent" who appears for the plaintiff  – could 
go a long way toward making the hearing a fair one.’ 
Even though Moulton envisages the use of lay people to serve as lay advocates, there is no reason why legal assistants 
could not be lay people. See also Weller, Ruhnka, Martin ‘American Small Claims Courts’ in Whelan ((n170) 14.  
235 Moulton (n155) 1680. 
 
 254 
the playing field. The inquisitorial nature of proceedings will be a farce. Presiding officers, who serve 
as volunteers,236 will be browbeaten by the legal profession. Consequently, presiding officers may be 
intimidated to take less robust approaches to dispute resolution and decision making. The air of 
informality will fly out the window, as hordes of gowned counsel descend upon the small claims 
courts. The litigant will once more become the passive spectator on the stage of justice, on which the 
lawyers will reign supreme.  
The legislature should remain resolutely on the path of barring legal representation in the small claims 
courts. All effort should be made to breathe life into the recommendation of the Hoexter Commission 
to appoint legal assistants in the courts. The Department of Justice should send a directive to every 
senior magistrate and court manager to embark on a programme to appoint legal assistants to serve 
on a pro bono basis, until the government can budget for at least one permanently employed legal 
assistant at every small claims court. Long-serving commissioners in the small claims courts must 
train assistants to provide pre-trial advice to small claims litigants.  
The availability of neutral, non-partisan, non-adversarial legal assistants is key to bridging the 
competency gap between non-regular (‘one-shotters’) and more frequent (‘repeat-players’) court 
users.  
7.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that the issue of locus standi to sue and to be sued in the small claims court 
is a topical one requiring careful analysis and evaluation. In the process of re-imagining the court to 
meet contemporary access to justice challenges, the legislature cannot hold itself bound to the 
conceptualisation of the small claims courts at their establishment. The courts have to serve a cross-
section of society; they have to meet the economic and social challenges in the country; and they 
                                                             
236 See chapter 5. 
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must satisfy the demands of all citizens for access to the law. Limiting access to the small claims 
courts by narrowly construing who may and may not sue does not address contemporary access to 
justice challenges.  
At the same time, some of the original aspirations of the small claims courts, such as limiting legal 
representation, are worth retaining, because they are consonant with the objective of the small claims 
courts, which is to provide an inexpensive form of justice.  
To better facilitate the broader use of the small claims courts, to improve efficiency and the overall 
quality of justice, the processes and procedures of the courts also require attention. Chapter 8 
considers this aspect.  
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CHAPTER 8 




outh African civil procedure is characterised by three distinct procedures: the action 
procedure, the application procedure and the provisional sentence procedure. The 
distinction between actions, applications and provisional sentence is partly based on Roman-
Dutch law but is mostly influenced by Victorian English law.1  Following the English litigation 
style, proceedings in all the courts, other than the small claims courts, are adversarial.2  
The action procedure is initiated by summons; the application procedure by notice of motion; 
and the provisional sentence procedure by provisional sentence summons. Actions are used to 
hear both liquid and illiquid claims. Applications are mainly used to grant injunctive relief. But, 
applications can also be used where statute or the common law authorises litigation in that 
manner. The provisional sentence procedure is a hybrid procedure. It is an amalgam of the 
action procedure in that the process starts with the issuing of summons, but once the defendant 
defends the matter, the process mutates to an application-style procedure. The trial is replaced 
by a hearing. The provisional sentence procedure is said to provide speedy relief in claims based 
on liquid documents where the issues are simple to prove.3 
																																																								
1 Cilliers, Loots, Nel Herbstein & van Winsen: The Civil Practice of the High Courts of South Africa 1313 
(hereinafter referred to as Herbstein & van Winsen). See also Paleker ‘Civil Procedure in South Africa: the Past, 
the Present and the Future’ ZZP Int (2011) 343. 
2 Paleker ‘Fact and Truth-Finding in the South African Civil Procedure’ in van Rhee,  Uzelac (eds) Truth and 
Efficiency in Civil Litigation – Fundamental Aspects of Fact-finding and Evidence-taking in a Comparative 
Context 189 at 190. 
3 For a general discussion of applications and actions see Theophilopoulos, van Heerden, Boraine Fundamental 
Principles of Civil Procedure 129-143, 159, 173-174 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Fundamental Principles’). 
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In the magistrates’ courts and the High Courts, the action procedure is the dominant procedure. 
It has three phases: the pleading stage, the pre-trial stage and the trial. During the pleading 
stage, the parties exchange pleadings according to a strict timetable. In the pre-trial stage, 
discovery, pre-trial conferences and inspections of certain types of evidence (mostly 
documentary) take place to enable the parties to prepare for trial. The trial is a formal occasion 
where parties, through their legal representatives, appear before the court. Depending on the 
court in which the action is brought, the legal representatives are attorneys or advocates of 
various ranks and expertise.4 The trial consists of opening statements followed by evidence.  
Witnesses deliver their testimony through the process of examination-in-chief, cross-
examination and re-examination. Before the court adjourns to deliberate on its decision, legal 
representatives present formal legal arguments to persuade the court as regards how it should 
rule on a matter. 
The average duration of an action from inception to judgment in the magistrates’ courts is 
approximately one year. In the High Court, the duration could be anywhere from two to ten 
years, depending on the locality of the court.5 The cause of such delays is primarily the length 
of court rolls and the technical nature of the litigation rules, which encourage all sorts of 
interlocutory procedures.6   
The small claims courts are unique in that the distinction between applications, actions and 
provisional sentence do not feature in the processes and procedures. The small claims procedure 
																																																								
4 Following the English tradition, South Africa has a split bar system consisting of attorneys and advocates.  
5 In ‘Norms and Standards for the Performance of Judicial Officers’ in GG 37390 of 28 February 2014, the Chief 
Justice issued directive 5.2.5 stipulating that depending on the complexity and magnitude of a civil case, in the 
High Court a matter must be finalised within one year of the date of issue of summons, and in the magistrates’ 
courts within nine months. Anecdotal evidence reveals that these time periods have not been achieved. However, 
the judiciary is working on various strategies to expedite civil matters. One such initiative is judicial case-flow 
management, which has been piloted in a few divisions of the High Court. See Manyathi-Jele ‘Progress on Judicial 
Case-Flow Management’ De Rebus (May 2014) 65; Anonymous ‘The Slow of Pace of Justice in South Africa’s 
Court System’: http://www.enca.com/south-africa/slow-pace-justice-south-africas-court-system (last accessed on 
15 July 2017); Pule ‘New System to Improve Access to Justice’ Vuk’uzenzele (July 2015): 
http://www.vukuzenzele.gov.za/new-system-improve-access-justice (last accessed on 15 July 2017). 
6 Such as exceptions, special pleas, applications to compel and irregular step proceedings. 
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is essentially an action. But, unlike in the magistrates’ courts and the High Courts, the small 
claims action procedure is significantly streamlined. All matters commence by way of a letter 
of demand, followed by a summons, and then proceed to trial. Small claims courts, by and large, 
cannot hear applications, as they do not have jurisdiction to grant orders of specific performance 
and injunctive relief.7 Because small claims courts pleadings are kept to a minimum, and there 
is no pre-trial procedure, the plaintiff does not have to wait long for a trial date. The defendant 
is informed of the trial date in the summons.8 The most outstanding feature of the small claims 
court procedure is that the presiding officer is directed to proceed inquisitorially. The presiding 
officer is not a neutral umpire. He or she descends into the arena to gather facts and evidence 
from the unrepresented parties. The normal adversarial trial process thus does not apply in the 
small claims courts. 
This chapter considers the processes and procedures of the small claims courts as explicated in 
the SCCA and SCCRs. The chapter consists of several parts. Part I considers the letter of 
demand. Part II looks at the summons and the service rules. In Part III, the written statement of 
defence is discussed. Part IV is dedicated to the small claims courts’ trial procedure. Here issues 
of evidence and the inquisitorial role of the commissioner come under the spotlight. In each 
section, the current procedures of the small claims courts will be discussed, problems will be 
identified, and suggestions for reform will be made. Where applicable, reference will be made 
to comparative law for solutions.  
																																																								
7 SCCA, s 16(d) and 16(g). 
8 See SCCRs, Form 1. 
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PART I 
THE LETTER OF DEMAND  
8.2 THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Section 29(1)(a) of the SCCA provides: 
‘The plaintiff shall deliver a summons as prescribed personally or through his9 authorized representative 
to the clerk of the court, together with a copy of a written demand which was on a prior occasion delivered 
to the defendant by the plaintiff by hand or by registered post and in which the defendant was, 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law contained, allowed at least 14 days, calculated from 
the date of receipt of that demand by the defendant, to satisfy the plaintiff's claim.’ 
Section 29(2) provides:  
‘Upon production of the prescribed proof that the reminder contemplated in subsection (1) was delivered 
to the defendant, and if the clerk of the court is satisfied that the plaintiff is a natural person and that his 
summons complies with the prescribed requirements, the clerk of the court shall set a date and time for 
the hearing of the action and issue the summons and hand it to the plaintiff or his authorized 
representative, who shall personally serve it on the defendant, or deliver it to the messenger10 of the court 
for service on the defendant.’ 
In the magistrates’ courts and the High Courts, service of a letter of demand is generally not 
required for the initiation of legal proceedings. However, letters of demand are frequently sent 
as it is said that they serve the purpose of encouraging a party to settle a claim before summons 
is issued.11 A letter of demand may also be required under statute or the common law. This 
usually occurs where a statute or the common law requires notice of proceedings. For example, 
the Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain Organs of State Act (‘PACOS’)12 requires 
the plaintiff to give the defendant organ of state notice of an intention to sue before summons 
can be issued. Furthermore, under the common-law rules of contract, the plaintiff is sometimes 
required to put the defendant on terms to abide by the contract. If the defendant fails to comply, 
the contract can be cancelled and legal proceedings can be instituted.13  In both instances, the 
purpose of the letter of demand is to place the defendant on notice. 
																																																								
9 In future, gender-neutral language should be used.  
10 The term ‘messenger’ must be replaced with ‘sheriff’: see Sheriffs Act 90 of 1986. 
11  Paleker ‘Letters of Demand (Interpellatio Extraiudicialis): Form and Substance’ (2005) 30 Journal for Juridical 
Science 68 at 69. 
12 40 of 2002. This Act is discussed at §7.3(d). 
13 Paleker (n11) at 79ff. 
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Under s 29(1)(a) of the SCCA, a letter of demand is required in all cases. At least 14 calendar14 
days must elapse from the date when the defendant receives the demand before the clerk of the 
court can issue a small claims summons. Presumably, the purpose of the letter of demand is to 
inform the defendant of the plaintiff’s claim so that the defendant has an opportunity to resolve 
the dispute. In terms of s 29(2) the clerk of the court will issue the summons if there is proof of 
the following: (a) that the letter of demand was ‘delivered’ to the defendant, (b) that the plaintiff 
is a natural person, and (c) that the plaintiff’s summons complies with the prescribed 
requirements.  
8.3 THE LETTER OF DEMAND IS A PROCESS 
Because the letter of demand is a mandatory step, the letter is the first process in terms of the 
SCCA. This is significant because whereas a summons generally interrupts the running of 
prescription in the other courts, in the small claims courts prescription is interrupted by service 
of the letter of demand on the defendant.  
Section 15(1) of the Prescription Act15 provides: 
‘The running of prescription shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (2),16 be interrupted by the 
service on the debtor of any process whereby the creditor claims payment of the debt.’17 
The legislature defines ‘process’ in s 15(6) as follows: 
‘For the purposes of this section, 'process' includes a petition, a notice of motion, a rule nisi, a pleading 
in reconvention, a third party notice referred to in any rule of court, and any document whereby legal 
proceedings are commenced.’18 
																																																								
14 Section 4 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 provides:  
‘When any particular number of days is prescribed for the doing of any act, or for any other purpose, the same 
shall be reckoned exclusively of the first and inclusively of the last day, unless the last day happens to fall on a 
Sunday or on any public holiday, in which case the time shall be reckoned exclusively of the first day and 
exclusively also of every such Sunday or public holiday.’ 
15 68 of 1969. 
16 Subsection (2) provides: 
‘Unless the debtor acknowledges liability, the interruption of prescription in terms of subsection (1) shall lapse, 
and the running of prescription shall not be deemed to have been interrupted, if the creditor does not successfully 
prosecute his claim under the process in question to final judgment or if he does so prosecute his claim but 
abandons the judgment or the judgment is set aside.’ 
17 Italics supplied.  
18 Italics supplied.  
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The reference to ‘any document’ includes a letter of demand where the letter commences 
proceedings. Support for this view is found in Cape Town Municipality v Allianz Insurance Co 
Ltd19 where the court held: 
‘Bearing in mind that some of the key wording of s 15 must be given a wide and general meaning, 
consistent with a legislative intention to speak broadly rather than to define, and having regard to the 
spirit, scope and purpose of the Act, I conclude that s 15 must be interpreted as follows: 
1. It is sufficient for the purposes of interrupting prescription if the process to be served is one whereby 
the proceedings begun thereunder are instituted as a step in the enforcement of a claim for payment of 
the debt…’20 
The above dictum was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Peter Taylor 
& Associates v Bell Estates (Pty) Ltd.21 In Peter Taylor22 the court also drew attention to 
Murray & Roberts Construction (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Upington Municipality23 where the latter 
court stated: 
‘Where the creditor takes judicial steps to recover the debt, and thereby to remove all uncertainty about 
its existence, prescription should obviously not continue running while the law takes its course.’ 
 
For prescription to be interrupted, three requirements must be met: (a) There must be a process; 
(b) the process must be served on the debtor; and (c) in the process the creditor must claim 
payment of a debt.24 Clearly, the courts do not require service of a summons for the interruption 
of prescription. The reference to ‘any document’ in s 15(6) includes one that serves as a ‘step 
in the enforcement of a claim’. Within the context of the SCCA, the letter of demand is a 
‘judicial step to recover a debt’ and consequently, a ‘process’ for the purposes of the 
Prescription Act.25 In the letter of demand, the plaintiff demands payment of a debt and the 
plaintiff is required to serve the letter on the defendant.  
																																																								
19 1990 (1) SA 311 (C) at 334H-335B.  
20 This dictum was quoted with approval in Huyser v Quicksure (Pty) Ltd 2017 (4) SA 546 (GP) para [35]. 
21 2014 (2) SA 312 (SCA) para [9].  
22 Ibid [10]. 
23 1984 (1) SA 571 (A) at 578H.  
24 Peter Taylor & Associates v Bell Estates (Pty) Ltd supra [8.] 
25 68 of 1969.  
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A further argument for holding that the letter of demand is indeed a process is that if the letter 
of demand were not a process, this would give rise to an absurd result in that the plaintiff’s 
claim would be susceptible to prescription while the plaintiff waits 14 calendar days before the 
issuance and service of the summons.  
 8.4 PROBLEMS WITH REGISTERED POST  
According to the SCCA, the letter of demand may be delivered by hand or by registered post.  
While there is no problem with hand delivering a letter, in most cases26 letters of demand are 
posted. The reason for this is that the plaintiff may fear that he or she will be met with reprisals 
if the letter is hand delivered to the defendant. The defendant could also be uncooperative and 
refuse to accept delivery of the letter.27 Furthermore, it may be expensive to engage the services 
of the sheriff to deliver the letter.28  
Since time immemorial, legal notices have been sent by registered post. However, this form of 
service is no longer convenient or practically effective. The protracted and recurring strikes 
within the South African Post Office have made it extremely difficult to deliver processes by 
registered post.29 Furthermore, there is evidence which indicates that debtors do not collect their 
registered post from the post office. In Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize30 the court articulated how 
letters of demand are handled by the post office: 
‘(a) Letters to be sent by registered post are brought to the sender's post  office and handed in there, 
where an acknowledgment of receipt is provided. (This acknowledgment is the proof of despatch 
typically provided by attorneys.) 
(b) The registered items are then sorted according to the post office to which they are to be directed, 
and sent to that destination post office accompanied by a 'despatch bill' for that post office. 
(c) When the letters arrive at the destination post office an employee writes and sends out a first 
notification slip to the intended recipient's address. If the address is a street address, the 
notification is sent as if it is ordinary mail, and placed in the post box at that address. If it is a 
PO Box address, it is placed in the appropriate box at the post office. 
																																																								
26 Of course, if the claim is about to prescribe the plaintiff should personally hand deliver the letter of demand or 
the plaintiff should employ the sheriff to do so. 
27 The prevalence of so-called ‘gated communities’ in South Africa has also made physical delivery of legal notices 
quite difficult. See §8.13.  
28 See discussion in §8.13. See also fn 90.  
29  Surty ‘Section 65A(1) Notice to Appear for a s 65 Hearing of the Magistrate’s Court Act’ De Rebus 
(January/February 2016) 22.  
30 2012 (5) SA 574 (KZD).  
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(d) If the mail remains uncollected for a further ten days a second and final collection notice is 
prepared and sent the same way. (This second notification is not shown on the internet track and 
trace report.) 
(e) If the mail is collected proof of identity must be provided by the person concerned and that is 
recorded on the post office system. It sometimes happens that the addressee attends but, after 
having sight of the letter, refuses to accept it. In that case the track and trace report will include 
the word 'refused' when the item is returned to the sender.  
(f) Uncollected mail is returned to the sender after it has remained at the receiving post office for 
thirty days from date of despatch... The various events are recorded on the track and trace report. 
There is normally a delay of between one and two days between the occurrence of each event 
(for instance, the arrival at the destination post office) and the availability of that information on 
a track and trace report.’31 
In Absa Bank, the applicants placed evidence before the court to the effect that over 70% of 
registered letters are returned ‘unclaimed’.32 The court noted that even though past courts 
endorsed registered mail as a reliable form of service, the postal service is less reliable today 
than it was in the past. Consumer behaviour patterns have also changed. When people see legal 
trouble on the horizon, they are less likely to collect registered mail.33 The court thought that 
currently it is more effective to serve legal notices by ordinary mail than by registered post. To 
this extent, the court opined: 
‘But I do not think that I overreach the boundaries of judicial notice by suggesting that, in the case of post 
directed at consumers in financial distress, ordinary post is by a substantial margin more reliable than 
registered post. The country would be in an uproar if anything like 50% (let alone 70%) of ordinary mail 
went astray. Indeed, it seems reasonable to suppose that the proportion of ordinary mail lost is lower than 
50% by a very considerable margin.’34 
In light of the problems with registered post, it seems prudent to move away from this form of 
postal service. Aside from hand-delivered letters of demand, other forms of service should be 
contemplated, such as service by email, facsimile or other electronic means. Social media 





31 Ibid [24]. 
32 Ibid [26]. 
33 Ibid [31]. 
34 Ibid [35].  
35 See s 65(2) of the NCA, which makes provision for six forms of service, including facsimile, email and service 
on a printable webpage. The latter would include, for example, service on a social media platform such as 
Facebook.  
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8.5 SHOULD THE LETTER OF DEMAND BE ‘DELIVERED’, ‘RECEIVED’ OR  
 ‘SENT’? 
Section 29(1)(a) is confusing to interpret. It provides that a letter of demand must be ‘delivered’ 
to the defendant by hand or by registered post. The defendant has 14 calendar days calculated 
from the date of ‘receipt’ of the letter to satisfy the plaintiff’s claim. The subsection thus uses 
both the words ‘delivered’ and ‘receipt’ in relation to the letter of demand. 
The word ‘delivered’ should be distinguished from the word ‘receipt’. When a letter is sent by 
registered post, the addressee, on collecting the letter from the post office, must bring an 
identification document to show that he or she is the person to whom the letter is addressed.  
The addressee will sign to evidence that he or she received the letter. It is at that point that the 
addressee is considered to have ‘received’ the letter. The post office will notify the addressor 
that the letter was received by the addressee. While it is not impossible to prove ‘receipt’, the 
difficulty associated with proof is highlighted in Absa Bank,36 where the court accepted as fact 
that many addressees do not collect registered letters.  
The word ‘delivered’, on the other hand, is a far more pragmatic word from a procedural 
perspective. In Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited,37 the Constitutional Court was 
required to determine the meaning of the word ‘delivered’ in s 130 of the National Credit Act 
(‘NCA’). In terms of the provision, a credit grantor is required to ‘deliver’ a s 129 notice to a 
credit receiver. The notice in question may be sent by inter alia registered post.38 After careful 
analysis, the court concluded that the notice would be ‘delivered’ if the notice was sent ‘by 
registered mail to the address stipulated by the consumer in the credit agreement, and … was 
delivered to the post office of the intended recipient for collection there.’  The court stated:   
																																																								
36  Supra. 
37 2012 (5) SA 142 (CC). 
38 Ibid [62].  
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‘Where the credit provider posts the notice, proof of registered despatch to the address of the consumer, 
together with proof that the notice reached the appropriate post office for delivery to the consumer, will 
in the absence of contrary indication constitute sufficient proof of delivery.’39 
The above dictum confirms that, in the context of the NCA, ‘delivery’ of a notice does not mean 
that a notice must come to the actual attention of the recipient. Section 29(1)(a) of the SCCA 
has not been judicially interpreted. Because of the difficulty caused by the word ‘receipt’, it is 
submitted that for the purposes of the section it would be more appropriate if the letter was 
required to be ‘delivered’ and for the Act to define the word ‘deliver’. To prove ‘delivery’, the 
plaintiff would have to obtain a trace and track report from the post office.  
To require ‘receipt’ of the letter makes it more difficult for the plaintiff to issue summons in 
the small claims court as he or she would have to prove that the letter came to the attention of 
the defendant. The more relaxed approach is supported by s 29(2), where the word ‘delivered’ 
is used.40  
Section 29(2) states that the clerk of the court can set a matter down for trial and issue a 
summons on the defendant if the plaintiff proves that the letter of demand was ‘delivered’ to 
the defendant. Section 29(2) is thus to a certain extent in conflict with s 29(1)(a). It is submitted 
that for the purposes of access to justice, s 29(1)(a) must be read with s 29(2) so that an 
interpretation is taken that expedites the issuance of process in the small claims courts. The 
letter of demand should not stand in the way of the plaintiff getting his or her day in court.   
																																																								
39 Ibid [87]. 
40 Bredenkamp The Small Claims Court 31 states: 
‘When determining the date of receipt of the letter of demand sent by registered post, it is submitted that 
Magistrates’ Court Practice should be followed in this regard. In other words, 3 days after the letter of demand has 
been posted, it is deemed to have been received by the defendant.’  
With respect the above method cannot be adopted because the SCCA does not contain a deeming provision. 
Furthermore, the above method of calculation does not accord with the dicta in the Absa Bank Absa Bank Ltd v 
Mkhize and Two Similar Cases supra and Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited supra cases. Both cases 
are discussed in the main text above. 
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Section 29(1)(a) requires amendment in several respects. First, the word ‘receipt’ in the 
subparagraph should be deleted and replaced with the word ‘delivery’. This will make the 
subparagraph consistent with s 29(2) and will remove any potential confusion.41  
Secondly, to promote efficiency, a plaintiff should be able to serve the letter by hand, ordinary 
post, registered post, facsimile, or electronic means. A myriad of forms of service will address 
the issue of defendants not collecting letters of demand.42 As long as the plaintiff can show that 
the letter was delivered by reasonable means to the defendant, the requirement of service will 
have been fulfilled. For electronic service, Part 2 of Chapter III of the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act43 should be applicable.44  
Thirdly, the court must be empowered, at the trial, to condone non-delivery of the letter of 
demand unless the defendant can show prejudice. An example of prejudice would be if the 
defendant was precluded from raising the defence of prescription,45  or if the plaintiff did not 
afford the defendant an opportunity to rectify a breach where, for example, the contract required 
the plaintiff to place the defendant on terms before issuing summons.  Difficulties may, of 
																																																								
41 It is submitted that the provision should read as follows: 
‘The plaintiff shall deliver a summons as prescribed personally or through his authorized representative to the 
clerk of the court, together with a copy of a written demand which was on a prior occasion delivered to the 
defendant by the plaintiff by hand or by registered post and in which the defendant was, notwithstanding anything 
to the contrary in any law contained, allowed at least 14 days, calculated from the date of [receipt] delivery of that 
demand by the defendant, to satisfy the plaintiff's claim.’ (Words in square brackets signify deletions from the 
existing provision, and words in underline signify insertions).  
42 See NCA, s 65(2), where various forms of service have been written into the Act.  
43 25 of 2002.  
44 Of particular relevance is s 23, which provides: 
‘A data message –  
(a) used in the conclusion or performance of an agreement must be regarded as having been sent by the originator 
when it enters an information system outside the control of the originator or, if the originator and addressee 
are in the same information system, when it is capable of being retrieved by the addressee; 
(b) must be regarded as having been received by the addressee when the complete data message enters an 
information system designated or used for that purpose by the addressee and is capable of being retrieved and 
processed by the addressee; and 
(c) must be regarded as having been sent from the originator's usual place of business or residence and as having 
been received at the addressee's usual place of business or residence.’  
See also HCR 4A, MCR 9(9)(c)(ii).  
45 For the interruption of prescription, the letter of demand must be served on the defendant. If the court determines 
that the letter was not served on the defendant and the time for instituting the claim has expired, the court would 
not be able to condone non-delivery of the letter. However, if at the time when the trial commences the claim has 
not prescribed, there is no reason why the court cannot exhibit the letter of demand to the defendant and condone 
non-compliance with the 14-day period. Alternatively, the court could postpone the matter to comply with the 
waiting period. The court should have flexibility.   
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course, arise where a letter of demand is required in terms of legislation and the legislation 
prescribes service by registered mail. It is fortunate though for the small claims courts46 that the 
NCA allows for service of notices by facsimile, email, ‘delivery’47 by registered post, or ‘by 
printable webpage’.48  Similarly, PACOS stipulates in s 4(1): 
‘A notice must be served on an organ of state by delivering it by hand or by sending49 it by certified mail, 
or subject to subsection (2), by sending it by electronic mail or by transmitting it by facsimile…’.50  
 
8.6 THE DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT SHOULD 
 BE REMOVED   
The clerk of the small claims court should not have the discretion to refuse to issue a summons 
where proof of ‘delivery’ of the letter of demand is absent. It is submitted that the clerk must 
simply check to see that the letter was ‘sent’.51 The presiding officer must determine whether 
there was proper service. However, failure to deliver a letter of demand should not render the 
proceedings void. The presiding officer must determine whether the failure to deliver the letter 
has caused the defendant prejudice. 52  The presiding officer should have the discretion to 
condone non-compliance if the letter of demand is immaterial to the claim, in which case the 
summons must be deemed to be the process initiating the proceedings.53 Alternatively, where 
																																																								
46 Section 15(d) of the SCCA provides that the court may hear actions arising from the NCA. 
47 See definition of ‘delivered’ in Regulation 1 of the Regulations made in terms of the NCA published under GN 
R489 in GG 28864 of 31 May 2006. 
48 NCA, s 65(2). 
49 The word ‘send’ means something less than ‘delivery’. In Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited supra 
[70], in the context of the NCA, the court held that to send a document by registered post means that the document 
must be ‘despatch[ed]’ to the ‘last known address’ of the person.  A document ‘delivered’ in terms of the SCCA 
will thus include a document that must be ‘sent’ in terms of other legislation. 
50 Italics inserted for emphasis. When a letter is sent by means other than hand delivery or registered mail, s 4(2)(b) 
provides: ‘within seven days after the date upon which that notice was so sent or transmitted, [the creditor must] 
deliver by hand or send by certified mail a certified copy of that notice…’ (Italics inserted for emphasis). For a 
discussion of the relevance of the Act to the small claims courts see §7.3(d). 
51 For the definition of ‘send’ see fn 49 above. 
52 See fn 48 above.  
53 It is in any event debatable whether it is necessary to have both a summons and a letter of demand. In many 
jurisdictions, the statement of claim is the initiating document. It appears as if the South African legislature might 
have over complicated the small claims courts procedure by requiring a double-barrel procedure. While the Law 
Society of South Africa does not dispute the need for the letter of demand it does lament that many letters of 
demand are poorly drafted and the nature of the claim and the relief sought are not discernible from the letter. It 
seems that a pro forma letter of demand is required to address this issue. See Law Society of South Africa Annual 
Report (2017-2018) 59.  
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the defendant is prejudiced54 by the non-delivery of the letter, the presiding officer should be 
empowered to stay the proceedings until proper notice is given. 55  To this extent, it is 
recommended that s 29(2) of the SCCA should be amended as follows: 
‘29(2)(a) [Upon production of the prescribed proof that the reminder contemplated in subsection 
 (1) was delivered to the defendant, and if] If the clerk of the court is satisfied that the 
 plaintiff is a natural person 56  and that [his] the plaintiff’s summons complies with the 
 prescribed requirements, the clerk of the court shall set a date and time for the hearing of the 
 action and issue the summons and hand it to the plaintiff or his or her authorised 
 representative, who shall [personally]57 serve it on the defendant in accordance with the rules 
 for service, or deliver it to the [messenger] sheriff58 of the court for service on the defendant. 
        (b)  If the court determines that the plaintiff has not delivered the written demand contemplated in 
 subsection (1), the court may condone non-compliance if the defendant is not prejudiced and 
 the court shall regard the summons as the process initiating proceedings, or the court may stay 
 the action until the written demand is delivered to plaintiff and make an appropriate order as 
 regards the continuation of proceedings.’59 
The small claims court commissioner should have a general power to condone non-compliance 
with time periods and rules. Unlike the position in the magistrates’ courts and the High Courts, 
the SCCRs do not give the commissioner a general power to condone non-compliance with 
procedural rules. It is submitted that the following rule should be introduced in the small claims 
courts: 
 
‘A failure to comply with these rules does not render a proceeding, step, document or order a nullity, and 
																																																								
54 For example, the defendant may be prejudiced where there is a statute that requires prior notice, and the statute 
mentions that the letter must be ‘delivered’ or ‘received’ by the defendant. There is no reason why the small claims 
court commissioner cannot stay proceedings to comply with the statute. 
55 A similar position is to be found in s 130 of the NCA. Section 130(4)(b) provides: 
‘In any proceedings contemplated in this section, if the court determines that — 
(b) the credit provider has not complied with the relevant provisions of this Act, as contemplated in 
subsection (3)(a), or has approached the court in circumstances contemplated in subsection (3)(c), the court must 
–  
(i) adjourn the matter before it; and 
(ii) make an appropriate order setting out the steps the credit provider must complete before the matter may 
be resumed…’ 
In Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited supra, the Constitutional Court para [53] had the following to 
say about the above provision: 
‘[W]hile section 129(1)(b) appears to prohibit the commencement of legal proceedings altogether ('may not 
commence'), section 130 makes it clear that where action is instituted without prior notice, the action is not void. 
Far from it. The proceedings have life, but a court 'must' adjourn the matter,  and make an appropriate order 
requiring the credit provider to complete specified steps before resuming the matter. The bar on proceedings is 
thus not absolute, but only dilatory. The absence of notice leads to a pause, not to nullity.’ 
The court had no problem with the above approach. A similar approach may thus be adopted in the small claims 
courts.  
56 The reference to ‘natural person’ presupposes that only natural persons will be sued in the small claims courts. 
However, see the discussion at §7.5 where it is argued that perhaps the SSCA should be amended to allow juristic 
persons to sue. See also §7.5(b). 
57 The word ‘personally’ should be deleted so that the all the rules of service are applicable. See discussion in 
§8.13. 
58 The word ‘messenger’ must be replaced by the word ‘sheriff’: see Sheriffs Act 90 of 1986. 
59 Words in square brackets signify deletions from the existing provision, and words in underline signify insertions.  
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the court may grant all necessary amendments or other relief, on such terms as are just, to secure the just 
determination of the dispute.’60 
 
The purpose of small claims courts is to provide expedited justice to the person in the street. 
People should not be turned away at the doors of the courts because of minor technical 
infractions. The procedures of the court should permit parties to make mistakes and for the 
court to fill in the gaps where necessary. After all, the parties are unrepresented and cannot be 
expected to understand the technicalities of procedure. The nature of small claims does not 
justify perfect adherence to procedure. The presiding officer must have the discretion to rectify 
procedural mistakes so that the requirements of natural justice are met.   
PART II 
SUMMONS AND SERVICE RULES 
8.7 CONTENT OF THE SUMMONS  
Small Claims Court Rule 9(1) provides that a summons corresponding with Form 1 of 
Annexure 1 of the SCCRs must be served on a defendant not less than ten calendar days before 
the trial. The summons must contain the following information: 
• Details of the court out of which the summons is issued; 
• a description of the parties; 
• notice of the date and time of the trial; 
• a notice informing the defendant that the plaintiff’s claim may be defended and that a 
statement of defence may be tendered for this purpose; 
• particulars of claim containing the nature and amount of the claim(s). Where the summons 
contains more than one claim, the particulars of each claim and the relief sought in respect 
																																																								
60 This provision is an adaptation of rule 2 of the Ontario Small Claims Courts Rules  (Ontario Regulation 258/98 
as last amended by Ontario Regulation 488/16 with effect from 1 January 2017) which states:  
‘2.01 A failure to comply with these rules is an irregularity and does not render a proceeding or a step, document 
or order in a proceeding a nullity, and the court may grant all necessary amendments or other relief, on such terms 
as are just, to secure the just determination of the real matters in dispute.’ 
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of each claim must be stated separately;  
• a notice drawing the defendant’s attention to the possibility that the plaintiff may have 
abandoned a portion of the claim or admitted a debt61  to bring the matter within the 
monetary jurisdiction of the court;  
• a notice informing the defendant that failure to defend the summons could lead to default 
judgment; 
• a notice informing the defendant that where judgment is granted, any monies owing must 
be paid by the defendant directly to the plaintiff; 
• an instruction to the effect that the defendant can consent to judgment by contacting the 
plaintiff; 
• a suggestion that the defendant can pay the debt in instalments by contacting the plaintiff; 
• a notice drawing the defendant’s attention to the landlord’s tacit hypothec and an automatic 
rent interdict in respect of movable property if the claim is for arrear rental; 
• instructions informing the defendant that if the judgment is left unsatisfied or if there is a 
default in payment of agreed instalments, the defendant’s movable property may be attached 
and sold in execution. If there are insufficient movables, immovable property may be 
attached and sold in execution; 
• an instruction to the defendant to notify the plaintiff (judgment creditor) of a change of 
address, business, or employment and to supply the new details;  
• information that a financial enquiry may be conducted if the defendant does not pay the 
judgment debt; and  
• details of the sheriff’s fees for services rendered. 
In the summons, there is also a pro forma consent to judgment form, which the defendant can 
fill in and hand to the plaintiff or the clerk of the court.62   
																																																								
61 See §6.6. 
62 See Appendix 2 to this thesis.  
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To cite the plaintiff and defendant, SCCR 10(4) provides that the summons must:  
‘(a)  show the surname of the defendant by which he is known to the plaintiff, the defendant's sex 
and residence or place of business, and, where known, his first name or initials, and, in the case 
of a woman, her marital status; and, in the case of a legal person, partnership, club, association, 
business, church or syndicate it shall be summoned under the name by which it is known to the 
plaintiff; 
(b)  show the first name, surname, sex and the residence or place of business of the plaintiff.’ 
 
8.8 THE ‘STATEMENT OF CLAIM’  
Neither the SCCRs nor the pro forma summons explains how a small claims summons must be 
pleaded – for example, is the distinction between facta probanda and facta probantia 
relevant?63 Some commentators think that the small claims summons must be pleaded similarly 
to the summons in the magistrates’ courts.64 With respect, such commentators are wrong. The 
absence of formal pleading rules like the ones found in the MCRs65 and the HCRs66 means that 
the particulars of claim in the small claims courts can be stated in a relaxed fashion. This is in 
keeping with the ethos of small claims courts. Be that as it may, the fact that the commentators 
seem to equate small claims pleadings with magistrates’ courts pleadings suggests that Form 1 
is overly technical, and indeed, when one looks at Form 1, the summons is not particularly 
simple for the lay litigant to use.  The summons contains legal jargon. The summons is also 
outdated, misleading and is in some respects wrong because it does not reflect the current law.67 
But fundamentally, the summons does not cater for the small claims courts’ inquisitorial 
process. The form of the summons seems to support the adversarial process.  
One would have thought that the legislature would have adopted the German model of pleading 
																																																								
63 In an action the summons must contain the facta probanda of the claim and not the facta probantia. The facta 
probanda are the materials facts to establish a cause of action. The facta probantia are the particulars of evidence 
that corroborate the material facts. Because evidence is led at trial in an action, there is no need to present it in the 
summons. In an application, because evidence is presented on the papers, the facts and the evidence must appear 
in the pleadings (the notice of motion and the affidavits). See van Blerk Legal Drafting: Civil Proceedings ;10-11 
Paleker (n2) 192. 
64 Bredenkamp (n40) 87ff.  
65 MCRs 5,6.  
66 HCRs17 and 18. 
67 For example, the summons does not take into account the provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction From 
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998, which ousts the jurisdiction of the small claims courts to grant 
eviction orders in respect of residential property occupied by natural persons. See further Appendix 3 to this thesis.  
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in the small claims courts. In Germany, where proceedings are inquisitorial, the summons must 
contain both facts and the evidence corroborating the facts. Parties are encouraged to attach 
documentary evidence if available. The court uses the summons to plan proceedings so that it 
can identify the material issues in dispute, which once resolved, will permit the court to apply 
the law to the facts. The court identifies the legal rules that are likely to be applicable in the 
case and compares them to the factual allegations. Through this process, the court determines 
whether the case is capable of easy resolution or whether further evidence is required.68  The 
current small claims summons is attached in appendix 2 to this thesis. Notes have been inserted 
to reflect problems with the summons. Suggestions for improvement are highlighted. Appendix 
3 contains a proposed new summons.  
8.9  PROPOSALS FOR A NEW ‘STATEMENT OF CLAIM’ 
Appendix 3 to this thesis contains the new proposed summons, styled as a statement of claim. 
The new terminology is in keeping with international trends to embrace plain English in 
pleadings.69 Legal jargon and convoluted and pompous language are discarded. The positive 
features of the statement of claim are pointed out in the notes to appendix 3. 
The small claims statement of claim should be available in all official languages. Currently, the 
small claims summons is only available in English and Afrikaans. Clerks of court and legal 
assistants should help litigants to complete the statement of claim in their home languages if 
																																																								
68 Maxeiner ‘Pleading and Access to Civil Procedure: Historical And Comparative Reflections on Iqbal, a Day in 
Court and a Decision According to Law’ (2010) 114 Penn State Law Review 1257 at 1286; Langbein ‘The German 
Advantage in Civil Procedure’ (1985) 52 The University of Chicago Law Review 823 at 826ff. 
69 Collins ‘The Use of Plain-Language Principles in Texas Litigation Formbooks’ (2005) 24 The Review of 
Litigation 430; Stephenson ‘“Harry Potter Language?” The Plain Language Movement and the Case Against 
Abandoning “Legalese”’ (2017) 68 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 85-90. It is also interesting to note that s 23 
of the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act 2 of 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “Kenyan Small Claims Court Act”) 
refers to a ‘statement of claim’. 
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they are unable to do so themselves. It is therefore important for clerks and legal assistants to 
reflect the language demographic profile of a particular province.70   
The statement of claim must encourage the plaintiff to give a narrative of the claim in his or her 
own words. In some jurisdictions, the plaintiff is required to provide a sworn statement in 
affidavit form.71 This is not recommended in the South African context. Poorly educated people 
have difficulty articulating their thoughts in writing – even when transcribed by a third party. 
An illiterate person is at a greater disadvantage, as he or she cannot appreciate the content of 
the document other than by what he or she is told it contains.  A sworn statement would tie the 
case to the papers before the court. In a small claims court, the oral testimony of the parties and 
the inquisitorial role of the presiding officer to establish the facts and evidence must not be 
curtailed by pleadings. The purpose of the statement of claim must be to assist the court and the 
defendant to understand the plaintiff’s claims and what relief is sought. It should not crystalise 
the cause of action.72   
8.10 CONTENT OF FORM 1 – SOME PROBLEMS  
The content of Form 1 (appendix 2 to this thesis) presupposes that the plaintiff has a working 
knowledge of law and procedure. For example, it mentions that a portion of the claim can be 
abandoned and that a debt can be admitted. A lawyer will appreciate that the purpose of 
abandonment or deduction is to bring the claim within the monetary jurisdiction of the small 
claims court.73 However, the unrepresented lay litigant will not know this. Form 1 as it currently 
stands is scant and does not provide the litigant with context or an explanation. To remedy this 
																																																								
70 In the Western Cape, for example, the dominant languages are English, Afrikaans and Xhosa. The clerk’s office 
should consist of assistant clerks and legal assistants who can communicate in these languages. See discussion at 
§4.6.  
71 See, for example, Salt Lake City Small Claims Courts: http://www.slcgov.com/courts/forms (last accessed on 
16 December 2017); Michigan Small Claims Courts: 
http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/Forms/courtforms/dc84.pdf (last accessed on 16 December 2017).  
72 Ison ‘Small Claims’ (1972) 35 Modern Law Review 18 at 28. 
73 See §6.6. 
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deficiency, the pro forma statement of claim must contain information that contextualises the 
purpose of abandonment or deduction. In this regard, see appendix 3 to this thesis. 
Form 1 contains the following notice: 
‘5. Take notice that you and all other persons are hereby interdicted from removing or causing or suffering 
to be removed any of the furniture or effects in or on the premises described in the particulars of claim 
endorsed hereon which are subject to the plaintiff’s hypothec for rent until an order relative thereto shall 
have been made by the court.’ 
 
The notice above activates the landlord’s tacit hypothec74 and creates an automatic rent interdict 
precluding the defendant from removing movable assets from the premises. At the time of 
serving the summons, the sheriff is required to make an inventory of the furniture and other 
items on the premises. The effect of the inventory is to render what has been written up subject 
to an attachment ‘in the wide sense.’ The attachment is in the ‘wide sense’ because the mere 
fact that property has been interdicted from removal does not mean that the sheriff can remove 
it from the premises. The property must remain on the premises. In terms of the common law, 
only the court can order removal of the goods from the premises.75  
In the magistrates’ courts, where an automatic rent interdict summons also features, s 32 of the 
MCA specifically empowers the magistrate’s court, as a creature of statute, to order the removal 
of goods that are subject to the automatic rent interdict.76 In the small claims courts there are 
two problems. Firstly, the SCCA does not contain a provision similar to s 32 of the MCA. If 
the defendant decides to remove the goods that were inventoried by the sheriff before the trial, 
the plaintiff does not have a remedy to enforce the interdict.77 Secondly, and more significantly, 
																																																								
74 For more on the landlord’s tacit hypothec see van Loggerenberg Jones & Buckle The Civil Practice of the 
Magistrates’ Courts in South Africa Vol 1 at Act 219 (Service 10) (Hereinafter this work will be referred to as 
‘Jones & Buckle’). 
75 Paleker The South African Sheriffs’ Guide – Practice and Procedure (original service) 6-12 (Hereinafter this 
book will be referred to ‘South African Sheriffs’ Guide’).  
76 MCA, s 32(1). 
77  Section 106 of the MCA provides: 
‘Any person wilfully disobeying, or refusing or failing to comply with any judgment or order of a court or with a 
notice lawfully endorsed on a summons for rent prohibiting the removal of any furniture or effects shall be guilty 
of contempt of court and shall, upon conviction, be liable to a fine, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
six months or to such imprisonment without the option of a fine.’ 
There is no equivalent provision in the SCCA. 
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it appears that Form 1, in so far as it makes provision for an automatic rent interdict, is defective 
and ultra vires. Section 16(g) of the SCCA provides that the court has no jurisdiction in a matter 
in which an interdict is sought. Furthermore, unlike the MCA, which specifically empowers the 
magistrates’ courts to issue an automatic rent interdict summons,78 the SCCA is silent. Form 1 
cannot confer jurisdiction on the court. Jurisdiction is a substantive issue and cannot be 
conferred on a court in a pro forma summons attached to delegated legislation.79 
Form 1 makes provision for a consent to judgment, which the defendant can agree to and sign. 
In the magistrates’ courts, the defendant can also consent to a judgment upon receiving a 
summons.80 The purpose of the consent is to obviate the need for the court to hold a trial where 
the defendant does not wish to contest the action. Notwithstanding the magistrates’ courts’ 
procedure, it is submitted that a consent to judgment in the small claims court should not in 
itself ground a judgment. Defendants are unrepresented. Many are unsophisticated people who 
do not have legal knowledge of any kind. They can be easily influenced or pressured to consent 
to judgments by plaintiffs or unscrupulous court officials. Furthermore, before a court can grant 
judgment in an action arising out of the NCA,  the court has to determine whether the relevant 
pre-action steps were taken by the plaintiff to recover the debt.81 A consent to judgment, 
especially where the defendant is a natural person, undermines the rights that consumers have 
in terms of the NCA. It is advisable, therefore, that all matters be placed before a commissioner 
for judgment. The court must be satisfied that there is enough evidence to order judgment 
against the defendant. Fortunately, s 35 of the SCCA provides: 
‘(1)  If a defendant, upon a summons having been served on him in terms of section 29 –  
(a)  admits liability and consents to judgment in writing; or 
(b)  fails to appear before the court on the trial date or on any date to which the proceedings 
have been postponed, 
the court may, on application by the plaintiff, grant judgment for the plaintiff in so far as he has 
proved the defendant's liability and the amount of the claim to the satisfaction of the court, and 
the court may dismiss any counterclaim by the defendant.’ 
																																																								
78 MCA, s 31.  
79 The pro forma summons is attached to the SCCRs. The Rules are delegated legislation. 
80 MCA, s 58. 
81 NCA, ss 129 and 130. 
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It is patently clear that the court will not grant judgment by consent unless the plaintiff has 
proven its claim. 
8.11 CITATION OF PARTIES  
In chapter 782 SCCR 10(4)83 was discussed and found to be unconstitutional because it falls 
foul of s 9 of the Constitution. Consequently, the rule must be redrafted as follows: 
(a) show the surname and first names or initials of the defendant by which the defendant is known to the 
plaintiff, the defendant’s residence or place of business and, where known, the defendant’s 
occupation and employment address; 
(b) show the full names, gender (if the plaintiff is a natural person84), occupation and the residence 
 or place of business of the plaintiff.  
 
The above redraft will bring the SCCRs in line with the MCRs and the HCRs.85  Similarly, 
Form 1 should also be amended because it also requires that a female defendant’s marital status 
be stated – see appendix 2 to this thesis.  
8.12 AMENDMENT OF SUMMONS 
Small Claims Court Rule 11 permits a plaintiff to amend a summons. If a summons is amended 
before it is served, the plaintiff can effect the amendment as he or she deems fit. However, the 
clerk of the court must initial the amendment.  The SCCRs do not contain provisions relating 
to the amendment of a summons after service of the summons.86 This is not insurmountable, as 
there is no reason why a summons cannot be amended at the trial. A relaxed process for 
amendments is in line with the general idea of keeping the processes and procedures of the 
small claims courts informal.  
 
																																																								
82 See §7.4. 
83 The rule is set out above in §8.7. 
84 Of course, in the small claims court a plaintiff can only be a natural person. Juristic persons cannot sue. The 
phrase ‘if the plaintiff is a natural person’ is thus redundant. However, if juristic persons are allowed to sue in the 
small claims courts, then the phrase must remain. See also §7.5.  
85 HCR 17(4), MCR 5(4). It is interesting to note that the plaintiff is required to state his or her gender, whereas 
the plaintiff is not required to state the defendant’s gender. The distinction occurs because the plaintiff is not 
always in the position to state the defendant’s gender simply because the plaintiff does not have that information 
and a person’s name can be ambiguous in this regard.  
86 There is thus no equivalent in the SCCRs to MCR 55A or HCR 28. 
	 277	
8.13 SERVICE OF SUMMONS 
It is a cornerstone of our legal system that a person is entitled to proper notice of legal 
proceedings.87 If proceedings are initiated and pursued without the defendant being informed 
of the steps taken, all subsequent proceedings are either void or can be set aside on the basis of 
a procedural irregularity.88  
(a) Forms of service  
It is not necessary for a small claims summons to be served by the sheriff of the court. The 
plaintiff may personally serve it, at either the defendant’s residence or his or her place of 
business. However, if the defendant makes it impossible for the plaintiff to serve the summons 
– for example, if the defendant refuses to accept service or keeps his or her premises closed – 
the plaintiff is then required to use the services of the sheriff of the court.89 
When the sheriff is involved, SCCR 13(2) is applicable. The sub-rule provides that any 
process90 may be served in the following ways: 
‘(a) To the said person91 personally or to his duly authorised agent; 
(b) at the said person's residence or place of business to some person apparently not less than 16 
years of age and apparently residing or employed there: Provided that for the purpose of this 
paragraph, when a building is occupied by more than one person or family, 'residence' means 
that portion of the building occupied by the defendant; 
(c) at the said person's place of employment to some person apparently not less than 16 years of age 
and apparently in authority over him or, in the absence of such person in authority, to a person 
apparently not less than 16 years of age and apparently in charge at the said person's place of 
employment; 
(d) if the person to be served has chosen a domicilium citandi  at the domicilium  so chosen; 
(e) in the case of a body corporate at its local office or principal place of business within the area of 
jurisdiction of the court concerned to a responsible employee thereof or in any other lawful 
manner; 
(f) by registered post: Provided that where such service has been effected in the manner prescribed 
by paragraphs (b)  , (c)  or (e)  , the sheriff shall indicate in the return of service of the process 
the name of the person to whom it has been delivered and the capacity in which such person 
stands in relation to the person, body corporate or institution affected by the process, and where 
																																																								
87 Steinberg v Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago 1973 (3) SA 885 (RA) at 892C.  
88 See Dada v Dada 1977 (2) SA 287 (T) at 288C–E and the authorities there cited. 
89 SCCR 13(3). 
90 The use of the word ‘process’ means any process of the court and is not limited to the summons. It includes the 
letter of demand. The phrase ‘delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff by hand’ in s 29(1)(a) does not mean by 
the plaintiff’s own hand. The sheriff can serve the letter of demand by hand to the defendant on the plaintiff’s 
behalf. However, this hardly happens, as the cost of service by the sheriff is high. 
91 The ‘said person’ includes the defendant. However, the ‘said person’ also includes any other person who is 
required to be served with a document in terms of small claims court procedure.  
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such service has been effected in the manner prescribed by paragraphs (b)  , (c)  or (f)  , the court 
may, if there is reason to doubt whether the process served has come to the actual knowledge of 
the person to be served, and in the absence of satisfactory evidence, treat such service as invalid.’ 
Moreover, where the defendant keeps his or her residence or place of business closed and 
thereby prevents the sheriff from serving the process, it is sufficient according to SCCR 13(4) 
to affix a copy of the summons to the outer or principal door of the plaintiff’s residence or place 
of business. 
(b) Service by registered post requires reconsideration 
Earlier in this chapter, the problems attendant to service of a letter of demand by registered post 
were discussed. The comments made in respect of the letter of demand are apposite for service 
of a summons by registered post. It is submitted that the Rules Board for Courts of Law should 
in the future give serious consideration to whether it wishes to persist with this form of service.  
Small Claims Court Rule 13(10) provides:  
‘(10) (a) Where service of process may be effected by registered post such service shall, unless 
otherwise provided, be effected by the sheriff placing a copy of such process in an  envelope and 
addressing and posting it by prepaid registered letter to the address of the party to be served and making 
application at the time of registration for an acknowledgment by the addressee of the receipt thereof as 
provided in regulation 44(5) of the regulations published under Government Notice R550 of 14 April 
1960.92 
(b) A receipt form completed as provided in regulation 44(8) of the said regulations shall be a sufficient 
acknowledgment of receipt for the purposes hereof. 
(c) If no such acknowledgment be received the sheriff shall state the fact in his return of service of the 
process. 
(d) Every such letter shall have on the envelope a printed or typewritten notice in the following terms: 
“This letter must not be readdressed. If delivery is not effected before...............................19[sic]93......, this 
letter must be delivered to the sheriff of the small claims court at.......................................”.’ 
From the above rule, the following is discernible. Firstly, where service of any process is 
effected by registered post, the sheriff must place the process in an envelope and write the 
address of the addressee on the envelope. The envelope must have a printed or typewritten 
notice with specific wording.  The sheriff must thereafter make ‘application at the time of 
registration for an acknowledgement by the addressee of the receipt thereof as provided in 
regulation 44(5) of the regulations published under Government Notice R550 of 14 April 
																																																								
92 Government Notice R550 of 14 April 1960.  
93 The ‘19’ should be amended to ‘20’.  
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1960.’94 Regulation 44(5) provides: 
‘The sender of any registered postal article may upon application either at the time of the registration 
thereof or at any time within two years thereafter and upon payment of the prescribed fee in addition to 
the fee for registration, require to be furnished with an acknowledgement by the addressee of the receipt 
of such article, and any registered article, for delivery within the Union, which has been applied for at 
the time of registration, shall not be delivered until such acknowledgment has been obtained by the 
department.’95 
The purpose of the acknowledgement is to determine whether the addressee has received the 
process in question. If an acknowledgement is not received, the sheriff must state this fact in 
the return of service.96 It is unclear from the SCCRs what inference the court should draw from 
a non-acknowledgement by the addressee. Should the court consider the service as defective? 
Or should the court consider the service as valid because the process was ‘delivered’, albeit not 
received?97 It would appear from SCCR 13(10) read with regulation 44(5)98 that service of a 
summons is only valid once the addressee receives the summons.  Why else would the sheriff 
have to record this fact?99  
Where a summons is served by registered post on a postal address, SCCR 13(10)(b) provides 
that there should be compliance with regulation 44(8) of Government Notice R550 of 14 April 
1960.100 This regulation provides:  
‘In effecting delivery of a registered postal article through a private post office box rented from the 
Postmaster-General, a printed receipt form bearing the registered number and the address of such 
registered article shall be placed in such a box, and the presentation at the proper post office of the said 
receipt signed either by the addressee or the person presenting the same purporting to sign for shall be a 
sufficient warrant for the delivery of such registered article to the applicant.’  
The above provision serves to confirm that ‘receipt’ constitutes proper service of the summons 
in terms of the SCCA and SCCRs. Given that addressees can, and often do, ignore registered 
post notices and do not collect their post from the post office, service of small claims courts 
summons by registered post is problematic and must be reconsidered. It is also unclear why 
																																																								
94 SCCR 13(10)(a). 
95 Italics inserted for emphasis.  
96 SCCR 13(10)(c). 
97 To this extent, see the proviso to MCR 9(3), where the court is directed as to how to treat improper service. 
According to this proviso, the magistrate’s court has to treat the service as invalid.  
98 Note 92. 
99 SCCR 13(10)(c). 
100 Note 92.  
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proof of actual receipt of the summons is necessary if the summons is not the initiating legal 
process in the small claims courts.101 
(c) Service on domiciliary address is problematic  
Service on a domiciliary (domicilium) address is well recognised.102 In the past, the courts were 
prepared to accept service on a domiciliary address even if that address turned out to be a vacant 
plot. In this regard, the Appellate Division in Amcoal Collieries Ltd v Truter103 held: 
‘It is a matter of frequent occurrence that a domicilium citandi et executandi is chosen in a contract by 
one or more of the parties to it. Translated, this expression means a home for the purpose of serving 
summons and levying execution. (If a man chooses domicilium citandi the domicilium he chooses is taken 
to be his place of abode: see Pretoria Hypotheek Maatschappij v Groenewald 1915 TPD 170.) It is a 
well-established practice (which is recognized by rule 4(1)(a)(iv) of the Uniform Rules of Court) that if 
a defendant has chosen a domicilium citandi, service of process at such place will be good, even though 
it be a vacant piece of ground, or the defendant is known to be resident abroad, or has abandoned the 
property, or cannot be found (Herbstein & Van Winsen The Civil Practice of the Superior Courts of South 
Africa 3rd ed., p210. See Muller v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd1972 (1) SA 328 (W) at 331H - 
333A, Loryan (Pty) Ltd v Solarsh Tea & Coffee (Pty) Ltd1984 (3) SA 834 (W) at 847D - F.)’ 
Recently – probably under the influence of the Constitution – the correctness of the above 
approach has been questioned. Debtors usually choose domiciliary addresses in contracts and 
other standard form documents. Even though contracts invariably allow a debtor to change his 
or her domiciliary address by giving the creditor notice, debtors frequently forget to do so. To 
expect people to scrupulously abide by administrative provisions in a contract takes freedom of 
contract too far. People enter into far more contracts these days than they might have in the 
past. From mobile phone contracts to credit card agreements, the person in the street enters into 
a vast array of service-related contracts. It is unreasonable to expect people to remember all the 
contracts they entered into so that a change of address can be given for legal proceedings that 
might arise sometime in the future.104 
																																																								
101 See discussion at §8.3. 
102 In Muller v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd 1972 (1) SA 328 (W) the court stated at 332G: 
‘Our Courts adopt the view that normally where a person chooses a domicilium citandi et executandi, 
the domicilium so chosen must be taken to be his place of abode within the meaning of the Rule of the Rules of 
Court which deals with the service of a summons. Downey v Downey, 16 S.C. 475; Pretoria Hypotheek 
Maatschappij v Groenewald, 1915 T.P.D.  H 170; Botha v Measroch, 1916 T.P.D. 142; I'ons v Freeman & Frock, 
1916 W.L.D. 64; Hollard's Estate v Kruger, 1932 T.P.D. 134; Lindrup v Lowe, 1935 NPD 189 at pp. 192 to 
193; Goldberg and Another v Di Meo, 1960 (3) SA 136 (N) at p. 143.’ 
103 1990 (4) SA 1 (A) at 5J-6A (hereafter referred to as ‘Amcoal Collieries Ltd’). 
104 See Rossouw v First Rand Bank Ltd t/a FNB Homeloans 2010 (6) SA 439 (SCA) para [32]. 
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In Firstrand Bank Ltd v Gazu, 105  service on the defendant took place in terms of HCR 
4(1)(a)(iv). This rule in the High Court allows service on a chosen domiciliary address. The 
court, after citing Amcoal Collieries Ltd,106 and having regard to the facts of the case, held:107 
‘...this Court has a discretion with regard to the provision of service. In this matter it is clear that:- 
(a) Miss Gazu was contracting with a banking institution; and 
(b) the provision of the domicilium citandi et executandi is stated in clause 20  of the mortgage bond to 
be at the hypothecated property; and 
(c) those words “THE HYPOTHECATED PROPERTY” have been typed into the mortgage bond 
which was a document obviously prepared by the bank; and 
(d) it is notorious that in dealing with the banks, mortgage bonds and other formal documents are 
presented to their clients on a “take it or leave it” basis and the ability of the other contracting party 
to balance out the unequal bargaining power in the mortgage bond is extremely limited if not entirely 
excluded; and 
(e) given the requirements with which banks have to comply in order to meet their obligations in terms 
of the provisions of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001, it is inevitable that the bank will 
have a great deal of personal information concerning the applicant. This information will almost 
certainly include matters such as a residential address, a home and cell telephone number and even 
probably the e-mail address of Miss Gazu.  
In those circumstances it seems unfair that the bank made no further effort whatsoever to contact Miss Gazu 
and notify her that it was taking such drastic action against her.’ 
The above dictum illustrates that some courts108 are disinclined to accept a lazy reliance on a 
domicilium clause in a contract.  The plaintiff needs to satisfy the court that its method of service 
is appropriate in the circumstances.109  
Small Claims Court Rule 13(2)(d) read with SCCR 13(5) permits service on a domiciliary 
address. The potential prejudice associated with service on a domiciliary address is ameliorated 
by SCCR 13(6). According to this rule, when the sheriff comes to know that a defendant has a 
new residential address, the sheriff is duty-bound to serve the process at the new residential 
address. This sub-rule is of general application and applies in all instances where the sheriff 
serves a process and discovers information about the defendant’s actual residence. A problem 
arises where the sheriff does not discover such information or fails to make proper enquiries.  
																																																								
105 2011 (1) SA 45 (KZP). 
106 Supra. 
107 Firstrand Bank Ltd v Gazu supra paras [12]-[13].  
108 Other courts follow the common law to a tee. See, for example, Shepard v Emmerich 2015 (3) SA 309 (GJ) 
where the court stated at para [6]: 
‘The significance of the changed circumstances is this: had the service been effected in accordance with 
the domicilium clause, even though the summons did not come to the attention of the respondent due to the 
changed circumstances, it would have constituted good service.’ 
109 See also HCR 4(10) which provides: ‘whenever the court is not satisfied as to the effectiveness of the service, 
it may order such further steps to be taken as to it seems meet.’  
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In the magistrates’ courts, MCR 9(3)(d) provides for service on a domiciliary address. To 
remedy the potential prejudice that could befall a defendant, the Rules Board for Courts of Law 
introduced a proviso to the rule. The proviso appears at the end of MCR 9(3) and reads as 
follows: 
‘Provided that where … service has been effected in the manner prescribed by paragraphs (b), (c), (d) or 
(f), the court may, if there is reason to doubt whether the process served has come to the actual knowledge 
of the person to be served, and in the absence of satisfactory evidence, treat such service as invalid…’.110 
According to the proviso, a magistrate can treat service on a domiciliary address as ‘invalid’ if 
he or she doubts that the process has come to the ‘actual knowledge’ of the defendant. The 
sheriff must be reasonably sure that the process will come to the defendant’s attention. The 
sheriff has to record the basis of holding that belief in the return of service. Accordingly, there 
is little scope for a process to be left at some spot or with some nondescript person in the hope 
that it will come to the defendant’s knowledge.  
The difficulty with the proviso, however, is that the discretion conferred on the judicial officer 
may not be consistently applied. Some presiding officers may be more meticulous than others. 
In particularly busy districts, the court could forget to exercise the discretion to the detriment 
of the defendant, who may be subject to default judgment.111  Be that as it may, there is no 
doubt that having the proviso ameliorates the unsavoury aspects of service on a domiciliary 
address. It is recommended, therefore, that the proviso should apply in the small claims courts 
as well. To achieve the same result as in the magistrates’ courts, the Rules Board for Courts of 
Law112 must in the future amend the proviso in SCCR 13(2)(f). The proviso should be a general 
one in respect of the whole of SCCR 13(2) and should state: 
‘Provided that where such service has been effected in the manner prescribed by paragraphs (b), (c) or 
(e), the sheriff shall indicate in the return of service of the process the name of the person to whom it has 
been delivered and the capacity in which such person stands in relation to the person, body corporate or 
institution affected by the process, and where such service has been effected in the manner prescribed by 
paragraphs (b), (c), (d) or (f), the court may, if there is reason to doubt whether the process served has 
come to the actual knowledge of the person to be served, and in the absence of satisfactory evidence, treat 
such service as invalid.’113 
																																																								
110 Italics inserted for emphasis.  
111 SCCA, s 35. 
112 See chapter 4.  
113 Insertion reflected in bold underline.  
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It must be noted that the Rules Board is currently exploring the possibility of doing away with 
service on a domiciliary address altogether. On 6 April 2017, the Rules Board invited public 
comment on the issue.114  According to the Rules Board’s public statement: 
‘The Rules Board has considered that the rules providing for service on a domicilium citandi where the 
person sought to be served is no longer at the chosen domicilium may result in unfairness and in certain 
circumstances be contrary to public policy. 
The Board therefore considered that the rules … should not be left as they are, but should instead be 
addressed so as to remove possible prejudice … 
There are different possibilities by which the service rules providing for service on a domicilium citandi 
may be addressed. These include but are not limited to: 
(a) Repealing service on a domicilium citandi entirely; 
(b) Allowing for service on a domicilium but requiring that service must be effected on a person 
at the domicilium; 
(c) Allowing for service on a domicilium provided that if the court is not satisfied with the 
service it may require further or better service or another form of service.’ 
Irrespective of how the issue of service on a domiciliary address is resolved in the future, it is 
axiomatic that the SCCRs require amendment. Aside from SCCR 13(2), it appears that SCCR 
13(5) also requires amendment.  According to this sub-rule: 
‘Where the sheriff is unable after diligent search to find at the residence or domicilium citandi of the 
person to be served either that person or a person referred to in subrule (2)(b) or, in the case of a 
body corporate referred to in subrule (2)(e), a responsible employee, it shall be sufficient service to 
affix a copy of the process to the outer or principal door of such residence, local office or principal 
place of business or to leave a copy of the process at such domicilium.’ 
If the suggested proviso is introduced in SCCR 13(2), all references to a domicilium address in 
SCCR 13(5) must be deleted. The consequence of this would be to bring SCCR 13(5) in line 
with MCR 9(3)(e) and HCR 4(1)(a)(v).  
(d)   Affixing to doors and gates  
Whether SCCR 13(5) should permit processes to be affixed to the outer or principal door of a 
‘local office or principal place of business’ of a defendant is debatable. In terms of MCR 9(3)(e) 
and HCR 4(1)(a)(v), a simple affixing is possible if the defendant is a close corporation or a 
company. It has been held 115  that these rules are in conformity with s 170(1)(b) of the 
Companies Act of 1973,116 s 23(3) read with s 220 of the Companies Act of 2008,117 and s 25(1) 
																																																								
114 http://www.justice.gov.za/rules_board/comment.html (last accessed on 30 October 2017).  
115 Arendsnes Sweefspoor CC v Botha 2013 (5) SA 399 (SCA) paras [7] and [9]. 
116 61 of 1973. 
117 71 of 2008. 
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read with s 25(2) of the Close Corporations Act.118 According to these legislative provisions 
every company and close corporation is obliged to have a postal address and a registered office 
to which all notices may be addressed and at which all processes may be served. If service by 
affixing is retained, then for the sake of harmonisation, SCCR 13(5) should read the same as 
MCR 9(3)(e) and HCR 4(1)(a)(v).  
In the case of natural persons, SCCR 13(4) provides: 
‘Where the person to be served keeps his residence or place of business closed and thus prevents the 
sheriff from serving the process, it shall be sufficient service to affix a copy thereof to the outer or 
principal door of such residence or place of business.’  
A similar provision can be found in MCR 9(5). There is no analogous provision in the HCRs. 
It is submitted that despite the absence of a similar rule in the High Court, it may be useful to 
retain SCCR 13(4). The rule has limited application. For the rule to apply, the sheriff must state 
facts in the return of service from which it can be determined that the defendant deliberately 
evaded the sheriff or prevented the sheriff from serving the process. For example, that ‘he or 
she peeped through the window but kept the door locked’, ran away at the sight of the sheriff, 
or ‘in any other way indicated to the sheriff that he or she was not prepared to accept service.’119 
 (e) Other modes of service  
In the technological age, it is startling that the rules of service do not make provision for 
electronic service of court documents. Email, 120  Facebook 121  and other social media 
platforms 122  are common forms of communication. Many platforms allow people to 
																																																								
118 69 of 1984. 
119 See South African Sheriff’s Guide (original service) Annexure 2-52. 
120 As at 14 July 2017 there were 21 million internet users in South Africa. According to a recent study, it was 
anticipated that there would have been 22,5 million users by the end of 2017: Shapshak ‘South Africa has 21 
Million Users, Mostly on Mobile’ Forbes (19 July 2017): 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tobyshapshak/2017/07/19/south-africa-has-21m-internet-users-mostly-on-
mobile/#513efde51b2d (last accessed on 21 July 2017). 
121  As at 30 June 2016, there were 14 million Facebook users in South Africa: 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm (last accessed on 14 April 2017).  
122 WhatsApp is the most popular social media platform in South Africa. It is estimated that a third of South African 
internet users have WhatsApp accounts: http://www.htxt.co.za/2016/04/29/the-stuff-south-africa-26-8-mil-
internet-users-spend-most-their-time-doing-online/ (last accessed on 14 July 2017); Vermeulen ‘This is Why 
South Africa Fell in Love with WhatsApp’  Mybroadband (29 April 2016): 
https://mybroadband.co.za/news/columns/157611-this-is-why-south-africa-fell-in-love-with-whatsapp.html  (last 
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communicate with others directly in encrypted123 environments to ensure that a message or 
document reaches the intended user.124 
The traditional service methods are for many reasons ineffectual and expensive. Personal 
service is a cumbersome process. The sheriff is expected to travel to the defendant’s residence 
or place of business. This takes time. The sheriff must locate the defendant or an appropriate 
person on whom the process can be served. It often takes several attempts before the sheriff 
manages to serve the process. This is costly because for each attempt the plaintiff has to pay 
the sheriff a fee.  The tariff for serving a summons is set out in Annexure 2, Part II of the 
SCCRs. In terms of the tariff, the sheriff is entitled to claim a fee for every attempted service 
and for the actual service of the summons. Fees are adjusted depending on how far the sheriff 
has to travel. The sheriff can also charge for drawing up the return of service.125 
In the busy city centres, it can take the sheriff weeks to deliver a summons on account of the 
volume of court processes that the sheriff has to serve. A sheriff’s office does not just serve 
small claims summonses; the sheriff must also serve magistrates’ courts and High Court 
processes. Aside from serving process, the sheriff has many other duties.126 
In New England Merchants National Bank v Iran Power Generation and Transmission 
Company,127 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York declared: 
‘Courts … cannot be blind to changes and advances in technology. No longer do we live in a world where 
communications are conducted solely by mail carried by fast sailing clipper or steam ships. Electronic 
communication via satellite can and does provide instantaneous transmission of notice and information. 
No longer must process be mailed to a defendant's door when he can receive complete notice at an 
electronic terminal inside his very office, even when the door is steel and bolted shut.’ 
																																																								
accessed on 14 July 2017); Anonymous ‘WhatsApp Dominates in South Africa’ BusinessTech (5 August 2014): 
https://businesstech.co.za/news/mobile/64778/whatsapp-dominates-in-south-africa/ (last accessed on 14 July 
2017).  
123 This means that nobody but the sender and receiver of the message or call will be able to access the contents – 
not even the employees of an electronic data platform.  
124 Murgia ‘WhatsApp Adds End-to-End Encryption: What Is It and What Does It Mean for You?’ The Telegraph 
(6 April 2016).  
125 Item 7, Annexure 2, Part II of the SCCRs. The return of service has to be handed to the court as it evidences 
the manner in which the sheriff carried out the service. 
126 See generally South African Sheriff’s Guide (revision service 1, 2016).  
127 495 F.Supp 73 (S.D.N.Y) at 81. This is a seminal case because it triggered the debate about the use of 
technology in civil proceedings in the United States.  
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Implicit in the above statement is an appreciation that electronic service allows a plaintiff to 
reach a defendant where physical access to the defendant would otherwise be impossible.  This 
is particularly relevant in South Africa. Sheriffs struggle to serve summonses on people living 
and working in ‘gated communities’ and informal settlements. With the appalling safety 
situation in the country, many people live and work in security complexes and estates – the so-
called ‘gated communities’.128  Sheriffs struggle to access these.  Informal settlements present 
a particular problem as they evolve organically into sprawling townships. There are no street 
names or home numbers in these informal settlements. Houses are arranged chaotically to 
maximise space. To serve a court process in an informal settlement can be near impossible. 
Some sheriffs refuse to enter some settlements out of fear for their personal safety.129 But, many 
people in gated communities or in informal settlements have mobile phones. Many of them will 
have access to email by mobile phone or to a social media platform like Facebook, WhatsApp 
or Skype. It is easy these days to see if a defendant is using a social media platform on a regular 
basis. For example, one can see how often the user posts information, or what their online status 
is.  There are different ways of checking whether someone has checked their email or whether 
they communicate by email. Because litigation evolves from a relationship, it is not far-fetched 
to assume that the plaintiff might have communicated with the defendant using a particular 
platform or combination of platforms in the past and would be in a good position to give the 
sheriff advice about the best means of electronic service.  
Many electronic and social media platforms allow documents to be attached. They also allow 
for voice and video messages to be recorded and posted. Voice and video messages are 
particularly beneficial for people who are blind or illiterate. There is no reason why a sheriff 
cannot exhibit a summons to the defendant in a video message and read the contents of the 
																																																								
128 Dawson ‘Geography of Fear: Crime and the Transformation of Public Space in Post-Apartheid South Africa’ 
in Low, Smith The Politics of Public Space (2006) 123ff. 
129 I am grateful to Messrs J Fourie (Sheriff of Simon’s Town, Western Cape) and Mr H van Nieuwenhuizen 
(Sheriff of Witbank, Gauteng) for this information. Both sheriffs have more than 30 years’ experience as sheriffs 
and have shared their professional expertise with the sheriffs’ profession for many years.  
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claim to him or her with an instruction to appear at court on a particular date. The insatiable 
attachment that people have to their mobile phones is well-documented, making this form of 
service quite effective. 
The South African legislature and courts are not averse to using technology to serve legal 
documents. PACOS,130 for example, currently allows for service of notices by email and 
facsimile. The MCRs131 and the HCRs132 allow for pleadings, other than a summons or notice 
of motion, to be served by electronic means if the opposing party has consented thereto.133 
Following the decision in CMC Woodworking Machinery (Pty) Ltd v Pieter Odendaal 
Kitchens134 the courts permit service of pleadings, including summonses and notices of motion, 
by electronic means (including WhatsApp, Skype and Facebook) as a form of substituted 
service135 –  if service according to the traditional means is not possible. The procedural rules 
of the courts have not, however, mainstreamed electronic service of court documents that 
initiate proceedings. This is likely to change on account of s 44 of the SCA.136 Section 44(1) 
provides: 
‘(a)  In any civil proceedings before a Superior Court, any summons, writ, warrant, rule, order, 
 notice, document or other process of a Superior Court, or any other communication which by 
 any law, rule or agreement of parties is required or directed to be served or executed upon any 
 person, or left at the house or place of abode or business of any person, in order that such 
 person may be affected thereby, may be transmitted by fax or by means of any other electronic 
 medium as provided by the rules. 
(b) The document received or printed as a result of the transmission contemplated in 
 paragraph (a) is of the same force and effect as if the original had been shown to or a copy 
 thereof served or executed upon the person concerned, or left as aforesaid, as the case may 
 be.’137 
																																																								
130 See §7.3. 
131 MCRs 5(3)(a) and 13(3)(a). 
132 HCR 4A. 
133 This is similar to Practice Directive 6A of the Civil Procedure Rules of England and Wales.  
134 2012 (5) SA 604 (KZD).  
135 In terms of the MCRs  and the HCRs, where service cannot be effected by one of the methods prescribed by 
the rules of court, the party seeking to serve a court document can make application to court for substituted service. 
For more on substituted service see Peté, Hulme, du Plessis et al  Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 108ff. 
136 10 of 2013 (hereafter referred to as the ‘SCA’).  
137 Section 40 of the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 8 of 2017 amends s 44 of the SCA as follows: 
‘Section 44 of the Superior Courts Act, 2013, is hereby amended –  
(a) by the substitution for the heading of the following heading: 
‘‘Electronic transmission of summonses, writs and other process [and of notice of issue thereof]’’; 
(b) by the substitution in subsection (1) for paragraphs (a) and (b) of the following paragraphs, respectively: 
‘‘(a) In any civil proceedings [before a Superior Court], any summons, writ, warrant, rule, order, notice, 
document or other process of a Superior Court, or any other communication  which by any law, rule or 
agreement of parties is required or directed to be served or executed upon any person, or left at the house or place 
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The Rules Board for Courts of Law will in due course draft rules to facilitate service of 
processes in the Superior Courts138 in terms of the aforementioned provision. There is no reason 
why the SCCA and the MCA cannot be amended to achieve a similar objective. Sceptics might 
rely on two arguments against electronic service of processes in the lower courts.  The first is 
that the defendant has not been given an opportunity to choose service of a summons by 
electronic means. The second is that there is a likelihood that the summons may go astray (either 
intentionally or negligently) so that it never comes to the defendant’s attention.  
However, choice of method of service should not be an obstacle for service by electronic means. 
Even with the traditional service methods, the plaintiff exercises a choice. The defendant cannot 
prescribe the manner of service. There is no reason why the same should not apply to electronic 
service. To allow electronic service would expand the range of options open to the plaintiff to 
effect service. The potential of a summons going astray exists even when the traditional modes 
of service are used. Service on a domiciliary address is inherently risky as there is no guarantee 
that the defendant resides or works at the service address. Service on an individual, other than 
on the defendant personally, also has its perils. A summons can go missing when it is left with 
a person ‘apparently not less than 16 years of age and apparently residing or employed’139 at 
the place of service or served upon a person ‘apparently not less than 16 years of age and 
apparently in authority’ over the defendant or ‘in charge [at the defendant’s] place of 
employment’.140 The courts have the discretion to determine whether there has been proper 
																																																								
of abode or business of any person, in order that such person may be affected thereby, may be transmitted by [fax] 
facsimile, or by means of any other electronic medium [as provided by the rules], to the person who must serve 
or execute such process or communication. 
(b) The document received or printed as a result of the transmission contemplated in  paragraph (a) is of the 
same force and effect as [if the original had been shown to or a copy thereof served or executed upon the 
person concerned, or left as aforesaid, as the case may be] the original thereof.’’; and 
(c)  by the substitution in subsection (2) for the words preceding paragraph (a) of the following words: 
‘‘A notice [sent by fax] transmitted by facsimile, or any other electronic medium [authorised   by 
the rules] as contemplated in subsection (1)— ’’.’ 
[Words in square brackets signify deletions from the existing provision, and words in underline signify insertions].  
138 ‘Superior Court’ means the ‘Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court, and any court 
of a status similar to the High Court’: SCA, s 1.  
139 SCCR 13(2)(b). 
140 SCCR  13(2)(c).  
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service and to treat service as invalid if there is reason to believe that the process has not come 
to the actual knowledge of the defendant.141 In the High Court, HCR 4(10) permits a court to 
order a different form of service if the court is not satisfied with the traditional mode of service 
used. There is no reason why the courts would be any less qualified to determine the 
effectiveness of service of a summons by electronic means.  
The potential for a court process to go astray always exists. However, fraud and other nefarious 
activities can be ameliorated if the sheriff continues to be responsible for service of the 
summons by electronic means. The sheriff will state his or her reasons for using a particular 
form of electronic service in the return of service, the steps taken to verify the appropriateness 
of that mode of service, and the defendant’s conduct after service. As technology improves, it 
will become easier to see if people receive electronic messages. Furthermore, their behaviour 
may provide tell-tale signs that they have received a court document.  
For the small claims court litigant, electronic service of a summons will reduce the cost of 
service. The sheriff will not have to claim the cost of travel in addition to the fee for actual 
service of the document.142 In many small claims matters, the cost of service of a summons is 
a deterrent to parties wishing to institute claims because the sheriff expects the small claims 
litigant to pay for service in advance. Alternatively, the sheriff sometimes refuses to provide 
the return of service if the defendant does not pay. 143 Without the return of service, the court 
																																																								
141 See SCCR 13(2) proviso.  
142 See discussion below.  
143 In theory, these actions by the sheriff are unacceptable. Section 14(7) of the MCA provides: 
‘A messenger receiving any process for service or execution from a practitioner or plaintiff by whom there is due 
and payable to the messenger any sum of money in respect of services performed more than three months 
previously in the execution of any duty of his office, and which notwithstanding request has not been paid, may 
refer such process to the magistrate of the court out of which the process was issued with particulars of the sum 
due and payable by the practitioner or plaintiff; and the magistrate may, if he is satisfied that a sum is due and 
payable by the practitioner or plaintiff as aforesaid which notwithstanding request has not been paid, by writing 
under his hand authorize the messenger to refuse to serve or execute such process until the sum due and payable 
to the messenger has been paid.’ 
Even though the SCCA does not have a similar provision, anecdotal evidence reveals that sheriffs often refuse to 
serve small claims summonses unless the plaintiff pays upfront. The reason for this is that the plaintiff is 
unrepresented and there is thus no law firm that the sheriff can turn to for payment. 
There is no similar provision in the SCA or in the SCCA. Given that only a judicial officer can exonerate a sheriff 
from serving process in the magistrates’ courts, it would be unwise for a sheriff to take unilateral action in the 
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will not know if the summons has been served. Sometimes the cost of serving the summons is 
more than the value of the claim, causing some litigants not to seek justice.144 
The environmental advantages of electronic service are also not difficult to appreciate: less 
paper, less printing, and less travel by the sheriff translate to a smaller carbon footprint when it 
comes to the service of court processes.  
There are plans to introduce ‘e-filing’ in all the High Courts in South Africa. It is only a matter 
of time before e-filing is introduced in the lower courts. Although electronic service of 
processes and e-filing at court are complimentary to each other, they are not dependent on each 
other for implementation. Until e-filing is introduced, there is no reason why documents that 
have been manually issued at the courts cannot be served on litigants by electronic means, as 
document scanners are commonplace these days. In fact, there are free software applications 
that allow one to scan documents using a mobile phone or a tablet device.145 
(f)  Substituted service  
Where a plaintiff cannot serve a summons by one of the traditional methods, SCCR 13(9) makes 
provision for substituted service. The presiding officer can order service by another means, for 
example, by publication in a newspaper or by electronic means. Since there is no formal 
application or interlocutory application procedure in the small claims courts, the presiding 
officer would make such an order on the date of the trial indicated in the summons. The wording 
of SCCR 13(9) is wide enough for the court to consider the issue of substituted service mero 
																																																								
small claims court and refuse to serve process where the litigant is indigent. See South African Sheriffs’ Guide 
(revision service 1, 2016) § 7.19, 7.2; SCA, s 43(1). 
144 I am thankful to Mrs N Ndlovu for this information. Mrs Ndlovu has served as a commissioner in the small 
claims court in Eastern Cape for more than 15 years. She knows of many cases where the value of the claim was 
less than the cost of the service of the summons. See also Law Society of South Africa Annual Report (2007-2008) 
38. 
145  Heaton ‘Tablets Help Court Go Paperless in Texas’ (12 June 2012): http://www.govtech.com/public-
safety/Tablets-Help-Court-Go-Paperless-Texas.html (last accessed on 16 May 2018); Farrell, Tipping, Woodward 
‘Trialling the use of Tablets in Australian Courts: The Jury is Still Out’ (2015) Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 
of the Australian Special Interest Group for Computer Human Interaction 483 ; Dixon ‘Technology and the courts: 
a futurist view’ (2013) 52 Judges Journal. 36.  
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motu.  
(g)  Sheriff’s costs  
Part II of Annexure 2 to the SCCRs is titled ‘Fees and Travelling Expenses for Sheriffs.’ In 
keeping with the aims and objectives of small claims courts, the tariffs were set at a lower rate 
than the magistrates’ courts.  
The problem with the tariffs is that the Minister of Justice last amended them 27 years ago.146 
The tariffs are out of kilter with the reasonable costs incurred by sheriffs when performing their 
functions. For example, the tariffs stipulate that the sheriff may claim R15 for service of a small 
claims summons if service takes place within 20 kilometres of the courthouse.147 The sheriff 
can claim the cost of travel if service takes place more than 20 kilometres from the courthouse 
at a rate of 70 cents per kilometre for each kilometre travelled beyond the 20-kilometre mark.148 
When compared to the magistrates’ courts’ tariffs, which allow the sheriff to claim a fee of R63 
for service of a court document within 20 kilometres of the courthouse, and a travelling 
allowance of R5 per kilometre for every kilometre travelled (i.e. going and returning), the small 
claims courts’ tariffs do not make economic sense.149  Consequently, sheriffs simply replace 
the tariff amounts in the SCCRs with the appropriate tariffs drawn from the magistrates’ courts 
tariffs. Although this may not be an ethically sound practice,150 one can see why the sheriffs 
adopt this approach.151 For a small claims court litigant, the current situation is not ideal. It 
																																																								
146 The last amendment was by GN R851 in GG 13178 of 19 April 1991.  
147 Annexure 2, Part II, Item 1(a)(ii) of the SCCRs. 
148 According to Annexure 2, Part II, Item 3 of the SCCRs, if it is necessary for the sheriff to travel more than 20 
kilometres from the courthouse of the magisterial district within which a process must be served or executed, a 
travelling allowance of 70 cents per kilometre may be charged for every kilometre travelled or part thereof ‘further 
than the aforesaid distance to and from the place of service or execution.’ The qualifying part of the rule suggests 
that the sheriff can only start charging a traveling fee from the 20 kilometre mark. If service or execution takes 
place within a 20 kilometre radius of the courthouse, the travelling fee may not be charged. It must be noted that 
the travelling charge may be levied for the forward and return journey. See also Paleker at 13-57 fn 4. 
149 See Item 1B(a)(iii) read with Item 5(a) of Annexure 2, Part II of Table C of the MCRs.  
150 Sheriffs do not have the authority to amend delegated legislation of their own accord. As officers of the court, 
they must abide by legislation.  
151 I am thankful to Mr Allan Murugan, the sheriff of Durban North, for information on how sheriffs charge. Mr 
Murugan trains members of the sheriffs’ profession on sheriffs’ costs.  
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explains why the cost of serving a summons can be an obstacle to accessing the small claims 
courts. 
When the Rules Board for Courts of Law becomes the responsible authority for regulating the 
fees and tariffs of the small claims courts in the future,152 it must urgently amend Annexure 2 
of the SCCRs. In consultation with the sheriffs’ profession, the Rules Board must increase the 
tariff amounts. While the fee for service should be less than the magistrates’ courts rate, it is 
unlikely that the sheriffs’ travelling costs can be lower. The cost of petrol and the fuel levy have 
escalated dramatically over the years and sheriffs should receive full compensation for their 
disbursements.153 
The key to reducing the sheriff’s cost, especially when it comes to serving processes, is to 
stipulate alternative service methods. Service by electronic means, for example, will reduce 
costs. The sheriff will not have to travel to the place of service and will not have to expend a 
																																																								
152 See discussion in chapter 4.  
153 The travelling cost of R5 in the magistrate’s court compensates the sheriff for petrol expenses and for the wear 
and tear expenses incurred by the sheriff for the use of a vehicle. It has to be noted, however, that where the sheriff 
has to serve multiple processes in the same vicinity the cost of travel is apportioned between all the processes 
served.  The same principle applies in the small claims courts. Item 4(c) of Part II of Annexure 2 of the SCCRs 
provides: 
‘A travelling allowance shall be calculated in respect of each separate service, except that –  
(i) where more services than one can be done on the same journey beyond a radius of 20 kilometres from 
the court-house concerned, the distance of the radius of 20 kilometres to the first place of service may be taken 
into account only once and shall be apportioned equally to the respective services, and the distance from the first 
place of service to the remaining places of service shall likewise be apportioned equally to the remaining 
services; and 
(ii) where service of the same process has to be effected on more than one person by a sheriff within the area 
served by him, only one charge for travelling shall be made.’ 
For illustrative examples see South African Sheriffs’ Guide 13-7 to 13-12. The following table sets out the extent 
to which the petrol price increased during the period 2006-2016.  
 
Source: https://businesstech.co.za/news/energy/134400/petrol-vs-diesel-prices-in-south-africa-2006-2016/ (last 
accessed on 20 July 2017). 
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lot of time trying to effect service of a document.   
(h)  Not necessary for the sheriff to exhibit the original summons 
Small Claims Court Rule 13(3) provides: 
‘The sheriff shall, on demand by the person upon or against whom process is served, exhibit to him the 
original of the process except where service has been effected by post, in which case the original may be 
inspected where it is filed of record.’ 
This rule is similar to MCR 9(4), which requires the sheriff to exhibit the original process or a 
certified copy of the process to the party being served. In addition, the sheriff has to explain the 
nature and the content of the process to the person concerned.  In terms of the HCRs, the sheriff 
is not required to exhibit the original process. The sheriff only has to serve a copy of the process 
and explain the contents thereof. It is unclear why sheriffs’ duties in the lower courts are 
different to those in the High Court.  
The requirement that the sheriff exhibits the original process must be removed if electronic 
service is introduced.  The original process should be presented to the defendant at court if he 
or she wants to see it. In any event, the original summons would be in the court’s file for perusal 
by the presiding officer who will determine its authenticity.154 The sheriff should, however, 
explain the contents of the summons where possible. Small Claims Court Rule 13(3) must be 
amended as follows: 
‘The sheriff [shall] must, as far as it is practically possible, explain the contents of a process [on demand 
by] to the person upon or against whom the process is served, [exhibit to him the original] and hand a 
copy of the process to the person: Provided that the person may inspect the original at court [except 
where service has been effected by post, in which case the original may be inspected where it is filed 
of record].’155  
The SCCRs should contain a definition of the word ‘copy’ as ‘an exact reproduction of an 
original, certified copy of an original, or duplicate original of a document, notice or process.’ 
																																																								
154 In all matters, the sheriff is responsible for returning the original summons to the plaintiff who has to ensure 
that the original is filed at court. 
155  Words in square brackets signify deletions from the existing provision, and words in underline signify 
insertions. 
	 294	
This definition will cater for documents that have been faxed, scanned, photocopied, SMSed, 
emailed, or attached as documents in PDF format or otherwise to a social media webpage.  
PART III 
THE STATEMENT OF DEFENCE 
8.14 THE STATEMENT OF DEFENCE IS NOT A PLEA  
In the magistrates’ courts and the High Court, the defendant must within 20 days of delivering 
the notice of intention to defend deliver a plea.156  If the defendant fails to deliver the plea after 
receiving notice to do so, the plaintiff may apply for default judgment.157 In the plea, the 
defendant has to set out its factual defence to the plaintiff’s claim. The plea is a technical 
document: the defendant must admit, deny, confess and avoid or plead no knowledge of the 
allegations contained in the plaintiff’s summons (particulars of claim) and plead facts to exhibit 
a defence.158 If a plea does not follow the technical drafting rules, it may be challenged in terms 
of the rules of court.159 
 
In the small claims court, a defendant is not required to do anything to defend a matter. The 
defendant is simply required to pitch up at court to defend the case.  If the defendant wants, he 
or she can deliver a ‘written statement’ in anticipation of the trial. The statement can be 
delivered160 at any time prior to the trial.   
Section 29(3) of the SCCA provides: 
‘Apart from the summons no pleadings shall be required of the parties, but the defendant may at any time 
before the hearing lodge with the clerk of the court a written statement setting forth the nature of his 
defence and particulars of the grounds on which it is based, and a copy of that statement shall be furnished 
to the plaintiff by the defendant.’ 
																																																								
156 MCR 17(1); HCR 22(1).  
157 MCR 12(1)(b); HCR 35(5)(a). 
158 MCR 17(2); HCR 22(2). 
159 MCR 17(6); HCR 22(5). 
160 The word ‘deliver’ is defined in SCCR 1 as follows: 
‘“deliver” (except in rules 8 and 13) means to file with the clerk of the court and serve a copy on the opposite party 
and 'delivery' and  'delivered' and  'delivering' have a corresponding meaning’. 
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The ‘written statement’ must contain the nature of the defendant’s defence and particulars of 
the grounds on which it is based. It is interesting to note that some commentators seem to think 
that the defendant’s ‘statement’ has to follow the usual formal format of the plea and that 
allegations must be admitted, denied, etc.161 With respect, they are wrong. The absence of 
formal rules for the written statement indicates that it is a relaxed document in which the 
defendant should give a narrative of the defence. To follow the plea format would introduce 
technicality into the small claims procedure, which could not have been intended by the 
legislature.162 
If the defendant wishes to counterclaim, a statement of defence must be tendered. In this regard, 
SCCR 14(3) provides: 
‘A claim in reconvention shall be made by stating in the written statement of defence such particulars of 
the claim in reconvention as are required in terms of rule 10 in respect of a claim.’ 
Like the summons, the defendant (plaintiff in reconvention) has to give a narrative of the facts 
upon which the counterclaim is based. Thereafter the defendant must state the relief sought. 
The defendant can abandon a portion of its counterclaim to bring it within the jurisdiction of 
the court or admit a debt owed to the plaintiff.  
Small Claims Court Rule 14(2) is a strange rule. It provides: 
‘For the purposes of this rule 'defendant' includes any person upon whom a summons has been served 
and who alleges that he is not the defendant cited in the summons and enters appearance to defend on 
that ground.’163 
 
According to the above rule, it seems that a party who is joined to proceedings but believes that 
he or she should not have been joined can raise the misjoinder by delivering a statement of 
defence. Of course, defendants may appear at trial and tender the defence orally without filing 
a statement of defence. The statement is thus optional in this instance. The rule refers to an 
‘appearance to defend.’ This is nonsensical, as there is no formal notice of intention to defend 
																																																								
161 Fundamental Principles 258-262. 
162 The Hoexter Commission’s Report §13.20 states: ‘…no formal plea by the defendant should be required…’  
163 Italics inserted for emphasis.  
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in the small claims courts (as there is in the magistrates’ courts and the High Court).164 The 
drafters of the rules seem to have inadvertently lapsed into the procedures of the magistrates’ 
courts when drafting this rule.165 The rule should be replaced with the following: 
‘For the purposes of this rule “defendant” includes any person upon whom a summons [has been] is 
served and who [alleges] delivers a statement of defence alleging that he or she is not the defendant 
cited in the summons [and enters appearance to defend on that ground].’166 
 
8.15 DELIVERY OF THE STATEMENT OF DEFENCE TO THE CLERK OF THE 
 COURT AND TO THE DEFENDANT  
Section 29(3) of the SCCA provides that the statement of defence may be submitted ‘at any 
time before the hearing’. Presumably, the reason for the stipulation is to afford the presiding 
officer time to read the statement and to reconcile him or her to the contents thereof. That said, 
because the small claims procedure is not rigid, the presiding officer cannot refuse to accept a 
statement of defence at trial. But, if the defendant wants to raise a counterclaim, the statement 
of defence must be tendered. This is clear from SCCR 14(3). 
The SCCRs do not contain clear information on how a statement of defence has to be delivered 
to the plaintiff. The small claims summons does not give the defendant clear directions about 
where to serve the ‘statement.’ In the magistrates’ courts and the High Courts, the plaintiff has 
to appoint in the summons an address within 15 kilometres of the courthouse at which the 
defendant may serve notices and other pleadings after the summons is served.167 In small claims 
courts’ procedure, the legislature does not stipulate a similar requirement. Perhaps the 
legislature thought that this would be too onerous for the plaintiff to comply with.  But, the lack 
of direction creates a practical problem for the defendant. Is the defendant expected to serve the 
																																																								
164 HCR 19; MCR 13. 
165  The Hoexter Commission’s Report §13.20 states: ‘…the defendant should not be required to make any 
appearance at the small claims court before the day of the actual trial.’  
166  Words in square brackets signify deletions from the existing provision, and words in underline signify 
insertions.  
167 MCR 5(3)(a); HCR 17(3)(a). 
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statement of defence on the plaintiff at the address cited by the plaintiff in the summons? What 
if that address is far from where the defendant lives or works?  The issue of inconvenience is 
compounded further because the defendant is also expected to file the statement at court. Would 
the defendant employ the services of a sheriff to serve the statement and to file it at court? On 
a reading of the SCCRs, it would appear that the ‘statement’ does not fall neatly168 into SCCR 
13,169 as it is not a ‘process’ per se.170 Notwithstanding SCCR 13, there is nothing to preclude 
the defendant from engaging the services of the sheriff if the defendant can afford to do so. It 
seems unlikely that a defendant will be able to recover the cost of service of a statement. Even 
though s 34(d) read with s 37(c) of the SCCA empowers the court, on conclusion of a case, to 
award sheriffs’ fees and travelling expenses if it is ‘just’ to do so, it is clear that the costs order 
will be in favour of a successful plaintiff, and not for an out-of-pocket defendant.  
There are several possible solutions to the above problem. Firstly, if e-filing is introduced,171 
the defendant should be able to file its statement of defence with the court online.172 Secondly, 
the plaintiff should be required to state in the summons (see appendix 3 to this thesis) whether 
it is prepared to accept service of the statement of defence via email or via a mobile telephone 
platform (for example, WhatsApp). Thirdly, the SCCA should be amended to enable the court 
to apportion between the parties the costs of service of court documentation at the end of a trial. 
This will encourage people to agree to easier document exchanges out of fear that if they do not 
facilitate effective and expeditious document handling, the court can hold them liable for costs.  
 
																																																								
168 It can be argued that if the statement of defence contains a counterclaim, it is elevated to a ‘process’ within the 
meaning of SCCR 13. 
169 SCCR 13 deals with service of process by the sheriff. See §8.13 above. 
170 Garrett v Lea Hobbs Milton & Co 1979 (4) SA 922 (W). 
171 ‘Digital to Transform Court Filing System’ Bizcommunity (21 June 2016):  
http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/546/146658.html (last accessed on 18 January 2018).  
172 Section 23(7) of the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act provides: ‘Any party may lodge his or her statement of 
claim or defence by electronic means.’ ‘Electronic’ is defined in s 2 of the Act: ‘includes electrical, digital, 
magnetic, optical, biometric, electromechanical, wireless or electromagnetic technology’. 
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8.16 RECOMMENDED AMENDMENTS 
Section 29(3) should be amended in several respects. First, the subsection should be gender 
neutral. Secondly, the ‘written statement’ should be called the statement of defence. This is the 
better descriptor of the ‘written statement’. There should be a pro forma statement of defence 
attached to the SCCRs to assist the defendant (see appendix 4 to this thesis). Thirdly, the phrase 
‘and particulars of the grounds on which it is based’ should be deleted. The statement of defence 
should contain the defendant’s defence in his or her own words. In the pro forma statement of 
defence, the defendant should be informed that he or she may attach any documentary evidence, 
such as emails, letters, receipts, invoices or contracts, which have not been attached to the 
plaintiff’s statement of claim and which the defendant wishes to rely upon. However, the 
defendant should not be precluded from handing up documents to the court during the trial. To 
this end, the pro forma statement of defence must be worded in a permissive and encouraging 
tone.  Requiring the defendant to state the particulars of the grounds on which the defence is 
based is redundant and does not add to or detract from the nature of a statement of defence. 
In some jurisdictions,173 it is mandatory to file a statement of defence before the small claims 
court trial. The statement assists the presiding officer to prepare for trial and gives the plaintiff 
an indication of what the defendant will say in court. Having the statement gives the presiding 
officer vital information about the nature of the defence and the types of evidence that the 
defendant will rely upon. The presiding officer can use the information to narrow issues and to 
strategise about how he or she will approach the trial. The statement of defence provides insight 
into whether the matter can be resolved by simple application of the law to the facts, or whether 
																																																								
173 Section 25(1) of the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act provides that the respondent ‘shall lodge’ with the court 
a written response to the claimant’s claim in a prescribed form within 15 days. Section 27(1) provides that if the 
respondent fails to respond to the claim in the prescribed period, the court may enter judgment for the claimant 
and order the relief sought in the statement of the claim. 
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the defence introduces aspects that could best be resolved through a process of mediation.174 
Clearly, there are many advantages to filing a statement of defence.  
However, in the South African context, it is not advisable to make the statement of defence 
mandatory. Having a mandatory statement of defence will make the small claims procedure 
more complicated for litigants because it will add a further procedural step to the doors of the 
court. Unsophisticated defendants who have neither the capacity nor the resources to file the 
statement of defence will be prejudiced by a mandatory step. It seems inimical to the nature of 
small claims courts for the presiding officer to discount the defendant’s oral defence just 
because a written defence was not filed. Consequently, it makes more sense to leave the 
statement of defence as an optional step.  
As regards the bringing of counterclaims, SCCR 14(3) should be amended. Often 
unsophisticated people do not know that they have a counterclaim to the plaintiff’s claim. In 
many cases, the counterclaim becomes apparent to the presiding officer from the oral testimony 
of the witnesses in court. There is no reason why a small claims court should refuse to recognise 
a counterclaim just because the defendant has not stated it in a written statement.  The small 
claims procedure and indeed the trial process should be robust enough to admit defences at the 
trial. If necessary, the commissioner should call for further evidence to prove the counterclaim 
and adjourn the case for a short time. This will prevent a multiplicity of actions and strengthen 
access to justice. Mere technicalities should not block the small claims court from dealing 
holistically with cases. To this extent, SCCR 14(3) should be amended as follows: 
‘The defendant’s counterclaim [A claim in reconvention shall] may be made by stating in the written 
statement of defence the facts giving rise to the counterclaim and by attaching such evidence as may be 
required to prove the counterclaim [such particulars of the claim in reconvention as are required in 
terms of rule 10 in respect of a claim].’175 
 
																																																								
174 See chapter 10.  
175  Words in square brackets signify deletions from the existing provision, and words in underline signify 
insertions. 
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The amendment draws attention to the acceptability of raising a counterclaim in the statement 
of defence. However, the deletion of mandatory language gives the court the latitude to consider 
a counterclaim at the trial and to take a more flexible approach to the gathering of evidence.  It 
is interesting to note that in Saskatchewan, Canada a counterclaim may be raised either by 
notice or orally at a case management conference or the trial. 176  If a defendant raises a 
counterclaim orally and the judge is of the opinion that the plaintiff has been taken by surprise, 
the judge may: 
‘(a)  adjourn the case management conference or trial, as the case may be; and 
 (b)  order177 the defendant to file the counterclaim with the court by a specified date.’178 
The flexibility of raising a counterclaim at the trial should be introduced in the South African 
small claims courts. 
PART IV 
THE TRIAL  
8.17 INQUISITORIAL PROCEDURE 
The SCCA contains just three sections articulating the nature of the trial in the small claims 
courts. 179  The SCCRs do not contain any further provisions in this regard.  The lack of 
legislative provisions is not necessarily a disadvantage. It illustrates the simplicity and 
flexibility of the small claims courts’ trial process.180  
In conformity with the Hoexter Commission’s recommendations, s 26(3) of the SCA provides 
that the court must proceed inquisitorially. 181  Unlike in adversarial court procedure, the 
																																																								
176 See fn 178 below. 
177 If a court orders a defendant to file the counterclaim by a specific date, the clerk of the court or a legal assistant 
should assist the defendant to file the counterclaim properly. 
178 The Small Claims Act, 1997 (Chapter S-50.11 of the Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1997), s 12(4) read with s 12(3). 
179 SCCA, ss 26-28. 
180 In the Hoexter Commission Report §13.6 it is stated that:  
‘The [presiding officer] will adopt any method of procedure which he [or she] considers to be convenient, and to 
afford a fair and equal opportunity for each party to present his case…’. 
181 Report §13.6. 
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presiding officer is not an umpire; he or she descends into the litigation arena. 182   The 
commissioner is both the fact finder and the truth finder. He or she must question the parties 
and their respective witnesses.  After weighing the facts and evidence, a finding is made. 
According to the SCCA, the parties are expressly precluded from cross-examining each other 
or questioning witnesses.183 
To appreciate the difference between the inquisitorial procedure and the adversarial procedure, 
the following statement by Devlin is instructive: 
‘The essential difference between the [adversarial and inquisitorial] systems…is apparent from their 
names: the one is a trial of strength and the other is an enquiry. The question in the first is: are the 
shoulders of the party upon whom is laid the burden of proof…strong enough to carry and discharge it? 
In the second the question is: what is the truth of the matter? In the first the judge or the jury are arbiters; 
they do not pose questions and seek answers; they weigh such material as is put before them, but they 
have no responsibility for seeing that it is complete. In the second the judge is in charge of the inquiry 
from the start; he will of course permit the parties to make out their cases and may rely on them to do so, 
but it is for him to say what it is that he wants to know. 
… 
The English say that the best way of getting to the truth is to have each party dig for the facts that help it; 
between them they will bring all to light. The inquisitor works on his own but has in the end to say who 
wins and who loses…[I]n the adversary system the judge in his quest for the truth is restricted to the 
material presented by the parties while in the inquisitorial system the judge can find out what he wants to 
know. Put in a nutshell, the arbiter is confined and the inquisitor is not.’184 
 
The choice of the inquisitorial procedure in the small claims courts is appropriate given that 
legal representation is not permitted.185 Furthermore, the inquisitorial procedure supports the 
expeditious nature of the small claims trial because it enables a presiding officer to get to the 
nub of the dispute quickly. The difficulty, however, is that if the parties get an impatient or 
																																																								
182 The following statement reflects the characteristics of the adversarial litigation system: 
‘The parties are responsible for taking charge of and driving litigation forward. They formulate cases and present 
evidence in court. During trial, the judge simply sits as a neutral umpire who does not descend into the litigation 
arena. The judge may, from time to time, ask a witness who has been called  to the stand a question for the 
sake of clarification, but the judge does not have an investigative role per se. The judge has no discretion about 
which witness comes to court. This is a matter for the parties to decide. The key function of the judge at trial is to 
ensure that courtroom decorum is maintained, that parties keep to the rules of evidence and procedure and that the 
court process is not abused. Thus, when it comes to fact and truth-finding, the judge has a very limited role to play. 
The judge relies on facts alleged in pleadings and patiently waits for the appropriate evidence to be tendered during 
trial.’ 
See Paleker (n2) 189 at 190. See also Greer, Mulvaney ‘Small Claims: The Northern Ireland Experience’ (1987) 
6 Civil Justice Quarterly 56 at 66. 
183 Section 26(3). 
184 Devlin The Judge 54. 
185 See chapter 7. 
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abrasive commissioner, they can easily feel as if they have not received their day in court. 
Telling one’s story can be cathartic. It enhances the court experience.186 It is thus essential for 
judicial officers to receive proper training. Part of their legal training should entail some 
sensitivity training for identifying the expectations of the parties when appearing before the 
court.187  The problem-solving skills of lawyers are specific: identify the legal issues from the 
relevant facts, analyse the relevant law, and apply the law to the facts of the case to arrive at a 
just outcome. To the lay person, the clinical nature of law can seem disempowering. In the usual 
litigation process, a party’s legal representative is the sympathetic ear and reassuring voice. In 
the small claims court, the court itself fulfils this role. An impatient or unmindful court can 
leave the parties feeling unfulfilled. A negative court experience can affect perceptions of 
access to justice.  
To supplement the inquisitorial small claims court procedure, mediation must be introduced in 
the courts. If the presiding officer sees that the nature of the dispute is such that it can be 
resolved by mediation, he or she should be at liberty to make the referral. Chapter 10 makes 
recommendations for incorporating mediation into the small claims court procedure. The idea 
is not to displace the inquisitorial trial process but to give presiding officers an alternative 
dispute resolution mechanism. It will be argued in chapter 10 that mediation is more beneficial 
in terms of achieving lasting solutions, because a serious problem with the small claims process 
is the enforcement of judgments.188 
It is interesting to note that the SCCA does not provide for the possibility of the presiding officer 
interviewing witnesses over the telephone. In many jurisdictions, the possibility of holding 
telephonic interviews is written into legislation. 189  Some argue that taking evidence by 
																																																								
186 Ruhnka, Weller with Martin Small Claims Courts – A National Examination 21-22. 
187 Ibid at 37. 
188 See discussion in chapter 9. 
189 Kenyan Small Claims Court Act  s 29(1). The Saskatchewan Small Claims Courts Act, 1997 (n178) contains a 
particularly comprehensive provision. Section 28(1) provides: 
‘28(1) A judge may order that the oral evidence of any witness may be taken by telephone where: 
(a) the parties consent; or 
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telephone is risky because the presiding officer cannot observe the demeanour of witnesses.190 
However, it is submitted that there are good reasons for allowing the practice. Sometimes 
witnesses are far away or suffer from some medical condition precluding them from coming to 
the seat of the court. In many instances, a telephonic interview will not be the only evidence 
that the court will rely upon.191 The telephonic interview is used to corroborate testimony in 
court. With the ability to hold video phone calls it is easier these days to observe the demeanour 
of witnesses192 than it might have been in the past. It is therefore recommended that the SCCA 
and SCCRs should make express provision for the taking of evidence by telephone. This will 
expand the inquisitorial powers of the court.  
8.18 RULES OF EVIDENCE DO NOT APPLY 
The SCCA provides that the rules of evidence do not apply. 193  Following the Hoexter 
recommendations,194 the legislature opted for a free system of evidence, consistent with the 
Continental European tradition of evidence taking, rather than selecting the Anglo-American 
tradition that focuses on the weight of the evidence that is presented to the court. 195  
																																																								
(b) in the opinion of the judge, it is necessary to ensure a fair hearing. 
(2) Where taking evidence by telephone is or becomes unsatisfactory or the personal attendance of  the 
witness is desirable, the judge may: 
(a) refuse to hear or to continue hearing that evidence; 
(b) receive or reject the evidence that has been heard; and 
(c) make any order, including an order respecting costs, that the judge considers appropriate. 
(3) Unless the judge orders otherwise, the party who intends to call a witness whose oral evidence is to be taken 
by telephone shall file with the court, before the trial, all written material to which the witness intends to refer. 
(4) The party on whose behalf a witness is called shall pay all of the telephone charges of calling that witness.’ 
190 Weller, Ruhnka Practical Observations on the Small Claims Court 25.  
191 In fact in the jurisdictions that Weller, Ruhnka (n190) surveyed it was established that the court would only 
rely on telephonic testimony if three conditions were met: (i) the testimony of the missing witness was essential 
to the trial; (ii) the witness was a disinterested third party who had no stake in the outcome of the case, either 
directly or because of friendship with one of the parties; and (iii) both parties agreed to the procedure.  
192 In any event there is there is a growing scepticism regarding the reliability of demeanour as an indicator of 
veracity. 
193 Section 26(1). 
194 Report §13.41. 
195 Kunert ‘Some Observations on the Origin and Structure of Evidence Rules under the Common Law System 
and the Civil Law System of “Free Proof” in the German Code of Criminal Procedure’ (1966-1967) 16 Buffalo 
Law Review 122ff. 
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Consequently, the usual exclusionary196 and cautionary197 rules of evidence do not apply in the 
small claims courts.  
Given the extent to which the Anglo-American evidentiary tradition is embedded in the South 
African litigation system, one might be inclined to perceive the small claims courts’ free system 
of evidence as an inferior fact-finding mechanism. Schwikkard and Van der Merwe are critical 
of this view.198 Referring to Paton and Derham – who state that the ‘functional test to which all 
procedural rules should be subjected is the practical efficiency in providing machinery for the 
prompt and reasonably cheap settlement of disputes on lines that do justice to both parties’ – 
Schwikkard and Van der Merwe support the small claims courts’ evidentiary system. They see 
the relaxation of the rules of evidence in the small claims courts as being consistent with the 
theoretical objectives of the courts and the inquisitorial role of the presiding officers.199 
It must also be noted that other jurisdictions200 also relax evidentiary rules in small claims 
courts. Studies abroad show that the law of evidence often frustrates lay witnesses who come 
to courts holding the belief that they will be able to tell their stories. Litigants frequently feel 
dissatisfied because the trial process and the rules of evidence preclude them from telling their 
sides of the case. To many litigants the exclusion of certain types of evidence (for example, 
hearsay evidence) is inconsistent with the conventions of everyday life.201 It is thus a particular 
strength of the small claims procedure in South Africa, as well as in foreign jurisdictions,202 
																																																								
196 For the exclusionary rules see Schwikkard, Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4ed 281-283 (hereinafter 
referred to as Fundamental Principles of Evidence 4ed) 
197 For the cautionary rules see Ibid 558ff.   
198 Ibid at 10. 
199 Schwikkard, Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3ed 13 
200 See for example rule 9(b) of The County Court (Amenment No. 2) Rules (Northern Ireland) 2009; Article 9 
and Preamble paras 9, 12, 20 of Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure. 
201 Carlen Magistrates’ Justice (1976) 85; O’Barr, Conley ‘Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small 
Claims Court Narratives’ (1985) 19 Law and Society Review 661 at 666-667. 
202 Section 32 of the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act 2 provides: 
‘32. (1) The Court shall not be bound wholly by the Rules of evidence. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the Court may admit as evidence in any proceedings 
before it, any oral or written testimony, record or other material that the Court considers credible or trustworthy 
even though the testimony, record or other material is not admissible as evidence in any other Court under the law 
of evidence.’  
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that litigants are afforded the opportunity to relay their testimony in an unconstrained way. 
Many litigants find their small claims appearances cathartic because the free system of evidence 
allows them to ‘let off steam’, thereby neutralising conflict.203 
A particularly attractive feature of the free system of evidence in the small claims courts is that 
hearsay evidence may be heard by the court. The hearsay evidence rule is notoriously difficult 
to understand and to apply. Since time immemorial the feasibility of excluding hearsay 
evidence has been debated in Anglo-American systems. In the South African context, the 
definitional requirements of hearsay evidence have caused some confusion in the law. 204  
Therefore, it must have been a source of relief to commissioners to discover that they do not 
have to apply this aspect of the law of evidence in the small claims courts.  
In 1988 the legislature passed the Law of Evidence Amendment Act.205 The Act clarifies the 
definition of hearsay evidence206 and gives the courts the power to admit hearsay evidence in 
certain circumstances. Section 3 of the Act provides: 
‘(1) Subject to the provisions of any other law, hearsay evidence shall not be admitted as evidence at       
criminal or civil proceedings, unless – 
(a)  each party against whom the evidence is to be adduced agrees to the admission thereof as 
evidence at such proceedings; 
(b) the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence depends, himself 
 testifies at such proceedings; or 
(c)  the court, having regard to –  
(i) the nature of the proceedings; 
(ii) the nature of the evidence; 
(iii)  the purpose for which the evidence is tendered; 
(iv) the probative value of the evidence; 
(v) the reason why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose credibility the     
probative value of such evidence depends; 
(vi) any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might entail; and 
(vii) any other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into account,  
  is of the opinion that such evidence should be admitted in the interests of justice. 
																																																								
See also Zucker, Her ‘The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Small Claims Court 
System’ (2003) 37 University of San Francisco Law Review 315 at 328. 
203 Abel The Politics of Informal Justice (1982) 284.  
204 Hoffmann, Zeffertt The South African Law of Evidence 623-649. The learned writers give a detailed exposition 
of the confusing nature of the hearsay evidence rule under the common law. 
205 45 of 1988. 
206 Section 3(4) provides:  
‘For the purposes of this section –  
“hearsay evidence” means evidence, whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends upon the 
credibility of any person other than the person giving such evidence’.   
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(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not render admissible any evidence which is inadmissible on 
any ground other than that such evidence is hearsay evidence. 
(3) Hearsay evidence may be provisionally admitted in terms of subsection (1)(b) if the court is 
informed that the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence depends, will 
himself testify in such proceedings: Provided that if such person does not later testify in such 
proceedings, the hearsay evidence shall be left out of account unless the hearsay evidence is 
admitted in terms of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) or is admitted by the court in terms of paragraph 
(c) of that subsection.…’ 
A commissioner must be careful not to subconsciously apply the provisions of the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act207 in the small claims court. Even though the Act gives a court wide 
latitude to admit hearsay evidence, the discretion of the presiding officer is nevertheless 
constrained by the way in which the section is interpreted.208 In the small claims court, the 
commissioner has an unfettered discretion to admit hearsay evidence.209 
In Anglo-American jurisdictions where the rules of evidence (in particular the hearsay rule) are 
relaxed in the small claims courts, commentators argue that the relaxation of the rules does not 
mean that the court will fail to consider the weight to be accorded to  evidence. The court will 
still look for indicators of reliability 210 because ultimately the court has to be satisfied that the 
plaintiff has met the burden of proof.211 This requires the court to look for quality evidence that 
supports the plaintiff’s case. Hearsay evidence may be tendered. However, if the court questions 
the credibility of the witness giving the evidence, the hearsay evidence may be discounted. It is 
also debatable whether the courts will ever, as a general proposition, decide cases by just relying 
on hearsay evidence because even if the admissibility of hearsay evidence is unproblematic, the 
																																																								
207 45 of 1988.  
208 For the interpretation of the section see Fundamental Principles of Evidence at 293ff.   
209 Because the small claims courts preside over civil claims, the unfettered discretion is not unconstitutional. It 
has been argued in academic circles that an unmitigated reliance on hearsay evidence to convict someone in 
criminal proceedings violates s 35(3)(i) of the Constitution. Section 35(3)(i) provides: ‘Every accused person has 
a right to a fair trial, which includes the right to adduce and challenge evidence’. Because the admission of hearsay 
evidence makes the cross-examination of the witness providing the hearsay evidence difficult, it is argued that the 
lack of cross-examination and the concomitant admission of extensive hearsay evidence prevent the accused from 
‘challenging’ the hearsay evidence as envisaged in s 35(3)(i). In this regard see Mujuzi ‘Hearsay Evidence in South 
Africa: Should Courts Add the “Sole and Decisive Rule” to their Arsenal’ (2013) 17 International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 347, and see the authorities there cited. It is submitted that since s 35(3)(i) does not apply to 
civil proceedings, the SCCA, in so far as it permits reliance on extensive hearsay evidence, is not unconstitutional.   
210  Van der Merwe ‘The Inquisitorial Procedure and Free System of Evidence in Small Claims Courts: An 
Examination of Principles’ De Rebus (September 1985) 447 at 448. 
211 Kunert (n195) at 125. See also Bredenkamp (n40) at 36. 
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court will inevitably engage in a process of evaluating all the evidence to arrive at the truth. 212 
In some sense, therefore, the SCCA gives a false impression about how the court approaches 
evidence. It creates the impression that the court proceeds in a free-wheeling fashion, when in 
fact this will not occur. Perhaps, the SCCA needs to incorporate a provision that is similar to s 
28.1 of the Saskatchewan Small Claims Courts Act, 1997.213 According to the provision: 
‘If a judge considers the evidence to be credible and trustworthy, the judge may admit as evidence any 
oral or written testimony or report.’214 
The reference to ‘credible and trustworthy’ evidence paints a better picture of the thought 
process employed by a presiding officer in the small claims court when deciding whether to 
rely on a particular piece of evidence.  
It is vital that commissioners understand their duties as fact finders and evidence gatherers. 
Because commissioners are drawn from the ranks of the attorneys’ and advocates’ professions 
there is always the risk that they might be influenced by the dominant adversarial mode of 
thinking. Proper training is thus essential to ensure that they understand their roles in gathering 
the facts and evidence.215 
8.19 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 
Documentary evidence is necessary in the small claims courts. Parties are expected to bring 
evidence in the form of contracts, invoices, photographs, and so on to prove their claims.  Case 
preparation is thus vital. Unfortunately, the lack of legal assistants216 means that first-time court 
users are not adequately informed and assisted to gather evidence. One can only imagine that 
																																																								
212 Ibid 142. 
213 Chapter S-50.11 of the Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1997.  
214 See also s 32(2) of the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act, which provides: 
‘Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the Court may admit as evidence in any proceedings before 
it, any oral or written testimony, record or other material that the Court considers credible or trustworthy even 
though the testimony, record or other material is not admissible as evidence in any other Court under the law of 
evidence.’ 
215 Bredenkamp ‘Due Hof van Klein Eise en die Reëls van die Bewysreg’ De Rebus (October 1989) 772 at 773. 
216 See §4.5. 
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clerks do not have the time to sit with litigants and explain to them how the court process works 
and how to prove their claims or defences.217 This is a stumbling block that requires attention. 
The involvement of legal assistants can solve the problem. Furthermore, public education in 
the form of online videos and brochures may be of assistance. The parties should be encouraged 
at the time of issuing a summons or filing a defence to attach the appropriate evidence to prove 
the claim or defence. Not only will this assist the parties in understanding the claim or defence 
of the other side better, but it will allow them to prepare for trial properly. See appendix 3 and 
appendix 4 to this thesis.  
Sometimes documentary evidence or objects are in the hands of third parties. There is no 
mechanism in the SCCA for compelling third parties to provide the evidence in their possession 
or to subpoena them to come to court with the evidence. In the High Courts and the magistrates’ 
courts, the subpoena duces tecum enables a party to compel a third party to bring documentary 
evidence or objects to court.218 Perhaps a similar provision should be introduced in the small 
claims courts.219 If the witness fails to appear, the court can hold the witness in contempt of 
court. 
8.20  SUBPOENAS 
At the 2003 Small Claims Courts Conference220 delegates lamented that the small claims courts 
do not have the power to subpoena witnesses to provide oral testimony or to bring evidence to 
court. Sometimes a litigant knows of a witness who can shed light on a case. However, unless 
																																																								
217 In its 2015-2016 Annual Report, the Law Society of South Africa makes the following observation: 
‘The Committee took note of the fact that the current training of the clerks operating in the Small Claims Courts 
was not sufficient and that much time was wasted by commissioners in court when trying to ascertain what the 
exact nature of the dispute is as set out in the summons. The Committee recommended that senior and experienced 
commissioners be utilised to assist in the training of the clerks.’ See also Settle ‘Blame Department for Small 
Claims Problems’ De Rebus (September 2009) 5. 
218 HCR38; MCR 26(3). 
219 See also s 20(1) of the Saskatchewan Small Claims Courts Act, 1997 (n178), which provides: 
‘Any party may apply to have a judge or clerk issue a subpoena to compel a person to give evidence or a subpoena 
to compel a person to give evidence and bring documents directed to a witness.’ 
220 See §3.6.  
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the litigant can persuade the witness to come to court voluntarily, the witness can, and often 
does, refuse to do so.   It makes sense, therefore, to confer power on the court to subpoena a 
witness. The Law Society of South Africa supports the proposal.221 
The difficulty with subpoena powers is what happens when the witness fails to appear. The 
easy answer is that the court may hold the witness in contempt of court.  To this end, s 48 of 
the SCCA provides:  
‘(1)  Any person who wilfully insults a commissioner during the session of his court, or a clerk or   
messenger or other officer present at that session, or who wilfully interrupts the proceedings of a 
court or otherwise misbehaves himself in the place where the session of a court is held, shall, without 
prejudice to the provisions of section 4 (3), be liable to be sentenced summarily or upon summons to 
a fine not exceeding R500 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or to such 
imprisonment without the option of a fine. 
(2)  When a commissioner sentences any person under this section, he shall without delay transmit to the 
registrar of the Supreme Court having jurisdiction for consideration and review by a judge in 
chambers, a statement, certified by him to be true and correct, of the grounds and reasons for the 
action taken by him, and shall also furnish to the person sentenced a copy of that statement.’ 
If witness subpoenas are introduced in the small claims courts, s 48 must be amended. First, 
there would have to be some mechanism for securing the witness’ attendance at court when he 
or she wilfully fails to appear, or where the witness absents himself or herself from court 
without a reasonable excuse. Second, the court should be empowered to hold the witness in 
contempt and to impose an appropriate fine in the absence of a reasonable explanation for his 
or her dilatoriness. The notion of imprisonment for contempt in the small claims courts should 
be revisited in its entirety. If imprisonment is ordered, incarceration for a short period is 
appropriate. The commissioner must be satisfied that the witness can be held in a safe 
environment. To order imprisonment for up to six months in the small claims court context is 
harsh. South African prisons are dangerous places.222 To hold a witness in prison should not be 
a light decision.  A short imprisonment of a few daylight hours can impress on people the 
importance of complying with a court subpoena. Imposing a fine would also be appropriate.. 
																																																								
221 Law Society of South Africa Annual Report (2015-2016) 61. 
222 Makou, Skosana, Hopkins ‘Fact Sheet: The State of South Africa’s Prisons’ Daily Maverick (17 July 2017): 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-07-18-fact-sheet-the-state-of-south-africas-
prisons/#.WrOjbmaB1qc (last accessed on 14 February 2018). 
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Section 47 of the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act223 contains a comprehensive contempt of 
court provision. It provides: 
‘47. A person who— 
[1] (a)  assaults, threatens, intimates or wilfully insults an Adjudicator, judicial officer or a witness, 
involved in a case during a sitting or attendance in a court, or while the Adjudicator, judicial 
officer or witness is travelling to and from a court;  
(b) wilfully and without lawful excuse disobeys an order or direction of the court in the course of 
the hearing of proceedings;  
(c)  within the premises in which any judicial proceedings are being heard or taken, or within  the 
precincts of the same, shows disrespect, in speech or manner, to or with reference to such 
proceedings, or any person before whom such proceedings are being heard or taken; 
(d)  having been called upon to give evidence in a judicial proceeding, fails to attend, or having been 
sworn or affirmed, refuses without lawful excuse to answer a question or to produce a document, 
or remains in the room in which such proceedings are being heard or taken after the witnesses 
have been ordered to leave such room; 
(e)  causes an obstruction or disturbance in the cause of judicial proceedings; 
(f)  while judicial proceedings are pending, makes use of any speech or writing misrepresenting such 
proceedings or capable of prejudicing any person in favour of or against any parties to such 
proceedings, or calculated to lower the authority taken; 
(g)  publishes a report of the evidence taken in any judicial proceedings that has been directed to be 
held in private; 
(h)  attempts wrongfully to interfere with or influence a witness in judicial proceedings, either before 
or after he or she has given evidence in connection with such evidence; 
(i)  dismisses a servant because he or she has given evidence on behalf of a party to judicial 
proceedings; or 
(j)  commits any other act of intentional disrespect to any judicial proceedings, or to any person 
before whom such proceedings are heard or taken, 
commits an offence. 
(2)   A police officer may, by order of the Court, take into custody and detain a person who  
  commits an offence under subsection (1) until the court adjourns. 
(3)   A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) shall on conviction be liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five days, or to a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand 
shillings, or to both. 
(4)   In exercise of its powers under this section, the court shall observe the principles of fair 
administration of justice set out in Article 47 of the Constitution.’ 
The above provision is comprehensive for articulating the circumstances under which a litigant 
or witness that is summoned to appear can be held in contempt of court. The duration of 
imprisonment, namely five days, indicates that the Kenyan legislature, too, believes that 
contempt of court should attract short prison sentences. If the South African legislature adopts 
the Kenyan formulation, s 47(4) of the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act224 should be adapted 
in the South African context to refer to s 35 of the Constitution. This section deals with the 
rights of arrested and accused persons. Furthermore, the maximum fine that a court should 
impose for contempt of court should be a nominal fee  
																																																								
223 2 of 2016.  
224 Ibid.  
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Section 48(2) of the SCCA is a particularly useful feature to retain even if s 48 is modelled after 
s 47 of the Kenyan legislation, as it enables a High Court judge to review whether a 
commissioner has acted appropriately. This will ensure that commissioners do not in moments 
of frustration impose harsh sentences on people. 
PART V 
8.21 CONCLUSION 
While many aspects of the small claims court procedure are defensible and should be retained, 
this chapter has shown that there is room for vast improvements. The processes and procedures 
of the court must be receptive to technological advancements, the influence of the Constitution, 
and the practical difficulties that litigants face. Procedural bottlenecks must be addressed as 





ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, APPEAL AND REVIEW, AND 
MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
ustice is eroded if a judgment cannot be enforced. It is thus a matter of concern that since 
the inception of the small claims courts people have complained that it is difficult to enforce 
a judgment.1 At the 2003 Small Claims Courts Conference2 delegates drew attention to the 
provisions of the SCCA that require small claims courts’ judgments to be transferred to the 
magistrates’ courts for enforcement.3 They argued that the transfer is slow and costly. It was 
recommended that the small claims courts should have greater power to enforce their 
judgments.4 
A hallmark feature of the small claims procedure is that an order that the court makes is final 
and cannot be appealed. Yet, for a considerable time commissioners and lawyers have argued 
that an appeals mechanism should be introduced in the small claims courts.  
This chapter considers the two issues above. In addition, it considers certain miscellaneous 
procedural issues, which are often overlooked as being unimportant, but have a bearing on the 
overall efficiency of small claims courts. The enforcement of judgments of the small claims 
courts is discussed in part I. The question of whether decisions of the small claims courts should 
be appealable is confronted in part II. Miscellaneous procedural issues are discussed in part III. 
																																																								
1 Scott-MacNab ‘The Legal Profession’s Declining Image: Is There A Better Way?’ De Rebus (January 1987) 27. 
2 See §3.6. 
3 See §9.4. 




ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 
9.2 THE JUDGMENT CREDITOR MUST BE PAID DIRECTLY 
Section 38 of the SCCA optimistically provides: 
 ‘Money payable in terms of a judgment or order of a court, shall be paid by the judgment debtor direct to 
the judgment creditor.’ 
At the time of granting judgment, the presiding officer must determine whether the judgment 
debtor is able to pay the judgment creditor. If the judgment debtor indicates that he or she can 
pay, the court will direct that payment takes place ‘without delay’.5 Presumably, this means on 
the same day or on the next business day. Ideally, the judgment debtor should pay the money 
to the clerk of the court so that the latter can monitor the enforcement of the court’s judgment. 
However, in terms of s 38, the court does not have an oversight function. It seems that the court 
is required to take the judgment debtor’s word and to assume that payment will be made.  
The lack of court-connected oversight probably explains why many judgment creditors do not 
receive any money from judgment debtors or wait a long time before they are paid. On account 
of thefts at court-based cash offices, it is very unlikely that the SCCA will be amended to task 
the clerk of the court with receiving money. Surely, a solution needs to be found because the 
parties are unrepresented. Perhaps the legislation should require that money be paid to the 
sheriff of the district falling within the jurisdiction of the relevant court. It is common cause 
that sheriffs operate trust accounts and that money deposited with them is insured against theft.6 
For receiving and transferring money, the sheriffs can be paid a small fee regulated by the tariffs 
of costs of the small claims courts. Should the money not be paid to the sheriff, the sheriff 
should inform the court so that the court can take further steps against the judgment debtor. 
																																																								
5 SCCA, s 38 read with s 39(1). 
6 Sheriffs Act 90 of 1986, s 22(1). 
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Some official oversight function seems better than none. It also reduces the likelihood of 
disputes arising about payments received.  
9.3 FINANCIAL INQUIRY 
Section 39 of the SCCA provides:  
‘(1)  When a court grants judgment for the payment of a sum of money, the court shall enquire from the 
judgment debtor whether he is able to comply with the judgment without delay, and if he indicates 
that he is unable to do so, the court may, in camera,7 conduct an inquiry into the financial position 
of the judgment debtor and into his ability to pay the judgment debt and costs. 
(2) After such an inquiry the court may –  
(a) order the judgment debtor to pay the judgment debt and costs in specified instalments or 
 otherwise; 
(b) ...... 
(c) suspend the order under paragraph (a) either wholly or in part on such conditions as 
 to security or otherwise as the court may determine.’8  
If at the time that judgment is granted, the judgment debtor indicates that he or she cannot pay 
the judgment debt, the court may, in terms of s 39, hold a financial inquiry in camera. Although 
the initial enquiry by the court is mandatory, the subsequent financial inquiry is not. The 
purpose of the enquiry is to ask whether the judgment debtor has the means to satisfy the 
judgment and costs in full.9 If the enquiry reveals that the judgment debtor is too impoverished 
to do so, the court has the discretion to hold an inquiry to determine if the debt can be paid in 
instalments, or if it should suspend the enforcement of the judgment on such conditions as to 
the payment of security or otherwise as the court may determine.10  
The idea of interrogating the judgment debtor at the time of granting a judgment was first 
proposed by the Hoexter Commission. In its Report, the Commission stated: 
‘The Commission is firmly of the opinion…there should be provided at the time of the judgment itself a 
procedure for the immediate determination of the debtor’s financial position; and in addition, that the first 
two stages in the execution process (the issue of the writ and the attachment of the judgment debtor’s 
attachable movable assets) should be made an integral part of the small claims process.’ 11 
																																																								
7 In camera means that the court will hold the inquiry in private. 
8 Italics and underline supplied to emphasise the distinction between the court’s duty to enquire from the judgment 
debtor whether he or she can pay the debt and the inquiry into the financial position of the judgment debtor.  
9 SCCA, s 39(1). 
10 SCCA, s 39(2). 
11 Report §13.27. 
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The difficulty with the way that s 39(1) is phrased is that it mandates a court to conduct an 
enquiry without obliging the court to hold the subsequent inquiry as contemplated by the 
section.  While the failure to make an enquiry constitutes a breach of the ‘categorically 
imperative provisions of s 39(1)’ and thus amounts to ‘a gross irregularity that renders 
proceedings reviewable under s 46(c) of the Small Claims Courts Act’,12 the non-holding of 
what should be the follow-on financial inquiry does not per se impact on the validity of small 
claims proceedings. However, the failure to hold the financial inquiry may be inconsistent with 
the spirit of the National Credit Act.13 In this regard Moosa argues: 
‘Accordingly, the failure to conduct a financial inquiry and the refusal to grant an order under s 39(2)(a) 
for the payment of the debt in instalments is not per se an irregularity. However, it is certainly prejudicial 
to a litigant who is in financial difficulty and is willing but unable to settle the judgment debt without 
delay. In my view, a gross irregularity would only be present if the cumulative effect of the court’s 
conduct is such that it can be concluded that, based on the facts known to the court, no reasonable 
decision-maker would have declined to conduct such a financial inquiry or grant an order under s 39(2)(a) 
for the payment of the debt in certain instalments (as the case may be). In such circumstances, the decision 
is arbitrary or unreasonable and is thus reviewable (see Geldenhuys v Resident Magistrate, 
Sutherland 1914 CPD 62; Nigrini v Resident Magistrate, Sutherland 1914 CPD 661).’14 
The above problem is easy to address. The legislature must amend s 39(1) and replace the word 
‘may’ with ‘shall’.  
In terms of s 40 of the SCCA, if a financial inquiry is not held, the judgment debtor may within 
ten calendar days of the court granting the judgment make a written offer to the judgment 
creditor to pay the debt in instalments. If the latter consents, the clerk of the court ‘shall … 
order the judgment debtor to pay the judgment debt and costs in accordance with his [or her] 
offer’. The order that is made by the clerk of the court is ‘deemed to be an order of the court in 
terms of section 39.’15 From s 40 read with s 39(1), it is clear that unless a financial inquiry is 
held at the time of granting judgment or the judgment debtor requests an instalment 
arrangement within ten days of the judgment, there is no mechanism for flexibility regarding 
the payment of the judgment debt. Furthermore, there is no prospect of holding another 
																																																								
12 Moosa ‘Paying a Small Claims Court Judgment Debt in Instalments’ De Rebus (September 2012) 34. 
13 Ibid 34.  
14 Ibid.  
15 SCCA, s 40. 
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financial inquiry in the small claims court if the judgment debtor fails to satisfy the judgment 
after undertaking to do so, or if the judgment debtor fails to abide by an instalment plan. And 
finally, it seems that if the judgment creditor fails to consent to the written offer in terms of s 
40, the court cannot override the judgment creditor’s decision, even if it thinks that the judgment 
creditor is acting unreasonably. 
In terms of s 65A of the MCA, if a judgment of a magistrate’s court remains unsatisfied for a 
period of ten days, or if the judgment debtor fails to abide by an instalment plan ordered by the 
court, the judgment creditor can issue a notice calling on the judgment debtor to appear at 
court16 on a specified date for a financial inquiry.17  If the judgment debtor fails to appear, the 
court may issue a warrant of arrest to secure the attendance of the debtor at the financial 
inquiry. 18  The arrest must be conducted ‘in accordance with section 35(1)(d) 19  of the 
Constitution’.20 The purpose of the arrest is to place the judgment debtor on terms and secure 
the judgment debtor’s attendance at court to hold the financial inquiry, and not to incarcerate 
the judgment debtor for an extended period. The judgment debtor must be brought before a 
court ‘as soon as reasonably possible’21 to explain22 his or her non-attendance at the financial 
inquiry. At the inquiry, the judgment creditor bears the onus of proving the extent to which the 
judgment debtor is in default of the court’s judgment. To this extent, the judgment creditor must 
file an affidavit supported by documentary evidence, if any.23 
																																																								
16 The ‘court’ is not necessarily the court that granted the original judgment, but the court where the debtor resides, 
carries on business or is employed. 
17 MCA, s 65A(1)(a). 
18 MCA, s 65A(6). 
19 Section 35(1)(d) of the Constitution provides: 
‘Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has the right to be brought before a court as soon 
as reasonably possible, but not later than – 
(i)  48 hours after the arrest; or 
(ii)  the end of the first court day after the expiry of the 48 hours, if the 48 hours expire outside  ordinary court 
hours or on a day which is not an ordinary court day’. 
20 MCA, s 65A(8)(a). The words ‘in accordance with’ refer to the principle against delay: see Jones & Buckle 
Act416 (Service 11, 2016). It is submitted that it is unconscionable to hold a person who has been arrested in terms 
of s 65A overnight. The person should be arrested on the same day as the court hearing.   
21 MCA, s 65A(8)(a). 
22 Section 65A(10) provides that the court may establish the judgment debtor’s guilt in a ‘summary manner.’  
23 S 65A(4). 
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There is no reason why s 65A of the MCA cannot be incorporated into the SCCA with the 
appropriate modifications. This will give the small claims courts more teeth to enforce their 
judgments. Presently, when a small claims matter is transferred to a magistrate’s court in terms 
of s 4124 of the SCCA, s 65A of the MCA can be activated, and a financial inquiry can be 
conducted by the magistrate’s court. The problem, however, is that the magistrate’s court can 
award legal costs25 for holding the financial inquiry and the judgment debtor is entitled to legal 
representation.26 This seems to be contrary to the aims and objectives of the small claims courts, 
which include offering speedy and inexpensive justice. 
A judgment debtor should be able to approach a court at any time to pay a judgment in 
instalments. Section 73 of the MCA provides: 
‘The court may, upon application of any judgment debtor…and if it appears to the court that the judgment 
debtor is unable to satisfy the judgment debt in full at once, but is able to pay reasonable periodical 
instalments towards satisfaction thereof…,suspend execution against that debtor either wholly or in part 
on such conditions as to security or otherwise as the court may determine.’ 
A similar provision should be incorporated into the SCCA. The beauty of such a provision is 
that s 40 of the SCCA can be deleted because there will be no need to hold the judgment debtor 
to a time limit, and furthermore, there will be no need for the judgment debtor to obtain the 
judgment creditor’s consent to pay the debt in instalments. The proposed new s 40 should read 
as follows: 
‘40 [Offer by judgment debtor] Financial inquiry after judgment 
 
If no order has been made in terms of section 39 (2), [the judgment debtor may within 10 days after 
the court has granted judgment for the payment of a sum of money, make a written offer to the 
judgment creditor to pay the judgment debt and costs in specified instalments or otherwise, and if 
such an offer is accepted by the judgment creditor, the clerk of the court shall, at the written request 
of the judgment creditor, accompanied by the offer, order the judgment debtor to pay the judgment 
debt and costs in accordance with his offer, and such an order shall be deemed to be an order of 
the court in terms of section 39] and if the judgment debtor is unable to satisfy the judgment debt in 
full, a court shall upon notice27 by the judgment debtor hold a financial inquiry to determine: 
(a) whether that judgment debtor should pay the judgment in periodical instalments and the amount 
thereof; and 
																																																								
24 See §9.4. 
25 MCA, s 65A(1)(c).  
26 Ibid; see also s 65A(1)(b). 
27 Proceedings on notice are less formal than applications. The judgment debtor would not have to draft a notice 
of motion or have supporting affidavits. The judgment debtor would give notice of proceedings to the court and 
to the judgment creditor. Of course, the SCCRs should contain a form that sets out the content of the notice. 
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(b)  whether to suspend execution of the judgment against that judgment debtor either wholly or in part 
and on such conditions as to security or otherwise as the court may determine.’28 
Furthermore, s 39(2) of the SCCA should be amended to make reference to s 40. At the moment, 
both sections cover financial inquiries and employ identical wording, but without the cross-
reference it creates the impression that the two sections are referring to different things, when 
in fact the two sections are complementary of each other. 
9.4 EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS BY THE MAGISTRATES’ COURTS 
Aside from making provision for the judgment debtor to pay the judgment creditor directly and 
providing for a financial inquiry to determine the judgment debtor’s ability to pay the judgment 
debt, the small claims courts have no further mechanisms to enforce a judgment. Section 41 of 
the SCCA mandates the magistrates’ courts to take the matter further: 
‘(1)  When a court has granted judgment for the payment of money or made an order for the payment of 
money in instalments, that judgment, in the case of failure to pay the money within 10 days, or that 
order, in the case of failure to pay an instalment at the time and in the manner determined by the 
court, shall be enforceable by execution in the magistrate's court having jurisdiction in accordance 
with the provisions of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1944 (Act 32 of 1944), and the judgment creditor 
may proceed as if the judgment was granted in the magistrate's court in his favour for the amount 
mentioned in the affidavit referred to in subsection (2). 
(2) The clerk of the court shall, upon the written application of the judgment creditor accompanied by 
an affidavit specifying the amount and the costs still owing under the judgment or order and how that 
amount is arrived at, transmit that affidavit, together with a certified copy of that judgment or order 
reflecting the nature of the cause of action, to the clerk of the magistrate's court of the district in 
which the judgment debtor resides, carries on business or is employed, or, if the judgment debtor is 
a juristic person, of the district in which its registered office or main place of business is situated. 
(3)  Upon receipt of the documents referred to in subsection (2) the clerk of the magistrate's court 
concerned shall record the details of the judgment or order concerned and the amount owing 
mentioned in the affidavit in his registers.’ 
If the purpose of the small claims courts is to provide speedy and inexpensive justice, then it 
seems strange that the legislature should so readily relinquish the enforcement of a small claims 
court judgment to the magistrates’ courts, where court processes are significantly more 
complex, and where legal representation is permitted. As a matter of theory and practice, all the 
gains made in taking a matter to the small claims court fall flat in the process of enforcing the 
judgment. It is interesting to note that the Hoexter Commission in its recommendations thought 
																																																								
28 Words in square brackets signify a deletion from the existing provision and words underlined signify an insertion 
into an existing provision.  
319		
that the small claims courts should, in addition to holding a financial inquiry, issue warrants for 
the attachment of movable property.29 In fact, in the original version of the SCCA, s 41 read 
differently. The section provided: 
‘(1)  When a court has granted judgment for the payment of money or made an order for the payment of 
money in instalments, that judgment, in the case of failure to pay the money within 10 days, or that 
order, in the case of failure to pay an instalment at the time and in the manner determined by the 
court, shall be enforceable by execution against the movable property and, if insufficient movable 
property is found to satisfy the judgment or order or the court on good cause shown so orders, against 
the immovable property of the party against whom such judgment has been given or such order has 
been made.  
(2)  Upon failure to pay an instalment in accordance with an order of court, execution may be levied in 
respect of the whole of the judgment debt and costs then still unpaid, unless the court, on application 
by the party that is liable, orders otherwise.’ 
Section 44 went on to provide: 
‘(1)  If a court has granted judgment for the payment of a sum of money and the clerk of the court is 
satisfied that such judgment has remained unsatisfied after the judgment debtor has acted in terms of 
all the provisions of this Chapter available to him, the clerk of the court shall, upon the written 
application of the judgment creditor accompanied by an affidavit specifying the amount still owing 
under the judgment and how that amount is arrived at, transmit a certified copy of that judgment, 
together with that affidavit, to the clerk of the magistrate's court of the district in which the judgment 
debtor resides, carries on business or is employed, or, if the judgment debtor is a juristic person, of 
the district in which its registered office or main place of business is situated.  
(2)  Upon receipt of the documents referred to in subsection (1) the clerk of that magistrate's court shall 
record the details of the judgment concerned and the amount owing mentioned in the affidavit, 
whereupon the judgment creditor may proceed as if it were a judgment granted in that magistrate's 
court in his favour for the amount mentioned in the affidavit, subject to the right of the judgment 
debtor to dispute the correctness of the amount.’ 
 
It is clear that the legislature initially empowered the small claims courts to levy execution 
against movable and immovable property. It went one step further than what was recommended 
by the Hoexter Commission. Section 44 – the transfer provision – kicked in when the judgment 
creditor was unsuccessful in recovering a judgment debt and needed to go beyond attachments 
of property to, for example, obtaining an emoluments attachment order or a garnishee order. In 
those instances, due to the complex nature of those procedures, the magistrate’s court was 
deemed to be the appropriate forum.30 To give effect to s 41 of the SCCA, rules 17 to 21 of the 
SCCRs of 30 August 198531 contained detailed provisions to execute against movable and 
																																																								
29 Report §13.27. 
30 See MCR 46 and 47. See also Nienaber Emoluments Attachment Orders in the South African Law (Unpublished 
LLM dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015).  
31 GN R1893 in GG 9909 of 30 August 1985.  
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immovable property in the small claims courts. The rules also contained Form 3 titled ‘Warrant 
of Execution Against Property.’  
By Act 63 of 1989,32 s 41 of the SCCA was amended to the current version and s 44 was deleted. 
To match the legislative amendments, the SCCRs were also amended. Rules 19 to 21 and Form 
3 were deleted. However, the legislative amendments were not tidy. For example, s 42 of the 
SCCA was not deleted and still provides: 
‘42. Property exempt from execution 
 The provisions of section 67 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1944 (Act 32 of 1944), shall apply 
mutatis mutandis in respect of a warrant of execution in terms of this Act.’33 
It is unclear what prompted the policy change that led to the amendment of the SCCA. However, 
the amendments were not welcomed. Members of the legal profession expressed the opinion 
that the small claims courts were left toothless to enforce their own judgments.34 Consequently 
amendments were sought, but nothing happened. It is time that the SCCA is amended to give 
the court more teeth to enforce its judgments. 
																																																								
32 Small Claims Courts Amendment Act 63 of 1989. The Act came into operation on 20 May 1991.  
33 Section 67 of the MCA provides: 
‘In respect of any process of execution issued out of any court the following property shall be protected from 
seizure and shall not be attached or sold, namely: 
(a) the necessary beds, bedding and wearing apparel of the execution debtor and of his family; 
(b) the necessary furniture (other than beds) and household utensils in so far as they do not exceed 
in value the amount determined by the Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette; 
(c) stock, tools and agricultural implements of a farmer in so far as they do not exceed in value the 
amount determined by the Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette; 
(d) the supply of food and drink in the house sufficient for the needs of such debtor and of his family 
during one month; 
(e) tools and implements of trade, in so far as they do not exceed in value the amount determined 
by the Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette; 
(f) professional books, documents or instruments necessarily used by such debtor in his profession, 
in so far as they do not exceed in value the amount determined by the Minister from time to time 
by notice in the Gazette; 
(g) such arms and ammunition as such debtor is required by law, regulation or disciplinary order to 
have in his possession as part of his equipment: 
Provided that the court shall have a discretion in exceptional circumstances and on such conditions as it may 
determine to increase the amounts determined by the Minister in respect of paragraphs (b), (c), (e) and (f).’ 
34 Department of Justice Small Claims Court Evaluation (2 May 2010) 19. 
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9.5 EXECUTION AGAINST MOVABLES SHOULD BE PERMITTED BUT IT 
 SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED AGAINST IMMOVABLES 
If the SCCA is amended in the future, it should permit the issuing of warrants of execution 
against movable property.35 The SCCRs must flesh out the execution process. The rules must 
stipulate the responsibilities of the sheriff when executing against movable property, as well as 
the process that must be followed to arrange a sale in execution. The sale in execution must 
comply with the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act36 so that the execution debtor is 
protected from unscrupulous sheriffs and execution creditors. The interests of the execution 
debtor must be balanced against those of the execution creditor so that both parties are treated 
fairly.  To ensure that the execution debtor is not left indigent, s 67 of the MCA should apply 
in the small claims courts. At present, s 42 of the SCCA incorporates the provisions of s 67 by 
reference. To make the SCCA user-friendly to the lay person, the provisions of s 67 should be 
contained in the Act.37  
A small claim execution creditor should not be able to execute against the execution debtor’s 
immovable property in the small claims court. At present, a magistrate’s court can issue a 
warrant of execution against immovable property irrespective of the value of the claim.38  
Following pronouncements of the Constitutional Court,39 the Rules Board for Courts of Law 
amended the MCRs40 and the HCRs41 to offer better protection to execution debtors when their 
immovable property is sold in execution. In particular, the sale of immovable property must be 
subject to judicial oversight.42 A presiding judge has to determine: whether there is good cause 
																																																								
35 See also s 39(1)(a) of the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act 2 of 2016. 
36 68 of 2008. Section 45(1) of the Act states that the term ‘auction’ includes a sale in execution pursuant to an 
order of court, to the extent that the order contemplates that the sale is to be conducted by auction. See South 
African Sheriffs’ Guide 8/58-8/75. 
37 See n33. 
38 MCR 43 as amended by GN R1272 in GG 41257 of 17 November 2017 with effect from 22 December 2017. 
39 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC); Gundwana v Steko Development CC 2011 (3) 
SA 608 (CC). 
40 MCR 43A. 
41 HCR 46A. 
42 In Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz supra [55] the court held:  
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to order execution; whether the immovable property in question constitutes the primary 
residence of the execution debtor; and, if it is the primary residence, whether the sale price of 
the immovable property pursuant to a sale in execution is fair.43  Because of these important 
legislative interventions, it seems that the magistrates’ courts are better suited to hear matters 
involving the execution of immovable property. The magistrates’ courts have more time, 
resources and expertise to determine whether execution is in conformity with constitutional 
imperatives. Furthermore, the parties are also entitled to legal representation.  
Notwithstanding the current powers of the magistrates’ courts, it may be unjust to sell a primary 
residence (a person’s home) to settle a trifling outstanding debt. Having a home is fundamental 
to one’s human dignity, freedom and security.44 Consequently, the SCCA as well as the MCA 
should be amended to specifically provide that a claim that falls within the monetary 
jurisdiction of the small claims courts cannot result in the sale in execution of immovable 
property which is the primary residence of a person. In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v 
Dawood,45 the full bench of the Western Cape High Court drew attention to the following 
statement in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz:46  
‘…the size of the debt will be a relevant factor for the court to consider. It might be quite unjustifiable 
for a person to lose his or her access to housing where the debt involved is trifling in amount and 
significance to the judgment creditor.’ 
A small claims debt may be significant to the execution creditor in terms of obtaining justice. 
However, a small claim cannot be treated as anything other than ‘trifling’. Even if the monetary 
jurisdiction of the small claims courts is increased as proposed in chapter 6, the reality is that it 
																																																								
‘Judicial oversight permits a magistrate to consider all the relevant circumstances of a case to determine whether 
there is good cause to order execution. . . . Even if the process of execution results from a default judgment the 
court will need to oversee execution against immovables. This has the effect of preventing the potentially 
unjustifiable sale in execution of the homes of people who, because of their lack of knowledge of the legal process, 
are ill-equipped to avail themselves of the remedies currently provided in the Act.’ 
See also du Plessis ‘Judicial Oversight for Sales in Execution of Residential Property and the National Credit Act’ 
(2012) De Jure 532. 
43 MCR 43A; HCR 46A. 
44 See Van der Walt ‘Property Law in the Constitutional Democracy’ (2017) Stellenbosch Law Review 8 at 13. 
45 2012 (6) SA 151 (WCC) para [33]. 
46 Supra. 
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will always be significantly lower than the other courts. It seems patently unjust for someone 
to lose his or her home for a few thousand rand. Homelessness does not serve justice: it creates 
social injustice. It places enormous burdens on the State, which are shared by the rest of society.   
It is also debatable whether it is generally proper to sell any immovable property (primary or 
non-primary) to satisfy a small claims court judgment.  The property clause47 and the other 
rights in the Bill of Rights48 have not been invoked in the case law to prevent the sale of 
immovable property to satisfy a small claims court judgment. However, one can conceive of a 
situation where the injustice of selling immovable property to satisfy a small claim is far greater 
than the injustice of not enforcing a judgment by those means, even if the property is not the 
execution debtor’s primary residence. This issue is controversial however, it may be a useful 
area for lawmakers to explore as it might assist to prevent a further escalation of socio-economic 
problems in the country. Land and property rights are fundamental to economic prosperity and 
social equality. Depriving people of their land rights to satisfy a small claim should not be taken 
lightly.  
9.6  EMOLUMENTS ATTACHMENT ORDERS 
It is argued that if the small claims courts cannot execute against immovable property the 
solution is not to be found in the granting of emoluments attachment orders.  
In University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services49 
the Western Cape High Court confronted inter alia, the question whether certain provisions of 
the MCA relating to the granting of emoluments attachment orders were constitutional. In its 
judgment, the court noted that emoluments attachment orders are classically granted against 
low-income earners. The court held: 
																																																								
47 Section 25. 
48 Constitution, Chapter 2. 
49 2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC).  
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‘For debtors who work in low paid and vulnerable occupations, their salaries or wages are invariably their 
only asset and means of survival. A substantial reduction of this asset has the potential of reducing human 
dignity.’ 50 
The court went on to state that the government must take positive steps to prevent people from 
being ‘impoverished or facing a life of “humiliation and degradation”.’51 Inability to maintain 
one’s family is a limitation to human dignity. The court noted: 
‘Any court order or legislation which deprives a person of their means of support or impairs the ability 
of people to access their socio-economic rights constitutes a limitation of their right to dignity.’52 
On a survey of foreign law, the court found that several jurisdictions either cap or place limits 
on the proportion of an execution debtor’s salary that can be attached to satisfy a debt.53 The 
court thought that it was opportune for South Africa to introduce similar measures by way of 
judicial oversight.54  In this regard, the court held: 
‘…the objective conditions in this country with its vast disparities of wealth may result in a “cap” or the 
proportion of a debtor’s salary being attached, impacting differently on the various sectors of our society. 
If that proposition is correct, judicial oversight would be the only remaining mechanism for dealing with 
EAOs without compromising the dignity of the poor.’55  
Following the Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic case, the legislature passed the Courts of Law 
Amendment Act.56 Section 9 of the Act substitutes and replaces s 65J of the MCA. Section 65J 
deals with emoluments attachment orders. Section 9 of the Courts of Law Amendment Act57 
provides: 
‘Emoluments attachment orders 
‘65J. (1) (a)  Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), a judgment creditor may cause an order  
  (hereinafter referred to as an emoluments attachment order) to be issued from the court of 
  the district in which the [employer of the] judgment debtor resides, carries on business or 
  is employed[, or, if the judgment debtor is employed by the State, in which the  
  judgment debtor is employed]. 
 (b)  An emoluments attachment order – 
    (i)  [shall] must attach the emoluments at present or in future owing or accruing to the 
 judgment debtor by or from his or her employer (in this section called the garnishee), 
 to the amount necessary to cover the judgment and the costs of the attachment, 
 whether that judgment was obtained in the court concerned or in any other court; and 
   (ii)  [shall] must oblige the garnishee to pay from time to time to the judgment creditor or 
 his or her attorney specific amounts out of the emoluments of the judgment debtor in 
																																																								
50 Ibid [45]. 
51 Ibid [41]. The court cited Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka 2004 (4) SA 326 (SCA) paras [27]-[32].  
52 Ibid [41]. 
53 Ibid [43]-[49]. 
54 Ibid [84].  
55 Ibid [50]. 
56 7 of 2017. The Act has not yet come into operation.  
57 Ibid. 
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 accordance with the order of court laying down the specific instalments payable by 
 the judgment debtor, until the relevant judgment debt and costs have been paid in full. 
(1 A)     (a) The amount of the instalment payable or the total amount of instalments payable where 
  there is more than one emoluments attachment order payable by the judgment  
  debtor, may  not exceed 25 per cent of the judgment debtor's basic salary. 
             (b)   For purposes of this section, "basic salary" means the annual gross salary a judgment 
  debtor is employed on divided by 12 and excludes additional remuneration for  
  overtime or other allowances…’58 
 
The Courts of Law Amendment Act59 lays down a detailed procedure for the execution creditor 
to follow to obtain the ‘authorisation’ of the court before it can start the process of obtaining an 
emoluments attachment order. During the authorisation process, the court must determine 
whether the execution debtor is subject to other emoluments attachment orders, whether it is 
‘just and equitable that an emoluments attachment order be issued’ and whether ‘the amount is 
appropriate’. 60  Once the court authorises the emoluments attachment order, the execution 
creditor can start the process of having one issued. The execution debtor and all other creditors 
must be joined to the proceedings.61 The execution debtor can object to the granting of an 
emoluments attachment order if he or she disputes the amount claimed or if he or she believes 
that ‘25 per cent of the judgment debtor's basic salary is already committed to other emoluments 
attachment orders and that the debtor will not have sufficient means left for his or her own 
maintenance or that of his or her dependants.’62 The court is empowered to rescind emoluments 
attachment orders or adjust payment amounts if the court is satisfied that the execution debtor 
is overcommitted to such orders.63 
The Courts of Law Amendment Act64 introduces much needed changes to the law to protect 
execution debtors from unscrupulous execution creditors. The level of engagement required by 
the court is exacting, as well as time-consuming. Consequently, it would be inappropriate for 
small claims courts to be involved with emoluments attachment orders. The process is too 
																																																								
58 Words in square brackets signify deletions from the existing provision, and words in underline signify insertions. 
59 7 of 2017.  
60 MCA, s 57(2B) as amended by the Courts of Law Amendment Act 7 of 2017. 
61 Ibid. 
62 MCA, s 65J(2C) as amended.  
63 MCA, s 65J(2E) as amended. 
64 7 of 2017. 
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complex for the small claims courts. The SCCA specifically provides that the small claims 
courts should not be involved in complex legal matters.65 
9.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
When it comes to the enforcement of small claims judgments, it appears that the small claims 
courts have limited options. Because of recent legislative amendments influenced by 
constitutional jurisprudence, it would be unwise to permit the small claims courts to order 
execution against immovable property or to grant emoluments attachment orders. This must be 
left to the magistrates’ courts.  However, small claims courts could order warrants of execution 
against movable property. To this end, the SCCA and the SCCRs must be amended to take into 
account the considerations mentioned earlier. The s 39 financial inquiry can be shored up to 
give the court wider latitude to call for such inquiries. Direct payments, too, can be improved 
either by involving the court – provided that safety concerns at court-based cash offices can be 
addressed – or by involving the sheriff of the court to receive money and to pay judgment 
creditors. Leaving payments in the hands of judgment debtors without some oversight is a 
recipe for laxity.  
PART II 
APPEAL AND REVIEW 
9.8 NO APPEAL BUT REVIEW PERMITTED 
One of the hallmark features of the small claims courts is contained in s 45 of the SCCA. 
According to the provision a decision of the court is ‘final’ and ‘no appeal shall lie from it.’  
Section 46 allows a party to take a matter on review and sets out the grounds of review. The 
section states: 
																																																								
65 SCCA, s 23. 
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‘The grounds upon which the proceedings of a court may be taken on review before a provincial or local 
division of the Supreme Court of South Africa are –  
(a)  absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court; 
(b)  interest in the cause, bias, malice, or the commission of an offence referred to in Part 1 to 4, or 
section 17, 20 or 21 (in so far as it relates to the aforementioned offences) of Chapter 2 of the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004, on the part of the commissioner; and 
(c)  gross irregularity with regard to the proceedings. 
Because the law relating to review is settled in our law and is uncontentious in the small claims 
courts,66 there is no need to consider this aspect any further in this thesis, save to state that 
further recommendations were made in chapter 4 to shore up the review process.67 
9.9 THE HOEXTER RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Hoexter Commission Report paid considerable attention to the issue of appeal and review 
in the small claims courts. The Commission considered foreign jurisprudence and found that 
countries take different approaches. Some allow for appeals and others do not. Comparative 
law was thus unhelpful to definitively determine whether a right of appeal should be permitted. 
Ultimately, the Commission opted for an approach that was most pragmatic in the South 
African context. The Commission concluded: 
‘Having given anxious consideration to the matter, the Commission has arrived at the conclusion that 
there should be a strong element of finality about the decisions of the small claims court, and that there 
should be no right of appeal from its judgments.’68  
The Commission noted that many small claims courts litigants are poor, ill-educated and 
unsophisticated.69 In the mind of the Commission: 
‘To afford a system of appeal to a higher tribunal or to a series of higher tribunals would … inevitably 
transform a simple, swift and inexpensive legal process into a cumbersome, slow and costly one.’70  
That the small claims courts are not courts of record was a further reason to limit the right of 
appeal.71 As long as presiding officers apply their minds honestly to a matter and apply the rules 
																																																								
66 For a full discussion of review see Cilliers, Loots, Nel Herbstein & van Winsen The Civil Practice of the High 
Courts of South Africa chapter 40 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Herbstein & van Winsen’). 
67 See §4.3. 
68 Report §13.35. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid §13.35. 
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of natural justice by for example abiding by the audi alteram partem rule, the Commission felt 
that they should be free to decide cases in their own way.72 
To mitigate the lack of the right of appeal, the Commission opted for a right of review because 
the denial of a proper hearing undermines the judicial process.73 The Commission stated: 
‘…the terms of paragraphs (b) and (c) of the section are sufficiently wide to provide adequate redress by 
way of review to an aggrieved litigant in a small claims court who complains that his case has not been 
fairly determined either because of the existence of some or other improper motive on the part of the 
adjudicator, or because the adjudicator has failed to apply his mind at all to the issue in the case.’74 
The Commission treated the lack of jurisdiction of the court as a review issue as the 
Commission felt that it would result in a miscarriage of justice if the small claims court exerted 
influence over matters in which it lacked jurisdiction.75 
9.10 CALLS FOR A RIGHT OF APPEAL  
At the 2003 Small Claims Courts Conference 76  some legal practitioners serving as 
commissioners asked the Department of Justice to reconsider s 45 of the SCCA. They requested 
a sui generis appeal procedure. They proposed that a panel of three senior commissioners at 
each small claims court should hear appeals. When prompted for the reason for the submission, 
commissioners pointed out that many commissioners rendered incorrect decisions because they 
either lacked knowledge of the law or were improperly trained to conduct trials in the small 
claims courts.   
The demand for an appeal procedure has not died away because on 28 November 2017 the Law 
Society of South Africa addressed a letter to the Rules Board for Courts of Law stating:  
‘The [Small Claims Courts] Act does not offer the parties a right to appeal against the Commissioner’s 
decision. Section 46 of the Act makes provision for the proceedings of a small claims court to be taken 
on review before a provincial or local division on the grounds listed in the Act. This process may however 
be a costly exercise for a matter that falls within the jurisdiction of the small claims court. It is accepted 
that: “in a South African small claims court many of the litigants will be poor, ill-educated and 
unsophisticated people.” (Chrish v Commissioner- Small Claims Court- Butterworth and Others 
																																																								
72 Ibid §13.36. 
73 Ibid §13.37. 
74 Ibid §13.39. 
75 Ibid §13.37. 
76 See §3.6. Mndebele ‘Small Claims Courts Not 100% Operational’ De Rebus (July 2008) 7. 
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(774/2005) [2007] ZAECHC 114) Given this, it is unlikely that an aggrieved litigant will be in position 
to take a judgment that has been issued in a small claims court on review.  
The LSSA recommends the inclusion of a sui generis type of appeal process whereby the decision of a 
Commissioner can be taken on appeal to a Tribunal consisting of two or three senior Commissioners who 
will then have the power to upset the decision of the first Commissioner and to replace it with a decision 
of its own, if necessary. The grounds for review are set out in section 46 of the Act and this can potentially 
remain unchanged. The implication is that litigants, who have approached the small claims court to 
resolve a dispute, will have a feasible option at their disposal to have a matter reviewed, if the grounds 
for review are present.  
The appeal can result in the re-hearing of a matter. New Zealand’s Disputes Tribunal Act, 1988 introduces 
re-hearings as in [sic] addition to an appeal process. In essence, its Disputes Tribunal may in limited 
instances, upon the application of a party to any proceedings, order the rehearing of a claim, to be heard 
upon such terms as it thinks fit. Applications for re-hearings must be made within a specified period of 
the order having been made.’77 
Apparently the legal profession is persisting with the idea of creating a panel of practitioners at 
each court to preside over appeals. The merits of the proposal will be discussed below.78 
9.11 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRECLUDING APPEALS 
(a)  Crish v Commissioner Small Claims Court, Butterworth79 
In Crish the applicant argued that s 45 of the SCCA was unconstitutional because it precludes 
a party from taking a matter on appeal. Instead of building an argument based on s 34 of the 
Constitution 80  – the constitutional peg on which many issues of procedure have been 
challenged81 – the applicant inexplicably relied on s 35.82 It is therefore unsurprising that the 
court expressed its dismay with the way in which the case was argued.83 In any event, the court 
opted to determine whether s 45 constitutes an unjustifiable limitation of a constitutional right. 
																																																								
77 For the contents of the letter, see: 
http://www.lssa.org.za/upload/files/LSSA%20Comments/LSSA%20Comments%20%20SMALL%20CLAIMS%
20COURTS%20ACT%20AND%20RULES%2029%20November%202017.pdf (last accessed on 7 January 
2018).  
78 §9.12.  
79 [2007] ZAECHC 114 (26 July 2007) (hereafter referred to as ‘Crish’). 
80 Section 34 of the Constitution provides:  
‘Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public 
hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.’ 
81 For example, see Malachi v Cape Dance Academy International (Pty) Ltd 2010 (6) SA 1 (CC); Twee Jonge 
Gezellen (Pty) Ltd v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa t/a The Land Bank 2011 (3) SA 1 
(CC); Bid Industrial Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Strang 2008 (3) SA 355 (SCA). 
82 Section 35 deals with the rights of arrested, detained and accused persons. 
83 Crish v Commissioner Small Claims Court Butterworth supra [31]. 
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In other words, the court applied the limitations analysis in s 36 of the Constitution.84 The court 
referred extensively to the reasons advanced by the Hoexter Commission for excluding the right 
of appeal in the small claims courts.85 After considering these reasons, the court found that the 
legislature acted reasonably in excluding the right of appeal.86 
The difficulty with the Crish case is that the court did not do a particularly good job of 
interrogating the issues. Perhaps, blame must be attributed to the applicant arguing the matter 
before the court. The constitutionality of barring a right to appeal therefore requires further 
consideration.  
(b)  Does a litigant have a right of appeal?   
A distinction must be drawn between civil cases and criminal cases. Because the SCCA bars a 
civil appeal, the question for the purposes of this discussion is whether a small claims court 
litigant can claim the right to a civil appeal.  
Over the last century the United States Supreme Court has consistently refused to recognise a 
right to a civil appeal.87 The Supreme Court takes the approach that US States do not have a 
constitutional obligation to offer a civil appeal. As noted in Cobbledick v United States:88 
‘Since the right to a judgment from more than one court is a matter of grace, and not a necessary ingredient 
of justice, Congress, from the very beginning, has, by forbidding piecemeal disposition on appeal of what 
for practical purposes is a single controversy, set itself against enfeebling judicial administration. Thereby 
is avoided the obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a 
																																																								
84 Section 36 of the Constitution provides: 
‘(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that 
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including –  
(a)  the nature of the right;  
(b)  the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
(c)  the nature and extent of the limitation;  
(d)  the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e)  less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.’ 
85 Crish v Commissioner Small Claims Court Butterworth supra.  
86 Ibid [36]. 
87 Robertson ‘The Right to Appeal’ (2013) 91 North Carolina Law Review 1219 at 1233. 
88 309 U.S. 323 (1940) 325. See also Pennzoil v. Texaco Inc 481 U.S. 1 (1987) at 31fn4; Griffin v Illinois 351 U.S. 
12 (1956) at 18. 
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succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its 
initiation to entry of judgment. To be effective, judicial administration must not be leaden-footed.’89 
In the US States where the right of appeal has been recognised as a constitutional obligation, 
the duty arises within the context of criminal cases and not civil cases. Most States, however, 
offer an appeal procedure in civil cases, because it encourages good decision-making and 
legitimises the administration of justice.90 But it must be emphasised that an appeal procedure 
is not seen as a sine qua non for the right to due process in civil cases.91 
There is no doubt that having a civil appeal procedure is a good thing. Appeals provide a 
safeguard to correct legal and factual errors;92 encourage the development and refinement of 
legal principles;93 increase uniformity and standardisation in the application of legal rules;94 
and promote respect for the rule of law.95  However, it is clear that the overarching justification 
for an appeal procedure lies not in correcting errors of law in individual cases. The purpose of 
an appeal process is to advance the administration of justice as a whole. The vindication of an 
individual’s rights is simply one aspect when determining whether to grant leave to appeal. The 
court has to be satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to permit a party to approach a second-
tier court to reconsider a case. It is thus acceptable for the legislature and the court to impose 
limits on when matters may be appealed.96 This explains why, for example, South African civil 
procedure requires a litigant to make application for leave to appeal in the magistrates’ courts 
and the High Court and does not grant litigants an automatic right of appeal.97  
																																																								
89 Italics supplied.  
90 See Arkin ‘Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal’ (1992) 39 UCLA Law Review 503 at 505. 
91 Robertson (n87) and the authorities there cited. 
92 Oldfather ‘Error Correction’ (2010) 85 Indiana Law Journal 49. 
93 Bruhl ‘Deciding When to Decide: How Appellate Procedure Distributes the Costs of Legal Change’ (2011) 96 
Cornell Law Review 203 at 214. 
94 Robertson (n87) 1225. 
95 Heise ‘Federal Criminal Appeals: A Brief Empirical Perspective’ (2009) 93 Marquette Law Review 825 at 827. 
96 It is interesting to note that Article 14 (5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides 
that ‘[e]veryone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction being reviewed by a higher tribunal 
according to law.’ The Covenant does not mention civil cases. 
97 Herbstein & van Winsen 1175ff. 
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In Pretoria Garrison Institutes v Danish Variety Products (Pty) Ltd,98 Schreiner JA had the 
following to say about the perceived right of appeal: 
‘Where a hierarchy of Courts exists it is perhaps natural to regard the denial of what we are accustomed 
to call the right of appeal from any order whatsoever made by a lower Court as, to some extent, a refusal 
of justice. Under an ideal system it might be expected that whatever error an inferior Court has committed 
would be promptly correctable by a higher Court, and so on until the highest tribunal in the pyramid had 
pronounced upon the matter. But history shows that it has generally been thought advisable to limit 
appeals in certain respects. A wholly unrestricted right of appeal from every judical pronouncement might 
well lead to serious injustices. For, apart from the increased power which it would probably give the 
wealthier litigant to wear out his opponent, it might put a premium on delaying and obstructionist 
tactics.’99 
The statement above provides a cost-benefit perspective on the question of whether it is feasible 
to conduct an appeal. A cost-benefit analysis, it is submitted, is consistent with ss 34 and 9(1)100 
of the Constitution. In Mathews v Eldridge,101 the Supreme Court of the United States adopted 
a three-factor balancing test for determining ‘what process is due’ in civil matters. According 
to Mathews, the court has to weigh: (i) ‘the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action’; (ii) ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards’; and (iii) ‘the 
Government’s interest, including function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’102 The Mathews test 
essentially applies a cost-benefit analysis to procedural due process because the court noted 
that:‘[a]t some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the 
administrative action and to society in terms of increased insurance that the action is just, may 
be outweighed by the cost.’103 
The private interest that is protected by an appeal process is that the process allows errors to be 
corrected and, as such, protects litigants from being wrongfully deprived of their property 
(including money). There is no doubt that in the small claims court context, incorrect decisions 
																																																								
98 1948 (1) SA 839 (A). 
99 Ibid at 868-869. 
100 Section 9(1) provides: ‘Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the 
law.’  
101 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (hereafter referred to as ‘Mathews’).  
102 Ibid at 335. 
103 Ibid 348. 
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will deprive people of their property. This is even more problematic for the defendant because 
the plaintiff as the principal litigant chooses the forum and unilaterally deprives the defendant 
of the opportunity to appeal the decision.   
However, there is no empirical or other hard evidence to prove that there is a significant risk of 
incorrect decision-making. There is no statistical or other information to suggest that incorrect 
decision-making affects defendants more than plaintiffs and vice versa. At most, there is 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that presiding officers make mistakes of law and incorrectly 
apply the law to the facts of a case. But anecdotal evidence in itself might not be sufficient to 
persuade a court that the lack of an appeal process poses a disproportionate risk of incorrect 
decision-making. It also seems that the risk of poor decisions can be significantly ameliorated 
if commissioners receive adequate training and mentoring. It has already been established that 
the training of commissioners is a fundamental problem in the small claims courts.104 The 
process is thus not inherently problematic. It is the logistical arrangements to facilitate the 
optimal functioning of the courts that are shaky. Having regard to the aims and objectives of 
small claims courts, the legislature has acted reasonably to limit the right of appeal.  
As far as defendants are concerned, it seems that if the MCA was amended to make provision 
for a small claims court track,105 and if magistrates were permitted to refer matters to that track 
in appropriate cases, this will level the playing field between plaintiffs and defendants. The 
plaintiff will no longer have the exclusive choice to decide whether a matter should be heard 
by the small claims court, and therefore will not have a unilateral right to deprive the defendant 
of the ability to appeal. Like the position in England and Wales,106 if the matter falls within the 
jurisdiction of the small claims court, the magistrate should be able to refer the matter to that 
court.  
																																																								
104 See chapters 3 and 5. 
105 See §4.7.  
106  Sime A Practical Approach to Civil Procedure 211-212. 
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If one applies a cost-benefit analysis, there is no doubt that the introduction of an appeal process 
in the small claims courts will escalate costs for the litigants and the State. Presently, only the 
High Court may review decisions of the small claims courts. The same would apply if appeals 
were permitted. A review application is already costly because the litigants have the option to 
instruct attorneys and advocates to represent them. Presumably, the same would apply if an 
appeal process was introduced. It is also not in the State’s interest to tie up precious and costly 
judicial time to hear appeals emanating from the small claims courts.   
On the Mathews test, it does not appear that the lack of an appeal process in the small claims 
courts interferes with litigants’ right to equality before the law as contemplated in s 9(1) of the 
Constitution or the right of access to courts entrenched in s 34. It is safe to bet that even if there 
is some infringement, the infringement would survive the Constitution’s s 36 limitations 
analysis for the reasons discussed above.  
9.12 THE LAW SOCIETY’S RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Law Society’s recommendation to introduce a sui generis appeal process poses several 
challenges. Firstly, lower courts do not have appellate jurisdiction. Were the small claims courts 
to hear their own appeals, it would mark a fundamental departure from the way in which appeals 
are heard in South Africa. This does not suggest that the law cannot be changed, but it would 
mean that the SCCA and SCCRs would require amendment to facilitate such a process. One 
might also have to rethink the jurisdiction of lower courts to not only hear appeals but also 
review proceedings. 
Secondly, it is unclear what impact appellate panels will have on the institutional culture of the 
small claims courts. It is already difficult to recruit volunteer commissioners in the small claims 
courts. There is a further risk that practitioners will be reluctant to serve as commissioners if 
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they know that their decisions are subject to appeal by their peers. Legal professionals are 
always concerned about reputational harm.  
Thirdly, there is no indication what level of expertise members of the appellate panel should 
have and how they would determine which cases are ripe for appeal. Presumably, presiding 
officers would have to provide written reasons for their decisions. Would the requirement of 
written reasons not escalate the burden of serving in the courts? 
Fourthly, the introduction of an appeal process raises the spectre that litigants will abuse the 
process, and that litigants will effectively expect their cases to be heard de novo. Every losing 
litigant might very well, for lack of understanding of the outcome of a case, want a second bite 
of the cherry.107 This would cause enormous bottlenecks in a process predicated on the quick 
finalisation of matters.  
One alternative is to empower the magistrates’ courts to hear small claims court appeals, and 
to limit the right of appeal to mistakes of law only.108 This may solve the problem addressed in 
the second point above. It may also partially resolve the problem in the fourth point because to 
limit an appeal to a question of law would not only reduce instances of appeal, but would also 
prevent a rehearing of evidence.109  However, it would not solve the issue of the escalation of 
costs and how appeals would affect the duties of the presiding officer and the processes of the 
small claims court that hears a matter at first instance. 
																																																								
107 See Datnow ‘A Sad Take of Harmful Business Practices in the Small Claims Court’ De Rebus (September 
1998) 26 at 27. 
108 Section 22 of the Zambian Small Claims Courts Act, Cap 47 provides that a decision of the small claims court 
may be appealed to the High Court on a question of law only. In New Brunswick, Canada, a small claims litigant 
can appeal a matter to the Queen’s Bench on a question of law only. See New Brunswick Regulation 2012-103 
under Small Claims Act (O.C 2012-383). 
109 It is interesting to note that in Ontario, Canada a party can request a new trial within 30 days of judgment, but 
only if he or she can show that there was arithmetical error in the calculation of damages, or if the applicant can 
show that it is in possession of new evidence that was not available at the time of the original trial and could not 
reasonably have been expected to be available at that time. See Rule 17.04 Ontario Regulation 258/98, Rules of 
the Small Claims Court. 
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A further limitation that could be placed on the right of appeal is to grant the right to the 
defendant only. In many jurisdictions, only the defendant (not the plaintiff) is permitted to 
appeal a small claims court judgment. In South Africa it would make sense to have such a rule, 
because currently the plaintiff has the exclusive right to unilaterally waive of the right of appeal 
by choosing to sue in the small claims court. By conferring a right to appeal on the defendant 
only would reduce the prejudice suffered by the defendant.  
A key feature of the small claims court is that it provides speedy and cheap justice. The moment 




9.13  JUDGMENT AND COSTS 
According to s 34 of the SCCA: 
‘A court may, after the hearing of an action, grant –  
(a)   judgment for the plaintiff in respect of his claim in so far as he has proved it; 
(b)    judgment for the defendant in respect of his defence or counterclaim in so far as he has  
     proved it; 
(c)   absolution from the instance, if the court is of the opinion that the evidence does not enable 
 it to give judgment for either party; 
(d)   such judgment as to costs contemplated in section 37 as may be just; 
(e)   an order, on such conditions as the court may deem fit, against the party for whom judgment 
 has been granted, deferring wholly or in part further proceedings upon the judgment for a 
 specified period pending arrangements by the other party for the satisfaction of the 
 judgment.’ 
 
The small claims court can make limited costs orders, namely, ‘court fees’, the ‘prescribed 
amount for the issue of the summons’ and ‘fees and travelling expenses of the messenger of the 
court.’110 The reference to ‘court fees’ and the ‘prescribed amount for the issue of the summons’ 
is a throwback to a time when these fees were paid in revenue stamps. With the abolition of 
																																																								
110 SCCA, s 37. 
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revenue stamps in 2009 these fees are no longer payable, and hence these provisions are 
redundant.111 Furthermore, the reference to the ‘messenger of the court’ should be amended to 
read ‘sheriff of the court’ as the term ‘messenger’ is outdated.112 
If the small claims court is given the power to subpoena witnesses,113 it must be determined 
whether the court should grant witness fees. Witness fees are permitted in the magistrates’ 
courts and the High Court. 114 In those courts witnesses are remunerated at a set rate to cover 
the cost of their travelling expenses and loss of income for having to attend court. To permit 
witness fees in the small claims courts will increase the cost of litigation. To counter this, the 
courts should only subpoena witnesses when it is necessary and if there are no other ways of 
taking the evidence, for example, by telephone115 or other means.  
9.14 DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT BY CONSENT 
Default judgment is a well-known concept in the South African law of procedure. Default 
judgment is usually granted where the defendant fails to participate in litigation or consents to 
judgment.116 It should thus come as no surprise that s 35 of the SCCA provides: 
 
‘(1)  If a defendant, upon a summons having been served on him in terms of section 29 –  
(a)  admits liability and consents to judgment in writing; or 
(b)  fails to appear before the court on the trial date or on any date to which the proceedings 
have been postponed,  
the court may, on application by the plaintiff, grant judgment for the plaintiff in so far as he has 
proved the defendant's liability and the amount of the claim to the satisfaction of the court, and the 
court may dismiss any counterclaim by the defendant. 
(2)  If a plaintiff fails to appear before the court on the trial date or on any other date to which the 
proceedings have been postponed, the court may, on application by the defendant –  
(a)   dismiss the plaintiff's claim: Provided that the plaintiff may again institute an action for that 
claim with the consent of the court; and 
(b)   with regard to a counterclaim, grant judgment for the defendant in so far as he has proved 
the  plaintiff's liability and the amount of the counterclaim to the satisfaction of the court.’117 
																																																								
111 Revenue stamps were demonetised by GN 360 in GG 32059 of 27 March 2009. 
112 See Sheriffs Act 90 of 1986. 
113 See §8.20.  
114 MCA, s 51bis; SCA, s 37. 
115 See §8.17. 
116 In the High Court and the magistrates’ courts default judgment is granted where the defendant (a) fails to enter 
an appearance to defend the legal proceedings; (b) fails to deliver a plea after being asked to do so in terms of a 
notice of bar; (c) consents to judgment; or (d) fails to turn up at a trial: Peté, Hulme, du Plessis et al Civil Procedure: 
A Practical Guide at 206-212. 
117 Italics supplied.  
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The reference to ‘application’ in s 35 is confusing. In the magistrates’ courts, a plaintiff seeking 
default judgment fills in a ‘request’ for default judgment 118  and attaches to the request 
documentary evidence to prove his or her claim.119 If the magistrate120 is satisfied that the 
requirements for default judgment have been met and that the plaintiff has a claim, the court 
will grant judgment in chambers. The plaintiff does not have to appear before the magistrate. 
The small claims courts procedure does not allow for applications in the traditional sense, 
because there is no equivalent to MCR 55 or HCR 6 in the small claims courts. Unlike the 
MCRs,121 the SCCRs do not contain a pro forma ‘application’ for default judgment. From the 
tenor of the SCCA, it seems that the court hears the ‘application’ for default judgment in open 
court and the plaintiff is required to address the court orally and not on paper.122 The reference 
to ‘application’ thus means something completely different to what one would expect in the 
magistrates’ courts or the High Court. It is submitted that the word ‘application’ in the section 
should be replaced with the word request.  
To obtain default judgment in the small claims court, the plaintiff has to come to court on the 
trial date. If the defendant does not appear at the trial, the court essentially determines whether 
default judgment should be granted and asks the plaintiff to satisfy the court that he or she has 
a claim. The court will not grant default judgment as an administrative process. Given that 
parties are unrepresented in the small claims court, having an open-court appearance at which 
the plaintiff’s claim is interrogated is appropriate. The same applies where the defendant 
consents to judgment. As noted earlier, judgment against the defendant on the basis of consent 
																																																								
118 MCR 12(1)(a). 
119 Ibid.  
120 If the claim is for a debt or a liquidated amount, the registrar or clerk of the court will receive the request and 
may even grant judgment (MCR 12(3A)), provided that the claim is not based on the NCA or the Credit 
Agreements Act 75 of 1980. If these Acts apply, the matter must be referred to a magistrate (MCR 12(5)). A 
request for default judgment based on an illiquid claim must be referred to a magistrate. 
121 MCR 12(1)(a) provides that the ‘request’ for default judgment must be ‘in writing similar to Form 5 of 
Annexure 1…’. 
122 Bredenkamp The Small Claims Court 38. 
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should not be granted lightly.123  It is, therefore, important for the court to interrogate the 
soundness of the consent to judgment in open court and for the plaintiff to prove by oral and 
documentary evidence that he or she is entitled to judgment. 
The use of permissive language in s 35(1) means that the court is not obliged to grant default 
judgment. Nothing precludes the court from, for example, postponing the case so that enquiries 
can be made as to why the defendant did not arrive at court, or to give the plaintiff an extension 
of time to bring appropriate evidence so that default judgment may be granted in due course. 
The permissive language should be supported and retained for another reason: if the court has 
the power to order alternative forms of service as was suggested in chapter 8,124 the permissive 
language will enable the court to postpone an application for default judgment so that the 
summons may be served by alternative means, thereby securing the attendance of the defendant 
at court. 
Section 35(2) seems pragmatic. It protects defendants from vexatious proceedings. In ordinary 
litigation, if the plaintiff fails to appear at court on the trial date, the court can dismiss the 
plaintiff’s action and grant the defendant wasted costs. Because costs are not permitted in the 
small claims courts, the subsection provides that where the plaintiff’s claim is dismissed for 
failure to appear on the trial date, the plaintiff may reinstitute the action if he or she obtains the 
‘consent’ of the court. The consent thus serves as a mechanism to restrain plaintiffs from 
abusing the court process. However, it is unclear how the consent must be obtained, given that 
there is no formal application procedure in the small claims courts. Does the plaintiff write a 
letter to the court concerned seeking leave to reinstitute the action? What criteria will the court 
apply before granting such consent? The SCCRs must flesh this aspect out more clearly. A 
further and related problem would arise where the plaintiff simply takes the claim to another 
																																																								
123 See §8.10. 
124 §8.13.  
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small claims court of concurrent jurisdiction and reinstitutes the action. Would the new court 
have a way of determining whether a previous claim on the same facts was instituted in another 
court? Presumably, the defendant would object to the reinstitution of the claim. However, 
would an unrepresented litigant know about this technical defence? Suddenly, the pragmatism 
of s 35(2) leaves more questions than answers. Perhaps, the way to overcome the difficulty is 
to delete ‘[p]rovided that the plaintiff may again institute an action for that claim with the 
consent of the court.’  
9.15 RESCISSION AND VARIATION OF JUDGMENT  
Section 36 of the SCCA provides: 
‘The court may, upon application by any person affected thereby or, in a case contemplated in 
paragraph (c) also suo motu –  
(a)  rescind or vary any judgment granted by it in the absence of the person against whom that 
judgment was granted, provided the application for set-down for hearing is made on a date 
within six weeks after the applicant first had knowledge of the judgment; 
(b)  rescind or vary any judgment granted by it which was void ab origine or was obtained by fraud 
or as a result of a mistake common to the parties, provided the application is made not later than 
one year after the applicant first had knowledge of the voidness, fraud or mistake; 
(c)  correct patent errors in any judgment, provided, in the case of an application, the application is 
made not later than one year after the applicant first had knowledge of any errors.’ 
Section 36 is modelled after s 36 of the MCA. Consequently, the interpretation of s 36 of the 
MCA is apposite in the context of s 36 of the SCCA.125 It is thus not necessary to discuss trite 
principles, save to state that the presiding officer will proceed inquisitorially in the small claims 
court to determine whether the party seeking rescission or variation of a judgment is entitled to 
the relief sought. The discussion below will be restricted to particular issues affecting the small 
claims courts. 
Like s 35 of the SCCA,126 s 36 makes reference to an ‘application’. However, as noted before, 
neither the SCCA nor the SCCRs contain dedicated provisions for applications. It is thus 
unclear how the application in terms of this section must be brought before the court. In the 
																																																								
125 Jones & Buckle Act 245ff (Service 14, 2017).  
126 See §9.14. 
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magistrates’ courts and the High Court, an application for rescission of judgment is brought by 
notice and is supported by affidavit(s). The small claims courts’ procedures, as they currently 
stand, are vague.  
Unlike the position in the magistrates’ courts,127 there is no indication in the small claims 
courts’ legislation as to what the party must show when making application for rescission or 
variation of a judgment. Presumably, the common-law requirements for rescission and variation 
of judgment would apply.128 However, this comes as cold comfort to the unrepresented litigant, 
because the common-law principles in this area are quite complex. To assume that the 
unrepresented litigant will be able to extrapolate the common-law principles on his or her own 
is thus a tall order. The rules should give some guidance about what the ‘application’ should 
contain, for example, that the party must explain why he or she failed to appear at the trial and 
the nature of the defendant’s defence to the plaintiff’s claim.129 It would also make sense for 
the rules to contain a pro forma ‘application’ for rescission or variation of a judgment. This 
recommendation is not far-fetched given that the legislature recently saw fit to include in the 
Courts of Law Amendment Act130 a pro forma application for ‘review of default judgment’ in 
the magistrates’ courts and the High Courts.131 The legislature enjoined the Rules Board for 
Courts of Law to draft further pro forma precedents for rescission of judgment applications in 
the magistrates’ courts and the High Courts.132 Something similar could be formulated for the 
small claims courts. 
A significant issue with s 36 of the SCCA is that the section does not make provision for 
rescission of judgment by consent or where the judgment debtor can show that the debt has 
																																																								
127 MCR 49. 
128 See Herbstein & van Winsen 929ff. 
129 See MCR 49(3). 
130 7 of 2017. This Act has not yet come into operation. 
131 Ibid, Schedule. 
132 Ibid, s 14. 
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been paid off. The Courts of Law Amendment Act133 amends s 36(2) of the MCA134 and inserts 
s 23A into the SCA.135 In terms of the amendments, if a judgment creditor consents to a 
rescission of a default judgment, the court may rescind the judgment. Furthermore, even if the 
judgment creditor refuses to consent, the judgment debtor may nevertheless apply to the court 
to rescind the judgment if he or she satisfies the court that the debt plus interest was paid. The 
purpose behind these provisions is, firstly, to encourage judgment debtors to pay their debts 
and secondly, to assist judgment debtors to have their negative credit profiles expunged. Given 
the problems with enforcing small claims judgments, it seems like a good idea to align the 
																																																								
133 7 of 2017.  
134 Section 2 of the Courts of Law Amendment Act provides: 
‘Section 36 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1944, is hereby amended – 
(a) by the substitution for subsection (2) of the following subsection: 
"(2) If a plaintiff in whose favour a default judgment has been granted has [agreed] consented in writing that the 
judgment be rescinded or varied, a court [must] may rescind or vary such judgment on application by any person 
affected by it.”; and  
(b) by the addition of the following subsections: 
"(3)(a) Where a judgment debt, the interest thereon at the rate granted in the judgment and the costs have been 
paid in full, whether the consent of the judgment creditor for the rescission of the judgment has been obtained or 
not, a court may, on application by the judgment debtor or any other person affected by the judgment rescind that 
 judgment. 
(b) The application contemplated in paragraph (a) –  
(i)  must be made on a form which corresponds substantially with the form prescribed in the rules; 
(ii) must be accompanied by reasonable proof that the judgment debt, the interest and the costs have been 
paid; 
(iii) must be accompanied by proof that the application has been served on the  judgment creditor, at 
least 10 court days prior to the hearing of the intended  application; 
(iv) may be set down for hearing on any day, not less than 10 court days, after service thereof; and 
(v)  may be heard by a magistrate in chambers. 
(4) A court may make any cost order it deems fit with regard to an application contemplated in paragraph (a)."’  
[Words in square brackets signify deletions from existing provisions and underlined words indicate an insertion.] 
135 Section  14 of the Courts of Law Amendment Act 7 of 2017 inserts s 23A into the SCA and reads as follows: 
‘"Rescission of judgment with consent of plaintiff or where judgment debt has been paid 
23A. (1) If a plaintiff in whose favour a default judgment has been granted has consented in writing that the 
judgment be rescinded, a court may rescind such judgment on application by any person affected by it. 
(2) (a) Where a judgment debt, the interest thereon at the rate granted in the judgment and the costs have been 
paid, whether the consent of the judgment creditor for the rescission of the judgment has been obtained or not, a 
court may, on application by the judgment debtor or any other person affected by the judgment, rescind that 
judgment.  
(b) The application contemplated in paragraph (a) –  
(i) must be made on a form which corresponds substantially with the form prescribed in the rules; 
(ii) must be accompanied by reasonable proof that the judgment debt, the interest thereon and the costs have been 
paid;  
(iii) must be accompanied by proof that the application has been served on the judgment creditor, at least 10 
business days prior to the hearing of the intended application; 
(iv) may be set down for hearing on any day, not less than 10 business days after service thereof; and  
(v) may be heard by a judge in chambers. 
(c) A court may make any cost order it deems fit with regard to an application contemplated in paragraph (a)."’ 
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SCCA with the amended MCA and SCA. 
9.16 CONCLUSION 
This chapter illustrates the technical nature of procedure. It shows that there is vast room for 
the improvement of the small claims courts’ procedures. Designing court procedures in a 
thoughtful and reflective manner is notoriously difficult. But the exercise is worth the effort 
because poorly designed court procedures affect the aims and objectives of the courts and 
impact on perceptions of justice.  
Chapter 10 argues for the introduction of mediation and explains how and at what point 
mediation could be introduced into the small claims courts’ procedure.  
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CHAPTER 10  
SMALL CLAIMS MEDIATION  
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
lternative dispute resolution (hereafter referred to as ‘ADR’) features in many 
jurisdictions across the globe. In fact, one will be hard-pressed to find a country where 
ADR is not endorsed in some or other form. Following the worldwide Access to Justice Project 
undertaken by Professors Cappelletti and Garth in the 1970s,1 many common-law countries 
adopted different forms of ADR as alternatives to court litigation. Civil law countries were 
slightly slower to see the benefits of ADR,2 but by the 1990s the pendulum firmly swung in 
favour of ADR.3 Recently the European Parliament passed directives mandating the use of 
ADR across the European Union.4  In his proposals for the reform of civil procedure, Lord 
Woolf espoused the merits of ADR. ADR was subsequently incorporated into the new Civil 
Procedure Rules5 of England and Wales.6  The Woolf reforms – as they came to be known – 
                                                             
1 Cappelletti and Garth in their international study identified ADR as one of ‘three waves of reform’.  See 
Cappelletti, Garth ‘Access to Justice: The Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective: A General Report’ in 
Cappelletti, Garth (eds) Access to Justice. See also Garth, Cappelleti ‘Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the 
Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective’ (1978) 27 Buffalo Law Review 181ff; Cappelletti ‘Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Processes within the World-Wide Access to Justice Movement’ 1993 (56) The Modern Law 
Review 282-296. 
2 Alexander ‘From Common Law to Civil Law Jurisdictions: Court ADR On the Move in Germany’ (2002) 4 ADR 
Bulletin 1; Alexander ‘Global Trends in Mediation: Riding the Third Wave’ in Alexander (ed) Global Trends in 
Mediation (2006) 1-36. 
3 See Taylor The Dispute Resolution Review for a discussion of 41 countries; Glasser, Roberts ‘Dispute Resolution: 
Civil Justice and its Alternatives’ (1993) 56 The Modern Law Review 277. 
4 See for example, Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council. For an instructive 
analysis of the use of ADR in the European Union, see Knudsen, Balina ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems 
Across the European Union, Iceland and Norway’ Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 109 (2014) 944-
948. In some states, ADR (mediation and arbitration) is offered online. See in this regard Mania ‘Online Dispute 
Resolution: The Future of Justice’ (2015) 1 International Comparative Jurisprudence 76-86. 
5 The Civil Procedure Rules (the ‘CPRs’) are the rules of civil procedure used by the Court of Appeal, High Court 
of Justice, and County Courts in civil cases in England and Wales. They apply to all cases commenced after 26 
April 1999, and largely replace the Rules of the Supreme Court and the County Court Rules. For the CPRs, see: 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil (last accessed on 7 August 2017). 
6  For a discussion on ADR in the CPRs see Halsey v. Milton Keynes NHS Trust [2004] 1 WLR 3002.  See also 
Jackson ‘Civil Justice Reform and Alternative Dispute Resolution’ Lecture delivered at the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators London (20 September 2016); Woolf  ‘Civil Justice in the United Kingdom’ (1997) 45 The American 




had the effect of influencing the shape of civil justice reform in many other parts of the world,7 
and more particularly in developing countries.8 In Africa, countries such Nigeria,9 Ghana,10 
Uganda,11 Namibia12 and Lesotho13 led the way for other African states to incorporate ADR 
and more specifically mediation, into their litigation models. Most African countries inherited 
colonial litigation systems, but ADR, it has been argued,14 has the potential to restore a sense 
of authenticity to the way that African people have traditionally resolved their disputes.  
                                                             
7 See for example: Department of Justice, Government of Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region Report of 
the Working Group on Mediation (2010); Irish Law Reform Commission ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: 
Mediation and Conciliation’ Report (2010). 
8 Crook ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Magistrates’ Courts in Ghana: A Case of Practical Hybridity’ 
Working Paper (2012) at 2-3. 
9 In 1999, the Lagos State Ministry of Justice established the Citizens’ Mediation Centre (the ‘CMC’) to provide 
free dispute resolution services to indigent Lagosians. With many Nigerians reportedly unable to pay the costs to 
pursue litigation, the new centre filled an evident gap. Targeting unresolved disputes over relatively small sums 
of money, the CMC focused on debt recovery, and quarrels between employers and employees, landlords and 
tenants, or among members of the same family. Its model has been replicated in 16 states – see Onyema, Odibo 
‘How Alternative Dispute Resolution Made a Comeback in Nigeria’s Courts’ African Research Institute (2017). 
In 2002, the Lagos Multi-Door Courthouse (the ‘LMDC’) was established.  Its mission is to provide timely cost-
effective and user-friendly access to justice through the use of ADR. The initiative proved so successful that the 
State legislature enacted the Lagos Multi-Door Courthouse Law. See further Lukman ‘Enhancing Sustainable 
Development by Entrenching Mediation Culture in Nigeria’ (2014) 21 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization 
19ff. 
10  Since 2005, the district courts (formerly magistrates’ courts) have offered court-annexed mediation on a 
voluntary basis. The referral to mediation has proved to be very successful.  Consequently, Ghana passed the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 798 of 2010. This stand-alone pro-ADR legislation establishes ADR as an 
official mechanism to resolve disputes alongside the formal litigation system in the district courts and High Courts. 
It comprehensively deals with all aspects of ADR such as the establishment and registration of the mediator and 
arbitrator professions, the nature of ADR processes, as well as their relationship with the rules of evidence. By and 
large referral to mediation is consensual. However, a court has the discretion to refer a matter to mediation if it is 
of the opinion that a matter may be resolved this way (s 64). For more discussion see: Nolan-Haley ‘Mediation 
and Access to Justice in Africa: Perspectives from Ghana’ 21 (2015) Harvard Negotiation Law Review 59 at 81ff; 
Crook ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Magistrates’ Courts in Ghana: A Case of Practical Hybridity’ 
Working Paper (2012). 
11 In 1996, Uganda established a special commercial division of the High Court. In terms of the directives issued 
for the division, commercial judges had to be proactive. This resulted in the introduction of court-annexed ADR 
as part of a pilot scheme. The pilot proved to be successful and was extended several times. In 2013 The Judicature 
(Mediation) Rules, 2013 were promulgated (Supplement No 6 The Uganda Gazette No 13 Volume CVI dated 15 
March 2013). In terms of the rules every civil case in the High Courts and the magistrates’ courts must be referred 
to mediation ‘before proceeding to trial’ (rule 4).  See further Kiryabwire ‘The Development of the Commercial 
Judicial System of Uganda: A Study of the Commercial Court Division, High Court of Uganda’ (2009) 2 The 
Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law 349-358. 
12 See Rules 38 and 39 of the High Court of Namibia: High Court Act, 1990, as amended  (GN 44 in GG 5392 of 
17 January 2014) together with the Registrar’s Notes Issued in Terms of PD 65 Incorporating Judge President’s 
Practice Notes. See also Damaseb ‘Mediation Programme of the High Court of Namibia’ Outreach Paper No 1 
(October 2014). 
13 The High Court (Mediation) Rules, 2011 (Supplement No 1, Gazette No 48 of 27 May, 2011). 
14 Keynote Address By Lady Justice Georgina Theodora Wood, Chief Justice of The Republic of Ghana at The 
Catholic University, Fiapre, Sunyani on the Occasion of the Inauguration of the ADR Training Institute (1 August 
2011) - see  http://mariancrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/MCRC_openingKeynote.pdf (last accessed on 5 
August 2017); Dieng ‘ADR in Sub-Saharan African Countries’ in Ingen-Housz (ed) ADR in Business: Practice 
Across Countries and Cultures 611 at 614. 
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This chapter argues for the incorporation of mediation into the procedure of the small claims 
courts.15 The chapter will first reflect on the history of mediation in civil litigation in South 
Africa. Thereafter ‘mediation’ will be defined. This is followed by a discussion of the 
arguments for and against mediation in the small claims courts. The challenges of ensuring the 
confidentiality of the mediation process and its outcomes within a litigation process will be 
discussed, as well as aspects relating to the training of mediators. Drawing on local and 
comparative experiences, a sui generis mediation model of mediation will be proposed for the 
small claims courts. 
10.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEDIATION IN CIVIL LITIGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
(a)  Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act and Short Process Courts and Mediation in 
Certain Civil Cases Act  
Thirty years ago mediation hardly featured in the civil justice system. In 1990 mediation was 
introduced in certain divorce matters by the eponymous Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters 
Act.16 In 1991 the ill-fated Short Process Courts and Mediation in Certain Civil Cases Act 
came into operation.17 The Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act is used extensively in 
divorce proceedings involving minor children.  The Short Process Courts and Mediation in 
Certain Civil Cases Act – though still on the statute book – has, by and large, been relegated 
to the scrap heap of history. It appears that the Act was hardly, if ever, used. Aside from its 
non-use, the Act is criticised for being cumbersome, inconsistent with mediation theory, and 
                                                             
15 See also Scott-Macnab ‘Mediation Prior to Small Claims Litigation: A Human Approach’ (November 1987) De 
Rebus 619. 
16 24 of 1987.  The Act came into operation on 1 October 1990. 
17 103 of 1991.  
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not particularly well thought out from a procedural perspective.18 One commentator goes as 
far as to describe it as a ‘curate’s omelette’.19 
(b)  Voluntary Court-Annexed Mediation Rules  
The years 1994 to 2017 saw significant legal developments. Many statutes made provision for 
ADR and in particular, mediation.20 Unfortunately, ADR did not feature in the legislation 
governing the courts. Neither the MCA nor the SCA makes provision for ADR.  The SCA 
stands as a monument to missed opportunity because the purpose of the Act was to repeal and 
replace the Supreme Court Act.21 Unfortunately, while introducing some new innovations the 
Act reaffirms the traditional colonial litigation model. The transformative values of the 
Constitution, in relation to promoting access to justice,22 are not evident in the Act.  
Mediation has not been overlooked completely, however. On 1 December 2014, Chapter 2 of 
the MCRs was promulgated. The Chapter contains the Voluntary Court-Annexed Mediation 
Rules (hereafter referred to as the ‘VCAMRs’) for the magistrates’ courts. Due to limitations 
imposed by legislation, the Rules Board for Courts of Law23 could not mainstream mediation 
                                                             
18 Paleker ‘Mediation in South Africa: Here But Not All There’ in Alexander (ed) Global Trends in Mediation 333 
at 336-339. 
19 Brown ‘A Visitor’s Perspective on South African Mediation’ (January 1994) De Rebus 61 at 63. See also 
Mowatt ‘The High Price of Cheap Adjudication’ (1992) 109 South African Law Journal 77 at 85. 
20 Health Professions Act 56 of 1974, s 42; Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, Chapter 7; Development Facilitation 
Act 67 of 1995, s 16(b)(iii); Higher Education Act 101 of 1997, Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997, 
s 31(1); National Water Act 36 of 1998, s 150; National Forests Act 84 of 1998, s 31(1); Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998, s 7 subsections (1), (2), and (5); National Land 
Transport Transition Act 22 of 2000, s 10(15); Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002, s 
5(a); Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act 37 of 2004, s 150; Children’s Act 38 of 2005, ss 21(3) and 33(5); 
Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006, s 42(1)-(2); Companies Act 71 of 2008, Part C; Child Justice Act 75 of 2008, 
ss 53(7), 62, 73; Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, s 70; Land Transport Act 5 of 2009, s 46(2); Pan South 
African Language Board Act 36 of 1998, s 150 subsections (1), (2), (3), (7); Petroleum Pipelines Act 60 of 2003, 
s 4(d); Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, 21(4)(b); Public Protector 
Act 23 of 1994, s 6(4)(b)(i); Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999, ss 5, 13(1), 2(c); National Credit Act 34 of 2005, s 
134(b)(ii); Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, s 13; Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011, ss 11(2), 13, 14, 
15, 17, 19, 20, 25, and 31; Customs Duty Act 30 of 2014, ss 87(1)(a), 88(1)(b), 93(b), 108(e), 126(e), 161(e); Land 
Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, s 18(3); National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998, s 17; 
Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015, s 13(1)-(2); Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, s 107(a)(2); Customs Control 
Act 31 of 2014, ss 827(b), 835(b)(ii), 847-850. 
21 59 of 1959. 
22 Constitution, s 34. 
23 Hereafter referred to as ‘the Rules Board’. See §3.4. 
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in the magistrates’ courts. Consequently, the application of the VCAMRs is entirely 
voluntary.24  
The Department of Justice is responsible for the implementation of the mediation rules. The 
Department embarked on a pilot scheme and offered mediation at 12 district magistrates’ 
courts.25 In 2017, the Department announced that it would add up to 50 more regional and 
district magistrates’ courts at which mediation will be available by 2020.26  
Even though mediation is not available in the overwhelming majority of district and regional 
magistrates’ courts, some courts have informally introduced mediation. In the Limpopo 
province, for example, mediation is used in the regional courts in family and matrimonial 
matters.27 There are also courts in the Western Cape which offer mediation services, albeit on 
an informal basis.28 
(c) Legislative intervention is needed  
The MCA and the SCA require legislative intervention to make provision for mediation. As 
noted earlier, the Rules Board is constrained by the Rules Board for Courts of Law Act29 and 
empowering statutes when exercising its functions. 30  Because the MCA does not make 
provision for mediation, the Rules Board could not give a magistrate the power to direct matters 
to mediation where he or she thinks that mediation may be the most appropriate dispute 
resolution mechanism. If the Act were amended to make provision for mediation, the Rules 
Board would presumably be able to give mediation more teeth. 
                                                             
24 For a discussion of the powers of the Rules Board see §3.4. 
25 GN 855 in GG 38164 of 31 October 2014. 
26 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Annual Performance Plan 2017/2018 38-39. 
27 I am thankful to Ms J Wessels, Regional Court President of Polokwane, for this information. 
28 For example, some magistrates at the Wynberg Magistrates’ Court refer some matrimonial matters to mediation 
where the parties are amenable thereto.  
29 107 of 1985 (hereafter referred to as ‘Rules Board for Courts of Law Act’). 
30 For more discussion see §3.4.  
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In the High Courts, there are currently no ADR rules. The lack thereof has not precluded some 
judicial officers from promoting the use of mediation. The judiciary encourages mediation in 
family-related matters31 and in eviction cases.32 In commercial litigation, the courts have not 
been as vociferous. This is because many commercial matters go to arbitration or to private 
mediation before litigation is instituted.33 The King Committee on Governance in its Draft 
Code of Governance Principles for South Africa (2009) § 10 states:  
‘It is accepted around the world that ADR is not a reflection on a judicial system of any country, but that 
it has become an important element of good governance. Directors should preserve business relationships. 
Consequently, when a dispute arises, in exercising their duty of care, they should endeavour to resolve it 
expeditiously, efficiently and effectively. Also, mediation enables novel solutions, which a court may not 
achieve, as it is constrained to enforce legal rights and obligations. In mediation, the parties’ needs are 
considered, rather than their rights and obligations. It is in this context that the Institute of Directors in 
Southern Africa (IoD) advocates administered mediation and, if it fails, expedited arbitration. Together 
with the Arbitration Foundation of Southern Africa, the IoD has developed an enforceable ADR clause 
for inclusion in contracts, the precedent of which is to be found in the Practice Notes to the report. The 
King Committee endorses the approach by the IoD…ADR is also in line with the principles of Ubuntu.’ 
The referral of disputes to mediation is regarded as part of the fiduciary duties of directors. 
Interestingly, the King Committee acknowledged that it is distinctly part of the African 
philosophy of ubuntu34 to refer a dispute to mediation. In a comprehensive analysis of African 
dispute resolution mechanisms, Zartman concludes that formal adversarial litigation is alien to 
African culture. Across the African continent, as well as in South Africa, mediation was and is 
extensively used by communities to resolve their every-day disputes.35 Of course, there are 
some negative aspects to African dispute resolution mechanisms, such as the prevalence of 
                                                             
31 MB v NB 2010 (3) SA 220 (GSJ); FS v JJ 2011 (3) SA 126 (SCA). 
32 Le Riche v Psp Properties CC 2005 (3) SA 189 (C); Mtshali v Masawi 2017 (4) SA 632 (GJ). 
33 Taylor The Dispute Resolution Review 593-594. 
34 Former Constitutional Court Judge JY Mokgoro in an instructive article ‘Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa’ 
(1998) 1 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 2 describes the concept of Ubuntu as follows: 
‘It has also been described as a philosophy of life, which in its most fundamental sense represents 
personhood, humanity, humaneness and morality; a metaphor that describes group solidarity where such 
group solidarity is central to the survival of communities with a scarcity of resources, where the 
fundamental belief is that motho ke motho ba batho ba bangwe/umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu which, 
literally translated, means a person can only be a person through others. In other words the individual’s 
whole existence is relative to that of the group: this is manifested in anti-individualistic conduct towards 
the survival of the group if the individual is to survive. It is a basically humanistic orientation towards 
fellow beings.’ 
35  Zartman (ed) Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict ‘Medicine’ 1. See also Muigua 




patriarchal structures that can have a silencing effect on women. But, ideologically African 
people like to resolve their disputes by consensus and joint decision-making.36 
(d) Judicial case-flow management 
Following international practice,37 the Office of the Chief Justice initiated a project in 2012 for 
the introduction of judicial case-flow management rules in various divisions of the High Court 
on a pilot basis.38 The pilot phase came to an end in 2015. On account of its success, the Practice 
Directives39 of the various divisions of the High Court incorporated the pilot rules with certain 
modifications. Currently, the Rules Board is considering a uniform set of judicial case-flow 
management rules for inclusion in the HCRs, which would have the effect of streamlining the 
rules across all the courts. Draft rule 37A(11) of the proposed new uniform judicial case-flow 
management rules provides: 
‘Without limiting the scope of judicial engagement at a case management conference, the case 
management Judge shall – 
(a) explore settlement, on all or some of the issues, including, if appropriate, enquiring whether the 
parties have considered voluntary mediation…’ 
While the draft rule is a step in the right direction, there is no reason why a judge cannot mero 
motu direct the parties to mediate a matter. The High Courts have on occasion relied on their 
inherent jurisdiction 40  to regulate their processes and to prevent an abuse of the courts’ 
procedures by imposing adverse costs orders on practitioners who had not advised clients to 
consider mediation. In MB v NB,41 a case involving a particularly acrimonious divorce, the court 
held: 
‘This is but an instance of what mediation might have achieved. In fact, the benefits go well beyond it. 
In the process of mediation the parties would have had ample scope for an informed, but informal, debate 
on the levels of their estates, the amount of their incomes and the extent of their living costs. Nudged by 
a facilitative intermediary, I have little doubt that they would have been able to solve most of the monetary 
disputes that stood between them. The saving in time and legal costs would have been significant and, 
once a few breakthroughs had been made, I have every reason to believe that an overall solution would 
have been reached. Everyone would, in the process, have been spared the burden of two wasted days 
                                                             
36 South African Law Commission ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’ Project 94 Issue Paper 8 (1997) Chapter 2. 
37 Glenn ‘Judges and Civil Justice’ in Glenn The Hamlyn Lectures 2008 – Judging Civil Justice at 173ff. 
38 Manyathi-Jele ‘Progress on judicial case-flow management’ (May 2014) De Rebus 65. 
39 Section 8(6)(e) read with s 8(3)-(4) of the SCA.  
40 On the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court see §6.2.  
41 2010 (3) SA 220 (GSJ) paras [58-59]. See also Brownlee v Brownlee, unreported judgment 2008/25274 (GSJ). 
 
 351 
trying to settle in judge's chambers, and four further days in which the minutiae of assets and liabilities, 
and income and expenses, were interrogated. 
In short, mediation was the better alternative and it should have been tried. On the facts before me it is 
impossible to know whether the parties knew about the benefits of mediation, but I can see no reason why 
they would have turned their backs on the process, especially if they had been counselled on the matter 
by the attorneys. What is clear, however, is that the attorneys did not provide this counsel; in fact, in the 
course of the pre-trial conference they positively rejected the use of the process. For this they are to blame 
and they must, I believe, shoulder the responsibility that comes from failing properly to serve the interests 
of their clients.’ 
To demonstrate its displeasure, the court limited the fees that the attorneys in casu could charge. 
The court ordered that they could only recover fees on ‘a party and party scale’42 with the caveat 
that the ‘client retains the right to pay more, but the attorney should not ask for this unless the 
client has obtained the advice of an independent practitioner.’43  
In light of the direct and indirect strides towards mainstream mediation in the civil justice 
system, it seems only appropriate to consider the feasibility of introducing mediation in the 
small claims courts. 
10.3  WHAT IS MEDIATION? 
(a)  The common characteristics 
The majority of mediation theoreticians agree that mediation as a process has certain common 
characteristics. 44 These characteristics are also indicative of the mediation process: 
• Mediation is a facilitative process in which parties arrive at mutually agreed upon solutions 
that can be more creative than what courts can impose.45 
• Mediation is a confidential, without prejudice, process that encourages parties to engage 
with each other frankly and freely.46 
                                                             
42 For a discussion of what is meant by ‘party-party’ fees, see chapter 6 fn 71.  
43 MB v NB supra [60]. 
44 Within mediation theory there are variations. For example, some commentators think that a mediator can have 
both a facilitative and an evaluative role, depending on the nature of the case and the attitude of the parties. Be 
that as it may, the common characteristics reflect mainstream mediation theory. See Stempel ‘The Inevitability of 
the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from Ideology’ (2000) 2 Journal of Dispute Resolution 247-293. 
45 Menkel-Meadow ‘Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of 
ADR”’ (1991-1992) 19 Florida State University Law Review 1 at 7. 
46  Rosenberg ‘Keeping the Lid on Confidentiality: Mediation Privilege and Conflict of Laws’ (1994) 10 Ohio 
State Journal on Dispute Resolution 157. 
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• The mediator, an impartial, trained third party, oversees the mediation. The mediator is not 
a decision-maker but a thoughtful facilitator47 who encourages the parties to resolve their 
dispute so as to achieve a mutually acceptable solution.48  
(b)  Mediation defined in the VCAMRs  
Holding true to the common characteristics of mediation, MCR 73 – the definitions rule of the 
VCAMRs – defines ‘mediation’ as: 
‘the process by which a mediator assists the parties in actual or potential litigation to resolve the dispute 
between them by facilitating discussions between the parties, assisting them in identifying issues, 
clarifying priorities, exploring areas of compromise and generating options in an attempt to resolve the 
dispute.’  
The above definition must be read with the definition of ‘alternative dispute resolution’, which 
is as follows: 
 ‘a process, in which an independent and impartial person assists the parties to attempt to resolve the 
dispute between them, either before or after the commencement of litigation’.49 
Furthermore MCR 80, which sets out the ‘role and functions’ of the mediator, further explicates 
what mediation is: 
‘(1) At the commencement of mediation the mediator must inform the parties of the following: 
   (a)    The purposes of mediation and its objective to facilitate settlement between the parties; 
   (b)    the facilitative role of the mediator as an impartial mediator who may not make any decisions of 
fact or law and who may not determine the credibility of any person participating in the 
mediation; 
   (c)    the inquisitorial nature of mediation proceedings; 
   (d)    the rules applicable to the mediation session; 
   (e)    all discussions and disclosures, whether oral or written, made during mediation are confidential 
and inadmissible as evidence in any court, tribunal or other forum, unless the discussions and 
disclosures are recorded in a settlement agreement signed by the parties, or are otherwise 
discoverable in terms of the rules of court, or in terms of any other law; 
   (f)    the mediator may during the mediation session encourage the parties to make full disclosure if 
in the opinion of the mediator such disclosure may facilitate a resolution of the dispute between 
the parties; 
   (g)    no party may be compelled to make any disclosure, but a party may make voluntary disclosures 
with the same protection referred to in subrule (1)(e); 
   (h)    the mediator will assist to draft a settlement agreement if the dispute is resolved; and 
   (i)    if the dispute is not resolved, the mediator will refer the dispute back to the clerk or registrar of 
the court, informing him or her that the dispute could not be resolved…’. 
                                                             
47 Brandon, Robertson Conflict and Dispute Resolution – Guide for Practice 212ff. 
48 See Fuller ‘Mediation – Its Forms and Functions’ (1970-1971) 44 Southern California Law Review 305 at 308, 
322ff. 
49 MCR 73. 
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If the small claims courts were to cater for mediation, one could draw on the provisions of the 
VCAMRs to formulate a comprehensive definition of what mediation entails. 
10.4 ARGUMENTS AGAINST AND FOR MEDIATION IN THE SMALL CLAIMS 
 COURTS 
 (a)  Mediation is unnecessary and slows down the finalisation of matters in the small claims 
 courts  
Some argue that there is no need for mediation in the small claims courts because the processes 
and procedures of the courts are already simplified and the cost of litigation is low. 50 
Furthermore, naysayers argue that mediation slows down the resolution of small claims 
matters.51  
There is merit in the above arguments because field studies52 show that mediation takes time 
and, as a process, it can be slower than the robust inquisitorial style of adjudication in the small 
claims courts.53 What the argument misses, however, is that the value of mediation is not 
limited to expediting processes and reducing costs – the so called ‘quantitative-efficiency’ 
aspect of mediation – it is also about providing good outcomes for people and communities – 
the ‘qualitative justice’ consequence of mediation.54 
The Hoexter Commission’s investigation into small claims courts placed considerable emphasis 
on the role of these courts to provide speedy, efficient and inexpensive justice. 55  The 
                                                             
50 Glasser, Roberts ‘Dispute Resolution: Civil Justice and its Alternatives’ (1993) 56 The Modern Law Review 277 
at 278. 
51 Raitt, Folberg, Rosenberg, Barrett ‘The Use of Mediation in Small Claims Courts’ (1993) 9 Ohio State Journal 
on Dispute Resolution 55 at 80-81. 
52 A British Columbia study revealed that the typical small claims court case took one or two hours of mediation 
to reach settlement because the issues were simple and the claims uncomplicated, whereas a Superior Court matter 
took an average of thirty hours to mediate: see, Kessler, Finkelstein ‘The Evolution of the Multi-Door Courthouse’ 
(1988) 3 Catholic University Law Review 577 at 580.  
53 McFarlane ‘Culture Change? The Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation’ (2002) 2 
Journal of Dispute Resolution 241 at 260. 
54 Menkel-Meadow (n45) 6. 
55 Report §14.3. 
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Commission surveyed and approached the small claims court as a legal institution operating 
within a strict process-driven environment. The Commission, however, did not evaluate the 
social impact of small claims courts. Aside from recommending the de-racialisation of the 
courts,56 the Commission did not attempt to grapple with the potential influence of the courts 
on the promotion of social cohesion. It paid no attention to the prevalence of so-called 
‘community courts’ or magotla, which were established in a few communities in South Africa, 
and what impact those courts had on every-day disputes.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, many townships in South Africa established their own court systems. 
These courts provided alternative fora for justice to communities who regarded the formal court 
structures as extensions of the Apartheid regime. The community courts or magotla, as they 
were known, dispensed both civil and criminal justice. Community members presided over 
them. Presiding officials were either appointed by a community or identified as leaders/elders 
within the community. The community courts were sometimes criticised 57  for dispensing 
vigilante justice with serious consequences for people that were found guilty of crimes or civil 
wrongs.58 For the purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to consider that aspect of the 
community courts. What is important to note is the role of the courts for people who often felt 
socially, politically and economically marginalised.      
The community courts provided spaces for people to vent their grievances in an informal 
environment. The victim could confront the wrongdoer. 59  The confrontation was not muted by 
formal court procedures and rules of evidence. The presiding officer who sometimes sat with 
other community appointees was required to mediate disputes. At the end of the process, a 
                                                             
56 Report §13.45. 
57 Hund, Koto-Rammopo ‘Justice in a South African Township: The Sociology of Makgotla’ (1983) 16 CILSA 
179. 
58 Choudree ‘Traditions of Conflict Resolution’(1999) 1 African Journal on Conflict Resolution 9 at 24. 
59 Studies reveal that a particularly strong feature of mediation is the ability of the parties to directly engage each 
other: see, McFarlane (n53) 265. However, others note that depending on the nature of the dispute, mediation can 
have a silencing effect and can lead to secondary victimization: see Burman, Rudolph ‘Repression by Mediation: 
Mediation and Divorce in South Africa’ (1990) 107 SALJ 251.  
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settlement would be reached – sometimes consensually and sometimes with a fair amount of 
coercion.60 The modus operandi of the courts was by no means ideal. However, the success of 
the courts lay in the fact that people felt comfortable with the outcomes that these courts offered. 
Strained relationships between community members and neighbours were rendered workable 
again. Social cohesion within communities was maintained. Alternative forms of compensation 
were sought. Different remedies could be explored. Settlement agreements were often enforced 
by social pressure. 61 
Given that virtually every magisterial district in South Africa has a small claims court, there is 
little doubt that these courts can make a difference in building relationships within communities 
and among people. The civil justice system polarises disputants. It does very little to bring 
people together at the end of a dispute. Neighbours, family members, work colleagues and 
partners are not encouraged to reconcile at the end of litigation. And yet, in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, people who sue and defend actions are familiar with each other and may have 
had long-standing relationships.62 
The problem-solving mechanism of civil justice is blunt. A court hears a dispute and delivers a 
decision. Adjudication produces a win-lose situation.63 It is hardly the case that the losing party 
feels that justice has been served. For him or her, the justice system has failed. Within this 
paradigm, there is little prospect of the parties reconciling. The winner feels vindicated and is 
unlikely to reunite with the loser. The loser is affronted and takes particular umbrage at the 
smugness of the winner. He or she will do everything possible to frustrate the winner’s attempt 
to recover the debt owed. The psychological consequence of a court judgment adds to the rift 
between disputants and this extends from the micro level to the macro level within 
                                                             
60 Grant, Schwikkard ‘People’s Courts?’ 304-316 (1991) 7 South African Journal on Human Rights.  
61 Burman, Schärf ‘Creating People’s Justice: Street Committees and People’s Courts in a South African City’ 
(1990) 24 Law and Society Review 693-744. 
62 Sarat ‘Alternative in Dispute Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims Court’ (1975-1976) 10 Law and Society 
Review 339 at 353 and 359-360. 
63 McFarlane (n53) 248; Menkel-Meadow (n45) 6. 
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communities.64 Because mediation is premised on empathy building and reconciliation,65 a 
mutually accepted settlement hardly results in the psychological distress of feeling like a loser. 
The process tries to prevent the situation where parties feel judged for their conduct. 66 
Mediation seeks to make people walk away from the process with their dignity intact, no matter 
how unreasonably they may have acted in the past. 67  This outcome seeks to preserve 
relationships68 or terminate them amicably,69 and builds co-operation.70 For the community at 
large, it is preferable to have people who can tolerate one another, instead of people who are at 
loggerheads with each other.71 
While mediation takes longer than adjudication in the small claims courts and can be viewed 
as unnecessary from the perspective of speed and costs, the social and psychological benefits 
of mediation as a problem-solving device serves people and communities better in the long run. 
Studies have shown that where people resolve disputes by mediation, they feel more upbeat 
about justice and they leave the court feeling positive about the level of service at the court.72  
They are also more likely to abide by the terms of the mediation settlement agreement because 
they had a direct hand in its fashioning.73 
                                                             
64 See Bush, Folger The Promise of Mediation – Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition. 
65 Beer, Packard with Stief Mediator’s Handbook 5; See also A Sarat ‘Alternative in Dispute Processing: Litigation 
in a Small Claims Court’ (1975-1976) 10 Law and Society Review 339 at 371. 
66 Fuller states: ‘whereas mediation is directed towards persons, judgments of law are directed towards acts…’  It 
is submitted that when courts pronounce on conduct, people can be left feeling judged for their conduct. See Fuller 
‘Mediation – Its Forms and Functions’ (1970-1971) 44 Southern California Law Review 305 at 308. See also 
Eisenberg ‘Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement and Rulemaking’ (1975-1976) 89 Harvard 
Law Review 637 at 652-659. 
67 Nolan-Haley ‘Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law’ (1996) 74 Washington University Law 
Review 47 at 84; Eisenberg (n66) 652-659. 
68 J McFarlane ‘Culture Change? The Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation’ (2002) 2 
Journal of Dispute Resolution 241 at 264; Bush, Folger(n64). 
69 Fuller  ‘Mediation – Its Forms and Functions’ (1970-1971) 44 Southern California Law Review 305 at 308. See 
also the study undertaken by A Sarat (n65) 368. 
70 Menkel-Meadow (n45) 6. 
71 Van der Merwe with Mbebe ‘Informal Justice: The Alexandra Justice Centre and the Future of Interpersonal 
Dispute Resolution’ Working Paper No 21 (1994) 5. 
72 Pearson ‘An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication’ (1982) 3 420 at 432; Goerdt Small Claims and 
Traffic Courts: Case Management Procedures, Case Characteristics, and Outcomes in 12 Urban Jurisdictions 
64-65, 103-104. 
73 McEwan, Maiman ‘Mediation in the Small Claims Court: Achieving Compromise Through Consent (1984) 18 
Law and Society Review 44; McEwen, Maiman ‘Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment’ 33 
(1981) Maine Law Review 237 at 245-49. In their critical piece about the impact of out-of-court settlements, 
Galanter and Cahil concede: 
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(b)  Mediation is bad because it forces people with good cases to make bad trade-offs 
The argument is made that mediation influences people with good cases to make bad 
compromises in the process of achieving settlement.74 This can be particularly problematic for 
unrepresented litigants. 
In the High Courts and the magistrates’ courts, litigants are known to make bad compromises 
to ward off expensive and lengthy litigation. 75  According to Galanter, ‘repeat-players’ 76 
(whether plaintiffs or defendants) use their experience, knowledge of the litigation game, and 
access to resources and people (legal and financial) to strategically acquire better outcomes for 
themselves at the expense of their opponents who may have stronger claims.77 The point is: 
even in ordinary litigation, people with good cases make bad trade-offs. Aside from bad 
compromises that are influenced by exorbitant legal costs and the time it takes to litigate a 
matter, studies78 have shown that lawyers routinely encourage clients to make bad settlements 
                                                             
‘McEwen and Maiman, who compared small claims courts in Maine where cases were mediated with 
courts where cases were adjudicated, reported a higher level of satisfaction and sense of fairness among 
those whose cases were mediated. Mediation was less intimidating and more understandable, giving 
participants the opportunity to explain their side, to explore all issues, and to vent and dissipate anger. 
Some 66.6 percent of the mediated parties reported that they were completely or mostly satisfied with 
their overall experiences, compared to only 54 percent of the adjudicated parties. Mediated parties 
deemed their settlements fair 67.1 percent of the time; adjudicated parties only 59 percent of the time.’ 
See Galanter, Cahill ‘“Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements’ (1993-1994) 46 
Stanford Law Review 1339 at 1355-1356. See also Hermann, Lafree, Rack, West ‘The Metro-Court Project’ Final 
Report (1993) at 42ff; Wissler ‘The Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on the Experience of 
Small Claims and Common Pleas Courts’  (1997) 33 Willamette Law Review 565 at 568; McEwan, Maiman 
‘Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent’ (1984) 18 Law and Society Review 
11 at 47. 
It is important for the mediator to ensure that a settlement is not unduly prejudicial to one party because studies 
have shown that people are less likely to abide by settlements that are unfairly weighted towards one party: see 
Van der Merwe with Mbebe (n71) 25. 
74 McEwan, Maiman (n73) 11; Glasser, Roberts (n50) 280. 
75 Silver ‘Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?’  (2001-2002) 80 Texas Law Review 2073 at 2083. 
76 Galanter ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on The Limits of Legal Change’ (1974-1975) 9 Law 
and Society Review 95-160. See §1.7. 
77 In a study of settlements in several American federal courts, Galanter and Cahill show that over half of plaintiff 
litigants who settled their matters during the course of litigation thought that the settlement was unfair. They state: 
‘It is not only these hapless one-shot players who are unhappy with their settlements. In recent years, we 
have heard a litany of complaints from insurers and corporate and governmental defendants, telling us 
how they were forced into nuisance settlements or very large settlements that were not deserved.’ 
See Galanter, Cahill (n73) 1353. 
78  For a particularly instructive study see Heuman, Hyman ‘Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement 




during the course of litigation. Their motivations range from acquiring their fees more quickly 
to losing interest in a matter and preserving their own reputations. They also frequently 
misjudge the possibility of success and some are too hesitant to take calculated risks. In the 
small claims courts, however, the absence of legal representation and the simplified processes 
and procedures are supposed to place litigants on the same footing so that they do not have to 
make bad compromises. It would thus seem that, in this regard, untrammelled mediation has 
the potential of subverting the ideological basis of small claims courts. However, this does not 
discount the need for mediation in the small claims courts; it just means that if mediation is 
introduced, it would have to be regulated. 
Bad trade-offs can be prevented in the small claims courts by giving the presiding officer a 
greater role in determining which cases should be mediated. For instance, if a presiding officer 
sees that a case turns on a simple and determinable question of law, the presiding officer may 
decide not to refer the matter to mediation.  Prescription is a good example. If a presiding officer 
sees that a claim can be resolved by applying the law relating to the prescription of claims, there 
is no need to refer the matter to mediation.79  However, if the presiding officer sees that a dispute 
turns on both questions of law and fact, he or she could refer the matter to mediation. Mediation 
is particularly useful if the presiding officer thinks that the relationship between the parties, if 
preserved, could reap long-term gains for both parties. Sometimes a short-term bad trade-off 
may be the opportunity to preserve or nurture future legal rights and mutually beneficial 
relationships.80 Needless to say, presiding officers would require training to identify cases that 
are ripe for mediation. 
The proposal above will not be a panacea to prevent every bad trade-off that could potentially 
occur, but a mediation screening process will reduce the likelihood of pervasive bad trade-offs 
                                                             
79 Prescription is a set of black-letter principles encapsulated in the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
80 Elleman ‘Problems in Patent Litigation: Mandatory Mediation May Provide Settlements and Solutions’ (1997) 
12 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 759 at 774; Silver (n75) 2084-2085. 
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in small claims matters. The screening process could be activated when the defendant delivers 
a statement of defence. The presiding officer will be in a position to compare the plaintiff’s 
claim (as amplified in the statement of claim) and the defendant’s defence, where a statement 
of defence is delivered.81 If the defendant does not deliver a statement of defence or if the 
defence is scantily articulated, the appropriateness of mediation can be determined during the 
trial when the parties present their cases. The presiding officer should have the discretion to 
separate issues so that a finding can be made on certain issues, whilst others are referred to 
mediation. Of course, if the mediation fails, the matter would return to court.  
A particularly attractive moment when a matter could be referred to mediation is when the 
presiding officer makes a finding but wants the parties to explore satisfaction of the court’s 
judgment.82 In other words, the execution of the judgment of the court could be referred to 
mediation. In chapter 9, it was argued that the execution of small claims court judgments is 
problematic. Where the execution debtor does not pay the judgment debt, the judgment must 
be transferred to the magistrate’s court of the district where the debtor resides. The transfer 
takes time. Furthermore, if the debtor is in a good financial position he or she may appoint a 
legal representative to stave off execution. The process of execution is expensive, because the 
sheriff is paid for services rendered at the magistrates’ courts rate. The sheriff may also require 
the judgment creditor to pay security before goods and other assets can be removed from the 
debtor’s premises.83 
Many disgruntled debtors go the extra mile to prevent the judgment creditor from successfully 
recovering the debt. 84  Perhaps, the success rate will be higher and the inconvenience of 
                                                             
81 On the statement of defence, see chapter 8.  
82 See Raitt, Folberg, Rosenberg, Barrett (n51) 80-89. 
83 MCR38(1) provides that the sheriff may require the judgment creditor to provide security in money before the 
sheriff executes on a judgment. Because execution of a small claims judgment is carried out in the magistrates’ 
courts, MCR 38(1) is applicable. See chapter 9 for a discussion on the execution of a small claims judgment. 
84 Fiss ‘Against Settlement’ (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1073 at 1982 notes: 
‘The parties may sometimes be locked in combat with one another and view the lawsuit as only one phase 
in a long continuing struggle. The entry of judgment will then not end the struggle, but rather change its 
terms and the balance of power. One of the parties will invariably return to the court and ask again for its 
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executing on judgments will be lower if issues regarding the payment of judgment debts are 
sent to mediation. With the intervention of the mediator, mediation might abate the 
dissatisfaction associated with losing a case. Mediation will afford the loser the opportunity to 
save face and perhaps, to reconsider his or her initial reaction to the court’s judgment.  
Admittedly, mediation after judgment would be unique in South Africa. It must be noted, 
however, that mediation would not replace the financial inquiry85 in s 39 of the SCCA, but 
would be a further tool to ensure that small claims courts’ judgments are worth their salt. 
(c) Mediation is unnecessary because the adjudicator in a small claims court helps both 
parties 
The role of the presiding officer, as an inquisitor, in a small claims court is fundamentally 
different to the role of the presiding officer in the magistrates’ courts or the High Courts.86 The 
commissioner in a small claims court is an interventionist fact- and evidence-gatherer for the 
unrepresented litigant. He or she thus performs a dual role: that of non-partisan counsel to the 
litigants, and that of adjudicator. It can therefore be argued that there is no need for mediation 
in the small claims courts as the presiding officers by virtue of their non-partisan roles achieve 
similar outcomes to mediation. The argument is misplaced because it distorts the mediation 
process. Mediation finds its justification from its underlying ethos, which is to create an 
environment wherein the parties can openly discuss their dispute and explore settlement 
solutions. Irrespective of the specialised role of the commissioner in a small claims court, he or 
she is still actively adjudicating the matter. The court’s duty is to conduct a trial by litigation. 
The parties do not have the autonomy to direct the dispute and they have limited opportunity to 
make recommendations to the presiding officer about how to resolve the matter. The presiding 
                                                             
assistance, not so much because the conditions have changed, but because the conditions that preceded 
the lawsuit have unfortunately not changed.’  
85 For the discussion on the financial inquiry see chapter 9. 
86 For the role of the judge in adversarial litigation see Paleker ‘Truth and Fact-Finding in South African Civil 
Procedure’ in Van Rheee, A Uzelac (eds) Truth and Efficiency in Civil Litigation – Fundamental Aspects of Fact-
finding and Evidence-Taking in a Comparative Context 189 at 190ff. 
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officer is also not in a position to suggest remedies other than those prescribed by black-letter 
law.87  
In mediation, the mediator does not decide the case. The parties arrive at mutually acceptable 
solutions. The mediator does not try the case. He or she facilitates discussions between the 
parties. The mediator does not impose rules on the parties but helps to arrive at ‘a new and 
shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and 
dispositions to one another.’88  The mediator does not gather information. The parties are 
encouraged to disclose what they want to. Disputants are likely to be more forthcoming, 
because one of the tenets of mediation is that disclosures are confidential. This is not the case 
in a courtroom setting, because evidence is presented in a public forum. 
A fundamental difference between adjudication and mediation is that mediation is private.89 In 
many jurisdictions, communities with strong cultural preferences for privacy detest airing their 
dirty laundry in public.90 People do not express themselves as openly in a courtroom as they 
might in mediation. In a mediation setting, parties are less exposed to criticism and mockery. 
While courtrooms with public galleries are lauded for their openness and transparency, many 
people find the experience embarrassing.  
The parties can also express feelings, emotions and opinions during mediation. 91  Courts 
generally label these as irrelevant to the trial of a case. Yet in mediation, feelings and emotions 
assist to identify hidden assumptions, prejudices, biases, or reasons giving rise to a dispute – 
the proverbial ‘gorilla in the room’.92 This information is also useful to make parties understand 
                                                             
87 Menkel-Meadow (n45) 7; Hendricks ‘The Trend Towards Mandatory Mediation in Custody and Visitation 
Disputes of Minor Children: An Overview’ (1993) 32 University of Louisville Journal of Family Law 491 at 496. 
88 Fuller (n48) 325. 
89 Sarat (n62) 353. 
90 In a 1994 study involving the community of Alexandria in Johannesburg, 87% of residents preferred for family 
matters to remain within the family. In other words, they preferred that a family dispute be resolved quietly without 
attracting public attention. The overwhelming majority of residents interviewed favoured mediation because the 
process was confidential: see Van der Merwe with Mbebe (n71) 19-20. 
91 Hendricks (n87) 495. 
92  Bernard The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide 41-46. 
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each other and their respective positions.  Due to time constraints in court and the nature of 
court proceedings, the presiding officer cannot traverse as much circumstantial information 
during the trial as would be the case during mediation.93  
Perhaps the most important difference between mediation and adjudication is that the mediator 
can explore different options with the parties as they approach settlement. When a person sues 
on a debt, the court usually makes a money order. This triggers a particular set of remedies. In 
mediation, the parties can explore their own redress measures. The remedy may take the form 
of the debtor repaying the money in instalments. But, it could also entail the debtor doing some 
work for the creditor. The remedial possibilities are wide.94 
So, while the commissioner in the small claims court uses his or her non-partisan, inquisitorial 
and adjudicative powers to dispense justice to the benefit of the parties, mediation provides a 
more nuanced approach to problem-solving, fact- and truth-finding, and the achievement of 
outcomes. Parties can exercise their personal autonomy to achieve settlement in a manner that 
conforms to their sense of justice. In a liberal society, there is much to be said for achieving 
subjective party-tailored justice, as opposed to experiencing objective court-imposed justice in 
all cases and in all circumstances.95 
(d) Some matters should not be mediated  
Commentators argue that some matters are incapable of being mediated. 96  In certain instances 
substantive law precludes mediation and in others, the circumstances of the dispute might 
militate against the use of mediation. 
                                                             
93 All the circumstantial and contextual issues are considered necessary to ‘map’ the issues in dispute: see Riskin, 
Welsh ‘Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” In Court-Orientated Mediation’ (2008) 15 George Mason Law 
Review 863 at 905. 
94 Eisenberg (n66) 652-658. 
95 Landes, Posner ‘Adjudication as Private Good’ (1979) 8 Journal of Legal Studies 235-284. 
96 See also Lerman ‘Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on 
Women’ (1984) 7 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 57. 
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Matters involving the validity and interpretation of wills cannot be mediated, as these can only 
be decided by a court of law.97 Status matters, too, cannot be mediated. The court, as the upper 
guardian of incapacitated people, is best placed to make findings relating to status. There was 
a time when it was thought that many issues relating to children were incapable of being 
mediated.98 However, the Children’s Act99 expands the use of mediation to matters involving 
children.100 This development reflects how traditionally-held views about the use of mediation 
can change as the law and cultural norms mutate. It is thus difficult to predict how substantive 
dictates precluding the use of mediation will be viewed in the future. 
Fortunately, the limited substantive jurisdiction of the small claims courts means that all of the 
substantive matters identified above and others identified in the literature do not apply in the 
small claims courts. The full range of contract and delict matters that are heard in the small 
claims courts can be mediated.  
What one has to watch out for, however, are the circumstantial factors that weigh against the 
use of mediation. Mediation theory widely accepts that where there is a threat to the safety of 
persons or where there is actual or threatened physical or emotional abuse, mediation is not 
suitable. Mediation is also not kosher where there is an indication of criminal activity that is 
ongoing or anticipated.101 In such instances, mediation can be harmful to people. If mediation 
were to be introduced in the small claims courts, the presiding officer would presumably 
identify instances where mediation is inappropriate. Again, this will require training on the part 
of the judicial officer. 
                                                             
97 See Wills Act 7 of 1953, s 2(3). 
98 Keenan ‘Domestic Violence and Custody Litigation: The Need for Statutory Reform’ (1985) 13 Hofstra Law 
Review 407. 
99 38 of 2005. 
100 Ibid ss 21(3), 33(5)(b), 34(3)(b)(ii)(bb), 39(3), 46(1)(h)(iii), 49(1), 71(1), 150(3), 155(4)(b). See also Paleker 
‘Mediation in South Africa’s New Children’s Act: A Pyrrhic Victory’ Asia Pacific Mediation Forum Conference 
(2008) http://www.asiapacificmediationforum.org/resources/2008/7-Mohamed.Paleker.pdf  (last accessed on 17 
August 2017).  
101 See Brandon, Robertson Conflict and Dispute Resolution 89. 
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Within the context of small claims courts, there is an interesting question that must be 
addressed: If the small claims courts are permitted in the future to hear matters involving the 
State, would the referral of the dispute to mediation pose a constitutional problem? The 
Constitution calls for open, accountable and transparent government.102 One of the ways in 
which citizens acquire knowledge of the activities of the State is by litigation, when the State’s 
actions are laid bare in court. The confidentiality of mediation proceedings can have a chilling 
effect on open, accountable and transparent government. The State may use mediation to 
prevent information pertaining to corruption, inefficiency and maladministration from being 
exposed. 
The difficulty with the above argument is that the State is already mediating many matters.103 
Nothing precludes the State from negotiating a matter and making it a term of settlement that 
the conclusion and various aspects of the dispute remain confidential between the parties. In 
fact, this happens all of the time. In terms of the Institution of Legal Proceedings Against 
Certain Organs of State Act,104 the State must receive 30 days’ notice of proceedings before a 
summons or application is issued against it.105 The State frequently uses this period to negotiate 
and mediate matters.106 The public is not privy to these negotiations and mediations. Parties are 
often required to enter into confidentiality agreements. It is said that the purpose of 
confidentiality is to limit the amount of information that other claimants can access, as it is not 
always in the interests of the public purse for would-be claimants to know if the State has 
conceded liability in a particular case, and what offers of compensation were made. Settlements 
can give rise to normative obligations and can in themselves be precedent-setting from the 
vantage point of other litigants with similar claims.107 
                                                             
102 Sections 1(d), 32 and 33.  See also Currie, de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 691-709; 643-690.   
103  ‘Africa: Could Mediation Cure South Africa's Medico-Legal Woes? All Africa (10 July 2017): 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201707100169.html (accessed on 29 September 2017);  
104 40 of 2002. 
105 See §7.3(d).  
106 Manyathi-Jele ‘Court-Annexed Mediation Launched’ (April 2015) De Rebus 11. 
107 Eisenberg (n66) 652-653. 
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The ambit of confidential settlement negotiations would most certainly be subject to the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act.108 It will thus be interesting to see how the courts will 
deal with issues of confidentiality in the future, not only as they relate to out-of-court 
settlements, but also settlements achieved by mediation where the State is a party. The courts 
may, for example, create a public interest exception to the confidentiality rule of mediation. 
One should be careful to discount the use of mediation in litigation involving the State based 
on an overemphasis on suspicions of corruption and maladministration. Mediation can save the 
State a lot of money109 by reducing the cost of litigation and allowing the State to negotiate its 
way out of large claims.  It is in the public interest that the State reduces its liability. In chapter 
7, it was argued that claims against the State in the small claims courts should be limited to 
local government. Mediation could be extremely useful in resolving local government disputes. 
It would allow local officials to engage directly with disgruntled citizens. Mediation can 
improve communication between communities and their local government officials, thereby 
fostering better relationships. It may also reduce the number of violent service delivery protests. 
During the period 2014-2017, the University of Cape Town’s Law Faculty, under the auspices 
of its Law@Work Programme, offered mediation training to many local government officials 
in the Western Cape and beyond. 110  Clearly, local government officials are starting to 
appreciate the benefits of mediation, and the small claims courts, in playing a part in the 
resolution of disputes at local government level (as argued for in chapter 7), should be open to 
referring these disputes to mediation where appropriate. 
                                                             
108 2 of 2000. 
109 It is estimated that the Government spent a staggering one billion rand in legal fees for the period 2016/2017. 
See S Mkhwanazi ‘Government Spends R1bn to defend lawsuits’ IOL (18 October 2017):  
https://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/government-spends-r1bn-to-defend-lawsuits-2080916 (last accessed 18 
October 2017). 
110 I am thankful to Adv J Joubert for this information. He is one of the mediation trainers at UCT.  
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10.5  CONFIDENTIALITY  
Confidentiality is a keystone feature of mediation because it seeks to encourage open discussion 
in a non-adversarial environment. Parties are encouraged to disclose information without fear 
that the information will be used against them if the mediation fails.111 Mediation thus stands 
in stark contrast to adversarial litigation. In adversarial litigation: 
‘[P]ractitioners are known to play a tactical game of cat-and-mouse. Too much openness and transparency is 
regarded as strategic suicide. Simulating a poker game, practitioners are known to hold their ‘evidential cards’ 
face down and will only expose the ‘aces’ up their sleeves when it is necessary or opportune to do so.’112 
 
Mediation confidentiality is recognised in rule 80(1)(e) of the VCAMRs. The rule declares that 
oral discussions and written disclosures – other than those that would ordinarily be 
discoverable113 in court – are confidential. Rule 80(1)(e) has not been judicially interpreted.  
The confidential nature of mediation proceedings is also entrenched by agreement in clause 12 
(headed ‘confidentiality’) of the ‘Agreement to Mediate’ contained in Form Med-6 of Annexure 
3 of the VCAMRs. Clause 12 stipulates: 
’12.1  It is understood between the Parties and the mediator that mediation will be strictly confidential 
and without prejudice.’  
12.2. Mediation discussions, written and oral communications, any draft resolutions, and any 
unsigned mediation agreements shall not be admissible in any court proceeding, unless such 
information is discoverable in terms of the normal rules of court. Only a mediated agreement, 
so signed by the Parties may be so admissible.’ (Italics inserted for emphasis) 
The mediation settlement agreement is admissible in court because in terms of the VCAMRs a 
settlement agreement can be made an order of court.114 In instances where the settlement 
agreement is not made an order of court, it is enforceable like any other agreement. Hence, the 
agreement is admissible to establish a cause of action.  
                                                             
111 Mediation consists of three stages: (i) Mapping the problem i.e. identifying all the issues (manifest and hidden) 
giving rise to the dispute; (ii) Setting the problem i.e. selecting the issues that must be addressed in the mediation; 
and (iii) addressing the problem so that the needs of each party can be adequately met. The disclosure of 
information is essential for each of these stages: see L Riskin & NA Welsh ‘Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” 
In Court-Orientated Mediation’ (2008) 15 George Mason Law Review 863 at 905-909. 
112 Paleker (n86) 189. 
113 The rules of discovery are contained in MCRs 23 and 24. It is clear that the VCAMRs do not affect the 
application of these rules. 
114 MCR 82(4). 
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Currently, South Africa does not have substantive legislation dealing with mediation. The 
common-law rules of evidence do not expressly create mediation privilege. Furthermore, the 
mediators’ profession is not recognized or formally regulated in South Africa. The issues 
pertaining to confidentiality and the limits thereof need to be determined by legislation. It is 
encouraging to note that the South African Law Reform Commission115 is in the early stages of 
investigating the need for legislation regulating mediation. 116  The new legislation will 
undoubtedly deal with the issue of confidentiality. 
If mediation is introduced in the small claims courts, the SCCA should be amended to deal with 
confidentiality. The provisions need not be expansive. They simply need to create a theoretical 
peg for the Rules Board to flesh out the nature of confidentiality. Of course, if the SALRC 
completes its work, its recommendations must be taken into account. 
10.6 TRAINING OF MEDIATORS 
There are no official and uniform industry standards for mediator training in South Africa.  Rule 
86 of the VCAMRs requires mediators serving in the courts to be accredited. On 31 October 
2014 the Department of Justice published the Fees Payable to Mediators, Qualification 
Standards and Level of Mediators (hereinafter referred to as the ‘FMQS’). According to clause 
1 of Schedule 2 of the FMQS: 
 ‘Every applicant for accreditation as a mediator must complete 40 hours of contact training consisting of: 
   (a)   Theoretical training including— 
   (i) basic civil procedure; 
   (ii)  a study of the court-annexed mediation rules; 
   (iii) the role and function of the mediator; 
   (iv)    principles, stages and methodology of mediation; 
   (v)    social-context and diversity awareness; 
   (vi)    conflict management; 
   (vii)    decision-making; 
   (viii)    communication and diplomacy; 
                                                             
115 Hereafter referred to as the ‘SALRC’.  
116  The SALRC is currently engaged in an investigation into ADR (Project 94). Project 94 is one of the 
investigations approved by the Minister of Justice in terms of the South African Law Reform Commission Act 19 
of 1973. The aim of the project is to consider the possible development of legislation to promote the use of ADR 
generally, and mediation in particular. The SALRC met on 30 October 2017 to chart the way forward for the 
drafting of legislation to formally recognise mediation and the mediation profession. The legislation will deal with 
various aspects, including the issue of confidentiality of mediation and its limits. 
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   (ix)    ethics and professional conduct; 
   (x)    negotiation and influence; 
   (xi)    interpersonal relations; 
   (xii)    confidentiality, privacy and reporting obligations; and 
   (xiii)   neutrality and impartiality. 
   (b) Practical training consisting of mock mediation sessions before a trained mediator.’117 
 
In terms of clause 1.2 training must be received through an institution ‘approved by the 
Minister’. The Minister approved inter alia all the South African universities to offer mediation 
training, as well as the various provincial law societies. 
While the legislative authority for the FMQS is questionable, the qualifications criteria accord 
with international standards. 118  These criteria could be incorporated into the mediation 
provisions of the SCCA. There is thus no need to reinvent the wheel.  
If mediation legislation is passed as a result of the efforts of the SALRC, there will be no need 
to amend the SCCA to incorporate qualification standards. Whatever standards are entrenched 
in mediation legislation would ipso facto apply to mediators operating in the small claims 
courts. 
Clauses 7 to 9 of the FMQS contain a set of ethical rules and norms that mediators must abide 
by:  
‘7. Mediator ethics 
Every Mediator must –  
(a) Act with honesty, impartiality, due diligence and independence; 
(b) Conduct himself or herself in a manner that is fair to all parties and must not be swayed by 
fear, favour or by self-interest; 
(c) Not tout for a mediation assignment and thereby undermine the mediation process; 
(d) Not accept a mediation appointment unless he or she is available to conduct the mediation 
promptly and competently; 
(e) Avoid entering into any financial, business or social relationship, which is likely to 
compromise their impartiality, or which might reasonably create a perception of partiality or 
bias; and  
(f) Not assert influence on any person involved in the court-annexed mediation processes by any 
improper means whatsoever, including the receipt of gifts or other inducements. 
(g) Refrain from soliciting or negotiating any private arrangement relating to fees and must abide 
by the fee structure determined by the Minister. 
 
                                                             
117 GN 854 in GG 38163 of 31 October 2014. 
118 See State-by-State Guide to Court Mediator Qualifications Standards (Northern-Virginia, USA); National 
Mediator Accreditation System (Australia); Mediation Accreditation Standards as determined by the Mediation 
Accreditation Committee, established in terms of s 59A of the Civil Procedure Act (Chapter 21, Laws of Kenya); 
Mediation Act 8 of 2004 [Trinidad and Tobago], Third Schedule.  
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7. Duty to disclose conflict of interest 
8.1 Every mediator must disclose any interest or relationship that is likely to affect his or her 
impartiality or which might create a perception of partiality including: 
(a)    Any direct financial or personal interest in the matter; and 
(b)     Any existing or past financial, business, professional, family or social relationship 
which is likely to compromise impartiality. 
8.2 After disclosure the mediator may continue to mediate a matter if both parties agree: 
Provided that the mediator must withdraw if the conflict of interest may unduly influence the 
mediation process. 
 
9. Mediator's conduct and obligations during mediation proceedings  
9.1 Every mediator must respect freedom of conscience, belief and expression and must avoid and 
dissociate himself or herself from comments or conduct that is racist, sexist or otherwise 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. 
9.2 Every mediator must respect the right to equality before the law and the right of equal 
protection and benefit of the law. 
9.3 Every mediator must observe religious, gender and cultural rights. 
9.4 Every mediator must conduct proceedings fairly, diligently and in a fair manner. 
9.5 A mediator must ensure that the parties and their representatives act in accordance with 
commonly accepted decorum. 
9.6 A mediator must be patient and courteous to legal practitioners, parties and the public and 
must respect the dignity of others. 
9.7 Every mediator must be punctual for a mediation session and keep to time limits, if any, set 
by the parties. 
9.8 Every mediator must be impartial and must not make any decisions or findings of law or fact 
or determine the credibility of any person participating in the mediation. 
9.9 A mediator must inform the parties that all discussions and disclosures, whether oral or 
written, made during the mediation session are confidential and inadmissible as evidence in 
any court, save for those that are included in a settlement agreement or are otherwise 
discoverable in terms of the rules of court or ordered by a court. 
9.10 Every mediator must at the beginning of the proceedings ensure that he or she understands the 
positions, needs, and expectations of the parties involved in a dispute. 
9.11 A mediator must understand the issues pertaining to the dispute before assisting the parties 
with the settlement of a dispute. 
9.12 Every mediator must prepare for mediation by inter alia understanding the issues in dispute 
beforehand and perusing all documentation pertaining to the matter. 
9.13 A mediator must decline an appointment to mediate or must withdraw or request technical 
assistance if he or she considers that a matter is beyond his or her competence or expertise. 
9.14 A mediator must not hold undisclosed discussions with any party or his or her representative 
without the consent of the other party: Provided that the mediator may in the interest of 
resolving the dispute hold discussions with the parties separately. 
9.15 A mediator must not permit parties or their representatives to record proceedings mechanically 
or electronically. 
9.16 A mediator must not delegate his or her duty to any other person without informing the 
mediation clerk/registrar, and obtaining the consent of the parties. 
9.17 A mediator must conduct mediation expeditiously and in such a manner so as to avoid an 
escalation of costs for the parties. 
9.18 A mediator must discourage unnecessary postponements, point-taking and undue formality. 
9.19 A mediator must not exert undue influence in order to promote a settlement or to obtain a 
concession from any party. 
9.20 Every mediator must upon resignation or the expiry of an appointment complete all part-heard 
mediations as soon as possible, unless directed otherwise by the parties or by the court.’  
Again, the ethical rules above serve as a basis on which to model the ethical requirements 
expected of mediators in the small claims courts. 119  The question, however, is how to 
                                                             
119 Mediation Act 8 of 2004 [Trinidad and Tobago], First Shedule; Code of Practice for Mediators (United 
Kingdom); and see generally McFarlane ‘Mediating Ethically: The Limits of Codes of Conduct and the Potential 
of a Reflective Practice Model’ (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 49-87. 
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incorporate these ethical rules in the small claims courts, given that the Rules Board cannot 
legislate codes of conduct. Presumably, either the Rules Board for Courts of Law Act or the 
SCCA would have to be amended to extend the powers of the Rules Board or the Minister of 
Justice to legislate ethical rules for mediators.120 
10.7   THE RECOMMENDED MODEL  
(a)  Mediation should be mandatory 
It was recommended above121 that a matter should only be referred to mediation if the small 
claims court presiding officer, after screening the case, is of the opinion that it should be 
mediated.122 Aside from preventing mediation from unnecessarily slowing down small claims 
matters, a screening process will curb the possible problem of people instituting spurious claims 
in the hope of extracting a mediation settlement.123 
A directive to mediate might be inconsistent with mediation theory. However, theorists differ 
on whether mediation, by its nature, is a voluntary process which must be agreed to by all the 
parties to a dispute, or whether mediation can be forced on the parties by an external actor (such 
as a judge) or by prescriptive laws.124  
Under the VCAMRs, the parties must voluntarily decide to mediate a matter. The parties cannot 
be penalised for refusing mediation. If a mediation fails, the presiding officer cannot impose ex 
post facto sanctions on the party who caused it to fail, or who refused to submit to mediation. 
In terms of the VCAMRs, a magistrate may at any time during the course of litigation (but 
before judgment) ‘enquire into the possibility of mediation’ with the parties. The ‘enquiry’ 
                                                             
120 This suggestion is not unconventional. See s 16(k) of the Sheriffs Act 90 of 1986. 
121 See §10.4.  
122 Different jurisdictions make provision for mediation at various stages, for example, pre-filing mediation, pre-
hearing mediation, mediation on the hearing date (also called ‘same-day’ mediation): see Raitt, Folberg, 
Rosenberg, Barrett (n82) 81ff. 
123 See Bebcbuk ‘Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer’ (1988) 12 Journal of Legal Studies  437.                                                                                                                                                                                              
124 Wissler (n73) 565.  
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should not be confused with a directive, as mediation remains fundamentally a voluntary 
process.  
The decision by the Rules Board to keep mediation voluntary in the magistrates’ courts was 
indeed correct. In keeping within its statutory powers and in light of the absence of a mediation 
provision in the MCA, the Rules Board drafted the VCAMRs as a set of facilitative voluntary 
rules instead of making them prescriptive.125 One can only speculate how the rules would have 
read had the MCA made provision for mediation. Perhaps the Rules Board would have been 
adventurous enough to mainstream mediation as a process and would not have left the decision 
of whether to mediate to the parties. 
Many argue that voluntariness is not an essential component of mediation.126 The absence of 
mutual consent does not fundamentally alter the aims and objectives of mediation. In fact, in 
many jurisdictions,127 court-annexed mediation is imposed on the parties by a court, or by 
legislation.128 It is convincingly argued that because mediation is aimed at assisting the parties 
to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution, the initial process of getting the parties to mediate 
does not have to be voluntary.129 Mandatory mediation does not violate the right of access to 
justice, because if the mediation fails, the parties can return to court. Mediation simply delays 
proceedings that have already been initiated so that parties can try to resolve the matter without 
a court’s intervention, and in accordance with the laudable aims and objectives of mediation.130 
                                                             
125 See §10.2. 
126 See Sander ‘Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview’ (1985) 37 University of Florida Law 
Review 1 at 15. 
127 Hendricks (n87) 542. See also comparative analysis at §10.8. 
128 Kessler, Finkelstein ‘The Evolution of the Multi-Door Courthouse’ (1988) 3 Catholic University Law Review 
577.  
129 Hendricks (n87) 491ff. 
130 Goldberg v Goldberg 691 S.W 2d 312 (Mo. Ct. App 1985); Kurtz v Kurtz 538 S0. 2d 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 
1989); Carter v Sparkman 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977). In cases where a referral 
to mediation was deemed unconstitutional, the Americans courts had regard to the fact that the statute in question 
required mediation before the parties could institute a civil action. The courts found that mandatory pre-litigation 
mediation violated the right to due process or access to justice in so far as a state constitution expressly entrenched 
a right of access to the courts. While the American Constitution expressly mentions due process (the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments), the Constitution makes no mention of the right to access to justice. See Loring 
‘Constitutional Law: Statutorily Required Mediation as a Precondition to Lawsuit Denies Access to the Courts’ 
(1980) 45 Misssouri Law Review 316-325. 
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(b) Mediators should offer their services on a pro bono basis 
Currently the overwhelming majority of presiding officers in the small claims courts are legal 
practitioners, appointed on a pro bono basis. If mediation is offered in the small claims courts, 
there is no reason why commissioners who have undergone mediation training cannot also offer 
mediation for free. Since the coming into force of the VCAMRs, many legal practitioners have 
been trained as mediators.131 With the co-operation of the Association of the Law Societies and 
the Bar Councils, it should not be too difficult to staff the small claims courts with qualified 
mediators. The Department of Justice could also initiate a sponsorship programme with the 
various universities to provide mediation training for would-be small claims courts presiding 
officers. 
Mediation does not have to be conducted by a trained legal professional. People in other 
professions, such as doctors, engineers, accountants etc. can also become mediators. There may 
be many professionals who are keen to do community service and to gain experience as 
mediators.  Nothing precludes them from serving in the courts. To be eligible for registration 
as a court-annexed mediator under the VCAMRs, the FMQS provides in clause 5: 
‘5. Every applicant for accreditation must produce –  
(a) A character reference, which is not older than 3 months from the date from when it was written; 
(b) Proof of South African citizenship, or in the case of a non-national, a valid work permit or 
permanent South African resident's permit; 
(c) A statement on oath or affirmation by the applicant that the applicant –  
(i) Is not an unrehabilitated insolvent; 
(ii) Does not suffer from a mental illness or a severe or profound intellectual disability in terms 
of the Mental Health Act (Act 17 of 2002) 
(iii) Has not been convicted of a crime involving fraud or dishonesty or violence, or has not been 
convicted of a crime where the sentence was imprisonment without the option of a fine. 
(d) Proof that the applicant has successfully completed the level of mediation training referred to in 
paragraph (1). 
(e) A certificate of good-standing by a professional body of which the applicant is a member, or by 
an institution referred to in paragraph 2(b), if the applicant is not a member of a professional 
body.’ 
The FMQS recognises two levels of mediators: 
                                                             
131  See Law Society of South Africa advertisement for a five-day mediation training program for all legal 
practitioners at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&ved=0ahUKEwiS1-
aznvXWAhXDLMAKHW3TDboQFghyMAY&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lssalead.org.za%2Fupload%2FCIV
ILMEDIATIONtrainingforattorneys2016.docx&usg=AOvVaw0WpvD7mGx2I2czXCzpoCnc (last accessed 2 
October 2017).  
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‘3.1 A level 1 mediator 1 must have a minimum of a NQF level 4 competence under the provisions 
of the National Qualifications Framework Act, 2008 (Act 68 of 2008) and should possess basic 
computer literacy skills. 
 3.2  A level 2 mediator must have NQF level 7 qualification or higher competency in terms of the 
National Qualifications Framework Act (Act 68 of 2008) plus a minimum of 5 years’ 
mediation experience in general mediation or specific fields of mediation.’ 
Clearly, it is not necessary for a mediator to be legally qualified.  
The FMQS provides a sound set of qualification requirements to ensure that court-annexed 
mediators are competent service providers in the courts and that they possess the intellectual 
acumen and strength of character to service the civil justice system. There is no reason why the 
same standards cannot apply to mediators in the small claims courts. Needless to say, mediators 
must be representative of a cross-section of the population so that the presiding officer in a 
particular case can choose the most appropriate mediator to conduct the mediation, having 
regard to the needs of the parties in terms of gender,132 race, ethnicity and language proficiency 
of the mediator.133 One gets the sense that when the Department of Justice enlisted mediators 
in terms of rule 86(2) of the VCAMRs to service the 12 pilot site magistrates’ courts at which 
mediation is offered, it ensured that there was a representative cohort of mediators.134 This is 
important because there is little value if the mediator in a case cannot engage with the parties 
on a personal level by at least speaking the language of the parties.135 It is also beneficial to 
make use of mediators from the community where the court is situated so that there can be 
direct community involvement in dispute resolution.136 
                                                             
132 The gender of the mediator is very important. It is important for women to serve as mediators: Van der Merwe 
with Mbebe (n71) 37-38. 
133 See RMoeketsi ‘Understanding the Other: A Case of Mis-Interpreting Culture-Specific Utterances during 
Alternative Dispute Resolution’ in J Cotterill Language in the Legal Process 231.  
134 See http://www.justice.gov.za/mediation/MediatorsList.pdf for a full list of court-appointed mediators for the 
magistrates’ courts (last accessed 15 August 2017).  
135 Language diversity is important: Van der Merwe with Mbebe (n71) 34. 
136 Ibid 33. 
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(c) Presiding officer cannot mediate a matter  
It seems obvious but necessary to point out that a presiding officer who refers a matter to 
mediation should not conduct the mediation.137 If mediation fails, a matter will be referred back 
to court and presumably (but not necessarily) the presiding officer who made the initial referral 
to mediation may be required to adjudicate the matter. It is thus important to prevent a conflict 
of interest. The SCCA should explicitly state that the presiding officer and the mediator cannot 
be the same person. 
(d) Settlement agreement should be made an order of court 
The VCAMRs, in conformity with many other jurisdictions, allow for a mediation settlement 
agreement to be made an order of court. The same should apply in the small claims courts.138 
To this extent, the SCCA and SCCRs should be amended to make provision for such a 
possibility.139 
10.8 COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES  
A literature review reveals that there are a considerable number of jurisdictions that incorporate 
mediation as part and parcel of their small claims procedures.140 In this section only a few 
jurisdictions will be considered as a matter of general interest. However, s 23 of the 
Saskatchewan Small Claims Act of 1997141 will be specifically focussed on below because this 
                                                             
137 Menkel-Meadow (n45) 43. 
138 For the requirements of a valid settlement agreement see: Payne ‘Enforceability of Mediated Agreements’ 
(1986) 1 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 385-405.  
139 The procedure of the court would have to be fashioned along the lines of HCR 41(4) and 
140 Whelan Small Claims Courts – A Comparative Study.  
141 Chapter S-50.11 of the Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1997. 
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provision could, with a few modifications, be incorporated into the South African SCCA as it 
conforms with the small claims model proposed above.142 
(a)  England and Wales    
In 2005, the Small Claims Mediation Service pilot scheme was initiated at the Manchester 
County Court. The Department of Constitutional Affairs of the United Kingdom commissioned 
the pilot. The pilot scheme proved to be so successful that it was rolled out across the whole of 
England and Wales. Today mediation is offered at every county court.143 
Once a matter is assigned to the small claims track144 of the county court, parties are presented 
with a questionnaire in which they are inter alia asked whether they would like to refer the 
matter to mediation. The parties can choose to have the matter mediated privately or by a court-
appointed mediator. The file is referred to a district judge who considers whether the case is 
suitable for mediation. The determination is made on the papers. Statistics reveal that around 
80% of matters are considered suitable for mediation. 
If one of the parties wants mediation and the other does not, the judge considers arguments for 
not wanting mediation. Depending on the nature of the objection, the judge can either refer the 
matter for an ‘allocation hearing’ or the judge can refer the matter to trial.  At an allocation 
hearing, the judge has discretion to refer the matter to mediation. The court mediation officer 
is tasked with arranging the mediation.145 
According to a 2009 study, customer satisfaction surveys revealed that 95,8% of litigants who 
engaged in mediation felt satisfied with their participation level during mediation. 94,6% of 
litigants were happy with the amount of time allowed for mediation and 98,1% felt pleased with 
                                                             
142 See §10.4 and §10.7. 
143 Civil Court Mediation Service Manual Publication (United Kingdom) 2. See also Doyle ‘Evaluation of the 
Small Claims Mediation Service at the Manchester County Court’ Final Report. The Report was commissioned 
by the Department of Constitutional Affairs, UK: see Report 5. 
144 See §4.7 for a discussion of the ‘track’ system in England and Wales.  
145 Civil Court Mediation Service Manual (UK) 11-18. 
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the level of professionalism displayed by the mediator. Of 3000 users surveyed, 94,5% of 
litigants said that they would use mediation again.146 People commented positively about the 
informality of the mediation process and about how comfortable they felt during the actual 
mediation. Significantly, the settlement rate of disputes referred to mediation was 71%.147 
(b)  Kenya  
Section 18 of the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act148 provides: 
‘(1)  In the exercise of its jurisdiction under this Act, the Court may, with the consent of the parties, 
adopt  and implement any other appropriate means of dispute resolution for the attainment of 
the objective envisaged under section 3 of the Act. 
(2)  The Court may adopt an alternative dispute resolution mechanism and shall make such orders 
or issue  such directions as may be necessary to facilitate such means of dispute resolution. 
(3)  Any agreement reached by means of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism shall be 
recorded as a binding order of the Court.’ 
Even though the Act does not define ‘alternative dispute resolution’, there is little doubt that a 
presiding officer will most certainly be able to refer a matter to mediation. On account of the 
fact that it has only been recently promulgated, the Kenyan Small Claims Court Act has not 
been evaluated. It will thus be interesting to see how the Act will be implemented in the future 
and how exactly mediation will work. 
(c) Uganda 
Uganda was one of the first countries in Africa to introduce mediation in small claims courts 
matters. This is hardly surprising as Uganda is the leading country in Africa for its use of 
alternative dispute resolution in civil justice. According to the Judicature (Mediation Rules) 
2011, a small claims court judge can refer a matter to mediation 14 days before the hearing of 
                                                             
146 Ibid 28. 
147 Ibid 14. 
148 Act 2 of 2016. 
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a case. If the mediation fails, the matter will be heard at trial. Where settlement is reached, the 
signed settlement agreement will be made an order of court.  
The following illustrative diagram149 explains the process: 
 
(d)  Saskatchewan, Canada  
Section 23 of the Saskatchewan Small Claims Act, 1997 provides: 
 ‘23 
(1) This section applies only at the court locations designated in the regulations. 
(2) A judge at a court location mentioned in subsection (1) may, at any time, direct the parties to 
participate in a mediation session. 
(3) In a direction pursuant to subsection (2), the judge shall set out the procedures to be taken to 
discontinue the mediation and have the matter brought before the court if the mediator and the 
parties are unable to resolve the matter. 
(4) Unless all of the parties and the mediator consent in writing, the following types of evidence are 
not admissible in any civil, administrative, regulatory or summary conviction proceeding: 
(a) evidence directly arising from anything said in the course of mediation; 
                                                             
149 The illustrative diagram is from ‘Courts of Judicature: Small Claims Procedure – User’s Guide’ (undated). 
Spelling and other errors are part of the illustrative diagram. 
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(b) evidence of anything said in the course of mediation; 
(c) evidence of an admission or communication made in the course of mediation. 
(5) If any fees or expenses of a mediator are payable, a judge may: 
(a) direct the proportion of the mediator’s fees and expenses that each party is to pay; or 
(b) direct one party to pay all of the mediator’s fees and expenses if the judge is satisfied that 
paying part of those fees and expenses would cause serious financial hardship to the other 
party. 
(6) No action lies or shall be instituted against a mediator for any loss or damage suffered by a 
person by reason of anything in good faith done, caused, permitted or authorized to be done, 
attempted to be done or omitted to be done by the mediator in the carrying out or supposed 
carrying out of: 
(a) any power or duty conferred by this section; or 
(b) any direction made pursuant to this section.’ 
This provision is comprehensive enough to be incorporated into the South African SCCA.  
For the purposes of the South African SCCA, subsection (1) of the Saskatchewan Small Claims 
Act, 1997 could be duplicated if mediation is incrementally rolled out. The Minister of Justice 
would then designate sites on an ongoing basis in regulations. Subsection (2) confirms that 
mediation is at the discretion of the judicial officer. The provision accords with the mediation 
model proposed above.150 Subsection (3) is apposite because the judicial officer will, after 
screening a matter for mediation, make directions for the mediation. Having regard to the facts 
of a case, the judicial officer could use his or her directive powers to stipulate that a mediator 
with special expertise must conduct the mediation, or that mediation must be completed within 
a specified period, failing which the matter must return to court. Directions will expedite 
matters and prevent unnecessary delays in the small claims courts.  The reference to 
‘administrative, regulatory or summary conviction’ in subsection (4) must not be duplicated in 
the South African context. The phrase is inconsistent with the jurisdiction and the processes 
and procedures of the South African small claims courts.  The rest of the subsection is 
satisfactory as it entrenches the confidentiality of the mediation process. The Rules Board 
should provide specimen mediation and settlement agreements in the SCCRs as examples for 
the parties to use. Subsection (5) must not be duplicated, as mediation should be offered on a 
pro bono basis by legal and other professionals. Subsection (6) is an excellent provision. It 
provides a blanket indemnity for the mediator provided that he or she acts in good faith. Where 
                                                             
150 See §10.4 and §10.7. 
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a mediator fails to disclose a conflict of interest, for example, the mediator may be disciplined 
or sued if a party suffers prejudice. A code of conduct for mediators would further amplify their 
ethical and professional responsibilities.  
10.9 CONCLUSION 
During the period August to October 2013, the University of Limpopo, in consultation with the 
Department of Justice, initiated a student-led mediation service in the small claims court of 
Mankweng. Mediation was offered on an informal and voluntary basis. By all accounts,151 the 
pilot project returned positive results with many people successfully mediating their matters.152 
This project illustrates that mediation can work in the small claims courts. It simply needs to be 
formalised and extended to every small claims court in the country. 
Litigation, whether in the small claims courts or in the other courts, is an emotional experience 
for most people. Court procedure and court appearances, no matter how simple lawyers 
perceive them to be, are daunting to the lay public. For the under-educated and unsophisticated, 
the experience is particularly challenging. Mediation offers a different approach to dispute 
resolution. It is consonant with African values and marks a fundamental shift from the inherited 
colonial153 litigation system.  
 
 
                                                             
151 I am thankful to Ms J Wessels, of the Regional Court of Polokwane for her positive feedback with regard to 
the University of Limpopo mediation project. Ms Wessels believes that mediation should be a permanent feature 
in the small claims courts.  
152http://photos.state.gov/libraries/southafrica/56706/pdf-docs/AlumniConnexIssue8-March2014.pdf. (last 
accessed on 14 November 2016). See also §3.8. 
153 See Paleker ‘Civil Procedure in South Africa: the Past, the Present, and the Future’ (2011) ZZPInt 343-468. 
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CHAPTER 11  
CONCLUSION 
Poverty is the most significant challenge facing South Africa. Twenty-four years into 
democracy, the guarantee of the new dawn promised to the nation in 1994 has not reached 
millions. One in four people are jobless, and the gap between the rich and the poor keeps 
growing.  
Civil justice reform is vital. Without access to quality justice, the rule of law might as well be 
written in water. The integrity of the legal system and the dignity of the courts are in peril if 
people feel alienated from the court system. If people feel connected to the justice system, they 
are more likely to value it and to respect the officers of justice.  
To address the legal costs crisis in South Africa, the inefficiencies in the litigation system and 
the day-to-day frustration felt by court-users who experience poor service, proceduralists must 
exert themselves to find creative and innovative solutions. This thesis has shown that while the 
small claims courts are not the panacea for all the challenges facing the civil justice system, 
they can make a valuable contribution from an access to justice perspective if they are ‘re-
imagined’ fundamentally and creatively (see chapter 1).  
This thesis makes many recommendations for reform (see chapters 4 to 10). The main 
suggestions for reform are the following: 
(a) To enhance access to justice, the small claims courts should also operate during business 
hours and not only after hours as is presently the case in the overwhelming majority of 
courts;  
(b) The courts must be staffed by dedicated personnel consisting of trained clerks, legal 
assistants and interpreters. There is no reason why final year law students, members of the 
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legal profession, and other interested people with appropriate training cannot offer 
assistance to litigants; 
(c) Presiding officers should consist of a combination of members of the legal profession, 
academics and retired magistrates who serve the courts on a part-time and on a voluntary 
basis. However, full-time presiding officers should also be appointed to ensure that the 
courts can function during business hours. It is essential that all presiding officers to receive 
adequate training and for them to be multilingual; 
(d) The monetary jurisdiction of the courts must be dramatically increased to cater to the needs 
of poor and middle-income litigants who cannot afford to litigate in the magistrates’ courts 
because of high legal costs; 
(e) The rules of jurisdiction must be relaxed to make it easier for people to access the courts. 
The principles of territorial jurisdiction should be flexible enough to allow litigants to 
approach a particular court on the basis of convenience; 
(f) Given the number of small claims courts in South Africa, consideration should be given to 
the possibility of juristic persons and trusts being able to sue in the small claims courts. This 
would assist small businesses to litigate inexpensively and will reduce litigation costs for 
litigants generally. If it is feared that business entities will swamp the courts, limitations 
should be imposed on corporate parties such as for example, limiting the number of times 
that a business can sue in the small claims court in a given year. 
(g) As a general rule, the State should not sue and be sued in the small claims court. However, 
it should be possible for local government to be sued in the small claims courts. This might 
improve service delivery at local government level and instil public confidence in the justice 
system and the rule of law;  
(h) The small claims courts should be able to enforce their judgments without having to transfer 
a matter to the magistrates’ courts. The SCCA and the SCCRs should be amended to make 
provision for this; 
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(i) A small claims track should be introduced in the magistrates’ courts to enable a magistrate 
to refer a matter to the small claims court where the claim is not complex and falls within 
the jurisdiction of the small claims court. This will prevent wealthy plaintiffs from forcing 
poorer defendants to defend matters in the magistrates’ courts. To this extent, the MCA 
should be amended; 
(j) Alternative dispute resolution in the form of mediation should be introduced in the small 
claims courts; 
(k) The legislation governing the small claims courts should be overhauled to improve the 
processes and procedures of the courts; 
(l) Technology must be used to make it easier for litigants to file claims in the small claims 
courts and to serve processes; 
(m) Court documents must be user-friendly and not formalistic.  
Ultimately, the hope is that the re-engineering of small claims courts might set into motion the 
overhaul of the entire civil justice system so that it satisfies the aspirations and needs of the 
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   REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA  
Issued by ..................................................................................................................... Case No. .................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................... Date ..........................................................         
Clerk of the Small Claims Court 
No. 1 SUMMONS COMMENCING ACTION 
 





            …………………………………………………………….  
             Signature of Plaintiff  
In the Small Claims Court for the District of ………………………………………………………………………................................................. 
held at ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Between ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. Plaintiff  
and ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. Defendant  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… (gender and if female also marital state)  
 
TO    ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
         ………………………………………………………………….............................................. 
         ………………………………………………………………….............................................. 
         ………………………………………………………………….............................................. 
         ………………………………………………………………….............................................. 
1. You are hereby summoned to appear personally before this court on the ………………………………………………………………………. 
day of ………………………………………………….. year …………………….. at ……………………. h ………………………….. to admit or deny your liability  
for the undermentioned claim.  
 
2. If you deny liability, you may at any time before the trial deliver to the clerk of the court at ………………………………………….. 
The summons 
should be called the 
‘statement of claim’. 
 
This section gives no indication to supply 
telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, or an 
email address. All of these are useful to expedite 
communications  Furthermore, there is no 
indication that the plaintiff can choose a form of 
service other than physical service for other 
documents that may have to be served such as 
the statement of defence. 
 
This is unconstitutional. See the discussion 
in Chapter 8 §8.4c. 
 
This section gives no indication to supply telephone 
numbers, facsimile numbers, or an email address. If 
the plaintiff has this information, the plaintiff should 
supply it. The additional information can be useful to 
the clerk of the court or to the court itself. 
APPENDIX 2: SUMMONS COMMENCING ACTION  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… address at a written statement 
setting out the nature of your defence and the particulars upon which it is based and a copy of the statement must then be 
delivered to the plaintiff.  
J141E 
 
3. Particulars of claim:  
Plaintiff’s claim is for-  










Date         Period            Amount R  . 
…………………………………………………….. …….      ……………………………………………………………      ………………………………………………………….. . 
…………………………………………………….. …….      ……………………………………………………………      ………………………………………………………….. . 
…………………………………………………….. …….      ……………………………………………………………      ………………………………………………………….. . 
 and  




(c)  Notice of *abandonment of part of claim / deduction the admitted debt.  
Take notice that the plaintiff hereby *abandons the undermentioned part of the claim/deducts the admitted debt set 





Dated at ……………………………………………………………………… this ……………………………. day of ………………….……….. year …………………………. 
          ………………………………………………………. 
          Plaintiff  
The defendant should be advised to set out documentary evidence. Ideally a pro forma statement 
of defence should be attached to the summons for the defendant to fill out. 
 
The plaintiff should be encouraged to narrate all the 
facts at his or her disposal relating to the claim. This 
will be of assistance to the court as it prepares for 
trial and determines what further evidence is 
required. The plaintiff should be encouraged to 
attach contracts, invoices and so on if the plaintiff 
has these in his or her possession. 
It is unclear why arrear rental 
is singled out in the 
summons. Surely, legal 
assistants should explain the 
nature of the claim for arrear 
rental and assist people to fill 
in the statement of claim if 
the claim is based on arrear 
rental. 
This is misleading because in terms 
of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction 
from and Unlawful Occupation of 
Land Act 19 of 1998, a plaintiff would 
not be able to obtain ejectment in the 
small claims court if the property in 
question is used for residential 
purposes. The matter would have to 
be heard by a magistrate’s court. 
A lay-litigant would not understand the purpose of the abandonment or the deduction of the 
admitted debt. Some explanation is required. 
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4. (a) Take notice that if you fail to appear in Court on the trial date after a summons has been served on you,     
judgement may be obtained against you by the plaintiff unless you have previously admitted liability to the plaintiff.  
(b) Money payable in terms of a judgment or order of court shall be paid directly to the judgement creditor.  
(c) If you admit the claim and wish to consent to judgment1 or wish to undertake to pay the claim in instalments or 
otherwise you may approach the plaintiff. 
5. Take notice that you and all other persons are hereby interdicted from removing or causing or suffering to be removed any of 
the furniture or effects in or on the premises described in the particulars of claim endorsed hereon which, are subject to the 
plaintiff’s hypothec for rent until an order relative thereto shall have been made by the court.2  
6. Notice.  
If any person against whom a judgment for the payment of money 3has been given or an order for the payment of money in 
instalments has been made fails to satisfy the judgment or order –  
(a) such judgment or order may be enforced against movables and, if the movables are found to be insufficient then 
against the immovables of the party against whom the judgment or order has been issued;  
(b) execution may be taken against the whole judgment debt and costs which have not yet been paid in default of an 
instalment being paid;  
(c) such a person is liable to notify the judgment creditor fully and correctly, within 14 days after he has changed his place 
of residence, business or employment of his new place of residence, business or employment;  
(d) and if he has let it be known that he is not in a position to comply with the judgment, the court may in chambers 
institute an investigation into the judgment debtor's financial position and his ability to pay the judgment debt and 
costs.  
 
7. The Messenger's 4fees are ............................................ R .....................  
8. Consent to judgment:  
I admit that I am liable to the plaintiff as alleged in this summons (or to the amount of R ..................................... and costs to 
date) and I accordingly consent to judgment.  
Dated at ........................................................................... ....... this …………… day of ............... .................. year …........  
...............................................................        …………………………………………..  
                              Date          Defendant   
                                                             
1 Defendants should not be allowed to consent to judgments. They should be allowed to agree with the plaintiff to pay off the 
debt in instalments. Judgments should only be granted by a court at trial. This prevents the situation where undue influence is 
exerted on defendants by bolshie plaintiffs. This is especially relevant if the small claims court in the future allows commercial 
parties to bring claims. See Chapter 8 §8.5. 
2 This provision creates an automatic rent interdict and activates the landlord’s tacit hypothec. However, in the greater scheme 
of things, the interdict is toothless because the SCCA does not have a provision that is equivalent to s 32 of the MCA.  See 
Chapter 9 §9.9. 
3 It may be better for this wording to be directed at the defendant to improve readability (i.e. ‘if you fail to satisfy the 
judgment…’).  
4 The reference to ‘messenger’ should read ‘sheriff’.  See Sheriffs Act 90 of 1986. 
Because small claims litigants are unrepresented, a judgment should be granted at trial after 
the presiding officer has listened to both parties and studied the evidence. Judgments based 
on mere consent can lead to fraud and undue influence being exerted on the unwitting 
defendant. If the defendant does not appear at the trial, the court can, in any event, grant 
default judgment after the plaintiff has satisfied the court that he or she is entitled to 
judgment. 
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   REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA  
Issued by         Case No.      
Date         
      
Clerk of the Small Claims Court 
       Telephone number: 
           Email address:  
FORM 1   
SMALL CLAIMS COURT  
STATEMENT OF CLAIM  
In the Small Claims Court for the District of          
held at               
 
INSTRUCTIONS: THE PLAINTIFF MUST COMPLETE PARTS A, B, C AND D BELOW. 
PART A 
DETAILS OF THE PLAINTIFF 
Full name and surname:             
Sex and occupation:              
Residential/business/employment address:          
              
              
               
Postal address:             
              
              
               
Telephone number (if any):       
Fax number (if any):        
Email address (if any):        
If you are prepared to accept further correspondence by fax, email, or any other means (for 
example, WhatsApp), please provide the relevant numbers, addresses etc. 
               
 
 
PART B  
There must be some 
mechanism for the parties to 







This allows the plaintiff to indicate alternative forms of service other than 
physical service. This accords with the HCRs and the MCRs.The reference to 
social media platforms has been added as people frequently use these 
platforms. See also Form 125 ‘Notice of Application for a Small Claim’ compiled 
in terms of Order 26, Rule 5 of the Northern Ireland Small Claims Court Rules.  
 
APPENDIX 3: PROPOSED STATEMENT OF CLAIM 
 2 
DETAILS OF THE DEFENDANT 
Full name and surname:            
Sex and occupation (where known):           
    
Residential/business/employment address:          
              
              
            
Telephone number (if any):       
Fax number (if any):         
Email address (if any):        
PART C  
PLAINTIFF’S FACTS 
(Kindly state the facts relating to the claim in your own words, and if you have any evidence relating to the 
claim, such as contracts, invoices etc, attach those to the statement of claim) 
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
               
If you cannot fit all the facts here, or you want to type the statement of claim, you can attach pages but 
make sure that: you sign every page; the clerk of the court initials every page; and you staple the pages to 
this form) 
This encourages people to complete the summons themselves 
and mandates the use of everyday language. 




THE PLAINTIFF’S RELIEF/REMEDIES 
(In this section, you must state what you want the court to grant: for example, a money amount plus interest 
or ejectment from commercial premises) 
              
              
              
              
              
               
PLEASE NOTE: The maximum amount you can claim from the court is R15 000 plus interest. You cannot 
claim more. If your claim is more than R15 000, you can abandon a portion of the claim or you can admit 
that you owe the defendant another debt, so that the abandoned amount or the other debt can be deducted 
from your claim to bring the claim within R15 000. If this is what you want to do, please give the court 
details: 
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
               
NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT  
1.  You1 must appear personally before this court on the    day of     
    at     to admit or deny your liability in respect of the plaintiff’s claim. (Note: if 
you cannot come to the court on this date, you must immediately inform the clerk of the court who 
will give you another suitable date).2 
 
2. If you deny liability, you may at any time before the trial file with the clerk of the court a written 
statement in your own words setting out the nature of your defence. A copy of the written statement 
must be filed3 with the clerk of the court and must be sent4 by registered mail to the plaintiff’s 
                                                             
1 The instructions are directed at the defendant to improve readability. 
2 It is important to tell the defendant what to do if he or she cannot attend court. The clerk will inform the plaintiff of the 
new date. 
3 Currently, ‘filing’ entails physical delivery to the clerk of the court. It could be argued that parties should be able to file 
documents at court by email or through an online electronic platform. Unless these facilities are available, filing would 
unfortunately have to take place by physical delivery. 
Again, the instruction encourages the use of everyday 
language. The court can decide at trial whether the plaintiff is 
entitled to the relief that he or she seeks. 
This explanation contextualises the nature of an abandonment 
or a deduction of an admitted debt in order to bring a claim 
within the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims court.  
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 4 
postal address mentioned in Part A. If the plaintiff has indicated in Part A that he or she is willing to 
accept service at an email address, fax address or by other means, you can use that method to 
serve your statement of defence on the plaintiff. You can collect a specimen statement of defence 
from the clerk of the court. You can also download the statement of defence from the following 
website:……5 
 
3. If you do not want to deliver the statement of defence in (2) above, you must still come to court on 
the date mentioned above. The court will listen to your defence orally. If you have a claim against 
the plaintiff, you must bring your documents to prove your claim. 
4.  If you fail to appear at court on the trial date, judgment can be taken against you. This will entitle the 
plaintiff to demand payment from you and you will be required to pay the plaintiff directly or through 
the office of the sheriff of the district.6 
5.  Before the trial date, you can contact the plaintiff to arrange payment in instalments. If you reach 
agreement, make sure that the agreement is in writing. If you reach agreement, you do not have to 
come to court on the trial date. The court will make the agreement an order of court. 
6. If the court grants judgment against you at the trial and you cannot pay the judgment plus interest, 
the court may: 
(a)  in chambers institute an investigation into your financial position and your ability to pay the 
judgment debt and costs;7  
 (b)  grant a warrant for the execution of movable assets;8 or 
(c) transfer the judgment to the magistrate’s court for further proceedings which may include an 
emoluments attachment order or a garnishee order.9  
 
7.  The sheriff’s fee payable by you is R .....................  
Dated at     on this   day of      .  
 
     








                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 The defendant does not have to show that the statement of defence was ‘delivered’. The defendant merely has to 
prove that it was dispatched by registered post by giving the court, in the event of a dispute, the postal slip for 
registered post. See Chapter 9 §9.4 footnote 46. 
5 The statement of defence could be attached to the summons. However, if this proves too cumbersome, these 
alternative ways of obtaining the statement of defence should be mentioned. 
6 See the recommendations in Chapter 9 §9.21. 
7 See the recommendations in Chapter 9 §9.22. 
8 See the recommendations in Chapter 9 §9.24. 
9 See the recommendations in Chapter 9 §9.25. 






THE CLERK’S CHECKLIST BEFORE ISSUING THE STATEMENT OF CLAIM: 
 THE CLERK MUST ENSURE THAT THIS CHECKLIST IS PLACED IN THE COURT FILE 
 
 
(a) Has the plaintiff sent the defendant a letter of demand and have the 14 days elapsed since the letter 
was sent?             
 
(b) Has the plaintiff filled in all the sections of the statement of claim as required?  
 
(c) Has the plaintiff explained the facts of the case in the statement of claim?   
 
(d) If the plaintiff has documentary evidence, has the evidence been attached?   
 
(e) Has the plaintiff received the assistance of the clerk of the court or a legal assistant to fill in the 
statement of claim?     YES   NO  
 
               
NAME OF CLERK IN BLOCK LETTERS  SIGNATURE    DATE 
The checklist ensures service delivery in the 
small claims court and ensures that the matter 
is procedurally ready to come before the court. 
 
The clerk should only establish if the letter was sent (i.e. 
dispatched) and not whether it was delivered. See §8.5. 
Names and signatures ensure that the responsible clerk can 
be held accountable for poor work performance. 
 





REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA  
  
FORM 2  
SMALL CLAIMS COURT  
STATEMENT OF DEFENCE 
In the Small Claims Court for the District of          
held at               
 
          CASE NUMBER: 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: THE DEFENDANT MUST COMPLETE PARTS A, B, C AND D BELOW. 
PART A 
DETAILS OF THE DEFENDANT 
Full name and surname:            
Sex and occupation:             
  
Residential/business/employment address:          
              
              
               
Postal address:             
              
              
              
Telephone number (if any):       
Fax number (if any):        
Email address (if any):       
If you are prepared to accept further correspondence by fax, email, or any other means (for 
example, WhatsApp), please provide the relevant numbers, addresses etc. 
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PART B  
DETAILS OF THE PLAINTIFF 
Full name and surname1:            
PART C  
DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFENCE 
(a) State whether you agree or disagree with the plaintiff’s statement of claim. 
(b) If you deny the claim, explain your version. If you have documentary evidence (such as invoices,   
contracts etc) to prove your version, and this evidence has not been attached to the plaintiff’s statement of 
claim, then attach it to this statement of defence. 
(c) If you feel that the matter can be settled, state your proposal for settlement. 
     
    
    
    
    
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
               
If you cannot fit all the facts here, or you want to type the statement of defence, you can attach pages but 
make sure that: you sign every page; the clerk of the court initials every page; and you staple the pages to 
this form) 
 
Signed at    on this   day of     . 
																																																													
1 This is for administration purposes. The plaintiff’s full details will be stated in the statement of claim.   
Gives the defendant directions about what to statement must 
contain. It is especially useful to request further documentation
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SIGNATURE OF THE DEFENDANT  
 
PLEASE NOTE: THIS STATEMENT OF DEFENCE MUST BE SERVED ON THE PLAINTIFF 
PERSONALLY OR WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE SHERIFF OF THE COURT IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE SERVICE METHOD CHOSEN BY THE PLAINTIFF IN THE STATEMENT OF CLAIM. THE 
STATEMENT OF DEFENCE MUST ALSO BE FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE SMALL 




2 Ideally, the defendant should be able to file the statement of defence with the court via email or through some other 
online platform.  However, until such time such facilities become available, physical filing will still be necessary. This is 
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